Full text of DOI:10.1093/pa/53.3.457

Germany: Extremism without Successful Parties
BY UWE BACKES AND CAS MUDDE
The so-called ‘third wave’ of right-wing extremism,1 which has washed
the shores of Western Europe since the mid-1980s, has largely passed
by both West and later unified Germany. With the notable exception of
the 1989 European elections and some regional elections, extreme right
parties in Germany have never been able to make substantial inroads
into the party system. In fact, they belong to the least successful extreme
right parties in Western Europe. This notwithstanding, Germany
remains linked to the phenomenon of the extreme right, not just because
of its tainted history but also because of contemporary events. In sharp
contrast to the weak parties, the extreme right subculture is well
developed, particularly in the former East Germany.
In this article we provide a short historical survey since the war,
focusing on the relevant political parties and their environment. We
describe the two parties that have come to dominate extreme right
politics since the 1980s, the Republicans (REP) and the German Peo-
ple’s Union (DVU). We assess whether 1998 has brought a ‘Second
Coming’ of the extreme right parties. We look at the broader extreme
right subculture, ranging from rigidly ideological and highly organised
neo-nazi groups to the rather disparate skinheads. In conclusion, we
consider why the extreme right in Germany is successful only outside of
the party-political realm and whether this is likely to remain the picture
in the near future.
The postwar extreme right 1945–80
After the second world war, Germany was briefly divided into four
sectors of Allied occupation. Most right-wing extremists were interned
or in hiding. Mobilisation was further obstructed by the denazification
policy, which included a provision requiring the approval of all parties
by the Allied forces. Moreover, as the over three million surviving
internees were reintegrated into German society, most chose to stay out
of politics or to join a democratic party. The same held for the over ten
million expellees, who had come to the Federal Republic from the
former ‘eastern territories’ (most notably in Czechoslovakia, Poland
and Russia). In the 1950s they had their own party political basis in the
form of the Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (Block of
Expellees and Dispossessed, BHE), which entered into electoral lists
with extreme right organisations at the regional and local levels. The
successful social integration of the expellees and refugees led to the
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Parliamentary Affairs
gradual disappearance of its electoral basis in the late-1950s. Its politi-
cal potential was mainly absorbed by the liberal Freie Demokratische
Partei (Free Democratic Party, FDP) and, more importantly, by the
large Christian-conservative ‘catch-all party’ CDU/CSU.
With the end of Allied party licensing and the increasing polarisation
of the East-West relations, some space was created for the extreme
right. However, overall, the environment remained largely hostile dur-
ing the whole postwar period. The few parties that did organise and
contested elections hardly grew beyond regional significance. Moreover,
when the reasonably successful Sozialistische Reichspartei (Socialist
Reich Party, SRP) was banned by the Constitutional Court on the
grounds of its neo-nazi character in 1952, the extreme right was
reminded of the narrow margins of its toleration.
The first successful extreme right mobilisation came with the foun-
dation of the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National
Democratic Party of Germany, NPD) in 1964. In the late-1960s it was
represented in seven of the ten state parliaments and was widely
expected to make it into the Bundestag. At its highpoint, the party
counted some 28,000 members, which added up to almost three-
quarters of the ‘organised’ German right-wing extremists. The only
remaining competitor was the wealthy publisher Gerhard Frey, owner
and editor of various nationalist weeklies with a combined readership
of over 200,000. Despite similarities in goals, he did not support the
NPD but called upon his readership to vote for the CDU/CSU.
The NPD’s failure to overcome the 5% hurdle in the 1969 national
elections, gaining ‘only’ 4.3% of the vote, was the beginning of the end.
As a consequence of infighting and scandals, as well as links between
the party’s youth movement and violent groups, the NPD lost all its
seats in the state parliaments by 1971. By the end of that decade, it had
become a ‘less-than-one-percent-party’ with huge financial debts and a
marginal membership of some 6,000. Though in the 1980s it tried to
revitalise itself by adopting the immigration issue, its days were num-
bered: the future belonged to other extreme right parties.
