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Post-Soviet Affairs
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The State of Russian Science: Focus Groups with
Nuclear Physicists
Theodore P. Gerber a & Deborah Yarsike Ball b
a University of Arizona
b Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Published online: 13 May 2014.
To cite this article: Theodore P. Gerber & Deborah Yarsike Ball (2002) The State of Russian Science: Focus Groups with
Nuclear Physicists, Post-Soviet Affairs, 18:3, 183-212
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The State of Russian Science:
Focus Groups with
Nuclear Physicists
Theodore P. Gerber and Deborah Yarsike Ball1
Abstract: Two specialists on Russian society and politics examine the condition of
Russian science and scientists based on secondary literature, official statistics, and
focus groups conducted with 19 Russian nuclear physicists in October 2001. The article
discusses the implications of their findings for international security and for Russia’s
economic and political trajectories.
he fate of Russian science has important implications for international
security, as well as for Russia’s economic and political prospects. Thus,
T
Western and Russian observers have been justifiably concerned about the
crisis that befell Russian science following the collapse of the Soviet system.
State funding for research and salaries contracted dramatically, the social
prestige of scientists plummeted, and many left science for opportunities
in other spheres or emigrated. The number of inventions, patent applica-
1Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Arizona, and Russian Political and Military
Analyst, Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and International Security Directorate, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, respectively. This work was performed under the auspices
of the U.S. Department of Energy by University of California, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, under contract No. W-7405-Eng-48. The views represented are those of the
authors and do not represent those of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Univer-
sity of California, the United States government, or any of the individuals who offered
suggestions and assistance. The authors express their gratitude to Andrew Hood and Randall
Beattie for advice and information about the International Science and Technology Center;
George Hobor for research assistance; and Viktor Voronkov, Liubov Ezhova, and Irina
Olimpieva for help with the focus groups. We also thank the Center for Global Security
Research at LLNL for funding and logistical help and, especially, Eileen Vergino for her
support and guidance. Gerber’s participation in this project was supported by a University
of Arizona Junior Faculty Professional Development Leave and a post-doctoral fellowship
from the National Academy of Education/Spencer Foundation.
183
Post-Soviet Affairs, 2002, 18, 3, pp. 183–212.
Copyright  2002 by V. H. Winston & Son, Inc. All rights reserved.

184
GERBER AND BALL
tions, and publications by Russian scientists declined. By the mid-1990s the
situation had become grim. As two prominent Russian scientists wrote:
“The common understanding is that science in Russia is now in a state of
crisis. This, however, is an exceptionally rosy view of its condition. … it
would be more accurate to describe its current condition as comatose”
(Zakharov and Fortov, 1995, p. 693).
We argue that today Russian science is less in a state of crisis than in a
state of transition. As the Russian economy has improved, the crisis in
science has abated. At the same time, new science institutions and new
orientations on the part of Russian scientists have begun to take root. We
elaborate and support our argument in two ways. First, we draw attention
to developments that suggest the crisis in science has diminished and that
new institutions have emerged that should increase the productivity and
effectiveness of Russian researchers. Second, we report the results of four
focus groups we conducted in October 2001 with nuclear physicists from
three formerly closed institutes in or near Moscow.
The Russian economy has grown since 1998, when it bottomed out
after the severe financial crisis in August. Greater state revenues as a result
of economic growth, improved taxation, and higher oil prices have trans-
lated into increased state spending on science. Moreover, for more than a
decade, Western governments, foundations, and firms have provided
financial support to Russian scientists through competitive grants and
contracts. Much of this support has developed or reinforced collaborative
relationships between Russian and foreign researchers. Russian scientists
have formed their own R&D companies, and Western firms have estab-
lished facilities in Russia that employ Russian researchers. Official indica-
tors suggest that the salaries, productivity, prestige, andmorale of scientists
have risen. And, finally, although the Russian government has balked at
implementing wholesale institutional reforms that would supplant the
centralized, defense-oriented, non-competitive Soviet science system, it
has introduced new mechanisms for funding science on a competitive
basis.
Our focus group study centers on the views of Russian scientists
themselves. We sought to find out how they perceive developments of the
last several years, how well they have adapted to the changes that have
taken place in Russian science, and what they think lies ahead for them
professionally.2 The results confirm that the “science in crisis” image is one-
sided and misleading. Participants did complain about low salaries, lack
of respect in society, and other similar issues, but they also expressed
positive sentiments about recent changes in the area of science. They noted
that state funding has stabilized over the past few years.
2Given the small size and specific nature of our sample, we emphasize that the findings are
only suggestive. But the results merit attention, because focus groups provide more depth
and detail on the views of participants than can be obtained from a questionnaire-based
survey (see Morgan, 1996).

THE STATE OF RUSSIAN SCIENCE
185
More importantly, they indicated that scientists can earn a decent
living and conduct interesting research on the basis of foreign and domestic
grants and contracts. Not all scientists embrace grant-based financing with
wholehearted enthusiasm. To be sure, some prefer the old Soviet system
wherein salaries were guaranteed by steady state financing allocated via
regular block grants to institutes. But most appear to accept the new system
of financing—where competition for grants and contracts is paramount—
as inevitable. Some even view these competitive processes as more meri-
tocratic. They think the drastic reduction in the number of scientists has rid
Russian science of non-productive “ballast,” even as they lament the poor
quality and small number of youth entering scientific fields. The partici-
pants in our groups also value their newfound opportunities to make
international contacts and collaborate with foreign specialists.
Russia’s science transition in some ways parallels the economic tran-
sition from a state-administered to a market-based system. It has proceeded
unevenly and is far from complete. The progress made to date may easily
be derailed, spurring a renewed crisis in Russian science. But it is important
to take note of that progress and to consider policies that might facilitate
additional steps forward.
In what follows, we first describe in greater detail the crisis in Russian
science that characterized the early years of the post-Soviet Russian state.
We then discuss the important consequences the fate of Russian science has
for international security and for Russia’s economic and political prospects.
Next, we elaborate on the state of transition that we believe aptly describes
the current state of science in Russia and explain what it implies about the
views of scientists. After describing our focus group methodology, we
present the main results from the focus group interviews. We conclude by
drawing out the larger implications of our focus group findings and
proposing policy measures to facilitate further progress in Russia’s science
transition.
SCIENCE IN CRISIS
The myriad problems befalling Russian science during the 1990s have
beenamply documented.3 The root of these problemswas the sharp decline
in state funding for scientific research. During the perestroika era, state
financing for science remained relatively stable, despite burgeoning eco-
nomic problems (Mirskaya, 1995). Following the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991, the state budget contracted radically and science became a
low priority, just as severe inflation eroded the value of the ruble. Science
financing went into a free fall: between 1991 and 1994 alone, total federal
appropriations for science declined in real terms by roughly 75 percent,
3For representative examples, see Aldhous (1994a); Aldhous and Dorozynski (1994); Clery
(1994a); Pokrovsky (1994); Kneen (1995); Zakharov and Fortov (1995); Lebedev and Milenin
(1996); Freemantle (1997); Matlack (1997); Ushkalov (1997); Yurevich and Tsapenko (1998);
Feder (1998); Levitin (1998); Varshavskii (1999).

