Full text of DOI:10.1111/j.1564-913X.2000.tb00401.x

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33
ILO principles concerning
collective bargaining
Bernard GERNIGON*, Alberto ODERO* and Horacio GUIDO*
ollective bargaining, as was only to be expected, has felt the impact of the
C major changes affecting the world over the past 25 years: the general
acceptance of the market economy following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the
debate on the role and structure of the State, economic restructuring and
globalization, the ready availability of efficient ways of fighting inflation, the
growth of non-standard forms of work and temporary contracts, the ongoing
process of political and social democratization, the growing autonomy of trade
unions from political parties, and many other factors too numerous to mention.
All these factors have had a varied and significant impact on collective
bargaining. The scope of collective bargaining in terms of the categories covered
has diminished, owing to inter alia high levels of unemployment and the growth
of the informal sector, of subcontracting and of the various forms of non-
standard employment relationship (which make unionization more difficult);
there has, however, been a certain tendency for collective bargaining to develop
in the public sector. Collective bargaining has also lost some of its margin for
manoeuvre as a result of the successive economic crises and the subjection of
national economic policy to processes of rationalization and economic integration
and agreements with the Bretton Woods institutions.
The increasingly harsh competition brought about by technological
innovation and globalization has led to a reduction in the influence exercised in
many countries by sectoral agreements and has given added importance to
collective bargaining at the enterprise level (and at lower levels, such as the
work unit, the factory or the workplace), strictly taking into account the criteria
of productivity and output. Flexibilization and deregulation of work have thus
encouraged the growth of collective bargaining at enterprise level.
At the same time, there has been an increasing need for bilateral and
tripartite agreements at national level, since certain issues of collective interest
cannot be treated in enterprise- or even branch-level bargaining, especially
when a country displays significant regional or sectoral differences. The bilateral
or tripartite pacts agreed in many countries have a scope reaching beyond
conditions of work in the strict sense, given that they cover employment,
vocational training, inflation and other social issues ( see, for example, ILO,
* ILO, Geneva.
Copyright © International Labour Organization 2000

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International Labour Review
1995a; and Héthy, 1995). These agreements enhance the prestige of collective
bargaining, as they settle questions formerly covered at most by non-binding
consultations between the social partners.
The ILO has carried out an enormous amount of standard-setting work
during the 80 years of its existence as it has sought to promote social justice
(see Valticos, 1996 and 1998), and one of its chief tasks has been to advance
collective bargaining throughout the world. This task was already laid down in
the Declaration of Philadelphia, 1944, part of the ILO Constitution, which
stated “the solemn obligation of the International Labour Organization to further
among the nations of the world programmes which will achieve ... the effective
recognition of the right of collective bargaining” (ILO, 1998a, pp. 23-24).
This principle is embodied in the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining
Convention, No. 98, which was adopted five years later in 1949, and which
since has achieved near-universal acceptance: as of January 2000, the number
of member States having ratified it stood at 145, which demonstrates the force
of the principles involved in the majority of countries.
More recently, in June 1998, the ILO took another step forward by adopting
the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-
up (see Kellerson, 1998). This states that “all Members, even if they have not
ratified the [fundamental] Conventions, have an obligation, arising from the
very fact of membership in the Organization, to respect, to promote and to
realize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the principles
concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject of those [fundamental]
Conventions” (ILO, 1999a, p. 51). These principles include the effective
recognition of the right to collective bargaining, along with freedom of
association and the elimination of forced or compulsory labour, the effective
abolition of child labour and the elimination of discrimination in employment
and occupation.
The framework within which collective bargaining must take place if it is
to be viable and effective is based on the principle of the independence and
autonomy of the parties and the free and voluntary nature of the negotiations; it
requires the minimum possible level of interference by the public authorities in
bipartite negotiations and gives primacy to employers and their organizations
and workers’ organizations as the parties to the bargaining. The ILO has also
encouraged tripartite national agreements which are similar to those reached
within the Organization by representatives of workers, employers and
governments.
History has shown that the principles contained within this framework
have retained their validity ever since Convention No. 98 was adopted 50 years
ago, despite subsequent radical changes in the world — which is why the present
article seemed opportune.
The purpose of this article is to set out the ILO’s principles of collective
bargaining as they emerge from the various international standards adopted by
the Organization and the comments made by its supervisory bodies (notably the
Committee of Experts on theApplication of Conventions and Recommendations
and the Committee on Freedom of Association). The definition and purpose of

ILO principles concerning collective bargaining
35
collective bargaining, the workers and subjects covered will first be set out.
Then follow the principles of voluntary negotiation and good faith, the
intervention of the authorities and the particular case of the public service.
Finally, a summary of the principles is presented along with some final
observations on the degree to which the right to collective bargaining is applied
across the world. 1
Definition and purpose of collective bargaining
In the ILO’s instruments,2 collective bargaining is deemed to be the activ-
ity or process leading up to the conclusion of a collective agreement. In Rec-
ommendation No. 91, Paragraph 2, collective agreements are defined as:
all agreements in writing regarding working conditions and terms of employ-
ment concluded between an employer, a group of employers or one or more
employers’ organisations, on the one hand, and one or more representative
workers’ organisations, or, in the absence of such organisations, the
representatives of the workers duly elected and authorised by them in
accordance with national laws and regulations, on the other (ILO, 1996b,
p. 656).
The text goes on to state that collective agreements should bind the
signatories thereto and those on whose behalf the agreement is concluded and
that stipulations in such contracts ofemployment which are contrary to acollective
agreement should be regarded as null and void and automatically replaced by
the corresponding stipulationsof the collective agreement. However, stipulations
in contracts of employment which are more favourable to the workers than
those prescribed by a collective agreement should not be regarded as contrary
to the collective agreement (ibid., Paragraph 3, p. 657). In 1951, Recommenda-
tion No. 91 set out the binding nature of collective agreements3 and their
precedence over individual contracts of employment, while recognizing the
stipulations of individual contracts of employment which are more favourable
for workers.
1 For reasons of space, this article does not deal with the right to strike or related issues
such as “social peace” , workers’ right to information and the duration of collective agreements,
which are covered in a recent publication (Gernigon, Odero and Guido, 2000).
2 The ILO has adopted a number or instruments dealing directly or indirectly with collective
bargaining and related issues: the Collective Agreements Recommendation, 1952 (No. 91), the
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87),
the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), the Workers’
Representatives Convention, 1971 (No. 135), the Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration
Recommendation, 1951 (No. 92), the Rural Workers’ Organisations Recommendation, 1975
(No. 149), the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151), the Labour
Relations (Public Service) Recommendation, 1978 (No. 159), the Collective Bargaining
Convention, 1981 (No. 154), and the Collective Bargaining Recommendation, 1981 (No. 163).
For the sake of readability, ILO instruments will hereafter be referred to by their number. The
texts of the Conventions and Recommendations are all presented chronologically in ILO, 1996b,
1996c and 1996d, and those concerning collective bargaining in ILO, 1995b.
3 The binding nature of collective agreements can be established either by legislative
means or by the collective agreement itself, according to the method followed in each country
(ILO, 1951, p. 603).