The ‘third wave’ 1980–
Rather than from the ruins of the NPD, the most successful postwar
extreme right party to date originated outside the extreme right subcul-
ture.2 Die Republikaner (The Republicans, REP) were founded in
November 1983 by two MPs of the Bavarian CSU, Franz Handlos and
Ekkehard Voigt, and a popular Bavarian television presenter, Franz
Scho¨nhuber. The immediate cause was the support by CSU-leader
Franz-Josef Strauß for a large credit to the German Democratic Repub-
lic, though this was in fact the last drop in mounting dissatisfaction
within CSU-circles. The original goal of the new party was to become a
sort of national CSU, a right-wing conservative party contesting elec-
tions throughout the Federal Republic and not just in Bavaria. Its first

Extreme Right in Germany
459
electoral programme was a replica of its mother party’s, moderate in
tone and policies and with a particular stress on Bavarian issues such as
agriculture. The only point in which the two programmes differed was
the importance of Christian values, stressed by the CSU and largely
ignored by the Republikaner. Most media, most notably in the south,
treated it accordingly, referring to it as a ‘right-wing breakaway’.
After a fierce power struggle, Scho¨nhuber got the upper hand in the
Republikaner Party. Elected chairman in 1985, Handlos and Voigt
decided to leave. The conflict had been both personal and political.
Inspired by the electoral successes of the Front National in France,
Scho¨nhuber wanted to make it a modern right-wing populist party. In
this, he was supported by his vice-chairman, Harald Neubauer, a former
NPD-member and Frey journalist. However, the new strategy, as well
as the past of the two leaders (Scho¨nhuber had served in the Waffen-
SS), strengthened media accusations that the party had drifted into
extreme right waters. In fact, under Scho¨nhuber the party did change
its original national-conservative party ideology into a modern extreme
right one.3 Building upon a core ideology of nationalism, xenophobia,
welfare chauvinism and law and order, it targeted particular issues like
German unification, ‘Vergangenheitsbewa¨ltigung’ (the way in which the
German state deals with the nazi past), immigration and crime. Though
always cautious in its use of language, it increasingly wrapped its
propaganda in populist anti-party sentiments, accusing the established
parties of betraying the German people and perverting the democratic
system.
The Republikaner’s first electoral test was the Bavarian state elections
of 1986. Though its 3.1% kept it well under the 5% hurdle, it did bring
generous state funding and national media coverage. This led to a
doubling of its membership within two years, bringing the number to
8,000 at the end of 1988, despite a string of less successful state
elections. In 1989, it had its best result to date, with 7.1% in the
European elections. As a consequence, it entered the European Parlia-
ment with six members, led by Scho¨nhuber, who together with the
French National Front and the Belgian Flemish Block, formed the
Technical Group of the European Right.
The party also had an increase in membership, from 8,500 in January
to 25,000 in December 1989. Moreover, its unexpected breakthrough
led to a REP-mania in German public opinion, with hundreds of
editorials, articles and books being written about the party. Some
commentators even predicted that it would become the fifth party in
the German political system, while within CDU/CSU circles voices
emerged favouring a coalition with it. At the same time, the ongoing
debate about the extremist character of the party was fuelled even
further, and the comparison between the Bonn Republic of the 1990s
and the Weimar Republic of the 1930s became a serious topic of
discussion.

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As quickly as its successes had come, its defeats followed. In the 14
elections the Republikaner contested in the following two years, it never
passed the 5% hurdle. Partly as a consequence of German unification,
which robbed it of a popular topic, partly because of increased infight-
ing, the REP fell back into a marginal position, gaining in between 1%
and 2% of the vote in the various elections. Scho¨nhuber was ousted as
party chairman, after a challenge by a group around Neubauer, only to
return with a vengeance, expelling the Neubauer group and declaring
the party cleansed from all ‘extremists’. Party membership fell back to
under 17,000 at the end of 1991.
Since then, the party has never been able to make a real comeback.
Though it had some regional successes, notably in the southern state of
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (10.9% in 1992 and 9.1% in 1996), it has become
more or less a marginal phenomenon within German politics. This was
demonstrated in the 1994 ‘super election year’, when it contested the
parliamentary, European and eight state elections without once over-
coming the 5% hurdle. Moreover, in December 1992 the Minister of
the Interior placed the party under surveillance by the Federal Office
for the Protection of the Constitution, a decision confirming its extrem-
ist character in law.