186
GERBER AND BALL
and they have remained roughly at that level ever since (Gokhberg and
Mindeli, 2001, p. 44). To make matters worse, for most of the 1990s only
partial portions of federal appropriations for science were actually dis-
bursed.4 Total R&D expenditures (some of which, during the Soviet era,
originated from contracts between enterprises and design bureaus)
dropped by 70 percent between 1990 and 1992 (Gokhberg and Mindeli
1999, p. 42). According to one estimate (Varshavskii, 1999, p. 61–63), in 1990
R&D spending represented 2.89 percent of Russia’s GDP, comparable to
the levels of the United States, Japan, and Germany. By 1995 the level
represented only 0.75 percent of a GDP that was roughly one-half its
previous size, placing Russia in the ranks of Egypt, India, and Portugal on
the basis of this criterion.
State financing was and remains by far the largest source of funds for
Russian science. Thus, sharp cuts in state funding inevitably led to severe
financial difficulties for scientific institutes and for scientists themselves.
The average official salary of employees in the science sector was 112.5
percent of the national average salary in 1990 (Varshavskii, 1999, p. 62).
This figure plunged to 64.4 percent in 1992 (Gokhberg and Mindeli, 1999,
p. 60). Thereafter it gained steadily on the national average, reaching 107.4
percent in 1999 (Gokhberg and Mindeli, 2001, p. 58), but throughout the
1990s the national average itself declined steadily because of persistent
inflation. To put the salaries of scientists in perspective, consider that in the
mid-1990s only 17 percent received salaries above the official subsistence
level (Yurevich and Tsapenko, 1998, p. 18). In 1998 the average salary of a
scientist was $60 a month (Levitin, 1998, p. 627). The dire situation com-
pelled research institutes to devote increasing proportions of their budgets
to salaries. Research institutes could no longer afford to maintain their
facilities or sustain subscriptions to scientific journals, much less purchase
new equipment or research materials.5 Expenditures on subscriptions to
foreign journals fell from $25 million in 1990 to a mere $500 thousand in
1993 (Ushkalov and Malakha, 1999).
The low salaries of scientists spurred a precipitous decline in the social
prestige of their profession. During Soviet times, scientific occupations
were among the most prestigious. But according to surveys conducted in
1996 and 1999, only 5–6 percent of Russians viewed scientists as among
“the most respected professions,” putting them 10th out of 12 professions,
behind “workers in trade,” “skilled manual workers,” “teachers,” and even
“peasants” (Gokhberg and Mindeli, 1999, p. 100).6
4For example, in 1994 only 55 percent of the science budget was fulfilled (Dezhina, 1997, p.
79); in 1996, only 60 percent (Saltykov, 1997, p. 18)
5For examples of the dilapidation of facilities, deterioration of instruments and materials, and
limitations on electrical power and phone service in science institutes, see Aldhous and
Dorozynski (1994); Clery (1994a); Mirskaya (1995); Freemantle (1997). By 1995 only one-tenth
of previously available scientific journals could be found in Russian research libraries (Lev-
itin, 1995b, p. 489). For more on declining journal subscriptions, see Markusova et al. (1996).
6Only “soldiers” and “engineers” ranked lower than scientists.

THE STATE OF RUSSIAN SCIENCE
187
Meager salaries, deteriorating work conditions, and low social pres-
tige drove many researchers from Russian science. From 1990 to 1994 the
number of scientific researchers declined from 993,000 to 525,000, eventu-
ally bottoming out at 417,000 in 1998 (Ushkalov and Malakha, 1999, p. 51;
Gokhberg and Mindeli, 1999, p. 28). Where did these scientists go? “Inter-
nal” brain drain—i.e., scientists leaving science for other forms of activity,
particularly business—appears to account for the most significant outflow
of Russian scientists from the scientific profession (Yurevich and Tsapenko,
1999). Hard numbers are difficult to come by, but by one estimate 27 percent
of Russia’s scientific personnel had left science for “commercial structures”
by the endof 1992 (Ushkalov and Malakha, 1999, p. 40). Also, many Russian
scientists emigrated abroad, where they could find better opportunities to
conduct their work. According to estimates of the Center for Science
Research and Statistics, this “external” brain drain peaked in the mid-1990s
at around 2,200–2,300 per year (Gokhberg and Mindeli, 2001, p. 40). Some
observers claim that the costs of internal and external brain drain are even
greater than the raw numbers suggest because younger, more talented, and
more ambitious scientists are the most likely to “migrate” (Lebedev and
Milenin, 1996; Matlack, 1997; Ushkalov, 1997; Letokhov, 1999). Finally, there
are fewer and fewer entrants to scientific professions. On top of a general
decline in university and graduate schoolenrollments and graduation rates
during the first half of the 1990s (see Gerber, 2000), lower proportions of
university graduates have been entering scientific fields (Lebedev and
Milenin, 1996; Ushkalov, 1997). Thus, there are few new recruits to take the
place of more senior Russian scientists who retire, emigrate, or give up
science for other pursuits.
The rapid shrinking of the Russian scientific community, the deterio-
ration of scientists’ working conditions, and the need for many scientists
to take up second jobs to survive have taken their toll on the output of
Russian science and the general morale of scientists. The numbers of
inventions, patent applications, and publications by Russian scientists all
have declined for most of the last decade (Yurevich and Tsapenko, 1999).7
Survey data from the mid-1990s suggest that “more than half of scientific
workers regret their choice of profession and would not want their children
to become scientists” (Lebedev and Milenin, 1996, p. 14).
The dire situation in Russian science led some to suggest that its very
survival hung “in the balance” (Pokrovsky, 1994). Reports of desperate
nuclear physicists seeking work as tram operators and conducting hunger
strikes dramatized the rapid collapse of one of the contemporary world’s
7According to official data (Gokhberg and Mindeli, 1999, p. 76), from 1992 to 1995 the number
of scientific publications by Russian scientists in foreign journals declined from 26,776
(representing 4.91 percent of all published articles) to 22,989 (representing 3.92 percent).
Meanwhile, the number of scientific publications in Russia declined by 58 percent from 1990
through 1993 (Lebedev and Milenin, 1996, p. 12). The number of new patent applications in
Russia by Russian scientists declined from 28,478 in 1993 to 15,106 in 1997 (Gokhberg and
Mindeli, 1999, p. 68).

188
GERBER AND BALL
most successful scientific establishments (see Levitin, 1995b; Holdsworth,
1996; Perera, 1996; Freemantle, 1997; Feder, 1998). Even more alarming was
the 1996 suicide of Vladimir Nechai, director of the second largest nuclear
research center in Russia (Chelyabinsk-70, now known as Snezhinsk).
Nechay, a respected theoretical physicist who spent almost 40 years work-
ing on Soviet and Russian nuclear programs, killed himself because he
could no longer endure his inability to rectify a situation in which his
employees had not been paid for more than five months and were “close
to starvation” (Kovaleva, 1996).
CAUSE FOR CONCERN
The travails of Russia’s scientists have sparked interest in the West
primarily because of the immediate security threat posed by their situation.
The seemingly relentless crisis in science has understandably raised fears
that desperate scientists might sell weapons-related expertise to countries
or organizations that harbor hostile intentions toward the United States.
The state of Russian science also affects Russia’s prospects for economic
and political development. International security will be improved if Rus-
sia develops a stable democracy and thriving market economy. A success-
ful scientific community can help on both counts. The Soviet system
produced a highly advanced scientific and technological research capacity
in Russia, with many capable and well-trained individuals. Science and
technology could serve as an important resource in Russia’s struggle to
restore economic growth, attract foreign investment, and compete in the
internationaleconomy. If developed effectively, Russia’s scientific potential
stands not only to fuel economic growth in Russia, but also to benefit
Western companies and scientists who will do business with Russian
researchers.
A strong scientific community could also serve as a key constituency
for the consolidation of democratic norms in Russia. According to classic
works in the sociology of science, there is a strong affinity between the
norms and arrangements of the scientific community and liberal-demo-
cratic political institutions. The reason is that liberal-democratic institu-
tions are held to encourage the autonomy of science and provide normative
support for core values of the scientific ethos: rationalism, universalism,
individualism, and autonomy (Barber, 1952; Merton, 1957).8 Finally, to the
extent that Russian scientific researchers are integrated into the global
8“Scientists, even those who have no other political interest, are interested in freedom. They
are manifestly concerned for the freedom of their own research, cherishing the privilege of
unhampered investigation and teaching in academic institutions. They also like to think of
science as the intellectual force that challenged the authority of the church and the old forms
of learning. They like to believe that the inner spirit of science is one of freedom, that the
processes of scientific research require freedoms, and that therefore the political influence of
science must be in the direction of freedom—not merely for scientists but for mankind”(Price,
1965, p. 270).

