Full text of DOI:10.2307/798060

Reagan and the Gorbachev Revolution:
Perceiving the End of Threat
BARBARA FARNHAM
The Reagan administration came into ofŽce in 1981 “with the most
1
avowed anticommunist crusading policy in two decades.” For President Ron-
ald Reagan, this policy reected a profound sense of threat that was deeply
rooted in his Žrm convictions about the nature of communism in general and
the Soviet Union in particular. Yet by the end of his second term, Reagan had
substantially revised his view of this threat and accepted the possibility of work-
ing with the Soviet Union in the interests of peace. He had been transformed
from an “essentialist,” who believed that the Soviet Union was governed by an
ideology that put no limits on what it could justiŽably do to gain its ends of
“
absolute power and a communist world,” to an “interactionist,” who saw the
conict between the Soviet Union and the United States in terms of mutual
2
misperception. He was hopeful about the possibility of substantial change.
This presents us with a puzzle, because the psychological literature strongly
3
suggests that central beliefs are altered only with great difŽculty, if at all. Since
1
Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold
War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), 1.
2
Ibid., 767–769. As Thomas Banchoff has observed, no postwar U.S. administration has “altered
its view of the threat as signiŽcantly as the Reagan administration between 1981 and 1988.” Thomas
Banchoff, “OfŽcial Threat Perceptions in the 1980s: the United States” in Carl-Christoph Schweitzer,
ed., The Changing Analysis of the Soviet Threat (New York: St. Martin Press, 1990), 82.
3
As Janice Stein has put it, “Cognitive psychologists suggest that stability is the default position
and change the exception.” (Emphasis in original.) Janice Gross Stein, “Political Learning by Doing:
Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner,” International Organization 111 (Spring
1994): 163.
BARBARA FARNHAM is senior associate at the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia
University. She is the author of Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-Making
and editor of Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conict. A longer and
more fully documented version of this article will appear in Good Judgment and Foreign Policy, which
is forthcoming from Roman & LittleŽeld Publishers.
Political Science Quarterly Volume 116 Number 2 2001
225

2
26 j political science quarterly
people tend to interpret new information in the light of what they already be-
lieve, they are likely to be slow to change their views, and those most committed
4
to their beliefs will have the most difŽculty revising them. This suggests that
decision makers may not always be responsive to changes in the nature or level
of threat. Yet, as Reagan’s behavior demonstrates, they do sometimes over-
come their cognitive limitations to make fairly accurate assessments of threat.
What enables these decision makers to reevaluate threat successfully while oth-
ers remain prisoners of their predispositions?
The question is particularly intriguing in view of the numerous criticisms
that have been leveled at Reagan’s cognitive abilities. According to one ob-
server, for example, he was intellectually shallow and inconsistent, superŽcially
5
attached to different and not necessarily compatible beliefs. Moreover, David
Stockman gives us a picture of the President as both ignorant of the complexi-
6
ties of policy and profoundly muddled, while others note his lack of analytical
ability, lack of curiosity, and legendary dislike of detail, which, combined with
7
his ignorance of many issues, put him at the mercy of his advisers. Richard
Neustadt has remarked on Reagan’s unfortunate habit of “combining igno-
rance and insistence” (incuriosity about details together with deep commitment
8
to his convictions), which provided fertile soil for such Žascos as the Iran-contra
9
scandal. Clearly, Reagan’s success in perceiving and responding to the changes
in Soviet policy, especially when many others did not, needs to be explained.
4
See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1976), chap. 7; Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds (Stanford, CA: Stan-
ford University Press, 1990), 113–27; and Deborah Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press), 32–34.
5
Keith L. Shimko, Images and Arms Control: Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan Admin-
istration (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 236–37, 239–41, 246–47.
6
Richard Neustadt has collected a number of the references that convey Stockman’s view. Richard
E. Neustadt, “Presidents, Politics, and Analysis” (Brewster C. Denney Lecture Series, Institute of Pub-
lic Management, Graduate School of Public Affairs, University of Washington, 13 May 1986), 17. Oth-
ers who note Reagan’s ignorance and lack of curiosity in matters of policy are Shimko, Images, 245–46;
Lou Cannon, Reagan (New York: G. Putnam’s Sons, 1982), 372–73; Lou Cannon, President Reagan
(
New York: Simon and Shuster, 1991), 130; Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, Presidential
Personality and Performance (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1988), 224; Richard E. Neustadt, Presi-
dential Power and the Modern Presidents (New York: Free Press, 1990), 270, 276; Michael Mandelbaum
and Strobe Talbott, Reagan and Gorbachev (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 128–29.
7
George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 1133; Martin
Anderson, Revolution (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1988), 289–91; Robert C. McFarlane, Special Trust
(
New York: Cadell and Davies, 1994), 106; Larry Speakes, Speaking Out (New York: Charles Scrib-
ner’s Sons, 1988), 67, 304; Cannon, Reagan, 375; Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference (New
York: Free Press, 2000), 146, 149; Larry Berman, “Looking Back at the Reagan Presidency” in Larry
Berman, ed., Looking Back on the Reagan Presidency (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1
990), 5; Cannon, President Reagan, 55, 181–82, 304. Reagan’s ignorance of nuclear matters is particu-
larly striking, 291–92, 305.
8
Neustadt, Presidential Power, 270, 276, 280; see also Gary Wills, Reagan’s America (New York:
Penguin, 1988), 286, 380.
9
Neustadt, Presidential Power, 270–71, 287, 290.

reagan and the gorbachev revolution j 227
Baseline 1981–1984: Reagan’s Initial Perception of the Threat
Showing that President Reagan’s understanding of the threat to American se-
curity changed in response to the changes in Soviet policy instituted by Mikhail
Gorbachev requires establishing a baseline. How did Reagan perceive the
threat initially? What were his beliefs about its source and nature, and what
evidence did he use to support them?
The Soviet Threat
From the beginning of his presidency and long before, Ronald Reagan believed
that the Soviet Union was the prime source of threat to American security, a
10
threat so pervasive and limitless that it was almost existential. For Reagan,
the Soviets threatened all the basic values of the United States and were behind
1
1
“
all the unrest that is going on” in the world. Moreover, these beliefs were
12
long-standing and deeply rooted. The only mitigating factor in Reagan’s anal-
ysis of the Soviet Union was a tendency to distinguish the Soviet people from
13
their leaders, plus an occasional reference to mutual suspicion fueling the
arms race and U.S.–Soviet conict, along with the suggestion that this might be
14
mitigated by increased communication.
Reagan’s sense of threat was compounded by fundamental mistrust based
on what he saw as the Soviet Union’s “record of deceit and its long history of
betrayal of international treaties.” This he claimed “could be found in the writ-
ings of Soviet leaders: It had always been their philosophy that it was moral to
lie or cheat for the purpose of advancing Communism. . . . [T]hey had told us,
15
without meaning to, that they couldn’t be trusted.” Reagan saw the threat
posed by the Soviet Union as broad and all-encompassing, political as well as
10
The term “existential threat” has been used by Daniel Lieberfeld to connote a threat to basic
security or national existence. Daniel Lieberfeld, Talking with the Enemy (Westport, CT: Praeger,
999); see also Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1900), 265; Frances
1
Fitzgerald, Way Out in the Blue (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 30–31; interview with Walter
Cronkite, 3 March 1981, cited in Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End
of the Cold War (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997).
11
Speech in March 1983, cited in Banchoff. “OfŽcial Threat,” 87–88; campaign speech, June 1980,
cited in Garthoff, Great Transition, 12.
12
See Reagan, American, 14; Garthoff, Great Transition, 12–13; Betty Glad “Black-and-White
Thinking: Ronald Reagan’s Approach to Foreign Policy,” Political Psychology 4 (March 1983): 44–46,
7; Fischer, Reagan, 81–2; and Shimko, Images, 101, 120.
6
13
As Shimko points out, however, the Soviet government “was assumed not to reect the desires
of its people.” Ibid., 146.
1
4
Ibid., 372, 374.
15
Reagan, American, 14, 267. See also Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York:
Harper Collins, 1993), 159. Garthoff, Great Transition, 8; Glad, “Black and White,” 45; and Banchoff,
OfŽcial Threat,” 88. Shimko distinguishes between hardline images which virtually the whole admin-
“
istration held and inherent bad faith enemy images which only some, like Caspar Weinberger and
Richard Perle, shared with Reagan. Images, 233.

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28 j political science quarterly
military. “[G]uided by a policy of immoral and unbridled expansionism,” and
16
following a pattern set by Lenin, the Soviet Union was advancing “all over
17
the world” with the goal of promoting revolution. It was thus a threat to the
18
security of the free world on all fronts. Not only was it the malign force behind
all national liberation movements, it was also the sponsor of international ter-
19
rorism and a signiŽcant threat to human rights.
As evidence of the Soviet threat, Reagan pointed to both intentions and
capabilities. His interpretation of Soviet intentions was highly ideological. In
January 1981, he told reporters that he did not “‘have to think of an answer
as to what their intentions are’ because all Soviet leaders since the Revolution
had ‘more than once repeated . . . their determination that their goal must be
the promotion of world revolution and a one-world socialist or Communist
20
state. . . .’” Reagan’s view of the capability side of the equation had two as-
pects: his perception of Soviet strength and his fears about American weakness.
His overall assessment of Soviet capabilities was, again, heavily ideological,
combining the conviction that the Soviets held a short-run advantage over the
United States with a belief in their inevitable failure over the long term owing
to their ideological blinders.
Reagan began his presidency convinced that because of a massive offensive
military buildup in the 1970s (“the largest and costliest military buildup in the
history of man”), the Soviet Union enjoyed “a deŽnite margin of superiority
21
over the United States,” with all the ominous consequences this entailed.
However, this superiority was not to endure. Not only could the United States
correct the imbalance with a military buildup of its own, but also the Soviet
system itself was inherently weak. BrieŽngs during the campaign and once in
ofŽce had convinced Reagan that “the Soviet economy was in even worse shape
than I’d realized. I had always believed that, as an economic system, Commu-
nism was doomed. . . . Now, the economic statistics and intelligence reports I
was getting . . . were revealing tangible evidence that Communism as we knew
1
1
6
7
Reagan, American, 548, 239, 265–68.
Cited in Garthoff, Great Transition, 14, 22; Shimko, Images, 103–104; Fischer, Reagan, 19–20. On
the administration’s view of the political and military threat, see Banchoff. “OfŽcial Threat,” 83–87.
1
1
2
8
9
0
Garthoff, Great Transition, 20; see also Banchoff, “OfŽcial Threat,” 88.
Reagan, American, 238–39; Garthoff, Great Transition, 19–20, 24, 26.
Cited in ibid., 8. See also Shimko, Images, 106, 235; and Reagan’s remarks in his press conference
in March 1981, cited in Banchoff, “OfŽcial Threat,” 87. For more on the ideological basis of Reagan’s
views about Soviet intentions, see Garthoff, Great Transition, 33, 98; Edwin Meese, With Reagan.
(
Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1992), 164, 169; Oberdorfer. Turn, 90; and Soviet Ambassador
Dobrynin’s account of Secretary of State George Shultz’s description of Reagan as “stubborn and ideo-
logically unprepared for agreements with the Russians.” See Anatoly Dobrynin, In ConŽdence (New
York: Random House, 1995), 81. See also Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom
(
London: Sinclair-Stevenson Ltd., 1991), 81.
2
1
Reagan, American, 294; Garthoff, Great Transition, 41; see also Fischer, Reagan, 20; Shimko, Im-
age, 102–103, 108–111; Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 34;
Oberdorfer, Turn, 32; and McFarlane, Special Trust, 218.