Electoral fiascos and state monitoring have led to mounting internal
disputes, which were one of the reasons for Scho¨nhuber’s rapproche-
ment with his old enemy Frey. When the two issued a joint communique´
in 1994, the party leadership reacted swiftly and decisively. Distancing
itself from any cooperation with ‘right-wing extremists’ (meaning Frey
and his party, see below), they dismissed Scho¨nhuber as leader. This
time he was unable to make a comeback and, after a short period of
internal opposition, left the party. The new leader of the party was
former vice-chairman, Rolf Schlierer, the uncharismatic but well-edu-
cated Stuttgart lawyer, who had been so successful in the Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg state elections. Under him, the party has tried to steer
away from open extremism, both in ideology and in alliances, but has
been unable to make an electoral impact. Consequently, it has been
riddled with internal dispute and a continuing decrease of its member-
ship, which numbered some 15,000 at the end of 1999.
Under Schlierer, it has also lost its position as the strongest electoral
formation to the right of the CDU. This position has been taken over
by the Deutsche Volksunion (German People’s Union, DVU) of Gerhard
Frey. After a short flirtation with the NPD in the mid-1970s, he had
stayed away from party politics for almost ten years, devoting himself
to the expansion of his publishing business. At the end of 1986,
however, he decided to found his own political party which, after a few
different names, became DVU-List D (the D standing for Deutschland)
in April 1987. In his own publications, Frey explained his entrance into
party politics as a reaction to the failure to deliver the promised ‘Wende’
(change of direction) by the Christian Democrat-Liberal government

Extreme Right in Germany
461
and its weaknesses in such matters as ‘Deutschlandpolitik’ (the politics
of the Federal Republic towards the German Democratic Republic),
internal security and immigration.
From the outset, the Volksunion was an odd party. It never produced
its own party paper, relying on Frey’s, and even its programme was a
selection of points taken from ‘action groups’ within a wider umbrella
organisation. Membership was extremely small, while cadre was non-
existent. The first was countered by a trick of counting all members of
the umbrella organisation as party members. This turned it from one of
the smallest into the biggest extreme right party in Germany, with some
25,000 members in 1989. However, this left the unusual situation of a
lot of money but no cadre. The problem was overcome by an alliance
with the former archenemy, the NPD, which had the more common
problem of enough cadres but no money.
Between 1987 and 1990 both parties profited from their partnership.
In the first elections it contested, in the city state of Bremen, in 1987,
the Volksunion got 3.4%. However, because of a special provision, the
5.4% in the constituency of Bremerhaven brought the party two seats.
Its success had been preceded by a massive electoral campaign, in which
Frey was said to have spent two million DM, more than the Social
Democrats and the Christian Democrats together, while receiving only
65,000 DM back from the state through the party subsidy system.
However, it was also a dress rehearsal for the European elections of
1989.
Its election campaign for the 1989 European elections was one of the
most expensive in German history. Frey paid no less than 17 million
DM, mostly his own money, primarily for three national door-to-door
deliveries of pamphlets with a total circulation of 70 million. This
notwithstanding, the party was completely overshadowed by the
Republikaner and got a mere 1.6%. This fiasco led Frey to end his
alliance with the NPD prematurely, thereby reinstating the old enmity.
It did not negatively affect Volksunion membership however, which
increased by almost 50% that year. In 1991 it returned from the
political dead, being elected into the state parliaments of Bremen and
Schleswig-Holstein, with over 6% in both and becoming the third
largest party in Bremen.
Surprisingly, the party did not contest any elections in the ‘super
election year’ 1994. The main explanation was its poor financial
situation, said to involve a debt of 9 million DM, covered by the
personal capital of the Frey family. With no money for its expensive
campaigns, and no activists for an alternative labour-intensive cam-
paign, it retained a shadow existence. It has never been able, and was
probably never really willing, to build a functioning party organisation.
As a consequence, it lacked qualified candidates in elections, which
again caused a consistent pattern of splits between and defections by its
parliamentary representatives.