THE STATE OF RUSSIAN SCIENCE
189
scientific community, it is easier to monitor and regulate their work using
international laws and norms. For these reasons, the development and
integration of Russian science could reap great economic, political, and
security benefits for Russia and for the international community.
On the other hand, a relentless crisis might turn Russian science into
a more malign economic, political, and international force. Without funda-
mental changes in the science institutions inherited from the Soviet
period—and a corresponding re-orientation of scientists toward commer-
cially advantageous research—investments in science will remain econom-
ically inefficient and unproductive. Disgruntled scientists may associate
their loss of material standing and prestige with the economic and political
reforms associated with the demise of the Soviet system. Their frustrations
could drive them to support political leaders and policies that undermine
marketization and democracy. Unless Russian science is again placed on
solid and productive economic footing, increasing numbers of scientists
may sympathize with voices decrying the influence of Western govern-
ments, corporations, and policies in Russia.9 This, in turn, could fuel anti-
Western policies on the part of the Russian government and scientific
leaders.
Frustrated scientists also pose a threat to global security if they are
tempted to sell their weapons-related expertise to governments with hos-
tile intentions toward the United States or its allies. This threat will be
enhanced to the extent that the Russian government seeks to isolate its
scientists and scientific research from the international scientific commu-
nity. On this score, new policies announced during the summer of 2001
requiring scientists in Academy of Sciences institutes to report all contacts
with foreigners (see Izvestiya, June 2, 2001) and mandating the official
registration of all contracts between scientific institutions and foreign
entities (Vaganov, 2001) are not encouraging.
SCIENCE IN TRANSITION
If Russian science is to thrive and thus contribute to Russia’s economic
and political development and ease security concerns, it must undergo an
institutional and cultural transformation. The institutional component
involves replacing fundamental features of the Soviet science system with
scientific institutions and practices that typify Western market-based soci-
eties. The cultural component requires that Russian scientists abandon
Soviet-era orientations toward scientific professional life and embrace
practices consonant with the new science institutions.
Distinctive features of the Soviet science system included a homoge-
nous and highly centralized organization; an overwhelming reliance on
9Loren Graham, a long-time observer of Soviet science, senses that parts of the Russian
scientific community are “drifting toward communist, nationalist, and anti-Western posi-
tions” (Graham, 1998, p. 51).

190
GERBER AND BALL
state financing distributed via block grants to institutes; the absence of
horizontal links among scientific institutes, universities, and productive
enterprises; an emphasis on military research; politically enforced seclu-
sion from the international scientific community; and sharp institutional
boundaries between science education (which took place mainly in univer-
sities) and scientific research (which took place in research institutes man-
aged by the Academy of Sciences or government ministries).10 These
institutions and practices greatly limited the effectiveness of Soviet science.
Although Soviet scientists could claim some important achievements, their
output was considerably lower than might have been expected on the basis
of their massive numbers and the resources invested by the state.11
The crisis in science inevitably resulted when Soviet science institu-
tions were combined with drastic cuts in the federal budget, a market
economy open to global competition, and a political system that permitted
citizens to travel abroad. Yet to survive and thrive, Russian science must
be open to the international scientific community and replace Soviet-era
science institutions with a system of diverse, decentralized, smaller-scale
institutions, horizontally linked, financed by grants and contracts from
state bodies, international funds, and domestic and foreign firms, and
oriented mainly to civilian commercial applications.
No less important, the success of Russian science requires a transition
in the attitudes of scientists themselves. Scientists must “buy into” a new
and largely unfamiliar philosophy regarding the goals, practices, and
rewards of scientific research. Old norms glorified “fundamental” research,
collectivism, and “scientific schools”; they disdained commercial orienta-
tion and competition for grants (see Gerber, 2001).12 Many scientists were
quite happy with Soviet institutional arrangements, which guaranteed
them some resources regardless of their productivity, insulated them from
competitive pressures, and relieved them of the need to justify their work
in commercial or practical terms (Graham, 1998).
10For more detailed descriptions of Soviet science institutions, see Kneen (1984); Vucinich
(1984); Graham (1990); Fortescue (1990).
11 See Graham (1998, ch. 4) and Saltykov (1997) for documentation and explanation of the poor
productivity of the Soviet science system. Consider also the biting assessment of an insider:
“In the end, the Soviet Union was swamped with far more scientists than it needed. … But
despite the huge numbers of Soviet researchers, they made far fewer discoveries of interna-
tional standing than their colleagues in the West. Soviet scientists began to judge themselves
by their own standards, and everyone believed they were doing research of international
quality—even when this was manifestly not the case. I knew of countless untalented
researchers who could not even spell out the aims of their research, but who managed to get
away with it because this inability to explain what they were doing was seen as ‘evidence’
that they were involved in very fundamental work”(Letokhov, 1999, p. 14).
12“Scientific schools” refer to groups of disciples who form around a great researcher—
always within a single research establishment—and pursue the leader’s research agenda for
decades. Many Russian scientists believe that these schools are the distinctive hallmark of
Russian science tradition.

THE STATE OF RUSSIAN SCIENCE
191
In order to resuscitate Russian science, scientists must accept that those
institutions are not viable and adapt to the new environment. They must
aggressively compete for funding for their work. That means developing
an entrepreneurial sense and actively seeking clients—private firms, grant-
making organizations, or state bodies that fund research on a contract
basis—rather than assuming the state will support them regardless of the
demand for or quality of their output. Scientists must learn what their
comparative advantages are by becoming familiar with work in their
scientific area outside of Russia. They must exhibit enough flexibility to
tailor their work to the demands of the market and form synergistic
alliances with other domestic and foreign researchers. Some of these alli-
ances may turn into long-term collaborative arrangements, but scientists
must be willing to enter into shorter-term collaborations as well.
The competitive, entrepreneurial, commercial, and international ori-
entations that Russian scientists must develop to be successful in the new
institutional context cut against the grain of Soviet-era professional norms.
Therefore, there must be sufficient institutional change to provide incen-
tives for the necessary cultural reorientation. Similarly, the institutional
changes will only bear fruit if they are accompanied by the requisite
transformation in scientists’ attitudes. In short, the two components neces-
sary for a successful transition in science must proceed in tandem.
GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM
Many of the institutions of Soviet science remain largely intact (Gra-
ham, 1998). The lion’s share of science funding is still distributed via block
grants to large institutes. Many research institutes remain excessively large
and inefficient. The Academy of Sciences still centrally administers a vast
network of research institutes that, in turn, are centrally administered,
which impedes the development of horizontal links of individual subunits
and scientists with commercial entities or funding sources.13 Administra-
tive and research functions are not organizationally separated, which limits
the effectiveness of both. One major reform—the creation of “state research
centers”—has amounted to an effort to reinforce existing institutional
arrangements and has been generally judged a failure (Schweitzer, 2000).14
Yet other signs suggest that the transition has begun. The Russian
government has demonstrated some awareness of the need to allocate its
funding for science on the basis of competitive principles rather than block
grants. To this end, it establishedthe RussianFoundation forBasic Research
13See Fortescue (2000) for an account of successful resistance to institutional reforms by
leaders within the Russian Academy of Sciences.
14Beginning in 1993, a small number of the strongest and most vital research institutes were
to be designated “state research centers,” a status that was to provide them with supplemen-
tary state funding. However, the number of institutes with this designation quickly prolifer-
ated, and the funds delivered never approached the promised amounts. See Schweitzer
(2000) for more details.