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International Labour Review
On several occasions, the Committee on Freedom of Association has ex-
pressed its preference for collective agreements over individual employment
contracts, objecting to equal status being given to the latter or to their being
used to the detriment of workers belonging to a union (see, for example, ILO,
1996a, para. 911; and ILO, 1997a, paras. 517-518). Thus, in a case concerning
the United Kingdom, the Committee on Freedom of Association indicated that
avoiding a representative organization and entering into direct individual
negotiation with employees is contrary to the promotion of collective bargaining
(ILO, 1998e, Case No. 1852, para. 337). For its part, the Committee of Experts
considers that granting primacy to individual agreements over collective
agreements does not encourage and promote collective bargaining as required
by Article 4 of Convention No. 98 (ILO, 1998c, p. 224).
Convention No. 98 does not contain a definition of collective agreements,
but outlines their fundamental aspects in Article 4:
Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken ... to encourage
and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary
negotiation between employers or employers’ organisations and workers’ or-
ganisations with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of
employment by means of collective agreements (ILO, 1996b, p. 640).
In the preparatory work for Convention No. 151 (1978) the interpretation
of the term “negotiation” was accepted as being “any form of discussion, formal
or informal, that was designed to reach agreement”, the term “negotiation”
being deemed preferable to “discussion”, which did not emphasize the need to
endeavour to secure agreement (ILO, 1978, paras. 64-65, p. 25/9).
Convention No. 154, adopted in 1981, defines collective bargaining in
Article 2 as follows:
[T]he term “collective bargaining” extends to all negotiations which take
place between an employer, a group of employers or one or more employers’
organisations, on the one hand, and one or more workers’ organisations, on
the other, for: (a) determining working conditions and terms of employment;
and/or (b) regulating relations between employers and workers; and/or (c)
regulating relations between employers or their organisations and a workers’
organisation or workers’ organisations (ILO, 1996d, p. 93).
The ILO supervisory bodies have also stated that the parties to collective
bargaining are entitled to choose, independently and without any interference
from the authorities, the level at which the negotiation is to be conducted (central,
sectoral or enterprise level), and that trade union federations and confederations
should be able to conclude collective agreements (ILO, 1994a, para. 249; and
ILO, 1996a, para. 783).
Subjects, parties, and issues in collective
bargaining
ILO instruments, as explained above, clearly permit collective bargaining
only with representatives of the workers concerned if there are no workers’
organizations in the area in question (enterprise level or higher). This standard

ILO principles concerning collective bargaining
37
is set out in Paragraph 2 of Recommendation No. 91 and is confirmed in Con-
vention No. 135, which provides in Article 5 that “the existence of elected
representatives is not used to undermine the positionof the trade unions concerned
or their representatives” (ILO, 1996c, p. 496); and in Convention No. 154,
which also provides in Article 3, paragraph 2, that “appropriate measures shall
be taken, whenever necessary, to ensure that the existence of these [workers’]
representatives is not used to undermine the position of the workers’ organisations
concerned” (ILO, 1996d, p. 93).
The preparatory work for the Collective Agreements Recommendation,
1951 (No. 91), shows that the possibility for representatives of workers to
conclude collective agreements in the absence of one or various representative
organizations of workers is envisaged in the Recommendation, “taking into
consideration the position of those countries in which trade union organisations
have not yet reached a sufficient degree of development, and in order to enable
the principles laid down in the Recommendation to be implemented in such
countries” (ILO, 1951, p. 603).
The Committee on Freedom of Association maintained in one case that
“direct settlements signed between an employer and a group of non-unionized
workers, even when aunion exists in the undertaking, does not promote collective
bargaining as set out in Article 4 of Convention No. 98” (ILO, 1996a, para.
790). Going into greater detail, in another case the Committee on Freedom of
Association stated that the possibility for staff delegates who represent 10 per
cent of the workers to conclude collective agreements with an employer, even
where one or more organizations of workers already exist, is not conducive to
the development of collective bargaining in the sense ofArticle 4 of Convention
No. 98 (ibid., para. 788). The Committee of Experts did not address these
issues in itslast general survey on freedom of association and collective bargaining
of 1994 on Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 (ILO, 1994a), although it has done
so in observations on the application in certain countries of the Conventions on
freedom of association and collective bargaining, in which it has expressed a
similar point of view to that of the Committee on Freedom of Association with
regard to collective agreements concluded with non-unionized groups of workers
(see, for example, the observations concerning Costa Rica, in ILO, 1993a,
pp. 184-185; and in ILO, 1994b, pp. 203-204).
It is important to emphasize that, for workers’ organizations to be able to
fulfil their purpose of “furthering and defending the interests of workers” through
collective bargaining, they have to be independent and must be able to organize
their activities without any interference by the public authorities which would
restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof (Convention No. 87,
Articles 3 and 10, ILO, 1996b, pp. 528-529). Moreover, they must not be
“under the control of employers or employers’ organisations” (Convention
No. 98, Article 2, ibid., pp. 639-640).
In this respect, Convention No. 151 provides in Article 5 that “public
employees’ organisations shall enjoy complete independence from public
authorities” (ILO, 1996d, p. 49), while Recommendation No. 91 indicates in
Paragraph 2 that “nothing in the present definition [of collective agreements]