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The Volksunion also has a strange political repertoire.4 Its pro-
gramme is probably the shortest of all German parties and has not been
seriously changed since its foundation—despite historical events such
as German unification, the fall of communism and the signing of the
Maastricht Treaty. It lacks a statement of principles, thematic brochures
and a paper of its own. In so far as the party has an ideology, it can be
found in Frey’s extreme right weeklies, the Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung
and the Deutsche National-Zeitung, which were merged in 1999.
However, they are based upon tabloid journalism, providing short and
shallow stories under shouting headlines. Moreover, they hardly address
contemporary issues, rather focusing on German’s history. Most of the
articles deal directly or indirectly with the war and the issue of German
responsibility, downplay or reject German atrocities while stressing
those of the Allied forces. They are also drenched with more or less
openly antisemitic articles, ranging from short stories about corrupt
Jewish businessmen to allegations that Jews started the second world
war or that Israel uses the Holocaust to extort money from Germany.
Finally, they highlight the virtues of German soldiers and the beauty of
the ‘real’ East Germany, i.e. the ‘lost territories’. As far as contemporary
issues are taken up at all, they mainly concern threats to the German
nation (immigration, crime, European integration) and German suc-
cesses, such as the double victory at Wimbledon in 1992. At the core of
these articles lays a mix of nationalism, patriotism, xenophobia, law
and order, and antisemitism. Even more than is the case of the Repub-
likaner, the Volksunion literature is dominated by conspiracy theories.
Strangely, this was not combined with any strong anti-party rhetoric.
For a long time, Frey remained loyal to his CDU/CSU allegiance. While
vigorously attacking the left-wing parties SPD and Greens, as well as
suspected left-wingers among the Liberals and Christian Democrats, his
papers wrote positively about right-wing Christian Democrats.
1998: a second coming?
After having lost its parliamentary factions in Bremen and Schleswig-
Holstein, not the least because of personal infighting and financial
scandals, the Volksunion made a comeback in Saxony-Anhalt in 1998.
The party, which at the time of the elections had hardly more than 30
members in this eastern state, won 12.9% of the votes and 16 seats in
the state parliament. Thereby, it obtained the highest vote percentage in
state and national elections of all extreme right parties in postwar
Germany. It had obviously succeeded in mobilising parts of the popu-
lation that hold extreme right values. This has been estimated at an
average of 13% of the population within Germany as a whole, ranging
from 4% in Saarland to 19% in Brandenburg, the ‘new’ (i.e. eastern)
states scoring high. The electoral result are however only partly
explained by the authoritarian and xenophobic potential because ideo-
logical considerations played a subordinate role for the majority of its

Extreme Right in Germany
463
voters. Economic motives proved decisive. Dissatisfaction with the
economic and social results of unification, and the impotence of all
other parties to solve them, found an outlet in voting for the DVU,
which dismisses the established party system fundamentally. Studies of
Saxony-Anhalt show DVU voters over-represented in the younger and
older age groups, in majority male, workers or apprentices, and secular
without Church affiliation. In their dissatisfaction with the party-
political system and their pessimistic evaluation of the economy, they
resembled the voters for the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) at the
other end of the left-right spectrum.
The electoral victory brought some new members into the party
(from 15,000 at the end of 1997 to 18,000 a year later). Moreover,
well-known activists within the ‘national camp’, among them former
Republikaner leader, Franz Scho¨nhuber, declared their willingness to
support the Volksunion. More surprisingly, the current REP leader,
Rolf Schlierer, gave in to mounting internal pressure and met Frey in
November 1998, agreeing that ‘unnecessary competition’ in future
elections should be prevented. Though Schlierer played down the
importance of the agreement immediately afterwards, the next year the
two parties no longer competed in state elections.
The rise in fortune was again short-lived, however. The 1998 parlia-
mentary elections once more showed the extreme right parties’ irrele-
vance nationally, with the Republikaner getting 1.8% and the
Volksunion a mere 0.6%. Even without competition, the former could
garner only 1.7% of the vote in the 1999 European elections (against
3.9% in 1994). The two parties could not overcome the 5% hurdle
except in two of the following state elections. In the western city state
of Bremen the Volksunion again profited from the special provision in
the electoral law and entered the state parliament on the basis of its 6%
in the Bremerhaven constituency (against just 3% state-wide). More
important, it got 5.3% and five seats in the eastern state of Mecklen-
burg-Vorpommern. The profile of its electorate there was very similar
to that in Saxony-Anhalt, though this time the number of young voters
clearly outnumbered the elderly.