reagan and the gorbachev revolution j 229
it was approaching the brink of collapse. . . . The Soviet economy was . . . a
22
basket case, partly because of massive spending on armaments.”
In the short run, however, the Soviet Union was exceedingly dangerous—in
part because of American shortcomings. That is to say, the Soviet threat was
magniŽed by U.S. military weakness and a loss of resolve that could only be
23
cured by an American military buildup. Reagan began such a buildup almost
immediately after taking ofŽce by requesting a huge increase in the defense
24
budget. As to the loss of American resolve, Reagan believed that in the late
970s the United States “. . . had begun to abdicate [its] historical role as the
1
spiritual leader of the Free World and its foremost defender of democracy.
Some of our resolve was gone, along with a part of our commitment to uphold
the values we cherished.” In line with their malevolent intentions, the Soviets
25
“
had tried to exploit [this weakness] to the fullest.”
The Nuclear Threat
As serious as the Soviet threat was, it was far from being the only one. Reagan
believed that the mere existence of nuclear weapons put Americans equally at
risk. He was dismayed that American defense policy placed “our entire faith
in a weapon whose fundamental target was the civilian population.” He was ap-
palled by the possible consequences, observing that, “Even if a nuclear war did
not mean the extinction of mankind, it would certainly mean the end of civiliza-
tion as we knew it. . . . [A]s long as nuclear weapons were in existence, there
would always be risks they would be used, and once the Žrst nuclear weapon
26
was unleashed, who knew where it would end?”
27
Reagan had adopted these beliefs well before he became president. They
accorded with his religious ideas about the coming of Armageddon, and they
were exacerbated by his realization in 1979 after a visit to NORAD (North
American Aerospace Defense Command) that no defense against nuclear mis-
22
Reagan, American, 237–38; Meese, With Reagan, 164–65, 169. See also Garthoff, Great Transition,
1; Shimko, Images, 142–44; Fitzgerald, Way Out, 175, n. 106.
1
23
Reagan, American, 294–95. See also, Weinberger on his Žrst meeting with the President-elect,
Fighting, 34–35; McFarlane, Special, 218–19; Shimko, Images, 102, 144; Fischer, Reagan, 26.
24
This buildup, according to Garthoff, “had been decided on before obtaining requests from the
military services—it was intended to signal the strong resolve of the new administration to build (“re-
build”) military strength. . . .” Garthoff, Great Transition, 33. As Garthoff also notes, despite the fact
that in 1983 the Scowcroft Commission report refuted the idea of a “window of vulnerability” for the
United States and the CIA found no spending gap between the United States and the Soviet Union,
the military buildup continued. Moreover, at least some members of the administration (Weinberger,
Perle) exaggerated the Soviet threat in order to gain support for that buildup, 33, 504.
2
5
Reagan, American, 266; see also Shimko, Images, 103.
Reagan, American, 549, 550. (Italics in original.) See also Shultz, Turmoil, 246.
See, for example, his speech to the Republican national convention in 1976. Anderson, Revolu-
26
27
tion, 71–72; Neustadt, Presidential Power, 277.

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30 j political science quarterly
28
siles existed. Moreover, his nuclear fears were only reinforced by the brieŽngs
29
he received after he became president.
Reagan’s plan for dealing with the nuclear threat was two-pronged. First
of all his “dream . . . became a world free of nuclear weapons.” However, recog-
nizing that this would not be easily achieved, he also dreamed of creating “a
defense against nuclear missiles, so we could change from a policy of assured
30
destruction to one of assured survival.” This dream, of course, was trans-
formed into the (in)famous Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a policy to which
31
Reagan clung tenaciously throughout his presidency. Reagan’s commitment
to both dreams is clearly shown in the discussion below of his negotiations with
Gorbachev. However, even before Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet
Union, Reagan’s apprehension about nuclear weapons was reected in his at-
tempts in 1983–1984 to negotiate with the Russians.
Pre-Gorbachev Changes in Tone and Policy
Toward the end of President Reagan’s Žrst term, a shift occurred in his tone and
32
policies that had little to do with Soviet behavior. This represented a change in
emphasis from the Soviet side of Reagan’s sense of threat to the nuclear side;
it did not, however, signal a substantive change in his core beliefs about the
Soviet Union. Early in 1983, Reagan began to show an interest in improving
relations with the Soviet Union. In February, despite the anticipated (and later
openly expressed) opposition of his National Security staff, Secretary of De-
33
fense Caspar Weinberger, and the head of the CIA, William Casey, Reagan
agreed to Secretary of State George Shultz’s suggestion that he meet with So-
viet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. After the meeting, Shultz was sufŽciently
“
impressed and reassured” by Reagan’s performance to push ahead with his
plan to “design a broader and longer-term approach to U.S.-Soviet relations to
34
put before the president,” and to get him “heavily engaged.”
2
8
Fischer, Reagan, 106–108; Anderson, Revolution, 80–83; Oberdorfer, Turn, 25–26, 67; Shultz, Tur-
moil, 261–62. On Reagan’s beliefs about Armegeddon, see Edmund Morris, Dutch (New York: Ran-
dom House, 1999), 632–33. Fitzgerald views the NORAD story as a dramatization of Reagan’s long-
standing horror of nuclear weapons, with Reagan himself at the center of the drama as an “American
Everyman.” See Fizgerald, Way Out, 20–29.
2
3
3
9
0
1
Weinberger, Fighting, 341; Reagan, American, 550.
Ibid., 550.
Shultz, Turmoil, 260–64; Garthoff, Great Transition, 99. See also Thatcher, Downing Street, 463,
4
66. For Reagan’s interest in strategic defense between 1979 and 1983, when he announced his program
to the American people, see Anderson, Revolution, 75–76, 84–88, 93–97.
3
2
As Garthoff points out, in the Žrst eight months of 1983, Soviet leaders sought without success
to engage the United States in serious arms control negotiation. Great Transition, 111. See also Alexan-
der M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan,1984), 131.
3
3
Shultz, Turmoil, 159, 164–66, 267; Jack F. Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire (New York, Random
House, 1995), 77; Oberdorfer, Turn, 16; Garthoff, Great Transition, 104.
3
4
Shultz, Turmoil, 164–65; Oberdorfer, Turn, 16–17. See also Reagan, American, 572. For develop-
ments in spring and summer 1983, see Matlock, Autopsy, 79. For Reagan’s own view of the matter,

reagan and the gorbachev revolution j 231
The culmination of the president’s inclinations and the secretary’s efforts
was a speech on 16 January 1984 in which Reagan stressed negotiation and dia-
logue, rather than confrontation, and a common interest in avoiding war and
reducing “the level of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course
35
which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition.” In another
major change, Reagan acknowledged for the Žrst time that “most [Third
World] conicts have their origins in local problems” and emphasized the need
36
to “reduce the risk of U.S.–Soviet confrontation in these areas.” While these
conciliatory gestures were clearly a departure from his previous stance, how-
ever the president was far from abandoning the negative themes he had
sounded earlier. Throughout 1984 both Reaganand members of his administra-
37
tion continued to refer to the Soviet Union as a threat.
How can we explain this combination of conciliatory gestures and negative
rhetoric? Possibly it was simply an expression of what Don Oberdorfer has
38
called the “dichotomous nature of Reagan’s views” about the Soviet Union.
However, while there is considerable evidence of Reagan’s dichotomous think-
ing, we need to understand why in 1984 he chose increasingly to stress the co-
operative side.
Heightened Sense of Nuclear Threat
A number of factors came together for the president in late 1983 that may have
triggered this shift in emphasis. To begin with, a series of events occurred high-
39
lighting the danger of nuclear weapons. The Žrst of these was the Soviet down-
ing in September1983 of a Korean airliner that had strayed into Soviet air space
see Reagan. American, 572. For developments in the spring and summer of 1983, see also, Matlock,
Autopsy, 79.
35
“
Soviet-American Relations,” 16 January 1984, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
20 (23 January 1984): 41. For references of this sort to common interests in 1983 and 1985, see Keith
L. Shimko, “Reagan on the Soviet Union and the Nature of International Conict,” Political Psychol-
ogy 13 (September 1992): 371–72.
36
“
Soviet-American Relations,” 42. For an analysis of this speech, see also Garthoff, Great Transi-
tion, 142–44; and Dobrynin, In ConŽdence, 545. For an extremely optimistic view of the speech as
the “turning point in his administration’s approach to the Kremlin,” see Fischer, Reagan, 3–4, 32–38.
Throughout 1984, Reagan returned to many of the ideas expressed in this speech. Garthoff, Great
Transition, 152, 156, 161. For other conciliatory moves by Reagan and his administration, see Fischer.
Reagan, 40–45.
37
See, for example, his 2 June speech in Ireland, cited in Garthoff, Great Transition, 153, 154, 157,
60. These negative references culminated in the Republican party’s 1984 election platform, adopted
1
by a Reagan-controlled convention, which afŽrmed that “the Soviet Union’s globalist ideology and its
leadership obsessed with military power make it a threat to freedom and peace on every continent.”
38
Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: from the Cold War to a New Era, The United States and the Soviet
Union, 1983–1990 (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991), 22–23. See also the similar view of Assistant
Secretary of European and Canadian Affairs, Rozanne Ridgway in William C. Wohlforth, ed., Wit-
nesses to the End of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 18.
39
Fischer, Reagan, 109.