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International Labour Review
should be interpreted as implying the recognition of any association of workers
established, dominated or financed by employers or their representatives” (ILO,
1996b, p. 656).
The requirement of a certain level of representativeness
Another issue which needs to be examined is whether the right to negoti-
ate is subject to a certain level of representativeness. In this respect, it should be
recalled, depending on the individual system of collective bargaining, that trade
union organizations which participate in collective bargaining may represent
only their own members or all the workers in the negotiating unit concerned. In
this latter case, where a trade union (or, as appropriate, trade unions) represents
the majority of the workers, or a high percentage established by law which does
not imply such a majority, in many countries it enjoys the right to be the exclusive
bargaining agent on behalf of all the workers in the bargaining unit.
The position of the Committeeof Experts is that both systems are compatible
with the Convention (ILO, 1994a, paras. 238-242). In a case concerning Bulgaria,
when examining the question raised by the complainant organization that some
collective agreements apply only to the parties to the agreement and their
members and not to all workers, the Committee on Freedom of Association
considered that “this is a legitimate option — just as the contrary would be —
which does not appear to violate the principles of freedom of association,
and one which is practised in many countries” (ILO, 1996e, Case No. 1765,
para. 100). The Committee of Experts has stated that:
[W]hen national legislation provides for a compulsory procedure for recogniz-
ing unions as exclusive bargaining agents [representing all the workers, and
not just their members], certain safeguards should be attached, such as: (a) the
certification to be made by an independent body; (b) the representative
organization to be chosen by a majority vote of the employees in the unit
concerned; (c) the right of an organization, which in a previous trade union
election failed to secure a sufficiently large number of votes, to request a new
election after a stipulated period; (d) the right of any new organization other
than the certified organization to demand a new election after a reasonable
period has elapsed.
[I]f no union covers more than 50 per cent of the workers, collective bargaining
rights should be granted to all unions in this unit, at least on behalf of their
own members (ILO, 1994a, paras. 240-241).
The Committee on Freedom of Association has upheld principles and
decisions along the same lines as the Committee of Experts (ILO, 1996a,
paras. 831-842), and has justified that decisions concerning the most
representative union should be made “by virtue of objective and pre-established
criteria so as to avoid any opportunities for partiality or abuse (ibid., para.
827).
Recommendation No. 163 enumerates various measures designed to
promote collective bargaining, including the recognition of representative
employers’ and workers’ organizations (ILO, 1996d, p. 97, Paragraph 3).

ILO principles concerning collective bargaining
39
Workers covered by collective bargaining
Convention No. 98 (in Articles 4-6) establishes the relationship between
collective bargaining and the conclusion of collective agreements for the
regulation of terms and conditions of employment. It provides that “the extent
to which the guarantees provided for in this Convention shall apply to the
armed forces and the police shall be determined by national laws or regulations”,
and also states that “this Convention does not deal with the position of public
servants engaged in the administration of the State, nor shall it be construed as
prejudicing their rights or status in any way” (ILO, 1996b, p. 640). Under this
Convention, only the armed forces, the police and the above category of public
servants may therefore be excluded from the right to collective bargaining.
With regard to this type of public servants, the Committee of Experts has stated
the following:
The Committee could not allow the exclusion from the terms of the Conven-
tion of large categories of workers employed by the State merely on the grounds
that they are formally placed on the same footing as public officials engaged
in the administration of the State. The distinction must therefore be drawn
between, on the one hand, public servants who by their functions are directly
employed in the administration of the State (for example, in some countries,
civil servants employed in government ministries and other comparable
bodies, as well as ancillary staff) who may be excluded from the scope of the
Convention and, on the other hand, all other persons employed by the
government, by public enterprises or by autonomous public institutions, who
should benefit from the guarantees provided for in the Convention (ILO,
1994a, para. 200).
The Committee on Freedom of Association has made statements in the
same vein (ILO, 1996a, paras. 793-795 and 798).
Subjects covered by collective bargaining
Conventions No. 98, No. 151 and No. 154 and Recommendation No. 91
focus the content of collective bargaining on terms and conditions of work and
employment and on the regulation of the relations between employers and
workers and between organizations of employers and of workers.
The concept of working conditions used by the supervisory bodies is not
limited to traditional working conditions (working time,4 overtime, rest periods,
wages, etc.), but also covers “certain matters which are normally included in
conditions of employment”, such as promotions, transfers, dismissal without
notice, etc. (ILO, 1994a, para. 250 including footnote 17). This trend is in line
with the modern tendency in industrialized countries to recognize “managerial”
collective bargaining concerning procedures to resolve problems, such as staff
reductions, changes in working hours and other matters which go beyond terms
of employment in their strict sense. According to the Committee of Experts, “it
4 For example, according to the Committee of Experts, it should be possible to agree
through collective agreements to a shorter working day than that envisaged by law (ILO, 1998c,
p. 256).

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International Labour Review
would be contrary to the principles of Convention No. 98 to exclude from
collective bargaining certain issues such as those relating to conditions of
employment” and “measures taken unilaterally by the authorities to restrict the
scope of negotiable issues are often incompatible with the Convention” (ibid.,
paras. 265 and 250, respectively).
Nevertheless, although the range of subjects which can be negotiated and
their content is very broad, they are not absolute and need to be clearly related
to conditions of work and employment or, in other words, matters which are
primarily or essentially questions relating to conditions of employment (ILO,
1996a, para. 812). Moreover, the supervisory bodies allow the exclusion from
the subjects covered by negotiation of matters which are for the employer to
decide upon as part of the freedom to manage the enterprise, such as the
assignment of duties and appointments (ILO, 1998c, p. 259). They also allow
the prohibition of certain clauses, such as discriminatory clauses, clauses of
trade union security, or clauses which are contrary to the minimum standards of
protection set out in the law.
TheCommittee on Freedom ofAssociation has indicated that certain matters
can also reasonably be regarded as outside the scope of negotiation, such as
“matters which clearly appertain primarily or essentially to the management
and operation of government business” (ILO, 1996a, para. 812). In a recent
case against the Government of Canada (Ontario), the Committee on Freedom
of Association noted that:
Determining the broad lines of educational policy has been given as an example
of a matter that can be excluded from collective bargaining; ... However, [the
Committee indicated that] policy decisions may have important consequences
on conditions of employment, which should be the subject of free collective
bargaining (ILO, 1998b, Case No. 1951, para. 220).
Governing principles
The principle of free and voluntary negotiation
The voluntary nature of collective bargaining is explicitly laid down in
Article 4 of Convention No. 98 and, according to the Committee on Freedom
of Association, is “a fundamental aspect of the principles of freedom of
association” (ILO, 1996a, para. 844). Thus, the obligation to promote collective
bargaining excludes recourse to measures of compulsion. During the preparatory
work for Convention No. 154, the Committee on Collective Bargaining agreed
upon an interpretation of the term “promotion” (of collective bargaining) in
the sense that it“should not be capable ofbeing interpreted in a manner suggesting
an obligation for the State to intervene to impose collective bargaining”, thereby
allaying the fear expressed by the Employer members that the text of the
Convention could imply the obligation for the State to take compulsory measures
(ILO, 1981, p. 22/6).
The Committee on Freedom ofAssociation, following this line of reasoning,
has stated that nothing in Article 4 of Convention No. 98 places a duty on a