Despite these incidental electoral successes, the party remains a ghost
party, which has to compensate for its lack of activists by very expensive
electoral campaigns. However, increasing financial problems, an esti-
mated debt of some 15 million DM at the end of 1999, have forced it
to choose carefully which elections to contest, with internal frustrations
as a result. Moreover, the lack of cadre renders the electoral victories
practically meaningless because the parliamentary parties always fall
apart within a year, leaving it virtually without representatives, money
or political influence. The situation of the REP is even worse: in the last
ten years it has been able to overcome the 5% hurdle only in Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg: it has no money and many of its declining number of
activists oppose the ‘moderate’ course of party leader Schlierer.

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So, at the beginning of a new millennium no German extreme right
party seems even remotely capable of establishing itself at the national
political level. The splintering of the party political camp to the right of
the CDU and the lack of a charismatic leader make it incapable of
profiting from the weakened position of the CDU, as a result of financial
scandals, or from the ‘Haider-effect’. This situation is in sharp contrast
with the vitality of the, often violent, extreme right subculture.
The extreme right subculture
Extreme right activities outside the realm of political parties go back a
long way in German history. After the war, extremists were often forced
to organise either within non-extremist parties (especially the Liberal
Party, FDP) or outside the party system altogether. Not surprisingly,
the largest extreme right movement, the Deutsche Volksunion (founded
in 1971 by Gerhard Frey), remained for a long time unattached to any
political party. In any case, the more extreme groups, such as the neo-
nazis, never laid much trust in the mechanics of parliamentary democ-
racy and preferred to mobilise outside of party politics.
In this respect, Die Bewegung (The Movement) was the most notori-
ous. Its charismatic young leader, Michael Ku¨hnen, was able to create
a whole network of neo-nazi organisations, overcoming most of the
typical infighting. Despite several prison sentences and his open homo-
sexuality, he was the most successful and least divisive neo-nazi leader
of the postwar period. His death of AIDS in 1991 dealt a decisive blow
to the mobilisation and integration capacities of the neo-nazi subculture.
The 1990s saw also an increasing vigilance of the German authorities
with regard to extreme right groups and several were banned. The
government reacted to the wave of anti–immigrant violence of the first
post-unification years, which had put it under considerable domestic
and international pressure to act. This was nevertheless largely symbolic
politics because the neo-nazi scene, the clearest target of the bans, was
certainly not the most important source of the violence.
A result of the bans was simply the restructuring of the scene. Instead
of well organised action groups, with formal membership and internal
hierarchies, loosely organised ‘circles of friends’ appeared: in 1998 the
various Offices for the Protection of the Constitution reported some 80
of these with between 10 and 15 activists. Some 2,400 people were
regarded as part of the ‘neo-nazis’, in 41 groups with ‘some organisa-
tional structure’. However, the rivalries of their leaders stand in the
way of more unified organisation and mobilisation.
Somewhat surprisingly, it is the oldest of the extreme right parties,
the NPD that has started to profit from this niche. The new chairman,
Udo Voigt, has decided to rejuvenate the party by opening it up to the
neo-nazi scene. He accentuated the anti-capitalist elements in the pro-
gramme, oriented himself on the model of the cadre party and chose an
activist course. Consequently, the party, and notably its youth wing

Extreme Right in Germany
465
(Young National Democrats), have become a pulling point for young
neo-nazis who have been looking for a new organisation after the 1990s
party bans. That the link between street politics and electoral politics
did not bring the NPD any electoral success was made clear in the 1999
European elections. Although it increased its vote from 0.2% to 0.4%,
it did not reach the 0.5% qualifying for electoral campaign subsidies.
That said, Voigt was able to consolidate and even elaborate his organ-
isation, increasing its membership to 6,000. The NPD has been able to
at times organise various protest marches; with up to 5,000 participants
from the extreme right and skinhead scenes, most notably in the eastern
states.