192
GERBER AND BALL
in 1992 (see Dezhina, 1997). Since 1993 the fund has allocated from 2.5
percent to 6.0 percent of federal funds earmarked for fundamental research
on the basis of open grant competitions (as calculated from Gokhberg and
Mindeli, 2001, p. 47).
Many Russian scientists have formed their own start-up companies
(Aldhous, 1994c; Matlack, 1997; Schweitzer, 2000). These companies face
tremendous obstacles, and many struggle, but those that have survived the
“Darwinian selection” are “becoming stronger and stronger” (Dezhina and
Graham, 2001, p. 7). The government has established other special funds
to support smallinnovative businesses and provide venture capital to high-
tech start-ups (see Dezhina and Graham, 2001). Financing for these initia-
tives remains limited, but they indicate that some leaders within the
government appreciate the need to shift government financing away from
block grants to more competitive mechanisms of distribution. Without
forming new corporate entities, some research institutes have shown cre-
ativity in using their equipment and facilities as sources of financing (see
Aldhous, 1994c; Kerr, 1994). Even the generally conservative Academy of
Sciences has taken initiatives to maximize commercial benefits from its vast
properties (Levitin, 1999).
Most importantly, Russian science has opened up to the outside world.
With some exceptions (for scientists working in top-security closed cities
and others with high-level security clearances), scientists are free to travel
abroad without restriction. As our focus groups demonstrate, many view
this as a significant improvement in comparison to Soviet times when
travel was tightly restricted for all scientists (see also Aldhous, 1994a).
Numerous working partnerships have been established between Russian
researchers and Western researchers in university or national laboratory
settings (Aldhous, 1994b; Clery, 1994b; Kerr, 1994; Matlack, 1997). Scientists
are also permitted to enter freely into contracts with foreign firms. Com-
panies such as Boeing, Intel, and Motorola have established research and
design facilities in Russia, and others have contracted with Russian insti-
tutes and individual scientists (Dezhina and Graham, 2000; Dezhina and
Graham, 2001).
In recognition of the opportunities and risks that Russian science poses
for international security, the US government has implemented bilateral
and multilateral programs intended to develop Russia’s scientific potential
in civilian-oriented directions. Such programs include Co-operative Threat
Reduction, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, the Nuclear Cities Ini-
tiative, and the International Science and Technology Centers (ISTC).15
Under an existing 10-year umbrella agreement on S&T cooperation
between Russia and the US, signed in 1993, more than 15 US agencies have
been engaged in projects with Russian scientists, ranging from from public
health and medicine to agriculture, the environment, space, energy, infor-
mation technology, and a wide range of basic science disciplines.16 The
15For an account of the origins and establishment of the ISTC, see Schweitzer (1996).

THE STATE OF RUSSIAN SCIENCE
193
European community has initiated some grant programs, including the
International Association for the Promotion and Cooperation with Scien-
tists from the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (INTAS).
Some private foundations—including the International Science Founda-
tion formed by George Soros, the MacArthur Foundation, and the Carnegie
Corporation—have also contributed substantial funding to Russian scien-
tists. Finally, Western corporations have invested directly in Russian R&D
ventures.
The advent of Western assistance in the form of competitive grants and
contracts has undoubtedly provided opportunities for the most ambitious
and capable Russian scientists to obtain support for their work through
non-state channels. Substantial resources have been distributed on a
strictly competitive basis. 17 Almost from the start, their purpose has been
not just to provide Russian scientists with income, but also to cultivate a
commercial, entrepreneurial orientation. Ideally, through participation in
these programs, scientists learn how to write grants, interact with col-
leagues in other countries, gain information on the state of their field,
discover where they can contribute, and develop an appreciation for
international laws and norms regarding scientific research. But have they
actually had such an impact? This is one of the key questions we sought to
answer through our focus groups.
There is evidence that Russia’s science crisis has, at the very least,
abated since 1998. In 1999 federal appropriations for science increased by
roughly 40 percent in real terms, relative to 1998 (Gokhberg and Mindeli,
2001, p. 42). Employment in science—which had declined every year since
1990—grew by 3,200 (Gokhberg and Mindeli, 2001, p. 28). University
enrollments have increased steadily since the mid-1990s, and the latest
official statistics show an upswing in patent applications and in public
opinion regarding the benefits of science and technology (Gokhberg and
Mindeli, 2001). A recent survey indicates that the desire to emigrate is now
considerably lower among scientists in closed cities than it was in 1992
(Tikhonov, 2001). A study of scientists in St. Petersburg reports that a large
majority has adapted to the new conditions in one way or another (Yev-
dokimova, Kugel’, and Olimpyeva, 2001). Certainly, the improved perfor-
mance of Russia’s economy has contributed to these positive signs. But
they might also stem from the progress of Russia’s science transition. To
find out, we embarked on our effort to assess how Russian scientists
themselves perceive the current situation, the changes that have taken
place in recent years, and the role of Western financing.
16Congressman Curt Weldon has proposed additional areas and topics on which US and
Russian scientists can cooperate (Weldon, 2001).
17For example, as of March 2001, the ISTC alone had spent $335 million funding 1,250 projects
involving 30,000 specialists in 400 institutes (see http://www.istc.ru/).

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GERBER AND BALL
FOCUS GROUP SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY
We carried out four focus groups with a total of 19 Russian physicists
in October 2001. Part of our objective was to assess the impact of participa-
tion in research funded by the International Science and Technology Center
(ISTC), so we sought participants who had participated in some form. Two
groups were recruited from the Moscow Engineering-Physics Institute
(MIFI). MIFI 1 consisted of seven participants who had previously worked
on ISTC-funded projects but did not have ISTC funding at the time of the
groups. MIFI 2 involved three participants, each of whom had been part of
projects that ISTC had approved but declined to fund. (ISTC’s approval of
a project does not guarantee that it will receive funding.) The third group
consisted of five project directors of current ISTC projects from the Institute
of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) in Obninsk. The final group was
from the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research (JINR) in Dubna and involved
four current non-PI participants on ISTC-funded projects. The focus groups
were conducted with the assistance of three sociologists from the Centre
for Independent Social Research (CISR) in St. Petersburg, one of whom
served as the moderator.
The moderator posed pre-established questions designed to elicit
participants’ assessments of changes in the situation of their institutes
during the last three years, their sense of how successful their laboratories
are, and their views on the effectiveness of state financing vs. financing
from grants and contracts, the social responsibility of scientists, genera-
tional differences in the orientations of Russian scientists, and whether they
think about leaving science or leaving Russia. Finally, the moderator asked
participants to assess the role of the ISTC and, secondarily, the general role
of Western support programs in the development of Russian science.
Participants were told at the outset that one objective of the research
is to provide some feedback to the ISTC about the effectiveness of its
programs and procedures. They were encouraged to contribute both pos-
itive and negative feedback. They were assured anonymity in all reports.
Although nuclear physicists are not representative of Russian scien-
tists in general, the direction of the resulting bias is hard to deduce. On the
one hand, nuclear scientists are typically viewed as the elite among scien-
tific professions and were certainly viewed as such during the Soviet era
(see Gerber, 2001), so the state of science may look especially favorable from
their vantage point. On the other hand, their previous elite status means
that nuclear physicists had the “furthest to fall” during Russia’s science
crisis (Clery, 1994a), so their views may be exceptionally negative. In
addition, the participants in our groups may not be representative of
nuclear scientists, since all except one have received some form of financial
support from Western grants. Because the vast majority have experienced
some degree of success in the new environment, they may have unusually
positive assessments of that environment.
In spite of the potential for bias, the focus groups offer instructive,
systematic empirical insights into the current attitudes of Russian scientists

