Full text of DOI:10.1111/1467-8500.00239

RESEARCH & EVALUATION
The Salinity Crisis in Western Australia: A Case
of Policy Paralysis
QuentinBeresford
Harry Phillips
Hugo Bekle
SchoolofInternational,
CulturalandCommunityStudies
EdithCowanUniversity
SchoolofInternational,
CulturalandCommunityStudies
EdithCowanUniversity
SchoolofInternational,
CulturalandCommunityStudies
EdithCowanUniversity
This article focuses on the Court government’s development of a State Salinity Strategy
during the 1990s which took nine years from the initial announcement to the final realease.
Western Australia has 70 percent of the nation’s dryland salinity, a figure widely regarded
as representing a potential environmental disaster with significant flow-on economic and
social impacts. The paralysis that has surrounded decision-making on this issue is examined
as a case study in the lack of effectiveness of government policy-making capacity on the
environment. The shortcomings of the Salinity Strategy examined in the article include a
lack of a leadership role for government, inadequate resourcing and weaknesses in the
supporting institutional arrangements.
processes supporting the enhanced political
activity. This is an important field for
investigation in light of persistent criticisms
relating to the poor record of Australian
governments in dealing with environmental
issues.According to Cowley and Walker (1999:4)
both Conservative and Labor parties have failed
to take environmental issues seriously and
shown a lack of appreciation of their importance
within an ecological framework. In these authors’
view, describing environment policy inAustralia
is a complex task; a case of not only identifying
the policy processes, institutions and legislation
at work in the area, but accounting for the missed
opportunities, failed initiatives and the presence
non-decision-making (Cowley and Walker
1994:3).
This complexity is starkly highlighted using
a case-study approach to policy-making regard-
ing dryland salinity in Western Australia’s
extensive wheat-belt region. Covering an area
approximately 700 km by 400 km in the southwest
of the state, this region has 70 percent of the
nation’s dryland salinity. According to a recent
national survey of salinity (Short and McConnell
2000:7), around 6.5 million hectares of the state’s
agricultural land will be subject to salinity as the
In recent years the problems associated with the
spread of salinity in Australia’s agricultural
regions have attracted increased attention as
federal and state governments respond to
intensified media interest in the issue and the
findings from official reports. Estimates of the
amount of land at risk of succumbing to salinity
in the coming decades vary between 5 million
and 15 million hectares (Industry Commission
1998; Australian Conservation Foundation
2000). Even at the lower estimates, salinity
represents one of the nation’s most serious
environmental problems with impacts already
being felt in lost agricultural productivity,
damaged infrastructure and loss of biodiversity.
Added to this list must be the incalculable
damage to the morale and social fabric of many
rural communities, with the long-term existence
of some gravely threatened by salinity.
Culminating recent political interest in
salinity was the Prime Minister’s October 2000
statement on salinity in which $700 million was
committed by the Commonwealth government
for the first national strategy to address the
problem. Yet, for all the funds and effort now
flowing into addressing salinity, there has been
comparatively little analysis of the policy-making
AustralianJournalofPublicAdministration •60(4):30–38, December2001
© National Council of the Institute of Public Administration, Australia 2001. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK,
and 350 Main Street, Malden 02148, USA.

The Salinity Crisis in Western Australia
31
water table rises over the next 20–50 years. This
Warnings about the relationship between
will affect up to 30,000 km of road and rail networks extensive land clearing and salinity — too
and 27 major rural towns and many smaller ones, numerous to document for the purposes of this
threaten 450 species with extinction and reduce article — can be traced from the turn of the
the operating profits of the sheep and cereals century and were made at regular intervals
industries by between $80 and $260 million especially from the 1930s when the causes in
annually.
the form of a rising water table were established
Responses from state and federal (Wood 1924; Teakle 1939; Teakle and Burvill
governments to this emerging crisis are the focus 1945).
of this article. In particular, it explores the public
policy issues surrounding the Coalition
government’s development of the State Salinity
The First Political Responses
Strategy, work on which commenced in the early Despite the growing body of scientific research
1990s but was not finally completed and on salinity during the 1970s (see Conacher
launched untilApril 2000. Implementation of the 1986:124–25) government and relevant agencies
strategy had barely commenced before the Court were slow to respond. Government inaction was
government was defeated in February 2001 and all the more surprising given the inclusion of the
the incoming Labor administration announced a salinity problem in the 1983 Conservation
review of it, apparently unconvinced of its Strategy for WesternAustralia where the alarm-
effectiveness. Thus, it is timely to reflect upon ing spread of salinity was noted: an average
the paralysis that has for years characterised annual progression of 9.5 percent between 1974
policy-making on this issue.