The mobilisation of groups has triggered a public discussion about
the development of a ‘social movement of the right’. There are definitely
indications of this, including informal networks, diffuse collective iden-
tities (transferred through communications outlets), and links to broadly
held stereotypes. At the same time, given the comparatively low level of
mobilisation potential, an extreme right social movement is at best in
an embryonic phase.
Recent bomb attacks, such as those in 1998 at the grave of Heinz
Galinski, the late leader of the Jewish community in Germany, and in
1999 at the Wehrmacht exhibition organised by the Hamburg Institute
for Social Research, have given rise to speculation on the formation of
an extreme right terrorist underground, which could start a systematic
campaign of violence after the example of the extreme left Red Army
Faction, but the state security forces have so far dismissed the ‘Brown
Army Faction’ as a brainchild of journalists.
The Federal Office for Crime put the number of violent attacks
motivated by right-wing extremism, antisemitism or xenophobia at 708
in 1998 (16 attempted murders, 595 bodily harm, 39 arson, three
bombs, and 55 trespassing). Some research provides a picture of the
social background of the extreme right violent scene of the 1990s. More
than half the offenders were 20 years or younger, they were largely
male, generally with low education, but unemployment not particularly
prevalent. More important, most did not belong to a structured group:
most acts of violence seem to have been spontaneous, often under the
influence of alcohol. Motives mentioned include: prejudices against
foreigners, own experiences of humiliation, search for recognition
among peers, and latent or manifest personal tendencies to violence.
Among those who could be linked to groups, the large majority came
from the skinhead scene which often has no real organisational struc-
tures: common styles of behaviour, music and alcohol consumption are
connecting elements. Music, which often glorifies violence, is more
central to its magazines than are political positions. ‘Extreme right’
fanzines were estimated at around 50 in 1998, an increase over the
years before. Extreme right skinhead bands were also on the rise,
numbering some 100 at the end of 1998. Skinheads tend to be predom-

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inantly male, young and low educated, with a high turnover, most
youths staying for only one or two years. There seems to be a slight
increase in the number of ‘older’ skinheads though, perhaps because
those convicted for violence or racist actions find (re)integration into
mainstream society more difficult as they are stigmatised as ‘neo-nazis’.
Extremism without successful parties
Unlike some European democracies such as France or Austria, extreme
right parties have not been able to make substantial and continuing
inroads into the party system of federal Germany. The reasons are
several. First of all, the horrors of the Nazi era work as a powerful
antidote against right-wing extremism within postwar German society.
As a consequence of the continuing and extensive dealing with the Nazi
past, political mobilisation at the extreme right meets public scrutiny
and generally leads to strong counter-reactions within society. Even
stronger than in the population as a whole has been the reaction of the
political and cultural elites. At times bordering at the neurotic, they
have ostracised everything and everyone who had just the appearance
of possibly being part of or linked to the extreme right. Consequently,
representatives of far-right parties have found only very little media
response, even in periods of electoral success. Since the beginning of the
1990s, the Republikaner Party have even been the subject of an outright
boycott by the federal press and public radio and television channels.
Second, mainstream parties have so far consistently rejected any
coalition politics with the extreme right and have played a key role in
the ostracism of such parties as well as of more moderate nationalist
parties. That also applies to the conservatives of the CDU/CSU, which
on purely strategic grounds followed the recommendation of former
CSU-leader Franz-Josef Strauß not to accept a democratically legitimi-
sed force to the right of the Union. The conservative CSU, which has
for decades formed the government in the state of Bavaria, did not let
itself be outdone by the left-wing opposition in its propagandistic
rejection of the REP. At the same time, it took up the themes of the
extreme right (immigration, asylum, crime)—according to the party
itself in a democratically acceptable manner. Most notably in the late-
1990s its electoral campaigns became spitting images of those of the
REP. In addition, the German electoral system, proportional with a 5%
hurdle, made it easier not to enter electoral coalition, particularly
compared to the French two-ballot majoritarian system. That said, even
at the communal level there have been rarely electoral deals with far-
right parties.
Third, and obviously related, German governments has in the federal
and state Offices for the Protection of the Constitution security organi-
sations empowered to watch, even spy, upon potentially violent and
anti-democratic organisations. The machinery of Germany’s ‘vigilant
democracy’ allows state intervention in the political freedoms of individ-

Extreme Right in Germany
467
uals and groups that act aggressively against the ‘free democratic order’.