THE STATE OF RUSSIAN SCIENCE
195
who have received Western funding. Western funding aims to affect scien-
tists’ orientations and practices, not just their bank accounts. Only by
directly examining the orientations of those who receive such funding can
we begin to evaluate whether Western funding and the other institutional
changes associated with Russia’s science transition have had the antici-
pated impact. Of course, a rigorous assessment of the impact of Western
programs and other changes requires systematic, large-sample compari-
sons of recipients and non-recipients. But the focus group approach offers
a more detailed, contextualized, and nuanced look at the perceptions of
participants than does a large-sample survey. Therefore, our focus groups
with physicists who have benefited from Western funding serve as a vital
preliminary step toward assessing their impact.
RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS ON
THE STATE OF RUSSIAN SCIENCE
Here we summarize the main findings from the groups regarding
scientists’ views on the current state of Russian science. We emphasize
views that were expressed in multiple focus groups. We first discuss the
positive assessments of the current situation and expressions of support
and appreciation for changes in Russian science. Then we turn to the more
negative assessments voiced by the participants, along with evidence that
some still adhere to Soviet-era norms. Finally, we briefly discuss their views
on scientists’ social responsibility.
Positive Sentiments and New Norms
Supporting the view that Russian science is in a state of transition,
participants in multiple—in some cases, all—groups pointed to several
developments that they view positively. They noted improved financial
stability, due to increased federal funding, elimination of wage arrears, and
new contracts with domestic firms and state ministries. They appreciated
the important role of financing from Western grants and contracts. They
cited increased contacts with the international scientific community as a
key improvement of recent years. Finally, they applauded a system of
incentives that rewards initiative and quality in scientific work.
All the groups indicated that the financial situation at their institutes
had stabilized or even improved during the last few years:
“[I]f we are talking about the last 2–3 years, there has been a certain
tendency toward stabilization. Before, they didn’t pay us our pay
and we had the impression that everything was collapsing. Now
somehow things have generally become more stable. Not every-
thing—but there is a tendency toward stabilization. … A certain
confidence has appeared.”(DU)18

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GERBER AND BALL
Apart from the widely noted cessation of wage arrears, many participants
alluded to recent increases in state orders and contracts. Of particular
interest, one participant claimed that a state contract won through a com-
petitive bidding process currently provides 50 percent of his laboratory’s
financing. (M2) Another said that state funding for defense-related projects
had recently increased, and that this significantly improved the general
sense of stability:
“In the last 2–3 years it seems like the volume of financing con-
nected with military research has increased…. In the preceding
years our defense orders were 0 percent, but now we are starting
to get them…. And this is positive because as a rule, defense orders
are not just for one year; they are for a longer period, and thus give
a greater sense of stability.”(OB)
Surely the perceived stabilization stems in large part from the
improvement in the Russian economy during the last three years. Eco-
nomic growth, higher prices for oil on the global market, and an improved
taxation system have increased the federal budget, making more money
available for science. The fact that several interviewees referred to an
increase in state “orders” and “contracts” suggests that, increasingly, state
funds are allocated on the basis of contracts rather than block grants. Of
course, references to defense-related orders probably reflect a renewed
emphasis on defense spending on the part of the Putin government. But
others pointed to increased demand of Russian firms for technological
innovations: “In the last 2–3 years our industrial sector has started to grow.
And therefore we have started to see opportunities to make agreements
[with firms].”(M1) One interviewee who has worked closely with Duma
members who deal with science issues said he noticed a renewed appreci-
ation of the importance of science for Russia’s economic development on
the part of top politicians and economic elites (DU).
If a recent improvement in state financing accounts for a newfound
sense of stability, our group participants also pointed to foreign grants and
contracts as a vital source of funding. When asked whether their own labs
were among the successful ones, almost without exception they replied
affirmatively.19 In almost every case, they attributed their success at least
partly to their ability to adapt to the new environment by attracting funding
from foreign sources:
18All direct quotations are direct translations by the first author from the Russian transcripts.
We indicate which group the quotation is from using “M1” for the MIFI 1 group, “M2” for
the MIFI 2 group, “OB” for the FEI group (conducted in Obninsk), and “DU” for the JINR
group (conducted in Dubna).
19Several added “otherwise, I would not be sitting here with you now,” raising the possibility
that less successful scientists are underrepresented in our groups.

THE STATE OF RUSSIAN SCIENCE
197
We used to work exclusively on military orders—100 percent. For
the last 13 years we have had no military orders, except for during
the last year or two, and those only amount to about 5 percent of
our financing. But nonetheless, throughout the whole period, we
have generally had no problems with equipment or with financ-
ing—that is, we have had the minimum necessary to receive our
pay. Perhaps due partly to circumstances, partly to luck, we were
able to reorient all our military orders to civilian uses. And even
today we have twice or thrice the volume. It is another matter that
the institute does not pay us for this. … Since 1996 we have worked
on direct contracts—for example, with Sandia and a company from
India—and, of course, on ISTC grants. These have been the stron-
gest incentives and greatest sources of support, and they have
allowed us to preserve our cadres. Despite the fact that in the
institute the outflow of cadres has been relatively high, we have
managed to preserve our cadres. … Our foreign grants have even
allowed us to hire eight young specialists during the last 2–3
years. … I am not just flattering myself here, so to speak, because
it is enough to just look around our own building to see that there
are other divisions which, well, unfortunately [are not success-
ful].(OB)
The linking of success to the receipt of grants and contracts from the
West was a common theme:
“Some groups [in our department] simply died, because they did
not receive enough financing and people simply left. … But other
groups had some kind of financing, including from the ISTC. These
groups survived, of course, and generally continue to live. I would
not say they live well. But they live ‘not badly’ because, thanks to
the ISTC, they were able to renew their scientific facilities and to
support young specialists. We were saying earlier that many peo-
ple left the institute, but they didn’t leave those groups that had
ISTC projects. Practically nobody left, because they received
enough to get by and they saw that they might have a chance to
get additional funding.”(M2)
All the groups acknowledged the important financial contributions
made by grants from funds such as the ISTC, NATO, and INTAS, and
contracts with foreign firms and partners: “When foreign grants started to
appear, then we understood that science would survive, that new clients
were emerging, that it would be possible to do something”(M2). Some
emphasized that grant support was indispensable for their research:
“It is not our country, but [foreign] foundations that support us.
Everything that we do, we can only do via foundations like ISTC,
TACIS, grants and so on. … Without question, support from West-

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ern foundations is of definitive importance. … The money we get
from foundations is n-times more than we get from state financ-
ing.”(DU)
“So this is our research, which is very interesting but not a main
priority of Minatom. If we hadn’t received the support of the ISTC,
then this work simply would not have been done, despite the fact
that it generated fascinating results.”(OB)
Apart from purely professional benefits (the possibility to conduct
research), participants clearly appreciate the higher salaries they earn from
grants. For example, participants in the DU group said that ISTC salaries
are 2 to 2.5 times more than they receive from their institute, referring to
the ISTC component of their earnings as “definitive.”
Group participants noted a number of concrete instances where fund-
ing from internationalgrants led to longer-term collaborations with foreign
partners and firms. One physicist described at length a joint Russian-
Japanese project involving the utilization of plutonium, adding that, “if we
hadn’t receive support from the ISTC, this project never would have
happened.”(OB) Grants encourage the formation of “capable (trudosposob-
nyye) research groups.”(DU) In some cases, they lead to direct contracts
with foreign firms. Moreover, the grant-writing process can be a valuable
education in and of itself. One participant expressed frustration that his
proposal was not accepted by ISTC even after ISTC had provided seed
money for its development. Yet he went on to describe the importance of
the seed grant for his later success:
“Working within the framework of ISTC gave me enormous expe-
rience and understanding about what our foreign colleagues need
from us and how to receive their financial support. That first grant
opened the path to all the other grants I since received. It became
clear what to do and how to do it. Naturally, the other grants
compensated for the fact that the ISTC proposal was not
funded.”(M2)
Participants inall the groups expressed deep appreciation that Russian
science had become more open to the international community: “Abroad,
they properly evaluate the level of your work. When you are not in your
own closed system, when everything is open, it is only a positive for
science.”(M2) As they repeatedly emphasized, newfound opportunities to
travel abroad and make contacts with foreign colleagues have permitted
them to determine their true standing in the international scientific com-
munity, learn what kind of work interests foreign entities, and establish
collaborative relationships that can and often do lead to additional fund-
ing. Here again, many group participants cited the important role of
Western grants:

THE STATE OF RUSSIAN SCIENCE
199
“The second [major contribution of Western grants] is that [they]
truly integrated us—especially those of us who were in defense-
related areas—into the international community.”(OB)
“We can use [Western-funded] projects to attend international
conferences, which gives us opportunities for international discus-
sions. That is, we can ‘show ourselves’ and have a look at others.
This is very important—it gives us the opportunity to establish
international connections.”(M1)
Another specific collective benefit of foreign grants noted by several
participants is the purchase of equipment, especially computers. One OB
participant said that 95 percent of the computers in his department were
purchased with ISTC funds, without which there would be 30 people per
computer. There was universal agreement that the institutes’ computer
facilities had been greatly improved by grant funds. Some also see Western
funding as a source for other types of equipment: “It gives us the possibility
to purchase more or less modern measuring devices, which we can use for
purposes other than completing the [grant-funded] project.”(M1) How-
ever, other participants were skeptical that Western grants permitted the
purchase of significant equipment apart from computers.
A number of the physicists we spoke with expressed the view that the
changes of the last decade—including the opening up of Russian science
to the international community and the shift from block funding to grant-
and contract-based financing—had led more meritocracy among Russian
scientists:
“I can cite another positive development: in the last 10–11 years it
has become clear ‘who is who.’ I consider this a positive factor.
Before, everyone was brought down to the same level. The inter-
national level of each group was not known. Because of [the
opening of Russian science], those who had not been working on
a high level either left science or “died” (in quotation marks). The
ones who survived are those who can work at an international
level, and they, of course, to this day receive money from the
branch ministries, from Minatom, and in particular, from foreign
foundations. I think it is a positive factor that it became evident
both to scientists and to others what level you are at.”(M2)
While many commentators assert that mostly top-flight researchers have
left Russian science, several participants took the opposite view: “It seems
to me that as a result of the financial crisis the institute was cleansed of
some ‘ballast.’ … Those scientists who remain in the institute are, shall we
say, not ‘ballast’ but some of the best. They are those who have been able
to re-orient themselves scientifically because of their professionalism,
training, and erudition.”(M1)

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Also testifying to a sense of meritocracy, one participant questioned
complaints in his group about growing “stratification” (rassloyeniye)
among scientists: “No! What ‘stratification’ means is this: some people
work Saturdays and Sundays until 10 pm. Others work from 8 to 5 and
then they feel there is stratification. They say ‘look at so-and-so, look at
how much he gets paid.’ So it is a controversial question.”(OB) Another
member of the group replied that everyone would work hard if they had
a project that was funded. But even he then allowed, “to some extent they
[those who do not have funded projects] are guilty for continuing to work
on themes that do not attract support rather than look for new
themes.”(OB)
The sentiment that the new basis of financing rewards the most capable
and energetic scientists and weeds out those less capable was fairly wide-
spread. Several other positive aspects were also mentioned, though gener-
ally by only a few individuals. Western grants were seen as more reliable
sources of funding insofar as they tended to be delivered directly to project
participants, leaving little opportunity for siphoning off by bureaucrats
and managers. The new environment gives scientists more independence
from institute administration. The influence of political factors on scientific
work has decreased, and censorship has practically disappeared. Manag-
ing grant-funded projects gives scientists experience and training in man-
agerial skills, which prepares them to take on leading roles in the
administration of their institutes. The quality and number of students
entering scientific fields has improved in the last several years. Finally,
several members of the DU group demonstrated a critical orientation
toward Soviet science institutions by sharply criticizing the Academy of
Sciences as a venal bureaucratic organization that contributes nothing to
Russian science but consumes enormous amounts of money.
In sum, each group pointed to recent positive developments inRussian
science. One such development—the modest improvement in financing
during the last several years—probably has more to do with the restoration
of economic growth in Russia and higher oil prices abroad than with any
institutional or cultural transformation. However, other positive develop-
ments clearly represent evidence that the institutional and cultural transi-
tion of Russian science is under way. These include opportunities to
conduct research, purchase equipment, and make a decent living based on
grants and contracts from Western sources, increased interaction with
foreign colleagues and partners, and a more meritocratic system of incen-
tives in science. At least some Russian scientists have accepted a new way
of doing business, aptly captured by the following admonishment: “If you
want to get paid, get to work. If you want to travel abroad, know the
[foreign] language. If you don’t know the language, learn it.”(OB)

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201
NEGATIVE ASSESSMENTS AND OLD NORMS
In addition to the surprisingly large number of positive sentiments and
new norms among our group participants, some negative assessments of
recent developments were expressed and lingering commitments to
Soviet-era norms were evinced. Four themes were especially salient: regret
over the decline of state financing, concern about the lack of good-quality
new recruits to Russian science, complaints about the growth of new forms
of bureaucracy, and ambivalence toward grant-based financing, which
recalls the traditional hostility toward grants characteristic of Soviet-era
scientists (Gerber, 2001).
While participants acknowledged recent improvements in the avail-
ability of funds, they nonetheless lamented the meager level of state
financing as compared to the Soviet era. They viewed the drop in state
financing as the main culprit for the low salaries and low prestige of
scientists, obsolescence of facilities and equipment, and the departure of
colleagues from the field of science. They are particularly irked by the
government’s failure to honor its public commitment to devote 4 percent
of its annual budget to the support of science. Several opined in this
fashion: “If we multiply the 1.4 percent we actually receive by three, that
would make 4 percent [of federal budget expenditures] and all of our
current problems, like attracting young specialists, would be solved.”(OB)
Participants expressed grave concern about “the aging of their insti-
tutes.” They perceive the sparse salaries and low prestige as adversely
affecting their ability to attract the best and the brightest to the field of
science. “People are proud to call themselves ‘businessmen’ even it means
they sell eggs at the market, but the title ‘scientist’ is laughable; it’s a
synonym for a starving person.”(M1) Because of the low appeal of a career
in science, the field generally attracts only mediocre students: “As a mem-
ber of our admissions committee, I can say that most of those who come to
work as graduate researchers are C-students (troyechniki).”(OB)
They also cited the more materialistic orientation of young Russians
as well as broader failures of the Russian education system:
“When we started to work in science, we never thought about how
much we would be paid. … The new generation of scientists
immediately asks about pay and about how stable their salary will
be.” (M1)
“The system of education, for reasons unknown to me, is now
producing young people with a level of education that is, let’s say,
several times worse in comparison to earlier times. … There is a
lack of intelligent people [among the young scientists]. Recent
graduates come to us and I see their level of education. It is possible
to teach them—they are not stupid—but they simply do not know
physics. I don’t know how they get any grades. Their level of
education is very, very low.”(DU)

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“The young scientists we get are—excuse me for saying so—
unformed material, who either want to get out of the army
(because our staff and graduate students are exempt from the
army) or have some other motivation, or just have nowhere else to
go. Or they cannot do anything else except enter our institute—no
firm will hire them because they are dawdlers. … You see, we get
the leftovers.”(OB)
The groups also complained about bureaucratic obstacles to their
work. These come in various guises. One group emphasized the Russian
government’s new export control policies, which some participants find
excessive and burdensome to comply with:
“A negative development is that now we have to send all publica-
tions and authorization materials to Minatom. The bureaucracy
has grown and now we have export control. There are new
branches that work on this, and the people who create intellectual
property are obliged to jump through all these new bureaucratic
hoops, including export control. All this makes it harder to get
work done.”(OB)
Another (M1) cited growth of bureaucracy within his institute, which he
attributed to the increasing complexity and indeterminacy of the system
for financing science. In the past, the State gave the institute a certain sum
of money, which the institute director then handed out according to his
criteria. Today, new regulations require scientists to write reports justifying
how the money will be spent before receiving funding:
“The system of expenditures they have introduced in our institute
is completely inappropriate, because we are not allowed to oper-
ationally change or re-allocate the money we have. Let’s say we
need some money for repairs. They say to us: ‘there is no line for
this in the budget.’ That’s it! We need money for this, but there is
no line in the budget. The money is there somewhere, and we are
willing to allocate it, but there is no line in the budget. … Now there
are dozens of budget lines, all of which have to be stipulated in
advance. But we do not know in advance what we will need. Say
that tomorrow the roof starts to leak, and we have to fill a hole
there. That costs money. … The system of expenditure should be
more flexible and liberal.”(M1)
More importantly, from the perspective of assessing whether Russian
scientists have embraced new norms, participants voiced a variety of
criticisms of grant-based financing. For instance, some took the flip side of
the view that grant-based financing is more meritocratic: they decried the
inequality that it produces among scientists and among research groups
(though they usually appeared to accept it with some resignation): “Some