2
32 j political science quarterly
(KAL 007). While Reagan ultimately came to believe that the shooting down
of KAL 007 had been a mistake, he was extremely troubled by it, believing that
it “demonstrated how close the world had come to the precipice and how much
40
we needed nuclear arms control. . . .”
Alarming as the thought of an inadvertently triggered nuclear war was,
Reagan’s distress was compounded by other events that autumn that made him
“
aware of the need for the world to step back from the nuclear precipice.” The
Ž
rst of these was a television movie, “The Day After,” which graphically de-
41
picted the effects of a nuclear war and left the president “greatly depressed.”
Following hard on the heels of this distressing cinematic event, Reagan under-
went another “most sobering experience”—a brieŽng from the military on the
SIOP (single integrated operational plan) for U.S. strategy to deal with a nu-
clear attack. He later characterized this brieŽng as a “scenario for a sequence
of events that could lead to the end of civilization as we knew it. In several
ways, the sequence of events described in the brieŽngs paralleled those in the
42
ABC movie.”
The Žnal episode in this series of nuclear-related incidents was the after-
math of the extensive military exercise carried out by American and NATO
forces in November 1983 (Able Archer 83) to test procedures for using nuclear
weapons in the event of war. Although the exercise was ultimately scaled down,
it remained large enough to alarm the Soviets, causing some to think that the
United States was actually preparing a nuclear attack. First dismissed as “Soviet
scare tactics,” the intelligence reports eventually began to be taken seriously
43
within the administration, especially by the president. For the Žrst time
Reagan realized to his great surprise that the Soviet Union might actually feel
threatened by the United States. Thus, in November 1983, he determined to
communicate “outside the normal diplomatic channels” with Yuri Andropov,
the Soviet general secretary, conŽding in his diary that he felt that “the Soviets
are so defense minded, so paranoid about being attacked that without being in
any way soft on them, we ought to tell them no one here has any intention of
44
doing anything like that.”
4
0
Reagan, American, 584. See also Matlock’s view that “there was a serious concern, beginning
with President Reagan, about the lack of communication following KAL.” Wohlforth, Witnesses, 76.
Note that despite the fact that this incident had brought the nuclear threat to the fore, it also conŽrmed
Reagan’s view of the Soviet threat. Reagan, American, 585. For a more detailed account of this episode,
see Fischer, Reagan, 112–114; and Garthoff, Great Transition, 118–127, who also discusses Soviet re-
actions.
4
1
Reagan, American, 585; also Fischer, Reagan, 115–20.
Reagan, American, 585–86. Fischer offers a psychological explanation for the impact of these
4
2
events on Reagan, Reagan, 120–22.
4
3
Garthoff, Great Transition, 138–140; Oberdorfer, Turn, 66–67; and Fischer, Reagan, 122–34.
Reagan, American, 588–89; Thatcher, Downing Street, 324; Garthoff, Great Transition, 139, 142n;
4
4
Oberdorfer, Turn, 67; and Fischer, Reagan, 134–38. There is some evidence that Reagan held such
beliefs as early as 1982. See Shimko, Images, 107; and Shimko, “Reagan,” 365, 369–70. Reagan’s re-
newed sense of nuclear threat also heightened his interest in nuclear defense.

reagan and the gorbachev revolution j 233
Impact of the U.S. Military Buildup
A heightened sense of nuclear danger was not the only factor encouraging
Reagan’s move toward cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1983 and 1984.
Another was his perception that the success of the military buildup he had initi-
4
5
ated now allowed him to deal with the Soviets from a position of strength.
In that sense, the buildup was at least a permissive, and probably a necessary,
46
condition of his willingness to negotiate. Reagan himself testiŽed to this in his
memoirs. While declaring that the Soviets had not changed in their “addiction”
to “Lenin’s secular religion of expansionism and world domination,” he ob-
served that “something else had changed: I felt we could now go to the summit,
for the Žrst time in years, from a position of strength. . . .” This sense of re-
newed strength was also reected in Reagan’s speeches on 16 January and at
47
48
the United Nations on 24 September 1984.
Secretary Shultz and the 1984 Election
From the start, George Shultz believed that while it was necessary to be wary
of the Soviet Union, “we should also be ready to deal with the Soviets more
49
constructively if the opportunity arose.” Throughout 1983 and 1984 Shultz
persisted in his endeavor to get the president involved in such an approach,
peppering Reagan with memos on the subject and promoting opportunities for
dialogue between the president and, among others, Dobrynin and Andrei Gro-
myko. Despite the determined opposition of Weinberger, Casey, and most of
the National Security Council (NSC) staff, Shultz ultimately prevailed, winning
50
Reagan’s support.
We should remember, however, that Reagan, at least, believed the secre-
tary had been effective precisely because his views accorded with the presi-
dent’s own, while those of Shultz’s opponents (Weinberger, Casey, and Edwin
Meese) did not. As he conŽded in his diary in November1984,“. . . [the dispute]
45
Glad points out that Reagan harbored a long-standing belief that if confronted with strength and
aware that they could not win, the Soviets would give up and back down. “Black and White,” 64.
46
According to Robert Jervis, “. . . behavior is inuenced by leaders’ perceptions and beliefs about
their own nations (self-perceptions). A state that sees itself in decline is likely to see others and to
behave very differently from one that conceives of itself as continuing to be strong, if not dominant.”
Robert Jervis, “Perception and Misperception, and the End of the Cold War” in Wohlforth, Witnesses,
228. The putative success of his military buildup also allowed Reagan’s personal conŽdence in his own
abilities to come to the fore. Matlock, Autopsy, 77; Oberdorfer, Turn, 22.
47
Reagan, American, 594. (Italics in original.) See also Thatcher, DowningStreet, 324; and Garthoff,
Great Transition, 769.
48
“
Soviet American Relations,” 41. For the September UN speech, see Garthoff, Great Transition,
1
61. See also, McFarlane, In ConŽdence, 563; and Oberdorfer, Turn, 35–36.
49
Shultz, Turmoil, 6.
50
Ibid., 159–67, 265–70; Garthoff, Great Transition, 102–10; Reagan, American, 605–606; Matlock,
Autopsy, 77–78; Oberdorfer, Turn, 34–37; McFarlane, Sacred, 295.

2
34 j political science quarterly
is so out of hand George sounds like he wants out. I can’t let that happen. Actu-
51
ally George is of course carrying out my policy.”
Finally, some, although not Reagan himself, point to the impending 1984
presidential election as a motivating factor in his willingness to negotiate with
the Soviets on nuclear arms. According to Oberdorfer, Reagan was told by his
pollster, Richard Wirthlin, that his “most serious political vulnerability” was
52
the public’s fear that he would bring America into “an unnecessary war.”
Moreover, Raymond Garthoff contends on the basis of a “well-informed ad-
ministration source” that as early as the end of 1982 Reagan was thinking about
the need to improve relations with the Soviet Union in terms of the coming
campaign, and that this continued to play a role in administration planning
53
through the 1984 election. However, while the campaign may have inuenced
Reagan’s approach to the Soviet Union in 1984, it does not seem to have been
as important as the other factors, especially given the counter pressures from
the right against any such negotiations.
How are we to understand Reagan’s rhetorical and policy shifts toward the
Soviet Union in 1983 and 1984? Given his persistently negative view of the So-
viet Union, it is hard to see it as a serious alteration in his perception of the
Soviet threat, especially since the Soviets had not in fact changed their behav-
ior. Rather, it represented a change in emphasis from the Soviet threat to the
54
nuclear threat, triggered by a series of nuclear-related incidents and combined
with a more conŽdent self-assessment of U.S. military power, Secretary Shultz’s
initiatives, and the political needs growing out of the forthcoming election cam-
55
paign, all of which made him more receptive to negotiating with the Soviets.
There was, however, no radical change in Reagan’s core beliefs about the na-
ture of the Soviet Union and the threat that it posed to the United States. Fur-
ther change would, as even Jack Matlock (who was considered a moderate
within the administration) believed, have to wait until the Soviet Union itself
changed, “If the Soviet Union stayed as it was, we could hope only to manage
56
the mutual hostility, not to harmonize policies.” Fortunately, as it turned out,
such change was not as distant as most believed at the time.
5
5
5
1
2
3
Reagan, American, 606.
Oberdorfer, Turn, 52; see also Shultz, Turmoil, 270.
Garthoff, Great Transition, 102, 152; see also Reagan’s own allusion to the campaign and foreign
policy in American, 605.
5
4
On the basis of a psychological analysis, Beth Fischer argues that this shift represented a real
change in Reagan’s perception of threat. Reagan, 2–5, 135, 141, 146–56. The evidence presented above
shows otherwise. Reagan changed his emphasis and some policies, but his view of the Soviet threat
remained the same.
5
5
Greenstein also notes this combination in “Ronald Reagan,” 215.
Garthoff, Great Transition, 167; Oberdorfer, Turn, 23; Matlock, Autopsy, 80; Alexander Dallin,
5
6
“
Learning in U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union in the 1980s” in George W. Breslauer and Philip
E. Tetlock, Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 415.

reagan and the gorbachev revolution j 235
Gorbachev: Change and Response
Initial Overtures
The year 1985 began with a continuation of the “unsteady, gradual normaliza-
57
tion” of U.S.–Soviet relations of the previous year. When Mikhail Gorbachev
came to power as general secretary of the Communist party on 11 March 1985,
the reaction of the Reagan administration was subdued. Although Secretary
Shultz and Vice President George Bush had been favorably impressed by Gor-
58
bachev at their Žrst meeting, and although Reagan had proposed a summit
meeting and Gorbachev had responded positively, the president retained his
59
long-standing suspicion of anything Soviet. Five weeks after Gorbachev’s ac-
cession to power, Reagan noted in his diary that “Gorbachev will be as tough
as any of their leaders. If he wasn’t a conŽrmed ideologue, he never would have
been chosen by the Politiburo.” This meant, “We’d have to be as tough as ever
in dealing with the Soviets. . . .” Reagan also noted, however, that “we should
work hard to establish channels directly between Gorbachev and me through
quiet diplomacy.” In his public statements, he expressed the hope for “more
60
constructive relations.”
The Geneva Summit, 19–21 November 1985
Although he was not often acclaimed for his dedication to the brieŽng book,
Reagan’s preparations for the summit were extensive. As National Security
Adviser Robert McFarlane saw it, he was “clearly determined to be thoroughly
prepared for his Žrst meeting with a Soviet head of state. He worked hard, and
by the time he reached Geneva, was thoroughly in command of his brief.”
Moreover, his efforts were, at least in part, motivated by an extremely success-
ful meeting with the new Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnazde in
61
late September.
These experiences led to a partial change in Reagan’s rhetoric. Rather than
emphasize Soviet culpability for problems in the relationship, Reagan pointed
to “misunderstandings,” and in his speech to the nation just prior to the summit
he stressed his “mission for peace,” the need to reduce “suspicion and mistrust,”
and his belief that nuclear weapons were the real threat. As Reagan himself
57
Garthoff, Great Transition, 197. Nevertheless, Reagan’s Inaugural and State of the Union speeches
still stressed the Soviet threat and the consequent need for a U.S. buildup and SDI. Ibid., 201–202.
58
Shultz, Turmoil, 532; see also Garthoff, Great Transition, 207, n.27; and Thatcher’s widely quoted
assessment of Gorbachev as a “man we can do business with.” Downing Street, 463.
5
9
See Mandelbaum and Talbott, Reagan, 44.
Reagan, American, 615; Garthoff, Great Transition, 208. Nevertheless, he also “resumed crusad-
60
ing rhetoric, charges of Soviet untrustworthiness, and reafŽrmations of SDI,” 213.
61
McFarlane, Sacred, 308. McFarlane himself remembers working “harder, probably, than I ever
had or would again.” This included one hundred meetings with Reagan and eleven NSC meetings.
Ibid., 312. See also Oberdorfer, Turn, 142; and Garthoff, Great Transition, 234.