ILO principles concerning collective bargaining
41
government to enforce collective bargaining with a given organization by com-
pulsory means, and that such an intervention by a government would clearly
alter the nature of bargaining (ILO, 1996a, para. 846).
It cannot therefore be deduced from the ILO’s Conventions on collective
bargaining that there is a formal obligation to negotiate5 or to achieve a result
(an agreement). Nevertheless, the supervisory bodies have considered that the
criteria established by law should enable the most representative organizations
to take part in collective bargaining (ILO, 1994a, para. 245), which implies the
recognition or the duty to recognize such organizations. Moreover, the Committee
of Experts, when examining the application of Convention No. 98, has not
criticized the prohibition of certain unfair labour practices in the process of
negotiation likely to hinder the development of collective bargaining (ibid.,
para. 246). Similarly, the principles of the supervisory bodies emphasize that
the machinery which supports bargaining (the provision of information,
consultation, mediation, arbitration) should be of a voluntary nature, in spite of
which many national legislations oblige the parties to follow fixed procedures
setting out all the stages and phases of the negotiation process, and under which
there are frequent and compulsory interventions by the administrative authorities
with predetermined time limits.
However, in practice, the supervisory bodies have accepted the imposition
of certain sanctions in the event of conduct which is contrary to good faith or
which constitutes unfair practice in the course of collective bargaining, provided
that they are not disproportionate,6 and have admitted conciliation and mediation
imposed by law within reasonable time limits.7 These criteria have undoubtedly
taken into account the objective of promoting collective bargaining in situations
in which the trade union movement is not sufficiently developed. They have
also taken account of the underlying concern in many legislations to avoid
unnecessary strikes and precarious and tense situations resulting from the failure
to renew collective agreements, particularly where they cover extensive categories
of workers.
Free choice of bargaining level
In this respect, Recommendation No. 163 provides that “Measures adapted
to national conditions should be taken, if necessary, so that collective bargaining
is possible at any level whatsoever, including that of the establishment, the
5 The obligation to negotiate is imposed in certain countries. See, in this respect, two
documents presented to the Joint Committee on the Public Service: ILO, 1988, especially p. 25;
and ILO, 1970.
6 For example, when examining the Panamanian legislation and noting that the employer
was obliged to pay the workers for days when they had been on strike, in cases where the strike
had occurred because the employer had not replied to the demands which had been made and
because conciliation had been abandoned, the Committee on Freedom of Association considered
that the sanctions were disproportionate (ILO, 1999b, Case No. 1931, para. 371).
7 See, for example, ILO, 1997b, Case No. 1898 (Guatemala), para. 324; and ILO, 1996f,
Case No. 1822 (Venezuela), paras. 508-509; see also ILO, 1998c, pp. 252-253.

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International Labour Review
undertaking, the branch of activity, the industry, or the regional or national
levels” (ILO, 1996d, pp. 97-98, Paragraph 4).
Similarly, the Committeeof Experts, after recalling that the right to bargain
collectively should also be granted to federations and confederations, and
rejecting any prohibition of the exercise of this right, has stated that:
[L]egislation which makes it compulsory for collective bargaining to take
place at a higher level (sector, branch of activity, etc.) also raises problems of
compatibility with the Convention [No. 98]. The choice should normally be
made by the partners themselves, since they are in the best position to decide
the most appropriate bargaining level, including, if they so wish, by adopting
a mixed system of framework agreements supplemented by local or enterprise-
level agreements (ILO, 1994a, para. 249).
The Committee on Freedom onAssociation has developed this point further
along the following lines:
According to the principle of free and voluntary collective bargaining
embodied in Article 4 of Convention No. 98, the determination of the
bargaining level is essentially a matter to be left to the discretion of the
parties and, consequently, the level of negotiation should not be imposed by
law, by decision of the administrative authority or by the case-law of the
administrative labour authority.8
... Thus, the Committee does not consider the refusal by employers to bargain
at a particular level as an infringement of freedom of association.
Legislation should not constitute an obstacle to collective bargaining at the
industry level (ILO, 1996a, paras. 851-853).
In thisrespect, the Committeeconsiders that the requirement of the majority
of not only the number of workers, but also of enterprises, in order to be able
to conclude a collective agreement on the branch or occupational level could
raise problems with regard to the application of Convention No. 98 (ibid., para.
854; and ILO, 1997a, para. 553). The Committee of Experts shares this view
(ILO, 1996g, p. 215). Furthermore, it should be sufficient for the trade union
at the branch level to establish that it is sufficiently representative at the enterprise
level (ILO, 1996h, Case No. 1845 (Peru), para. 516).
As regards the principle that the parties involved decide by mutual
agreement the level at which bargaining should take place, the Committee has
noted that, in many countries, this question is determined by a body that is
independent of the parties themselves. The Committee considers that in such
cases the body concerned should be “truly independent” (ILO, 1996a, para.
855).
The supervisory bodies have not established criteria concerning the
relationship between collective agreements at the different levels (which may
address the economy in general, a sector or industry, an enterprise or group of
enterprises, or an establishment or factory); and which may, according to the
individual case, have a different geographical scope. In principle, this should
depend on the wishes of the parties. In practice, the supervisory bodies accept
systems in which it is left to collective agreements to determine how they are to
8 See also ILO, 1998d, Case No. 1887 (Argentina), para. 103.

