REALITY- AND PLOT-DRIVEN ANALYSES
787
plot-driven preferences for particular outcomes wield an readers did not remove themselves from the narrative
influenceon narrativeexperiences:Again, bothovert judg- worlds of our experimental stories to encode and apply
ments and reading times reflected a shift such that readers generic expectations about “good guys” versus “bad
showed a propensityto accept that their preferred outcome guys.” In parallel to earlier research, we suggest that read-
might have happened despite reality-driven constraints. ers’ hopes and preferences heighten feelings of suspense
We take the overallpattern of data to supportour view that and the urgency of the outcomes (Gerrig, 1993).
readers’ narrative experiences are affected by the impera-
tives of both reality and plot.
When we defined plot-driven analyses in the introduc-
tion, we suggested that readers are likely to undertake
Our experimentstook as their starting point theories of these types of analyses quite regularly, but that different
situation models, such as the event-indexing model, that instances of plot-driven analyses will require different
make concrete predictions about the dimensions readers mental processes and representations. We conclude by
regularly encode during narrative experiences (Zwaan, briefly returning to that observation.For our experiments,
Langston, & Graesser, 1995; Zwaan, Magliano, & Graes- we have suggested that readers’ preferences prompted
ser, 1995). In that context, we believe that our first pair of them to act toward identicaltexts (i.e., the parts of the texts
experiments further contributes to the literature that sug- subsequent to the preference material) in quite different
gests that readers are attentive to temporal relationships ways. However, we categorized our preferences as only
positive negative
or . Suppose we varied the intensity of
when they create representations of texts. The question,
then, becomes how exactly the preferences our stories in- preferences within categories. We would be likely to find
stantiated (in Experiment 2) brought about the shifts in that readers would expend more effort (or different types
readers’ judgmentsand reading times. In the introduction, of effort) when the preferences were particularly strong.
we suggested that preferences might have an impact on We would imagine, for example, that readers would be
the way in which readers construct their mental simula- particularly intent on their plot-driven analyses in life-or-
Thunderball
tions: Readers could imagine fitting less or more activity death circumstances, such as James Bond’s
into an interval of time, depending on their plot-driven dilemma. We use this example to reinforce our suggestion
predilections. A related alternative would be that, in the that plot-drivenanalyseswill give rise to diverse processes
face of preferences, readers work less diligently to simu- and representations. An understanding of this diversity
late counterevidence. Consider, for example, circum- must be a precursor to a completecognitivepsychological
stances in which McGwire leaves the stadium after a account of readers’ experiences of narratives.
minute. Suppose the narration asserts “Billy got Mark
McGwire’s autograph.” In the absence of a preference, we
would expect readers to be skeptical (as they were in Ex-
periment 1) because they cannot easily imagine how, in a
minute’s time, that could be the case. In the presence of a
preference, we are suggesting either that readers might
simulatea scene in which Billy stands out and/or that they
might not work as hard to simulate the scene at all. When
they get the outcome they desire, readers might disengage
the ordinary impulse to construct or evaluate the coher-
ence of a text along a particular dimension (in this case,
the temporal dimension).
We have suggested that our plot-driven results arise
from readers’ hopes and preferences. An alternative pos-
sibility is that the preferences were creating “good guys”
and “bad guys” and that the readers were engaginggeneric
expectations for who should win or lose. Recall, for ex-
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