2
36 j political science quarterly
noted, “. . . once we’d agreed to hold a summit, I made a conscious decision to
tone down my rhetoric to avoid goading Gorbachev with remarks about the
6
2
‘
evil empire.’”
Ultimately, the Geneva summit yielded a number of beneŽts for both sides.
Reagan and Gorbachev “had come to like and respect each other,” and were
63
able to establish the basis for a working relationship. Certainly, this was true
of the president: “Reagan came out not convinced by Gobachev’s beliefs, but
respecting them. And he came out seeing Gorbachev as a person, a fellow poli-
tician . . . who had constraints just as he had, and if we could do it, he was willing
to try to Žnd a way around [those constraints]. So I think the impact of the
personal contact on Reagan was very substantial.” Gorbachev had been
humanized” for the president; he “had zeroed in on the character of the hu-
man being in the other chair, “admitting that the Soviet leader had deep convic-
64
“
65
66
tions of his own.” What is more, the feeling was mutual. Observers sensed a
“
personal chemistry” between the two leaders.
As an added beneŽt, according to Jack Matlock, Reagan came away with
a renewed sense of “conŽdence in his ability to convince,” which led “him to
67
take chances because he felt that the Soviet system could change.” Thus, while
the Geneva summit did not alter Reagan’s basic view of the Soviet threat, it
did represent a considerable step forward. As Reagan himself said on his return
to the United States, he and Gorbachev now “understand each other better. I
68
gained a better perspective; I feel he did too.” Moreover, while Gorbachev
69
has often been given much of the credit for the success of the summit, it was
Reagan who insisted on arranging more time for the private discussions that
70
went a long way to produce these positive effects.
Reykjavik Summit, 10–12 October 1986
During the Žrst six months of 1986, negotiations for the next summit failed to
prosper. Not until June did Reagan respond favorably to Gorbachev’s arms
6
2
Garthoff, Great Transformation, 235–37; “United States-Soviet Summit in Geneva, Address to
the Nation,” 14 November 1985, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 21 (18 November
985): 1399; Reagan, American, 628.
1
6
3
Shultz, Turmoil, 606; remarks of Rozanne Ridgway in Wohlforth, ed., Witnesses, 18; and Do-
brynin, In ConŽdence, 596.
6
4
Matlock in Wohlforth, ed., Witnesses, 22–23.
Shultz, Turmoil, 607; Dobrynin, In ConŽdence, 595; Shultz in Wohlforth, ed., Witnesses, 16; Ober-
6
5
dorfer, Turn, 54.
6
6
Shultz, Turmoil, 607, 606; Oberdorfer, Turn, 54; Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika (New York:
Harper and Row, 1987), 227; Pavel Palazchenko, My Years with Gorbachev and Schevardnadze (Uni-
versity Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 43. See also Wohlforth, ed., Witnesses, 11.
6
6
6
7
7
8
9
0
Ibid., 22; Garthoff, Great Transition, 239.
Ibid., 247.
Ibid., 239.
Ibid., 236. As Shultz has noted, Reagan and Gorbachev “spent almost Žve of the Žfteen hours of
ofŽcial meetings talking together privately.” Turmoil, 606.

reagan and the gorbachev revolution j 237
control initiatives, though even then the president showed no inclination to
71
abandon his dream of strategic defense. Finally, however, in late September
an interim meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev was scheduled to prepare
for the next summit. It would be held at Reykjavik, Iceland in October.
At that meeting, the greater part of the discussion, to say nothing of all the
drama, centered on arms control. Negotiations took place with respect to the
entire arsenal of nuclear forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union.
More strikingly, the two leaders seriously discussed eliminating all ballistic mis-
siles and actually considered doing away with all strategic nuclear weapons as
well. The sticking point was SDI, Gorbachev insisting that it be conŽned to the
72
laboratory and Reagan refusing to give up testing. Thus, the meeting broke
up with both sides registering considerable disappointment; many, including
most of the participants, considered Reykjavik a failure.
Given such negative sentiments, it is somewhat surprising that almost all
the participants assessed Reykjavik retrospectively as, in Reagan’s words, “a
73
major turning point in the quest for a safe and secure world.” Shultz was even
more enthusiastic, calling its results “sensational,” because it introduced the
Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) treaty and created, “in an immense amount
of detail, the basic structure of the START I agreement.” In Matlock’s view,
though the participants failed to appreciate it at the time, “The Reykjavik meet-
74
ing produced breakthroughs that cleared the way for subsequent treaties. . . .”
Moreover, it seems to have marked a turning point in the development of Gor-
75
bachev’s attitudes that made a number of later agreements possible.
The Washington Summit and the INF Treaty, 7–10 December 1987
These positive retrospective evaluations of the Reykjavik summit notwith-
standing, the relationship between United States and the Soviet Union was far
from smooth in its aftermath. As Matlock describes it, “For several months, a
feeling of bitterness and betrayal weighed upon U.S.–Soviet contacts. The lead-
7
1
Ibid., 265–84; Matlock, Autopsy, 94.
Ibid., 163; Matlock, Autopsy, 95–96; Garthoff, Great Transition, 285–88; Palaszhenko, My Years,
72
54–57. For Reagan’s own account of Reykjavik, see American, 675ff; for Gorbachev’s, see Peres-
troika, 236–44.
7
3
Reagan, American, 683.
74
Wohlforth, Witnesses, 175, 174; Matlock, Autopsy, 96–97. See also Reagan, American, 683–84;
Palazchenko, My Years, 57–58; Garthoff, Great Transition, 291; Gorbachev, Perestroika, 240; Speakes,
Speaking, 143. For a considerably less rosy assessment, see Thatcher, Downing Street, 470–71. Reagan
himself thought that “Gorbachev was ready to talk the next time we met in Washington because we
had walked out on him at Reykjavik and gone ahead with the SDI program.” American, 684.
75
“
[I]t was at Reykjavik . . . that Gorbachev put away passion and decided that he could and would
work with Reagan. He saw in him a person capable of taking great decisions, and Gorbachev himself
told me so when we returned to Moscow.” Dobrynin, In ConŽdence, 610; see also Matlock, Autopsy, 97;
and the testimony on this subject of Gorbachev’s personal adviser, Anatoly Chernyaev, in Wohlforth,
Witnesses, 109.

2
38 j political science quarterly
ers had come tantalizingly close to agreement, and each blamed the other for
failure.” As Reagan himself pointed out, during the fourteen months after Reyk-
javik, “progress didn’t come easily” although he also recognized that “. . . not
all of the obstacles to continuing the momentum started at Geneva originated
76
in Moscow.”
In January, the White House issued a strongly anti-Soviet paper titled the
National Security of the United States,” which reected the inuence of the
“
hard-liners in the administration. Moreover, the president continued to see
the shifts in Soviet foreign and military policy as a consequence of U.S. pressure
77
and renewed military strength. He was cautious about Gorbachev’s domestic
78
changes as well, although he claims to have taken note of them, and according
to Matlock, while these changes did begin in 1987, Reagan’s caution was not
79
entirely misplaced. However, after much negotiation, a date for the Washing-
ton summit was set for December 1987.
In contrast to Reykjavik, the Washington summit was generally thought to
have represented progress. Unlike previous encounters, this one began on a
note of considerable warmth between the two leaders. Moreover, they signed
the INF treaty, in which the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to de-
stroy all intermediate and shorter-range land-based missiles and their launchers,
and which included “remarkably extensive and intrusive veriŽcation inspection
and monitoring arrangements.” In addition, they discussed human rights, bilat-
eral relations, and regional conicts; and they agreed to hold another summit
80
in 1988.
Nevertheless, few considered the Washington summit an unqualiŽed suc-
cess. As Anatoly Chernyaev noted “. . . the INF Treaty was signed in an atmo-
sphere that I would still describe as a rather high level of mutual mistrust.”
However, he also observed that, “It was right after the INF Treaty . . . that the
character of our relations changed. And of course, in changing the character
of our relations, the personal rapport between Shultz and Shevardnadze and
between Gorbachev and Reagan was of great importance. . . . [I]t was after the
81
INF Treaty that our relationship began to evolve in the framework of trust.”
On the American side, the reviews were also mixed. Attributing the signing
of the INF Treaty to Reagan’s having restored America’s military and political
strength, Weinberger cautioned that “the restoration of the West’s security
8
2
must not be abandoned to an over-optimistic view of East-West relations.”
Reagan himself thought that his own policies had ultimately produced the
7
6
Matlock, Autopsy, 98; Reagan, American, 684. For a detailed account of this period, see Garthoff,
Great Transition, 291–99.
7
7
7
8
8
8
7
8
9
0
1
2
Ibid., 305–306, 308–309, 316.
Reagan, American, 686–87; Garthoff, Great Transition, 315.
Matlock, Autopsy, 65–66.
Garthoff, Great Transition, 325–32.
Wohlforth, Witnesses, 49; see also Gorbachev’s statement to the Politburo, 17 December 1987.
Weinberger, Fighting, 332.