ILO principles concerning collective bargaining
43
be coordinated (for example, by establishing that a problem resolved in one
agreement cannot be decided upon at other levels), as well as systems in which
legal provisions distribute subjects between collective agreements, give primacy
to a specific level, adopt the criteria of the standards which are the most
favourable to the workers, or which do not establish criteria and leave these
questions to practical application. Recommendation No. 163 indicates in
Paragraph 4 that “in countries where collective bargaining takes place at several
levels, the parties to negotiations should seek to ensure that there is co-ordination
among these levels” (ILO, 1996d, p. 98).
The principle of good faith
In the preparatory work for Convention No. 154, it was recognized that
collective bargaining could only function effectively if it was conducted in
good faith by both parties; but as good faith cannot be imposed by law, it
“could only be achieved as a result of the voluntary and persistent efforts of
both parties” (ILO, 1981, p. 22/11).
The Committeeon Freedom ofAssociation, in addition to drawing attention
to the importance that it attaches to the obligation to negotiate in good faith,
has stated that the principle of good faith implies making every effort to reach
an agreement, conducting genuine and constructive negotiations, avoiding
unjustified delays, complying with the agreements which are concluded and
applying them in good faith; to thismay be added therecognition ofrepresentative
trade union organizations (ILO, 1996a, paras. 814-818; and ILO, 1997c, Case
No. 1919 (Spain), para. 325). The principle of the mutual respect for
commitments entered into in collective agreements is explicitly recognized in
Recommendation No. 91, which provides that “collective agreements should
bind the signatories thereto and those on whose behalf theagreement is concluded”
(ILO, 1996b, p. 657, Paragraph 3).
For its part, the Committee of Experts has stated that:
In several countries legislation makes the employer liable to sanctions if he
refuses to recognize the representative trade union, an attitude which is
sometimes considered as an unfair labour practice. The Committee recalls in
this connection the importance which it attaches to the principle that employers
and trade unions should negotiate in good faith and endeavour to reach an
agreement, the more so in the public sector or essential services where trade
unions are not allowed strike action (ILO, 1994a, para. 243).
Voluntary procedures and compulsory
arbitration
The role of machinery to facilitate negotiations
According to the Committee of Experts, the existing machinery and pro-
cedures should be designed to facilitate bargaining between the two sides, leav-
ing them free to reach their own settlement (ILO, 1994a, para. 248). The Com-
mittee on Freedom of Association has established the following:

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International Labour Review
The bodies appointed for the settlement of disputes between the parties to
collective bargaining should be independent, and recourse to these bodies
should be on a voluntary basis.
Certain rules and practices can facilitate negotiations and help to promote
collective bargaining and various arrangements may facilitate the parties’
access to certain information concerning, for example, the economic position
of their bargaining unit, wages and working conditions in closely related
units, or the general economic situation; however, all legislation establishing
machinery and procedures for arbitration and conciliation designed to facilitate
bargaining between both sides of industry must guarantee the autonomy of
parties to collective bargaining (ILO, 1996a, paras. 858-859).
The supervisory bodies admit conciliation and mediation which are
voluntary or imposed by law, if they are within reasonable time limits (ibid.,
paras. 502-504) — as well as voluntary arbitration — in accordance with the
provisions of Recommendation No. 92 which indicates that: “Provision should
be made to enable the procedure to be set in motion, either on the initiative of
any of the parties to the dispute or ex officio by the voluntary conciliation
authority” (ILO, 1996b, p. 659, Paragraph 3).
Compulsory arbitration
One of the most radical forms of intervention by the authorities in collec-
tive bargaining, directly under the terms of the law or as a result of an admin-
istrative decision, is the imposition of compulsory arbitration when the parties
do not reach agreement, or when a certain number of days of strike action have
elapsed.9 Compulsory arbitration may also be sought by one of the parties, but
always conflicts with the voluntary nature of negotiation, since the solution
which is imposed is not derived from the will of both parties, but from a third
party to whom they have not had recourse jointly.
The supervisory bodies admit recourse to compulsory arbitration at the
initiative of the authorities, or of one of the parties, or ex officio by law in the
event of an acute national crisis, in the case of disputes in the public service
involving public servants exercising authority in the name of the State (who
can be excluded from the right to collective bargaining under Convention No.
98) or in essential services in the strict sense of the term, namely, those services
whose interruption would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the
whole or part of the population (ILO, 1996a, paras. 515 and 860-863). Evidently,
compulsory arbitration is also acceptable where it is provided for in the collective
agreement as a mechanism for the settlement of disputes. It is also acceptable,
as the Committee on Freedom of Association, following the Committee of
Experts, has recently indicated in cases where, after protracted and fruitless
negotiations, it is obvious that the deadlock in bargaining will not be broken
without some initiative on the part of the authorities (ILO, 1995c, Case No.
1768 (Iceland), para. 109).
9 On the relation between strikes and collective bargaining, see Gernigon, Odero and
Guido, 1998.

ILO principles concerning collective bargaining
45
Intervention by the authorities
In the ILO’s Conventions on collective bargaining, there are no provisions
covering possible conflicts between the specific interests of the parties and the
general interest of the population. This omission was deliberate, and not a
result of negligence (ILO, 1981, para. 64, p. 22/8). In practice, in situations of
extremely serious economic crisis (such as situations of war or in the subsequent
periods of economic reconstruction) or in order to combat inflation, achieve a
balance of payments or combat unemployment or other economic objectives,
governments have resorted to restrictive policies on wages and incomes. These
have been implemented through measures to freeze wages or confine wage
rises to certain limits,and have often included mechanisms requiring the approval,
modification or annulment of collective agreements that are in force. A freeze
is often also imposed in prices and in guaranteed minimum wage levels which
affects low-paid workers. The measures taken to pursue these policies may or
may not have been adopted with the agreement of employers’ and workers’
organizations, which are sometimes consulted or included in commissions
responsible for developing the policies (see ILO, 1974).
As will be seen below, the limitations implied by such adjustment policies
are not acceptable in the view of the supervisory bodies in cases where they
change the content of collective agreements which have already been concluded.
However, they are admissible when they are imposed on future negotiations,
provided that the situation is urgent and a series of guarantees are secured,
which are enumerated below. The various types of intervention by the authorities
in collective bargaining are covered below. Depending on the case, these may
be adopted for technical, legal or economic reasons.
Drafting and registration of collective agreements
In the opinion of the Committee on Freedom of Association, intervention
by the public authorities in the drafting of collective agreements is not compatible
with the spirit of Article 4 of Convention No. 98, unless it consists exclusively
of technical aid (ILO, 1996a, para. 866).
According to the supervisory bodies, refusal to approve a collective
agreement is permitted only on grounds of errors of pure form or procedural
flaws (ibid., para. 868), or where the collective agreement does not conform to
the minimum standards laid down by general labour legislation (ILO, 1994a,
para. 251). However, legislative provisions are not compatible with Convention
No. 98 where they permit the refusal to register or approve a collective agreement
on grounds such as incompatibility with the general or economic policy of the
government or official directives on wages or conditions of work; a situation
which requires prior approval of collective agreements by the authorities amounts
to a violation of the principle of the autonomy of the parties to negotiation
(ILO, 1996a, paras. 868-869; and ILO, 1994a, para. 251).
Nevertheless, for reasons of general interest, governments establish
mechanisms so that the parties take into account considerations relating to their
economic and social policy and the protection of the general interest. Both the