Membership of organisations that are officially declared ‘extremist’ is
forbidden to civil servants, which hampers such parties in attracting
well-educated cadres and isolates them from the large, state sector.
Fourth, despite the problems that have accompanied the unification
process, still ongoing in terms of society and economy, the German
state has been able to provide a high level of welfare for its citizens, in
both the west and east. Consequently, no deep redistribution conflict or
economic crisis is available for exploitation by the extreme right.
Further, since a battle about immigration policy divided Germany in
the early-1990s,5 a reticence about immigration in major party politics
has prevented a new electoral use by the extreme right of this still
sensitive topic. A similar argument can be made with regard to the
German unification of 1990 which, by and large, removed the national
issue from the political agenda. It left the extreme right with the far less
popular call for a ‘full reunification’, i.e. the inclusion of the alleged
‘German lands’ in Poland and Russia.
The relative lack of electoral success of the extreme right parties
weakens their integrative power at its militant fringes and thereby
strengthens the extreme right potential for violence. This relationship
was already evident at the end of the 1960s and in the early-1970s,
when the NPD, which had been a successful reservoir of the extreme
right before, slowly but steadily disappeared into political oblivion.
Militant, action-oriented groups, integrated into the party before, now
began to found their own political organisations. This was the start of
the formation of the neo-nazi action groups, which mushroomed in the
1970s. The fact that Germany is today home to one of the most
elaborate extreme right violent subcultures in Europe can also to a large
extent be traced back to the weakness of the nationalist electoral
organisations. According to the Federal Office for the Protection of the
Constitution, no less than 15% of the ‘organised right-wing extremists’,
i.e. those belonging to an extreme right organisation of some sort, are
considered to be ‘potentially violent’. Overall, the group of active
militant right-wing extremists is estimated at some 8,200 people, nota-
bly belonging to the ‘neo-nazi’ or ‘skinhead’ scenes (which obviously
overlap).
On the other hand, the large influence of the skinhead subculture in
the extreme right violence somewhat weakens the relationship between
successes in elections and successes in the streets. The skinheads are a
youth subculture that to a large extent organise outside of the political
arena. Though the subculture has from the outset attracted extreme
right attention and members, skinheads have also often resorted to
extreme right symbols or slogans simply to provoke. They mean to
shock the public. In a society that has only very few taboos left, SS
signs and swastikas have become the last means with which one can
upset the world of the adults. Well-organised neo-nazi groups and

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extreme right parties have long tried to mobilise the skinhead potential,
but until now to little avail.
In the eastern states of the unified Germany the extreme right
subculture profits from a fertile social, economic and cultural breeding
ground. The abrupt transformations of the political and economic
systems left large parts of the population in a deep identity crises.
Overwhelmed by the required personal adjustments, and left with very
weak social or religious ties as a consequence of fifty years of Commun-
ist rule, a minority of the youth have sought refuge in radical, identity-
presenting groups to cope with the feelings of insecurity. The skinhead
and neo-nazi subcultures are such escape possibilities. However,
extreme right skinheads can also feel in touch with the xenophobic
sentiments among substantial parts of the population. These resent-
ments transcend the borders of the party political camps and are
certainly not limited to the organised extreme right. Xenophobic vio-
lence is therefore a broader societal phenomenon, with a considerable
degree of independence from the extreme right parties and their chances
of mobilisation.
1
2
K. von Beyme, ‘Right-Wing Extremism in Postwar Europe’, West European Politics, April 1988.
On the ‘third wave’ of German right-wing extremism, see U. Backes and E. Jesse (eds), Jahrbuch
Extremismus & Demokratie, Nomos, 1989ff; R. Sto¨ss, Politics Against Democracy. Right-Wing
Extremism in West Germany, Berg, 1991; U. Backes and E. Jesse, Politischer Extremismus in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Propyla¨en, 4e, 1996.
3
4
5
See C. Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right, Manchester University Press, 2000, ch. 2.
Ibid., ch. 3.
See D. Tra¨nhardt, ‘The Political Use of Xenophobia in England, France and Germany’, Party Politics,
July 1995.