reagan and the gorbachev revolution j 239
treaty, and Shultz, while differing from Weinberger in his sense “that a pro-
found, historic shift was under way,” also believed that “there is nothing in the
‘
new political thinking’ that suggests that the end of the adversarial struggle is
83
at hand.”
Despite these mixed feelings, however, the relationship between Reagan
and Gorbachev was progressing rapidly. Moreover, according to Matlock,
“
from late 1987 . . . we began to register signiŽcant results in all parts of the
U.S.–Soviet agenda. The speed of change was dizzying for those of us who had
worked for decades on what had for long seemed the intractable problems of
84
dealing with USSR.”
The Moscow Summit, 29 May–2 June 1988
The Moscow summit meeting saw the culmination of the rapprochement be-
tween Reagan and Gorbachev, as well as a substantive change in Reagan’s view
of the Soviet Union. Ambassador Matlock had been greatly impressed by the
changes in the Communist party program issued in May 1988, and he communi-
cated his excitement to Reagan when he briefed him in Helsinki just prior to
the Moscow summit. “I told the president that if they turned out to be real, the
85
Soviet Union could never again be what it had been in the past.”
As for the meeting itself, the discussions, although without major break-
86
throughs, were conducted in a friendly manner. However, the real importance
of the summit lay in the impact on Reagan of his visit to Moscow. Impressed
by the warmth and friendliness of the Soviet people, he even disavowed his
characterization of the Soviet Union as an “evil empire”: “I was talking about
87
another time, another era.” As Reagan recalled it, “perhaps the deepest im-
pression I had during this experience and other meetings with Soviet citizens
was that they were generally indistinguishable from people I had seen all my
88
life on countless streets in America.”
This newfound attitude was tested, but not shaken, by Reagan’s Žrst-hand
observation of the KGB’s rough handling of the crowd during his walk on the
89
streets of Moscow. Indeed, the most interesting aspect of this episode is that
8
3
Garthoff, Great Transition, 332, 335; Shultz, Turmoil, 1003.
Garthoff, Great Transition, 332; Matlock, Autopsy, 148.
Matlock, Autopsy, 121–23.
84
85
86
For the substance of the discussions, see Garthoff, Great Transformation, 353–56; and U.S. Con-
gress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior—1988–90:
Gorbachev-Reagan-Bush Meetings at the Summit (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing OfŽce,
1
991), 71–72.
87
Oberdorfer, Turn, 299, 294–95, Reagan, American, 709; Garthoff, Great Transformation, 352;
Hugh Sidey, “Good Chemistry,” Time, 13 June 1988, 14.
8
8
Reagan, American, 709; Sidey, “Good Chemistry,” 17.
89
“
I’ve never seen such brutal manhandling as they did on their own people who were in no way
getting out of hand.” Reagan, American, 709. See also Thatcher, Downing Street, 776; Oberdorfer,
Turn, 296–97.

2
40 j political science quarterly
it did not have a more negative impact on Reagan’s feelings about the Soviet
Union, though it clearly conŽrmed his long-held beliefs. Nor did it deect his
“
conversion to a belief in friendly relations,” and his respect and admiration
for Gorbachev.
Looking back now, it’s clear that there was a chemistry between Gorbachev and
me that produced something very close to a friendship. He was a tough, hard bar-
gainer. He was a Russian patriot who loved his country. . . . I liked Gorbachev even
though he was a dedicated Communist. . . . [H]e was different from the Communists
who had preceded him to the top of the Kremlin hierarchy. . . . [H]e was the Žrst
not to push Soviet expansionism, the Žrst to agree to destroy nuclear weapons, the
Ž
rst to suggest a free market and to support open elections and freedom of ex-
90
pression.
On his way home from Moscow, Reagan gave a speech in London that sug-
gests the extent of his transformation. He not only had kind words for Gorba-
chev (“a serious man, seeking serious reform”), but he also gave his most opti-
mistic assessment of the future to date: “. . . quite possibly, we’re beginning to
take down the barriers of the postwar era; quite possibly we are entering a new
era in history, a time of lasting change in the Soviet Union. We will have to
91
see.”
New York Meeting, 7 December 1988
During the months before the New York summit, relations between the two
92
superpowers were “basically uneventful.” Gorbachev continued his efforts to
reform the Soviet Union, and on the day of his meeting with Reagan he gave
a path-breaking speech at the United Nations in which he publicly announced
many of those changes. Many people focused on his most striking pronounce-
ment—he was prepared to cut 500,000 troops from the Soviet armed forces.
But Shultz noted, “If you read that speech carefully, you will see that for the
Ž
rst time Gorbachev publicly renounced Marxism-Leninism as an approach to
93
the analysis of international issues and international processess.”
The meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan later that day, which also in-
cluded Vice President Bush, was “ceremonial” rather than substantive. Mark-
ing the Žnal ofŽcial encounter between the two leaders, it was notable for its
9
0
Garthoff, Great Transition, 253; Reagan, American, 707. Reagan voiced the same highly positive
view of Gorbachev even while he was still in Moscow and not long after his return to Washington,
acknowledging that he considered Gorbachev a “real friend.” Sidey, “Good Chemistry,” 17; Soviet
Diplomacy, 111. See also Morris, Dutch, 647.
9
1
“Remarks to Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, United King-
dom,” 3 June 1988, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 24 (June 6, 1988), 735. 91. By con-
trast, Vice President Bush was cautioning the public several weeks later that “the Cold War is not
over.” Cited in Banchoff, OfŽcial Threat, n. 41.
9
2
See Garthoff, Great Transformation, 368–71.
Wohlforth, ed., Witnesses, 91. See also Shultz, Turmoil, 365–67.
9
3

reagan and the gorbachev revolution j 241
94
cordiality. Moreover, shortly after Gorbachev left the United States, Reagan
gave a radio address to the nation in which he discussed their meeting in posi-
tive terms, noting that “this has been a period of important change inside the
95
Soviet Union,” and praising Gorbachev’s vision. Secretary Shultz’s assess-
ment after his participation in the opening of the UN General Assembly in Sep-
tember was even more enthusiastic: “The world had changed. Margaret
Thatcher had it right . . . [when] she said atly ‘We’re not in a Cold War now.’
Despite this new reality, many in the United States seemed unable or unwilling
96
to grasp this seminal fact. But to me, it was all over but the shouting.”
Explaining Reagan’s Change in Threat Perception
By 1988, many of the beliefs underlying Ronald Reagan’s perception of the
Soviet Union as a threat to the United States had been considerably altered,
shifting in response to Soviet behavior. Reagan did not change his own ideol-
97
ogy, especially his belief in the pernicious nature of communism. However,
he did perceive changes in theirs. Not everyone thought that Reagan’s new be-
liefs were well-grounded. One stumbling block was that these changes had oc-
98
curred in the absence of any shift in Soviet capabilities. This was enough to
prevent a realist like Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci from seeing a decline
99
in the Soviet threat, but it had no effect whatever on Ronald Reagan. Al-
though he Žrst attributed the changes instituted by Gorbachev to the pressures
of his situation (the American military buildup, SDI, and Soviet economic
weakness), ultimately the president was persuaded that real dispositional
change had occurred as well.
What are we to make of these changes in Reagan’s perception of the Soviet
threat? Most versions of rational choice theory hold that “beliefs are formed
100
and updated on the basis of all received information.” This, however, is con-
trary to the model presented in the psychological literature. Just as realists do
not expect changes in threat perception without changes in capabilities, cogni-
tive psychologists do not expect such changes to occur readily under any cir-
101
cumstances. Whether the question is viewed in terms of learning theory, be-
9
4
Garthoff, Great Transition, 371.
95
“
Radio Address to the Nation on Soviet-United States Relations,” 10 December 1988, Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents, 24 (December 19, 1988), 1613–14.
9
6
Shultz, Turmoil, 1131.
Fischer, Reagan, 148–49.
Jervis, “Perception and Misperception,” 226.
97
98
99
“
[W]e must be guided by realism, not wishful thinking. The West’s security preparations must be
based not on Kremlin declarations, but on actual Soviet military capabilities.” Garthoff, Great Transi-
tion, 533.
1
00
Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 38.
Ibid., 34; and Dan Reiter, “Learning, Realism, and Alliances,” World Politics 46 (July 1994):
101
493–94.

2
42 j political science quarterly
102
103
104
105
lief change, schema theory, images, or attitude change, revising beliefs
is thought to be slow and difŽcult, even in the face of disconŽrming information.
Such change is even more unlikely if the beliefs in question have any, let alone
all, of the qualities that characterized Reagan’s perception of the Soviet Union
as a threat: if, for example, they are particularly important to the person who
106
holds them or central to his or her belief system (and beliefs about the adver-
1
07
108
sary are thought to be particularly central); if they are linked to other beliefs,
109
110
are strongly held or value-laden, held with great conŽdence or linked to
strong emotion; and if the person has made a public commitment to them.
111
112
Thus, Reagan’s ability to revise his view of the Soviet threat is something
of a puzzle. This might not be true for those with less ideological views like
Shultz. But, as we have seen, Reagan initially held essentialist views much like
those of Weinberger and Perle, who unquestionably continued to cling to
113
them. Moreover, while learning theory suggests that learning is more likely
114
in the face of failure, Reagan appears to have revised his beliefs in the face
of success. What allowed him to make such changes when others with similar
views did not? The evidence suggests a combination of Reagan’s personal qual-
ities and a belief system that was somewhat more complex than has usually
been attributed to him.
1
02
Philip E. Tetlock, “Social Psychology and World Politics” in D. Gilbert, S. Fiske, and G. Lindzey,
eds., Handbook of Social Psychology (New York: McGraw Hill, 1998), 880; and “Theory-Driven Rea-
soning about Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics: Are We Prisoners of Our Precon-
ceptions?” American Journal of Political Science 43 (April 1999): 337–38; J. F. Voss, C. R. Wolfe, J.
A. Lawrence, and R. A. Engle, “From Representation to Decision: an Analysis of Problem Solving
in International Relations” in R. J. Sternberg and P. A. Frensch, eds., Complex Problem Solving: Prin-
ciples and Mechanisms (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erbaum, 1991), 131–33; Yaacov Vertzberger, The
World in their Minds (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 118–23.
1
03
Reiter, Crucible, 21–24; Stein, “Political Learning,” 163–64; Deborah Larson, “The Role of Be-
lief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision–Making,” Political Psychology 15 (March
994): 29.
1
1
04
Martha Cottam and Dorcas E. McCoy, “Image Change and Problem Representation after the
Cold War” in Donald A. Sylvan and James F. Voss, eds., Problem Representation in Foreign Policy
Decision Making (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 117–18, 123.
1
05
Jervis, Perception, chap. 7; Jon A. Krosnick, 1988. “Attitude Importance and Attitude Change,”
Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology 24 (1998): 240–55.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
Ibid., 240–41; Cottam and McCoy, “Image Change,” 118.
Vertzberger, World, 118–19, 137.
Krosnick, “Attitude Importance,” 240.
Cottam and McCoy, “Image Change,” 118.
Tetlock, “Social Psychology,” 880; Vertzberger, World, 120.
Ibid., 120, 137; Cottam and McCoy, “Image Change,” 123; Stein, “Political Learning,” 169.
Krosnick, “Attitude Importance,” 241.
For a comparison of Reagan’s image of the Soviet Union with that of his advisers, see Shimko,
Images, 233–37, 224–25. On Weinberger, see Weinberger, Fighting, 37, n.5, 331–32, 347–51; Garthoff,
Great Transformation, 531–32.
1
14
Reiter, Crucible, 35, 39 and “Learning,” 490; Stein, “Political Learning,” 173.