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International Labour Review
Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association accept
these mechanisms, provided that they are not of a compulsory nature. The
Committee of Experts has indicated that:
The public authorities could also envisage a procedure to draw the attention
of the parties in certain cases to considerations of general interest that might
call for further examination by them of proposed agreements, provided,
however, that preference is always given to persuasion rather than coercion
(ILO, 1994a, para. 253).
The Committee on Freedom of Association has stated that if the public
authority considers that the terms of the imposed agreement are clearly contrary
to the economic policy objectives recognized as being in the public interest, the
case could be submitted for advice and recommendation to an appropriate
consultative body, provided, however, that the final decision would rest with
the parties (ILO, 1996a, para. 872).
However, these considerations must not be confused with stabilization
policies which result in significant and generalized restrictions on future wage
negotiations, which will be specifically examined in a separate section below.
Interference in the application of collective agreements
in force
When the outcome of collective bargaining is restricted or annulled by
law or by decision of the administrative authorities, industrial relations are
destabilized and workers lose their confidence in their trade union organizations,
particularly when this type of intervention implies wage restrictions. These
interventions violate theprinciple of free and voluntary negotiation of agreements
and take various forms, which have been strongly refuted by the Committee on
Freedom of Association. These are: the suspension, interruption, annulment or
forced renegotiation of the agreement, by law or by decree, without the consent
of both parties (ILO, 1996a, paras. 875-880).
The compulsory extension of the validity of collective agreements by law,
particularly where this occurs following previous government interventions, is
only admissible in cases of emergency and for brief periods of time, since such
measures amount to interference with free collective bargaining (ibid., para.
881).
Restrictions on future negotiations
The Committee of Experts has noted that, in the belief that the national
economic situation requires stabilization measures, an increasing number of
governments have taken steps to restrict or prevent the free fixing of wages by
means of collective bargaining. In this respect, the Committee of Experts has
established the following basic principle:
[I]f, under an economic stabilization or structural adjustment policy, that is
for imperative reasons of national economic interest, wage rates cannot be
fixed freely by means of collective bargaining, these restrictions should be

ILO principles concerning collective bargaining
47
applied as an exceptional measure and only to the extent necessary, should
not exceed a reasonable period and should be accompanied by adequate
safeguards to protect effectively the standard of living of the workers
concerned, in particular those who are likely to be the most affected (ILO,
1994a, para. 260).
The Committee on Freedom of Association has expressed itself in very
similar terms and has added that, in any case, any limitation on collective
bargaining by the authorities should be preceded by consultations with the
workers’ and employers’ organizations in an effort to obtain their agreement
(ILO, 1996a, paras. 882-884).
The Committee has indicated that the basic principle with regard to wage
restrictions in the context of stabilization policies and the required guarantees
are also applicable in cases in which the law obliges future collective agreements
to respect productivity criteria, or the negotiation of wage increases beyond the
level of the increase in the cost of living (ibid., paras. 890-892).
With regard to the duration of restrictions on collective bargaining, the
Committee has considered that a three-year period of limited collective
bargaining on remuneration within the context of a policy of economic
stabilization constitutes a substantial restriction, and the legislation in question
should cease producing effects at the latest at the dates mentioned in the
legislation, or indeed earlier if the fiscal and economic situation improves (ibid.,
para. 886). Similarly, where wage restraint measures are taken by a government
to impose financial controls, care should be taken to ensure that collective
bargaining on non-monetary matters can be pursued (ibid., para. 888).
Collective bargaining in the public service
The exercise of the right of freedom of association by organizations of
public officials and employees is now a reality in industrialized countries and
in many developing countries. Convention No. 98, adopted in 1949, excluded
from its scope public servants engaged in the administration of the State, but
Convention No. 151, adopted in 1978, took an important step forward in
requiring States to promote machinery for negotiation or such other methods as
allow representatives of public employees to participate in the determination of
their terms and conditions of employment. According to Article 1, the only
categories which can be excluded (apart from the armed forces and the police,
as in previous Conventions) are “high-level employees whose functions are
normally considered as policy-making or managerial” and “employees whose
duties are of a highly confidential nature” (ILO, 1996d, p. 48).
A few years later, in 1981, came the adoption of Convention No. 154,
which promotes collective bargaining in both the private sector and the public
service (with the exception of the armed forces and the police) and only allows,
for the public service, the fixing of special modalities of application of the
Convention by national laws or regulations or national practice (ibid., Article
1, p. 93). A state which ratifies the Convention cannot confine itself to consul-
tations, but has to promote collective bargaining with the aim, inter alia, of

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International Labour Review
determining working conditions and terms of employment.10 It should be pointed
out, as a matter of interest which facilitated the inclusion of the public service,
that, in contrast with Convention No. 98, Convention No. 154 no longer refers
to the determination of terms and conditions of employment by means of for-
mal collective agreements (which in many countries have force of law, whilst
in certain countries ordinary agreements between parties are not even legally
binding). Such a provision would have made it impossible for this right to be
included, in view of the objections of the states which were prepared to recognize
collective bargaining in the public service, but without renouncing at the same
time a statutory system; see von Potobsky, 1988, p. 1890.
Characteristics of collective bargaining in the public service
Collective bargaining in the public service raises specific problems. On
the one hand, there are often one or more national conditions of service designed
to achieve uniformity, which are in general approved by Parliament, and which
often contain exhaustive regulations covering the rights, duties and conditions
of public servants, thereby prohibiting or leaving little room for negotiation.
On the other hand, the remuneration of public servants has financial implications
which have to be reflected in public budgets, which are approved by such
bodies as parliaments and municipalities, etc. These bodies are not always
the employers of public servants and their decisions have to take into account
the economic situation of the country and the general interest. Associations
which participate in negotiations in the public service are therefore very fre-
quently subject to directives or the control of external bodies, such as the Min-
istry of Finance or an interministerial committee. Moreover, the period of du-
ration of collective agreements in the public sector does not always coincide
with the duration of budgetary laws — a situation which can give rise to diffi-
culties.
These problems are compounded by other difficulties, such as the
determination of the subjects for negotiation and their distribution between the
various levels within the complex territorial and operational structure of the
State, as well as the determination of the negotiating parties at these levels.
This explains why, according to Conventions No. 151 and No. 154, it is
admissible for special modalities of application to be fixed for collective
bargaining in the public service. The Committee of Experts has not yet carried
out a general survey on this subject and the principles set out by the ILO’s
supervisory bodies have focused mainly on budgetary matters and interventions
by the authorities in freely concluded agreements. The question arises as to
whether these specific modalities include: (a) the harmonization of an agreed
system with a statutory system (von Potobsky, 1988, pp. 1888-1889, 1892); (b)
the exclusion from bargaining of certain subjects; (c) the centralization of ne-
gotiation on subjects with budgetary implicationsor which would imply changes
10 As of 1 January 2000, Convention No. 151 had been ratified by 36 countries and
Convention No. 154 by 30 countries.