THE STATE OF RUSSIAN SCIENCE
203
[scientific] collectives receive a great deal of financing, others receive very
little. Well, you can’t do anything about it, we have entered a market
system. But I still consider this a negative. … Yes, we absolutely have begun
to experience inequality.”(OB)
To some, grants and contracts inherently subordinate scientific to
commercial considerations and lead to the abandonment of fundamental
science in favor of applied research: “[Western funds] won’t give anything
for ideas, [they] will only support a concrete undertaking, something that
Western participants need or the production of some kind of special
materials.”(M1) The putative emphasis on applied work leads scientists to
propose projects that they think will be funded rather than those that most
interest them:
“Well, let’s say I propose some sort of technique for processing
uranium—that will be of interest [to Western funds]. But if I
propose a theory of fields with multiple time dimensions, they will
say ‘why don’t you work on that in your spare time?’”(DU)
“I would like to work on something that is good for my soul, good
for science, but in order to feed myself and my colleagues I am
obliged to work on topics that are given to me, that foundations
will pay for.”(DU)
The necessity of continually writing new proposals and submitting
reports and accounting statements distracts from scientific work: “On top
of everything else, we are now obliged to engage in bookkeeping activi-
ties!”(M2) These problems stem from the institute’s lack of resources to hire
staff who specialize in grant administration. Another downside results
from the need to attract multiple grants in order to economically support
a laboratory: “There is another problem associated with the lack of financ-
ing: proliferation of research projects (mnogotem’ye). Because projects are
generally poorly financed, a lab with, say, 15 people will be working on 20
projects at the same time.”(OB) In the view of some, the quality of scientific
work suffers as a result: “On the one hand, people are overburdened with
work; on the other, the quality of the work naturally suffers. I sense we are
starting to do poorer-quality work—we’re doing much more, but
worse.”(M2)
Some see ulterior motives on the part of Western funding sources. For
example, one participant believes Western grant programs are designed to
accomplish “the transfer of technological innovations.”(DU) As an illustra-
tion, he described a Western-funded project in which the Russian team
developed a new technique for processing beryllium plates. The Western
partners got to make use of the technique and reap vast profits, while the
Russian team got only the short-term benefit of the grant. Other partici-
pants recounted, often with some emotion, stories which they believe
demonstrate that the intellectual products generated by Russian scientists
are effectively “stolen” by Western partners (DU, M1). Not that they object

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in principle to the selling of Russian scientific know-how: “You know, the
bad thing is that [our ideas] are sold well below their value. It would be
fine if they were sold for what they are worth, but the way things are now,
it is a form of robbery.”(DU)
An M1 participant claimed that Western foundations exploit Russian
science by gathering vital information about the capacities of Russian
scientists: “They don’t mind not getting a financial return, because they get
much more valuable information about the potential of our scientists in
various areas. Therefore, both sides profit, but they actually profit more.”
Finally, an OB described an opinion—which he and other recipients of
Western grants do not share—that foreign foundations “engage in intelli-
gence activities and purchase very valuable information from Russian
scientists on the cheap.”(OB)
Many wished that the Russian government provided all the funds
necessary for scientific research. If the state raised the level of science
financing, then all the key problems—low prestige, recruitment issues,
aging equipment—would be solved. One interviewee expressed the view
that scientists deserve state support regardless of whether their results
have practical value:
“Scientists are, to put it simply, an elite within our state. Therefore,
the government should just support us, regardless of whether our
science has any use. A scientist needs to think, to live in his world;
he should not have to spend time looking for orders and contracts,
because his task is not to seek clients for his work but to live in the
world of abstraction, to occasionally create something useful from
this world.”(OB)
Others, particularly in the M1 group, complained about the absence of
a coherent state plan for the development of science. Without firm state
direction of the country’s scientific endeavors, only chaos and confusion
could result in science.
But even though many participants may like the idea of state support
for science with no strings attached, none seem to hold out much hope that
a resurgence of state financing to Soviet-era levels is in the cards. Instead,
they exhibited a sense of disappointment and betrayal when talking about
their treatment by the Russian state:
“It is of course very painful. Painful. After all, we had a paternal-
istic state—a state, you understand, which was both our mother
and our father and everything for us. You understand what I mean
by these terms. And suddenly, for the last 10 years, instead of a
paternalistic figure the state turns out to be more like the step-
mother or stepfather who does not like you at all. It was a complete
turnaround. I don’t know what my colleagues think, but in my
mind it was a complete reversal. And you start to feel very uncom-

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205
fortable when you realize that you are working but the state does
not reward you for it. It is a very strong break.”(M2)
Fatalistic acceptance of the new environment is also evident in this
participant’s lament:
“We have made the transition—rightly or wrongly—to the path
that is typical of the West and the United States in particular, where
you work on one contract then move somewhere else and work on
something completely different. In my opinion, the system we
used to have was much more favorable for the development of
science as such—where a person focused on one thing for his
whole life. That was a much better system, and that is why soon
we will not have any more science.”(M1)
Like it or not—and many of them do not—our participants appear to accept
that financing based on grants and contracts will remain an essential source
of funding for research.
“Science is, to some extent, being transformed, and it will turn into
an area of production (proizvodstva), when everything will be
regimented, where the possibilities for the scientific search will be
sharply curtailed. We will write beautiful proposals and receive
money for our projects. That is, Russian science is now on the path
of Western science itself. All financing comes through the frame-
work of projects.”(M2)
If such sentiments are widespread among Russian scientists—and we
cannot say whether they are without large-scale survey data—they consti-
tute strong evidence of that Russia’s science transition is under way.
Social Conscience?
The soacial conscience of Russian scientists can directly affect whether
they would be willing to sell their expertise to rogue states in order to earn
money. If Russian scientists believe strongly that researchers bear some
responsibility for how their work is used, they might exert normative
pressure on their colleagues not to work for unsavory clients. To get at this
topic, we asked the participants if they think that scientists have any
particular social responsibility.
Theirreactions and answers were quite revealing. All four groups were
at first palpably perplexed and discomfited by the question. Two
responded with a deafening silence, two others with outright suspicion—
for example, one participant in the DU group hastily declared that now
was the time for him to take a cigarette break (he was persuaded to stay).
Rather than respond to requests for clarification, the moderator asked
participants to interpret the question as they saw fit. Some focused on
professional ethics, noting that scientists have not only a responsibility, but