reagan and the gorbachev revolution j 243
Ideology
Ironically, Reagan’s democratic, anti-Soviet ideology, which many considered
a fault, may in fact have had the virtue of helping him to perceive change in the
Soviet Union. It gave him the sense that the tide of history was moving away
from the Soviets and toward democratic freedom. As he said in a 1982 speech
in London, “In an ironic sense Karl Marx was right. We are witnessing today
a great revolutionary crisis. . . . But the crisis is happening not in the free, non-
Marxist West, but in the home of Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Union. It is
the Soviet Union that runs against the tide of history by denying human free-
115
dom and human dignity to its citizens. It is also in deep economic difŽculty.”
This may have been a simple view of the world, but as Michael Mandel-
116
baum has pointed out, it was not necessarily wrong. It seems to have made
Reagan more receptive to change in the Soviet Union than he might otherwise
117
have been. For one thing, it sensitized him to the role of ideology in the con-
ict between the United States and the Soviet Union and perhaps to the sig-
niŽcance of ideological change for Soviet foreign policy. For another, it made
him more open to the possibility of change altogether. That is to say, Reagan
was in some sense primed to accept the reality of change because he already
118
believed it possible, even likely. This, in turn, contributed to his “unquench-
119
able optimism” about the future.
Dual Threats/Dual Goals
Reagan’s conviction that the Soviet Union was far from being the only serious
threat was as relevant as his ideology in helping him to revise his thinking about
the Soviet threat. The notion that nuclear weapons were also a grave danger
provided Reagan with more than one goal in the security Želd, and he was un-
115
Cited in Banchoff, “Changing,” 88. See also Shultz’s remarks in an interview with Peter
Schweizer: “President Reagan just had an innate sense that the Soviet Union would not, or could not,
survive. . . . That feeling was not based on a detailed learned knowledge of the Soviet Union; it was
just instinct.” Victory (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994).
116
Michael Mandelbaum, “The Luck of the President” in William G. Hyland, ed., The Reagan For-
eign Policy (New York: New American Library, 1987),140–41, 132.
117
For quite a different view, see Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. who, writing in 1983, recognizes the ideo-
logical basis of Reagan’s thought, but has nothing good to say about it and does not foresee a capacity
for change. “Foreign Policy and the American Character,” Foreign Affairs 62 (Fall 1983): 5–7. Gary
Wills, too, has scant respect for Reagan’s ability to think historically: “He has a skill for striking ‘histori-
cal’ attitudes combined with a striking lack of historical attentiveness.” Reagan’s America (New York:
Penguin, 1988), 63, 446–47. For Reagan’s lack of historical understanding during the Bitburg contro-
versy, see Cannon, President Reagan, 588.
118
Dobrynin, In ConŽdence, 549; Matlock in Wohlforth, Witnesses, 22; Dallin, “Learning,” 416.
Fischer uses the concept of priming somewhat differently to explain how Reagan’s reaction to the
events of the fall of 1983 “primed” him to take the nuclear threat more seriously. Reagan, 110–12.
119
Cannon, President Reagan, 179; Cannon, Reagan, 319, 337, 347–48; U.S. Congress, Soviet Diplo-
macy, 69, 114.

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44 j political science quarterly
120
troubled by any sense that his goals were in some way incompatible. Rather,
he was able to perceive changes in Soviet behavior that a more consistent per-
121
son might have dismissed as contradictions.
Some who fail to note the dual nature of Reagan’s goals have argued that
his inconsistent attitudes toward the Soviet Union were actually due to contra-
dictory beliefs: on the one hand, a “simplistic hardline image of the Soviet
Union. . .; and on the other hand, . . . an equally simplistic, even na¨ve, liberal
faith in the existence of an underlying harmony of interests among men and
122
nations.” An uncommited thinker, Reagan oscillated between the two views
123
according to changes in the situation and the pressure of his advisers. How-
ever, Reagan was not only deeply committed to his basic principles and consis-
tently unwilling to listen to any advice intended to diminish his support for
them, but also, rather than vacillate between two sets of incompatible views of
the Soviet Union, from at least 1984 he was increasingly concerned about seri-
ous threats emanating from both the Soviet Union and nuclear weapons. He
may not have been cognitively complex, but he did see the problem of threat
as having more than one dimension.
Nor did he waver between contradictory policies directed at these threats.
Rather, he felt able to concentrate on the nuclear danger, which included at-
tempting to negotiate with the Soviet Union, only after he had, in his own mind
at least, neutralized the Soviet threat by rebuilding America’s military strength.
Thus, Dobrynin, who was always intrigued by “the paradox of Ronald
Reagan,” seems closer to the mark in directing us to the “fascinating story of
how Reagan’s vision of nuclear apocalypse and his deeply rooted but almost
hidden conviction that nuclear weapons should ultimately be abolished, would
124
ultimately prove more powerful than his visceral anti-communism.”
Strong Principles and Determination
Closely connected to Reagan’s belief structure about threat were his Žrm prin-
ciples and determination to implement them. There is abundant testimony as
1
20
See the remarks of Ambassador Ridgway in Wohlforth, Witnesses, 18. On Reagan’s general trait
of harboring contradictory convictions and commitments, see Neustadt, Presidential Power, 277–78.
Gary Wills, referring to both conservative and liberal elements in Reagan’s political belief system,
notes that “All these personae were always present in him, and were not felt to be at odds. Like much
of America, he contained contradictions, but never experienced them.” Reagan’s America, 307. See
also Oberdorfer, Turn, 22; Neustadt, “Presidents,” 19.
1
21
Fischer explains this in terms of increased cognitive complexity, which allowed him to distinguish
the Soviet leaders who shared his “concerns about international security and nuclear war” from com-
munists in general. Reagan, 149.
1
22
Shimko, “Reagan,” 354–57, 359, 374.
John D. Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1
23
1
974), 129–31; Shimko, Images, 240–42. For evidence to the contrary, see Cannon, President
Reagan, 481.
1
24
Dobrynin, In ConŽdence, 606–608.

reagan and the gorbachev revolution j 245
to the strength of his “unshakable commitment to a limited number of posi-
125
tions,” including his belief about the dangers of nuclear weapons. Reagan
treated these as long-term goals and was not deected from them by apparent
1
26
setbacks; nor was he concerned that they violated the “conventional wisdom.”
Moreover, despite criticism that he was often captive to his advisers, when it
came to his principles, Reagan remained in control.
127
This commitment to principle may have contributed to Reagan’s ability to
appreciate changes in the Soviet Union in the sense that he perceived and re-
sponded to a similar quality in Gorbachev. According to Alexander Bessmert-
nykh, Reagan and Gorbachev “each had their own ideals which they tried to
follow all through their lives. Their ideals were not similar, but the dedication
to those ideals was similar. They both believed in something. . . . This is what
128
they sensed in each other and this is why they made good partners.”
Openness, Attitude to the Future, and Intuition
Other aspects of Reagan’s personal style also contributed to his ability to per-
129
ceive change. For a “putative ideologue,” he was strikingly open-minded. By
all accounts, Reagan was a good listener and willing to do considerable
130
amounts of homework when the subject interested him. He could also accept
131
criticism gracefully and was capable of a certain amount of empathy. For ex-
ample, while initially Reagan seemed to have difŽculty understanding why the
132
Soviets should see the United States as threatening in any way, after the nu-
133
clear scares of 1983, he became sensitive to that possibility.
125
Thatcher, Downing Street, 157–58, 257; McFarlane, Special Trust, 106; Speakes, Speaking, 301;
Cannon, Reagan, 372–73; George and George, Presidential Personality, 225; Greenstein, Presidential
Difference, 165–57.
126
Shultz in Wohlforth, Witnesses, 104. See also George and George, Presidential Personality, 224.
As Secretary Shultz and others have pointed out, this quality had its down side and was regarded as
obstinacy by those who wanted Reagan to change his mind. Shultz, Turmoil, 145; and remarks in Wohl-
forth, Witnesses, 104. For a striking example of this stubbornness during the Iran-contra crisis, see
Cannon, President Reagan, 630.
1
27
Fischer, Reagan, 155–56; Greenstein, Presidential Difference, 154–55.
All quotations are from Wohlforth, Witnesses, 107. On the importance of this kind of connection
128
between Reagan and Gorbachev, see Fred Greenstein, “Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the
End of the Cold War,” 218–19, remarks of Ridgway and Shultz, 115, 104. BothGreenstein and Ridgway
include Secretary Shultz as a kindred spirit of the two leaders in this regard.
1
29
Greenstein, “Ronald Reagan,” 214; see also Matlock’s remarks in Wohlforth, Witnesses, 114.
130
“
Ronald Reagan knew what he didn’t know, and he was willing to listen.” Matlock in ibid., 114.
See also McFarlane’s testimony about Reagan’s preparations for the Geneva summit, above; and
Speakes, Speaking, 301; Cannon, Reagan, 372, and President Reagan, 748–49, 763.
1
31
Ibid., 140, 372; see also Matlock’s comments in Wohlforth, Witnesses, 114.
Garthoff, Great Transition, 105, 139; see also, Fischer, Reagan, 21. As Stein and others have
132
pointed out, decision makers often have difŽculty in empathizing with the other side. “Building,”
50–51.
2
133
See Garthoff, Great Transition, 139; Oberdorfer, Turn, 67. Shimko Žnds evidence of this attitude
even earlier in “Reagan,” 365, 369–70, and Images, 107. See also Reagan, American, 595, 588–89.