ILO principles concerning collective bargaining
49
in the laws governing the conditions of service of public servants; or (d) the
possibility that the legislative authority should determine certain directives,
preceded by discussions with the trade union organizations, within which each
exercise of collective bargaining on issues relating to remuneration or other
matters with financial implications must remain. The answer to these questions
is likely to be affirmative, given that the Conventions in question allow a cer-
tain amount of flexibility.
In the opinion of the Committee of Experts, the following are compatible
with the Conventions on collective bargaining:
[L]egislative provisions which allow Parliament or the competent budgetary
authority to set upper and lower limits for wage negotiations or to establish
an overall “budgetary package” within which the parties may negotiate
monetary or standard-setting clauses (for example: reduction of working hours
or other arrangements, varying wage increases according to levels of
remuneration, fixing a timetable for readjustment provisions) or those which
give the financial authorities the right to participate in collective bargaining
alongside the direct employer are compatible with the Convention, provided
they leave a significant role to collective bargaining. It is essential, however,
that workers and their organizations be able to participate fully and
meaningfully in designing this overall bargaining framework, which implies
in particular that they must have access to all the financial, budgetary and
other data enabling them to assess the situation on the basis of the facts (ILO,
1994a, para. 263).
This is not the case of legislative provisions which, on the grounds of the
economic situation of a country, impose unilaterally, for example, a specific
percentage increase and rule out any possibility of bargaining, in particular by
prohibiting the exercise of means of pressure subject to the application of severe
sanctions (ILO, 1993b, Case No. 1617 (Ecuador), para. 63). In this respect,
during periods of prolonged and widespread economic stagnation the Committee
considers that the authorities should givepreference as far as possible to collective
bargaining in determining the conditions of employment of public servants;
where the circumstances rule this out, measures of this kind should be limited
in time and protect the standard of living of the workers who are the most
affected (ILO, 1994a, para. 264).
This point of view has been shared by the Committee on Freedom of
Association (ILO, 1996a, para. 899), which has also emphasized that “the
reservation of budgetary powers to the legislative authority should not have the
effect of preventing compliance with collective agreements entered into by, or
on behalf of, that authority” (ibid., para. 894).
Like the Committee of Experts, the Committee on Freedom ofAssociation
has considered that:
In so far as the income of public enterprises and bodies depends on state
budgets, it would not be objectionable — after wide discussion and consulta-
tion between the concerned employers’ and employees’ organizations in a
system having the confidence of the parties — for wage ceilings to be fixed in
state budgetary laws, and neither would it be a matter for criticism that the

50
International Labour Review
Ministry of Finance prepare a report prior to the commencement of collective
bargaining with a view to ensuring respect of such ceilings (ibid., para. 896).11
Before such ceilings are established, both the employers and the public
sector trade union organizations should be consulted and be able to express
their points of view to the authority responsible for assessing the financial
consequences of draft collective agreements. Nevertheless, “notwithstanding
any opinion submitted by the financial authorities, the parties to collective
bargaining should be able to conclude an agreement freely” (ibid., para. 897).
On the subject of the provisions of collective agreements relating to remu-
neration and conditions of employment which have financial implications, one of
the fundamental principles mentioned above is that collective agreements must
be respected by the legislative and administrative authorities. This principle is
compatible with the various budgetary systems, provided that they meet certain
conditions and, in particular, can accommodate, on the one hand, systems in
which collective agreements resulting from negotiation are concluded before the
budgetary debate (provided that the budgets in practice respect the content of the
agreements) and, on the other hand, systems in which the agreements are con-
cluded after the budget, provided they are sufficiently flexible. Such budgetary
flexibility can be achieved in a number of ways: by permitting an internal adjust-
ment of the budgetary items to give effect to collective agreements; by allowing
the transfer to future budgets of the debt resulting from unforeseen expenditure
derived from collective agreements in the public service; by permitting the budget
to be changed in subsequent additional laws which allow compliance with the
collective agreements; or, if there is significant latitude for negotiation, by deter-
mining maximum levels of remuneration in terms of percentage increases or the
overall wage mass, after taking into account in good faith the outcome of signifi-
cant prior consultations with trade union organizations.
Finally, the flexibility permitted by Convention No. 154 means that, when
negotiation covers terms and conditions of employment which involve changes
in the legislation respecting administrative careers or the conditions of service
of public employees, its results can take the form of a commitment by the
government authorities to submit draft legislation to parliament to amend the
above texts along the lines of the negotiations (see ILO, 1995c, Case No. 1561
(Spain), para. 40).
Summary of ILO principles on the right
to collective bargaining
The standards and principles emerging from the ILO’s Conventions, Rec-
ommendations and other instruments on the right to collective bargaining, and
the principles set forth by the Committee of Experts and the Committee on
11 This should not be confused with the requirement of a preliminary opinion issued by
the financial authorities (and not by the public employer) on draft collective agreements in the
public sector and their financial implications during their negotiation. In principle, such an
opinion is admissible.