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also an interest never to falsify results or otherwise deceive their clients.
Others referred to a general duty to do work for the benefit of society. One
participant noted that nuclear physicists disagree with the view pro-
pounded by the “greens” that they are responsible for destroying the
environment: to the contrary, physicists believe that nuclear power makes
a valuable contribution to humanity and to preservation of resources. (OB)
But in each group, some respondents eventually discerned the intent
behind the question. In no case did they agree that a scientist bears moral
responsibility for the use to which his or her work is put. To the M1 group,
this is a matter of personal conscience, not one of general moral standards.
The M2 group concurred with the following view:
“I don’t think that these days scientists or anybody else spends a
lot of time trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. But
unfortunately, it often turns out that one starts off with a certain
objective and ends up achieving something different. … It is very
hard to pinpoint the moment when the researcher can say: ‘that’s
enough, we cannot work any further on this theme because of
where it will lead us.’ Not just in physics, but in all branches of
science we often don’t know where our work will lead us. All these
secondary applications appear along the path, and sometimes the
final result is not evident. Therefore it is very hard to understand
where you should stop.”(M2)
In contrast to this rather abstract, evasive approach, the DU group
rallied around a very concrete disavowal of the idea that the scientist bears
responsibility for how his work is used:
“[Participant 3] It seems to me that everything now is determined
by money and salary. There are no moral or ethical considerations,
and there have not been for a long time. When people are stealing
billions, it is a joke to even suggest such considerations.
[Moderator] I am asking what you think about responsibility.
[Participant 1] Well, for example, let’s say someone from some
foundation approaches me and says: ‘I’ll pay you 1000 dollars if
you do this for me, some kind of process or technology. I do it and
I understand that this person could take it and use it …
[Participant 3] … for military purposes …
[Participant 1] … and apply it as a weapon of mass destruction. On
the other hand, he could also use it as a medicine. Naturally, he
comes to me and says: make it for me as a medicine. I am not going
to think about the fact that he might bury 20 million people with
it, right?
[Participant 4] Of course not!
[Participant 1] I’m going to give it to him as a medicine, because
he bears responsibility for how it used. … If I know that he could
kill 20 million people with one gram, I am not going to think about

THE STATE OF RUSSIAN SCIENCE
207
it. He asked me to make it as a medicine, so I’m not going to think
about the other use. …
[Moderator] So, if you see that it can be used as a weapon of mass
destruction, then you, all the same, will do the work on the medi-
cine, knowing that it can be used …
[All participants] Absolutely!”(DU)
The OB group agreed that money is the scientist’s overriding concern:
“I don’t know; for me personally—this may sound rude—a scientist is
something of a prostitute. He works on the themes that he is paid to work
on. There is no moral choice there.”(OB) They also spoke of the need to deal
honestly with clients. More generally, their complaints about the system of
export control might reflect a perception that politicians have gone too far
in limiting the freedom of scientists to take on any clients they want. In
another discussion, they appeared to view the restrictions on the export of
nuclear technology to Arab countries posed by the threat of terrorism as
something of a nuisance, rather than an important aspect of international
security.
If the focus groups offer a representative picture of how Russian
scientists think about such matters, it appears that their professional ethics
do not include a sense of moral responsibility for how their work is used.
Unfortunately, this suggests that we cannot rely on professional ethics to
dissuade Russian scientists from peddling their expertise to clients with
terrorist or criminal motives.
CONCLUSION: FACING THE CHALLENGES
TO SCIENCE IN TRANSITION
In the absence of an ethical/moral barrier to the diffusion of Russian
scientists’ weapons-related expertise, it is all the more essential for inter-
national security that Russia’s science crisis be reversed. Our focus groups
strongly suggest that the transition necessary for this to happen has com-
menced. At the very least, the “science in crisis” image is obsolete. Partic-
ipants did report continuing frustration at the loss of state financing, the
difficulties of attracting good-quality new recruits to science, and the
growth of bureaucracy. They are troubled by some aspects of financing
based on grants and contracts. But they also pointed to positive changes in
Russian science in recent years, many of them tied to the availability of
those same Western grants and contracts, greatly improved exchanges with
the international scientific community, and a newfound stability in their
institutes’ financial situation.
It is important, but tricky, to determine whether the enthusiastic
sentiments in our groups predominated over the negative views or vice-
versa. Two pieces of evidence suggest that overall, our participants accen-
tuate the positive. First, we asked participants whether they had recently
considered leaving science or emigrating. None said that they ever seri-
ously thought about leaving science. A few said that at some point in the

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last decade they had thought about trying to find work abroad, but even
those abandoned the idea. They spoke eloquently of the deep satisfaction
that doing original, independent, creative scientific work gives them. A few
participants suggested that they were too old to learn a new trade or seek
work abroad. The interviews left the impression that the sentiment is
widely shared by the participants:
“From the start, scientific work was simply very interesting: you
are a young scholar, you are doing something, researching some-
thing, and yet get some kind of results. They please you, and you
get great satisfaction from them. Then, everything around us
started to crash, and everybody faced a decision: to remain or not
to remain in science. Well, by then, in fact, age played a role, for
me and for my colleagues. It was a bit too late to start up in finance
or in trade or something, so we stayed in science. Moreover, if there
had been absolutely no financing at all [for science], then probably
we would have left. But since there were, all the same, some
possibilities, we tried to adapt to current conditions and continue
the activities we had been undertaking. And now I like doing
science more and more.”(M1)
Several also said specifically that emigration did not appeal to them. They
referred to acquaintances who had taken up scientific work abroad and
were very unhappy, or they cited an unwillingness to leave their friends,
family, and colleagues in Russia.
There is a second reason for concluding that the positive sentiments of
our group participants outweighed their negative sentiments. Despite
having just spent the better part of two hours discussing the difficulties
facing Russian science, only 5 of the 19 participants listed problems per-
taining specifically to science as one of the three most pressing problems
facing the country, in response to an open question on the brief survey they
completed after the session.
The positive balance of assessments in the focus groups gives us
grounds for hope that Russian science has moved from a state of crisis to
transition. The persistence of certain “old” norms testifies not to the
absence of a transition in science, but to its inevitably drawn-out and
uneven nature. We can hardly expect a normative reorientation to take
place rapidly, especially when institutional change in Russian science has
been slow, apart from the advent of grant-based financing and open
international travel. Inevitably, the fortunes of individual scientists will
continue to diverge radically, as some are better positioned than others—
because of ability, luck, or a combination of both—to take advantage of the
new emphasis on work with practical, profitable applications. Many scien-
tists who lose out in the process will be discouraged and blame the reforms.
But the key to the positive development of Russian science is not to make
all scientists happy—which is neither possible, given limited resources, nor

THE STATE OF RUSSIAN SCIENCE
209
even desirable—but to provide a structure of incentives that offers hope to
those most energetic and capable.
If Russian science has survived its most severe crisis and is now on a
path of transition to a different, perhaps “leaner and meaner” footing, it is
at least in some measure because of Western grants and contracts and
access to Western colleagues. Now is certainly not the time to diminish
efforts to shift Russian science to a market-based, civilian-oriented, inter-
nationally integrated footing. The US should continue to provide selective
financial support for Russian scientists on a competitive basis, emphasiz-
ing those proposals that have potential commercial applications. For its
part, the Russian government would help matters by refraining from
policies that seek to isolate Russian scientists from foreigners, such as the
Academy of Science regulation issued in June 2001 that scientists had to
report all contacts with foreigners. It should also demonstrate to scientists
that it values their work by honoring its public commitment to finance
science at the level of 4 percent of the annual budget, especially now that
the economy is growing. But the lion’s share of this financing should not
be handed out in the form of block grants to institutes or via the Academy
of Sciences. Instead, the majority of state funding should be distributed on
competitive principles. A share should also be devoted to promoting the
research capabilities of university departments, in order to improve pros-
pects for recruiting a new generation of top quality specialists.20 Instituting
special grants for young specialists also might contribute to this end.
We do not wish to create an overly optimistic impression. Russian
science has suffered severe blows since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Many serious obstacles remain to its successful resurgence. As long as its
difficulties continue, so will the threat to international security. No amount
of scholarly research can precisely assess the magnitude of this threat. But
as more research on the actual orientations of Russian scientists becomes
available, we believe that the “science in crisis” perspective should and will
give way to a more complex but more accurate picture of the transition
under way in Russian science—and a better sense of how to facilitate it.
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