2
46 j political science quarterly
Closely related to Reagan’s openness was his sense of optimism about the
future and his willingness to put forward original ideas. Although Reagan was
often accused of being doctrinaire, he possessed other qualities, such as a will-
ingness to adopt new ways of thinking that belied that characterization. Some
134
even thought of Reagan as “visionary,” a man whose approach was anything
but incremental and who had “a bold approach and a keen intuition, even if he
135
did not understand many of the important details.”
Nor was Reagan hidebound. He had a sense of history, yet he was oriented
toward the future. Although Reagan’s reasoning was clearly less sophisticated
and his ability to follow through more limited, Oberdorfer’s characterization
of Secretary Shultz as one of “the rare policymakers who takes a long view,
seeing and thinking in ‘time streams’ beyond the current day” can in some sense
136
be applied to Reagan as well. Moreover, Fran c¸ ois Mitterand, at Žrst “taken
aback by Reagan’s intellectual emptiness,” later concluded that “. . . beneath
the surface you Žnd somone who isn’t stupid, who has great good sense and
profoundly good intentions. What he does not perceive with his intelligence,
he feels by nature.” This view of Reagan as “a man of Žner instincts than intelli-
gence” was also shared by those who believed with Dobrynin that he “grasped
137
matters in an instinctive way but not necessarily in a simple one.” Nor were
Reagan’s intuitions about trivial matters. Rather, they concerned issues like the
138
viability of the Soviet Union and dangers of nuclear weapons.
This notion of intuition as a source of insight recalls Howard Gardner’s the-
ory of multiple intelligences, which suggests that people have many different
139
types of ability not covered by the traditional deŽnition of intelligence.
Reagan, for example, has been said to possess “emotional intelligence,” which
140
guides his intuitions. Thus, his strong emotional reaction to the dangers of
Garthoff, however, criticizes Reagan for his lack of insight into the impact of his harsh words on the
Soviet leaders. See Great Transition, 105.
1
34
Shultz, Turmoil, 263; Greenstein, Presidential Difference, 156–57; Cannon, Reagan, 372, Presi-
dent Reagan, 281, 740.
1
35
Soviet journalist, Aleksandr Bovin, cited in Oberdorfer, Turn, 438; and Greenstein, “Ronald
Reagan,” 215.
1
36
Oberdorfer, Turn, 439.
1
37
Morris, Dutch, 442, 445, 495; Dobrynin, In ConŽdence, 494; Wills, Reagan’s America, 384; Neu-
stadt, Presidential Power, 309, and “Presidents,” 16–23; Greenstein, Presidential Difference, 157; Can-
non, President Reagan, 133–36, 140. For evidence of Reagan’s intuitive approach earlier in his career,
see Cannon, Reagan, 155. On the possible virtues of simplicity, see Peter Suedfeld, “Are Simple Deci-
sion Always Worse?” Society 25 (1988): 25–27.
1
38
On the former, see Shultz in an interview with Schweizer, Victory, xiii; and Thatcher, Downing
Street, 467. On the latter, see Jervis, “Perception,” 227; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Soviet
Diplomacy, 115.
1
39
Cannon, Reagan, 137–38.
According to Greenstein, emotional intelligence is a person’s “ability to manage his emotions
1
40
and turn them to constructive purposes, rather than being dominated by them and allowing them to
diminish his leadership.” Presidential Difference, 6; as applied to Reagan, see 157; and Greenstein,
“
Reckoning with Reagan,” Political Science Quarterly 115 (Spring 2000): 121–22. On the connection
between emotion and intuition, see Deborah Larson, “Good Judgment in Foreign Policy” (paper pre-
sented at the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, 1996), 5–6.

reagan and the gorbachev revolution j 247
nuclear weapons led him to press for their reduction when almost everyone else
was content to work for limitation. What is more, he sought a defense against
them, which had among other things the consequence of making the Soviets
more cooperative “by threatening to impose unacceptable costs on the already
141
strained Soviet economy.” The same emotion was also partly responsible for
his desire to negotiate with the Soviets in the Žrst place, helping him to over-
come his equally strong anti-Soviet feelings. Moreover, it seems likely that
Reagan’s characteristic devotion to his principles and his determination to see
them carried out were also Žred by emotion.
Reagan has been praised for political intelligence as well. This manifested
itself in a number of ways. First of all, it affected the cues he responded to. For
example, in assessing the Soviet threat, Reagan looked not so much at capabili-
ties as at intentions. In doing so, he was able to focus on the impact of political
142
changes in the Soviet Union that others assessing only capabilities missed.
Second, his political sensitivity made him responsive to Gorbachev’s political
problems. As Matlock has described it, “. . . [W]here Reagan had a real instinct
.
. . was as a politician. He understood politicians. We could say about Gorba-
chev, for example, particularly after he got to know him, ‘Hey, Gorbachev’s got
a problem at home. . . .’ He would pay attention to that, he would be willing to
143
take it into account.”
Finally, Reagan understood his own political constituency. He was able to
use his popularity and conservative credentials to make his moves toward Gor-
144
bachev more acceptable to conservatives. Furthermore, he understood the
political climate in the United States well enough to be able to parlay the pub-
lic’s nuclear fears into increasing its acceptance of both negotiations and arms
control agreements, instinctively trusting that the American people would fol-
low the path that he himself had traveled.
It seems likely that Reagan’s openness and intuitive intelligence contrib-
145
uted substantially to his ability to perceive changes in the Soviet threat. More-
over, the same may be said of his capacity to be more exible and pragmatic
146
than his “rhetoric” would have suggested possible.
1
41
Greenstein, Presidential Difference, 154.
See above. This political sensitivity was also seen in President Franklin Roosevelt’s diagnosis of
142
the German threat after he had observed Hitler’s behavior during the Munich crisis. Barbara R. Farn-
ham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), chap. 5.
1
43
Wohlforth, Witnesses, 114; see also Thatcher, Downing Street, 301.
See Shultz’s remarks in Wohlforth, Witnesses, 104–105. See also Greenstein, Presidential Differ-
144
ence, 155. On Reagan’s ability to handle his right-wing supporters on the domestic front, see Cannon,
Reagan, 316. On political decision makers’ responses to the problem of acceptability, see Farnham,
Roosevelt, chap. 2.
145
As Vertzberger has pointed out, the opposite is true for those with closed cognitive systems.
World, 134.
146
See Dobrynin, In ConŽdence, 610; Anderson, Revolution, 284; Speakes, Speaking, 301; Cannon,
Reagan, 186, 309; Mandelbaum, “Luck,” 134.

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48 j political science quarterly
Experiential Learning
While the way Reagan came by his knowledge of the world has often been criti-
147
cized, in terms of the questions we are addressing here, its effect seems to
have been positive. His beliefs owed “from his life, from personal history
148
rather than study.” To make sense of the world, Reagan “crave[d] discourse,
not brieŽng papers.” Narrative and experience, rather than analysis and deduc-
149
tive logic were his tools.
The role stories played in Reagan’s thinking has often been remarked; he
150
learned by them and told them in order to convey meaning. Some have ob-
jected that his “impressionable” belief system resulted in ill-grounded beliefs,
151
easily changed by the next personal experience. It is not, however, universally
agreed that the capacity to learn from one’s experience is a handicap. Reagan’s
and Gorbachev’s ability to learn from and about one another advanced the dia-
logue between them and moved the relations between their countries to a new
plane, which many had longed for but few had ever expected to see.
Belief in Personal Contact
Of course, none of these positive results could have occurred without personal
contact between Reagan and Gorbachev, and Reagan was determined that it
should take place as often as possible. To him “personal experience counted
for everything, and strong personalities could change the world.” As Reagan
explained in an interview at the time of the Moscow summit, “Systems may be
brutish, bureaucrats may fail. But men can sometimes transcend all that, tran-
152
scend even the forces of history that seem destined to keep them apart.” If,
153
as is widely believed, a person’s own experiences facilitate learning, then in
this case Reagan’s instincts served him well.
1
1
1
47
48
49
Morris, Dutch, 414–15; Shimko, Images, 120; Neustadt, Presidential Power, 290–91.
Leslie Gelb, quoted in Shimko, Images, 120; see also, Cannon, President Reagan, 134.
Cannon, President Reagan, 376, 139; George and George, Presidential Personality, 224. As How-
ard Gardner concluded: “Reagan’s good with language, but not logically. . . . He makes sense of the
world narratively. Scientists can be deductive and understand logic but often can’t tell stories. Stories
are not necessarily logical.” Cannon, President Reagan, 138; also noted in Greenstein, Presidential Dif-
ference, 157.
1
50
Secretary Shultz, at Žrst irritated by Reagan’s love of stories, began to see a positive side: “he
used a story to impart a larger message—and sometimes that message was simply more important to
him than the facts. He was a gifted storyteller, who could use a story effectively to make his point take
on a deeper and more vivid meaning or to defuse a tense situation. People, he felt, believe in and act
on the stories they hear and tell about the past. Stories create meaning.” Turmoil, 1133.
1
51
Shimko, Images, 116, 120.
Mandelbaum and Talbot, Reagan, 5; Sidey, “Good Chemistry,” 17; Reagan, American, 14; Mat-
1
52
lock, Autopsy, 77; Shultz, Turmoil, 145; Carlucci in Wohlforth, Witnesses, 46; Dallin, “Learning,” 415.
On the positive impact of the two leaders’ mutual bluntness, see Shultz, Turmoil, 8, 16.
1
53
Jervis, Perception, 239–49; Reiter, Crucible, 34–35, 37, 39.