ILO principles concerning collective bargaining
51
Freedom of Association on the basis of these instruments, may be summarized
as follows:
A. The right to collective bargaining is a fundamental right endorsed by
the members of the ILO in joining the Organization, which they have an
obligation to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith (ILO Declaration
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up).
B. Collective bargaining is a right of employers and their organizations,
on the one hand, and organizations of workers, on the other hand (first-level
trade unions, federations and confederations); only in the absence of these latter
organizations may representatives of the workers concerned conclude collective
agreements.
C. The right to collective bargaining should be recognized throughout
the private and public sectors, and it is only the armed forces, the police and
public servants engaged in the administration of the State who may be excluded
from the exercise thereof (Convention No. 98).12
D. The purpose of collective bargaining is the regulation of terms and
conditions of employment, in a broad sense, and the relations between the
parties.
E. Collective agreements should be binding. It mustbepossible to determine
terms and conditions of employment which are more favourable than those
established by law and preference must not be given to individual contracts
over collective agreements, except where more favourable provisions are
contained in individual contracts.
F. To be effective, the exercise of the right to collective bargaining
requires that workers’ organizations are independent and not “under the control
of employers or employers’ organizations” and that the process of collective
bargaining can proceed without undue interference by the authorities.
G. A trade union which represents the majority or a high percentage of
the workers in a bargaining unit may enjoy preferential or exclusive bargaining
rights. However, in cases where no trade union fulfils these conditions or such
exclusive rights are not recognized, workers’ organizations should nevertheless
be able to conclude a collective agreement on behalf of their own members.
H. The principle of good faith in collective bargaining implies recogniz-
ing representative organizations, endeavouring to reach an agreement, engag-
ing in genuine and constructive negotiations, avoiding unjustified delays in
negotiation and mutually respecting the commitments entered into, taking into
account the results of negotiations in good faith.
I. In view of the fact that the voluntary nature of collective bargaining is
a fundamental aspect of the principles of freedom of association, collective
12 Nevertheless, when a state ratifies the Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981
(No. 154), the right to collective bargaining is also applicable in the context of the public
administration, for which special modalities of application may be fixed. By contrast, the
Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151), provides a lower level of
international protection for collective bargaining, since it permits, in the context of the public
administration, the possibility of opting between collective bargaining and other methods for
the determination of terms and conditions of employment.

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International Labour Review
bargaining may not be imposed upon the parties and procedures to support
bargaining must, in principle, take into account its voluntary nature; moreover,
the level of bargaining must not be imposed unilaterally by law or by the
authorities, and it must be possible for bargaining to take place at any level.
J. It is acceptable for conciliation and mediation to be imposed by law in
the framework of the process of collective bargaining, provided that reasonable
time limits are established. However, the imposition of compulsory arbitration
in cases where the parties do not reach agreement is generally contrary to the
principle of voluntary collective bargaining and is only admissible: (1) in essential
services in the strict sense of the term (those whose interruption would endanger
the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population); (2)
with regard to public servants engaged in the administration of the State; (3)
where, after prolonged and fruitless negotiations, it is clear that the deadlock
will not be overcome without an initiative by the authorities; and (4) in the
event of an acute national crisis. Arbitration which is accepted by both parties
(voluntary arbitration) is always legitimate.
K. Interventions by the legislative or administrative authorities which have
the effect of annulling or modifying the content of freely concluded collective
agreements, including wage clauses, are contrary to the principle of voluntary
collective bargaining. These interventions include: the suspension or derogation
of collective agreements by decree without the agreement of the parties; the
interruption of agreements which have already been negotiated; the requirement
that freely concluded collective agreements be renegotiated; the annulment of
collective agreements; and the forced renegotiation of agreements which are
currently in force. Other types of intervention, such as the compulsory extension
of the validity of collective agreements by law are only admissible in cases of
emergency and for short periods.
L. Restrictions on the content of future collective agreements, particularly
in relation to wages, which are imposed by the authorities as part of economic
stabilization or structural adjustment policies for imperative reasons of economic
interest, are admissible only in so far as such restrictions are preceded by
consultations with the organizations of workers and employers and fulfil the
following conditions: they are applied as an exceptional measure, and only to
the extent necessary; do not exceed a reasonable period and are accompanied by
adequate guarantees designed to protect effectively the standards of living of
the workers concerned; and particularly those who are likely to be the most
affected.
Final observations
The observations made by the Committee of Experts on the application of
the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98),
show that the large majority of states which have ratified the Convention apply
it in a satisfactory manner. This demonstrates that it is a right which enjoys
almost universal recognition.

ILO principles concerning collective bargaining
53
By way of example, it may be pointed out that in its 1998 and 1999
reports the Committee of Experts made critical observations on 47 out of
the 145 governments which have ratified Convention No. 98 (ILO, 1998c,
pp. 249-299; and ILO, 1999c, pp. 322-351).
The problems noted most frequently in the observations of the Committee
of Experts relate in particular to the denial of the right to collective bargaining,
to public servants who are not engaged in the administration of the State, as
well as the requirement for trade union organizations to represent too high a
proportion of workers to be recognized or to engage in collective bargaining.
Immediately afterwards comes the significant number of countries in which
collective bargaining is subjected to the government’s economic policy. Finally,
certain countries exclude some subjects from collective bargaining, submit it
to compulsory arbitration in certain cases, restrict the right of the parties to
determine the level of bargaining, or prohibit collective bargaining by specific
categories of workers in the private sector or of federations and confederations.
The near-universal endorsement of collective bargaining is due not only to
the strength of the fundamental principles underlying it but also to its powers of
adaptation. The contracting parties, that is, the employers and workers, are best
placed to know their own aspirations and potential so that, in a bargaining proc-
ess undertaken freely and in good faith, they can each make concessions, negoti-
ate provisions satisfactory to all the parties involved, and arrive at mutually ben-
eficial agreements. Thanks to its inherent nature, therefore, collective bargaining
has been able to adapt to the major political and socio-economic changes outlined
in the introduction. However, the impact of these changes, at the start of the year
2000, in no way diminishes the raison d’être, significance or achievements of
collective bargaining, as proved by the very large network of collective agree-
ments, at different levels and with a vast scope, to be found in many countries.
Will the picture be completed in the near future by the emergence of
international collective bargaining within a context of multinational enterprises
and regional economic integration? Up to now, the few instances of international
collective bargaining have occurred only in certain transnational enterprises. It
should be noted that Directive 94/45, adopted by the Council of Ministers in
1994, promotes consultation and collective bargaining in thousands of
transnational enterprises and groups of enterprises with headquarters or branches
in the European Union (European Communities, 1994). The first European
works councils within the framework of this Directive have now been set up
(see ILO, 1995d) and the social partners have also managed to conclude a
number of European Union-wide agreements.
Though in recent years a radical view has been heard arguing for labour
law to be abolished and replaced with civil and commercial laws, and though
some legislations still place — sometimes severe — limits on collective
bargaining, such ideas and practices are clearly only those of a minority and do
not cast doubt on the ILO’s principles on collective bargaining. On the con-
trary, as pointed out earlier, in the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work adopted by the ILO in 1998, the international community de-
clared collective bargaining to be a fundamental right.

54
International Labour Review
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