ECONOMICS OF EROSION AND SUSTAINABLE PRACTICES
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doubled and increased by a factor of 2.5, the OFV dropped by $193/ha and $270/ha, respec-
tively. These reductions in the OFV are 485% and 718% (2.5 times base case). The behavior
for Farm B is similar; however, the reductions are much greater (note difference in y-axis
scale in Figure 6). In percentage terms, Farm C (Figure 7) suffers the greatest percentage
reductions in the OFV/ha, particularly at the higher end of the erosion limit scale (least
restrictive). At lower erosion limits, the reductions in OFV/ha of Farm C were closer to those
of Farm B and the watershed model.
Equity Issues and Policy Implications
Table 2 provides the estimated costs of reducing soil erosion for each farm and for the water-
shed. Thus, if an erosion reduction policy were implemented in the Saint-Esprit watershed
and the erosion target value set at 2,750 kg/ha for each farm, it would cost Farms A, B and C
$18/ha, $167/ha and $50/ha, respectively. If an erosion reduction policy were implemented at
the Saint-Esprit watershed level and the erosion target value set at 2,750 kg/ha for the whole
watershed, it would cost: $33/ha, $6/ha and $50/ha respectively for Farms A, B and C.
For Farm A, the estimated cost of reducing soil erosion with the target set for the water-
shed is always greater than or equal to that set at the farm level. For Farm B, watershed costs
are greater than individual farm costs at 4,272 kg/ha. However, after this, the estimated cost
of reducing soil erosion with the erosion target value set at the farm level is always greater
than or equal to that set at the watershed level. For Farm C, except for a soil erosion value of
2,250 kg/ha, the estimated cost of reducing soil erosion with the erosion target value set at the
farm level is always greater than or equal to that set at the watershed level.
The two right-most columns in Table 2 estimate the opportunity cost per hectare at the
watershed level and a weighted average of the opportunity cost for the three individual farms.
The estimates show that the opportunity cost is lower when the required erosion target is set
at the watershed level. This can be explained by the fact that when an erosion target is set at
the watershed level, the model has more room to maneuver to allocate crops to fields; that is,
it does so in a more efficient (less costly) manner.
Policy makers could implement a standard for erosion or subsidize producers to decrease
erosion. Applied to the watershed, the Quebec Ministry of the Environment could fix a stan-
dard corresponding to a certain level of erosion or soil loss per hectare (e.g., 2,750 kg/ha) for
each farm or for the watershed. Farmers or the watershed as a whole polluting beyond this
standard would be charged a penalty (e.g., lump-sum fine or fines per unit of erosion beyond
that permitted under the standard). On the other hand, once the baseline level of effluents is
established (e.g., 4,751 kg/ha), the Ministry could subsidize each farmer or the watershed as
a whole for reductions in soil loss. This could, however, attract more producers into the water-
shed and increase the total amount of pollution generated (Baumol and Oates1988).
Sergenson (1998) and Bystrom and Bromley (1998) have proposed new policy designs
for nonpoint pollution control for agriculture. Both of these designs attempted to minimize
the transaction costs associated with the pollution control policy. Sergenson (1998) integrat-
ed both voluntary and mandatory aspects into her design. The voluntary aspect is a subsidy
with mandatory controls if specific quality goals are not met. The Bystrom and Bromley
(1998) policy was based on a watershed scale and included a trading scheme that allowed pro-
ducers to trade abatement effort between one another with collective penalties if target levels
were violated.