reagan and the gorbachev revolution j 249
Moreover, Reagan believed in the efŽcacy of his own powers of persua-
154
sion, and this was linked to his self-conŽdence—in both the validity of his
155
own convictions and his ability to implement them. If Reagan was able to see
change in the Soviet Union, it is at least partly because he Žrmly believed that
he could help make it happen through personal contact and was conŽdent
156
enough to resist the naysayers among his advisers. Ultimately, his faith was
justiŽed by the reaction of the one person who really counted. As Gorbachev
himself told the Politburo in December 1987:
In Washington, perhaps for the Žrst time, we understood so clearly how important
the human factor is in international politics. . . . For us, Reagan appeared as a repre-
sentative of and a spokesman for the most conservative part of the most conserva-
tive segment of American capitalism and the military-industrial complex. But . . .
policy makers . . . also represent purely human qualities, the interests and the aspi-
rations of common people, and that they can be guided by purely normal human
feeling and aspirations. . . . This is an important aspect of the new international
157
thinking, and it has now produced results.
Conclusion
Ronald Reagan was able to perceive change in the Soviet Union and revise his
perception of the Soviet threat accordingly. Moreover, his interpretation was
supported by contemporary observers like Shultz and Matlock, as well as the
verdict of later analysts. There is considerable evidence that Reagan’s initial
158
beliefs about the threat and the nature and timing of his revision of those
beliefs were reasonably sound. That evidence supports both Reagan’s caution
before late 1987 and his acceptance of the importance of the changes instituted
159
by Gorbachev thereafter.
1
54
Cannon, Reagan, 745.
155
On the former, see Shultz in Wohlforth, Witnesses, 103–105; Dobrynin, In ConŽdence, 608; An-
derson, Revolution, 286; George and George, Presidential Personality, 224–225. On the latter, see
Thatcher, Downing Street, 157; Shultz, Turmoil, 262–63; Wills, Reagan’s America, 383, 392; Mandel-
baum and Talbott, Reagan, 129.
1
56
Greenstein, “Reckoning,” 121.
Quoted by Chernyaev in Wolhforth, Witnesses, 49.
157
158
“
In reassessing the origins and dynamics of the Cold War from the admittedly one-sided evidence
that is currently available, several fundamental conclusions emerge. American ofŽcials on occasion
did exaggerate the magnitude of the Soviet threat and the malignant intent of Soviet leaders, but . . .
it is incorrect to contend that there was no serious threat. A Soviet challenge to a stable world and to
U.S. interests in democratic political systems and open economies clearly existed.” Samuel F. Wells,
Jr., “Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security During the Cold War” in Hogan, ed., End, 64–66; and
Garthoff, Great Transition, 752–57.
159
See Matlock, Autopsy, 148; Mandebaum and Talbott, Reagan, 86–87; William J. Jackson, “Soviet
Reassessment of Ronald Reagan, 1985–1988,” Political Science Quarterly 113 (Winter 1998–99):
29–42; Philip Zelikow and Condolezza Rice, Germany UniŽed and Europe Transformed (Cambridge,
6
MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 15–16, 19; Garthoff, Great Transition, 753; Mueller, “Quiet Cat-
aclysm,” 41. This view is contrary to Glad’s analysis of Reagan as a black and white thinker who might
be able to change his perceptions, but only after an inordinate amount of “negative evidence.” “Black
and White,” 72. For evidence of the contrast between Reagan’s ability to perceive change in the Soviet

2
50 j political science quarterly
Reagan not only recognized Soviet change; he also, as he himself believed,
contributed to it. His ideology led him to promote such policies as the U.S. mili-
tary buildup, SDI, negotiating with the Soviet Union, and broadening the dis-
cussion to include human rights and other issues, in the belief that the Soviets
would respond to changes in American behavior. Many former Soviet ofŽcials
now agree that these steps did often contribute to the result Reagan desired.
For example, Reagan’s conciliatory policies toward the Soviet Union enabled
Gorbachev to forge ahead in his domestic and international initiatives. As Do-
brynin noted, “If Reagan had stuck to his hard-line policies in 1985 and 1986
.
. . Gorbachev would have been accused by the rest of the Politburo of giving
everything away to a fellow who does not want to negotiate. We would have
160
been forced to tighten our belts and spend even more on defense.” The suc-
cess of Reagan’s moves in turn encouraged him to continue along the path of
trying to inuence the Soviet Union, convinced that “it could change if sub-
161
jected to sufŽcient pressure and his personal negotiating skill.”
What does the success of Reagan’s approach to the Soviet Union tell us
about his abilities as a leader? Since good outcomes can be the result of any
number of factors, including luck, it is unwise to infer automatically that they
are a consequence of good processes. In addition to the qualities that allowed
Reagan to perceive change, therefore, we must briey explore the other traits
that may have contributed to his effectiveness in this case. This is particularly
necessary in view of the widespread skepticism cited earlier about his intellec-
tual abilities, and his lack of experience, knowledge, and training in foreign pol-
icy. He could also be passive, incurious, uninterested in detail, ignorant of the
nuances of policy, and stubborn, all of which contributed to a hands-off man-
agement style that left him vulnerable to his advisers. The question is whether
other qualities of mind could have compensated in part for these failings.
Earlier we noted Reagan’s strong principles and determination to imple-
ment them. What also mattered was his ability to do so. Certainly, there is little
doubt about his impressive “people skills.” These were what gave Reagan con-
Ž
dence in personal contact and made it an effective tool for him. His powers
162
163
of persuasion have been widely recognized, as have his negotiating skills.
Moreover, Reagan’s openness to information and his capacity to be a good lis-
tener must also be noted. The qualities that helped him to perceive Soviet
change often facilitated his efforts to effect change himself.
Union and the inability of the C.I.A. to do so, see Philip Taubman, “How the C.I.A.’s Judgments Were
Distorted by Cold War Catechisms,” New York Times, 18 March 2001.
1
60
Cited in Greenstein, “Reckoning,” 121; see also Dobrynin, In ConŽdence, 609; Jackson, “Soviet
Reassessment” Wohlforth, Witnesses, 47–48, 164–166, 193, 244, 249.
1
61
Matlock, Autopsy, 77; see also Jervis, “Perception and Misperception,” n14.
See, for example, Cannon, Reagan, 333, 371; Speakes, Speaking, 301; Cannon, President Reagan,
1
62
1
22.
1
63
See Bessmertnykh in Wolhforth, Witnesses, 107; Shultz, Turmoil, 145. See also, Anderson, Revo-
lution, 241, 284–86; and Greenstein, Presidential Difference, 150–51, 156, and “Ronald Reagan,” 122.

reagan and the gorbachev revolution j 251
While Reagan’s skill as the “great communicator” has frequently been ac-
knowledged, his ability as a politician has been less often remarked. As we have
seen, he was more exible, pragmatic, and willing to compromise than his ideo-
logical orientation led many to expect. Moreover, he was able to sell his policies
to the public and use his popularity to get them through Congress—an ability
164
of which he was fully aware. As Fred Greenstein points out, “. . . Reagan was
far more than a political front man. He was a politically skilled chief executive
whose talents were insufŽciently recognized because he was cut from a differ-
165
ent cloth from most of those who rise to the nation’s highest ofŽce.”
A number of other qualities that enabled Reagan to be effective have been
noted earlier. His clearly deŽned goals allowed him to concentrate his energies
on what was important to him, and his consistency in pursuing them left his
166
subordinates in no doubt about his priorities. Reagan was conŽdent about his
own judgment and for the most part made decisions easily. Moreover, when
his goals were at stake, he could often assert himself and resist the temptation
167
to delegate his responsibilities.
When he was not so engaged, however, there could be trouble, as Reagan,
encouraged by his dislike of detail and content to focus on the big picture, left
to others the task of bringing his ideas to fruition. His management style was
distinctly hands off. As a former aide described it, “He made no demands, and
gave almost no instructions. . . . Rarely did he ask searching questions and de-
mand to know why someone had or had not done something. He just sat back
in a supremely calm, relaxed manner and waited until important things were
brought to him.” This put Reagan at the mercy of his advisers, with the inevita-
ble result that the system worked well when the his aides were competent and
168
loyal, like Secretary Shultz who “enabled Reagan to implement the unexpect-
edly visionary aspect of his world view.” When they were not such paragons,
“
disaster [could] strike.” At such times, as in the Iran-contra crisis, not even
Reagan’s “Žrst class temperament” could save him.
What, then does this singular mix of attributes and skills tell us about
Reagan’s leadership abilities? What was it that allowed him to recognize and
promote change in the Soviet Union, yet failed him so badly in the Iran-contra
situation? In fact, what stands out is how context dependent Reagan’s perfor-
mance was. When the nature of the problem played to his particular strengths,
it could be quite good. But in other situations, these skills could not compensate
for Reagan’s failings, and some of his strengths became weaknesses.
164
Greenstein, Presidential Difference, 156; Anderson, Revolution, 284; Cannon, Reagan, 319 and
President Reagan, 102, 116.
165
Greenstein, “Reckoning,” 122. This assessment has been echoed by Russians like Bessmertnykh
and Evgeniy Primakov (“he is a great political leader”). U.S. Congress, Soviet Diplomacy, 116; Wohl-
forth, Witnesses, 108. On Reagan’s political skill, see also Neustadt, “Presidents,” 17–23.
1
66
Greenstein, “Reckoning,” 122; and “Ronald Reagan,” 215; Neustadt, “Presidents,” 17.
Anderson, Revolution, 286; Fischer, Reagan, 80–81, 155–56.
Anderson, Revolution, 289–92; Reagan, For the Record, 266–69, 294.
167
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52 j political science quarterly
In perceiving and encouraging change in the Soviet Union, Reagan was
able to draw on his strengths. In contrast to Iran-contra, what the situation de-
manded of him was something he could do. When it came to perceiving and
encouraging change in the Soviet Union, what was required was openness, in-
sight, persuasion, and negotiation. Unlike the abilities demanded by the Iran-
contra situation (guiding and controlling staff and a detailed understanding of
policy), these were skills that Reagan possessed, and he exercised them will-
ingly. In this case, persuasion and communication were the essential tasks, and
Reagan had no need to delegate them.
Long ago, Machiavelli observed that particular combinations of talents may
169
produce success in some situations, but failure in others. Reagan provides a
classic example of this, though not all leaders are likely to exhibit such a huge
170
gap between strengths and weaknesses as he did. As Lou Cannon describes
it, “The paradox of the Reagan presidency was that it depended entirely on
Reagan for its ideological inspiration while he depended upon others for all
aspects of governance except his core ideas and his powerful performances. In
the many arenas of the ofŽce where ideology did not apply or the performances
171
had no bearing, Reagan was at a loss.” He could lead the nation and inuence
his counterparts on the world stage, yet fail spectacularly at keeping his own
house in order.*
1
1
69
70
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), 131–32.
Of course, President Jimmy Carter did exhibit such a gap between his analytical ability and his
lack of political sensitivity. See Greenstein, Presidential Difference, 141–42; Farnham, Roosevelt, 240 n 47.
1
71
Cited in George and George, Presidential Personality, 225.
*
I would like to thank the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University for support-
ing this research and Deborah Larson and Robert Jervis for their helpful comments.