and 1979 (Conservation and Environment
Few people appreciate that the current crisis Council 1983:41) However, throughout the 1970s
of salinity began as a consequence of the way and 1980s, political interest was virtually non-
in which government policy supported the existent. Parliament’s Hansard does not record
opening up and clearing of the land now known any major debate (and only a few scattered
as the wheatbelt.As Glynn (1975:18) has argued, references to water salinity) in the period 1972
the creation of the wheatbelt was a form of to 1988. Relevant departmental annual reports
induced economic development ‘which are only marginally more enlightening. Those
depended upon important economic decisions issued by the Agriculture Department contain
being taken at the political level’. In the decades irregular commentaries on salinity, mostly in the
after 1900 agricultural development became the form of feedback on research activities into
sacred cow of Western Australian politics control mechanisms. The Agriculture Depart-
representing an integrated social and economic ment believed salinity affected a tiny proportion
vision for the state. In pursuit of this vision, of agricultural land (Conacher and Conacher
government played a formidable role. Successive 2000:62). The record of the Environmental
Western Australian governments operated the Protection Agency — the organisation charged
cheapest prices for wheat land in the with providing advice to government on
Commonwealth, endured considerable public environmental matters — listed its priorities in
debt to aid agricultural expansion, promoted land its 1986–87 and 1987–88 annual reports.
settlementAustralia-wide and overseas to attract However, salinity was not listed among the
population and developed and operated an extensive range of issues examined by the
extensive system of railways to service the agency.
wheat-growing regions.
This inaction was obviously critical to the
The pro-development ethos at the centre of worsening of the problem and represents a
the movement to open up the wheatbelt was classic example of non-decision-making flowing
buttressed, at various times, by parallel social from the over-arching political commitment to
and economic imperatives: the demands to developmentalism. Some of the issues surround-
repatriate returning soldiers after World War I ing government inaction were later examined in
and II; the need to improve Australia’s terms of the report of the 1988 Legislative Council Select
trade during the 1950s and 1960s; and the push Committee on Salinity, the first major expression
from farmers during the 1970s for the survival of of political interest. Among the issues
the family farm.
documented by the committee were a lack of
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Beresford, Phillips and Bekle
32
awareness and cooperation among farmers; lack jointly to the WAWater and Resources Council
of funding for research; the poor performance and the Land Conservation Council which
of the Agriculture Department and the absence delivered a strategy to government in mid-1995.
of inter-agency cooperation.
However, by the end of that year the government
However, the harshest criticisms issued by still had not endorsed or released its contents.
the committee described the lack of political Criticism inevitably followed. The West
leadership on the problem:
Australian, which championed the salinity
cause from the early 1990s, editorialised on the
government’s poor performance. The need for
urgent action, the paper argued, seems to have
been lost on the Court government. The paper
criticised the government for sitting on the draft
strategy for the past six months apparently
procrastinating about the cost estimates: ‘After
nearly three years in office, the Court govern-
ment has fallen abysmally short of its 1993
election promise to spend unprecedented
resources fighting salinity and to inspire all
sections of society to take up the cause as a
united campaign’ (The West Australian, 22
November 1995).
The Committee notes there is no overall set
of objectives and policies to define salinity
control activities. Similarly there is no State
plan for salinity control which can identify
all the elements of proposed salinity control
projects and activities in terms of their
relationships, sequence and priority. There
is also no integrated budget for all salinity
control activities, only a series of State
departmental budgets … There does not
appear to be any attempt to allocate funds
within the total framework of salinity control
activities across agency and ministerial
boundaries. Because of these factors it is
virtually impossible to systematically
monitor and evaluate the efficiency and
effectiveness of all salinity control activities
as a whole (Legislative Council 1988:45).
Stung into action, the Coalition government
released a Draft Strategy in November 1996 with
promises of $580 million in expenditure over 10
years and the establishment of a State Salinity
Action Council. This commitment made the
In other words, government ministers did not strategy even more ambitious than the earlier
give the emerging crisis the attention it deserved. commitment of nearly the same amount of money
Certainly, throughout the 1980s there was a lack spread over double the time period. The strategy
of political pressure upon governments to act. came with an equally purposeful endorsement
With some 70 percent of voters resident in from Court: ‘We want to be the ones who make
metropolitan Perth and even given the so-termed the biggest assault to turn this situation around’,
malapportionment of seats favouring the rural he said. (TheWest Australian, 22 November 1995)
regions, there was virtually no electoral pressure Welcoming the announcement, The West
on governments, and political parties, regardless Australian was nonetheless cynical about the
of their political persuasion, to take decisive timing which, it claimed, was ‘almost certainly’
action. Thus, none of the extensive list of linked to a pre-Christmas election (The West
recommendations made by the Select Committee Australian, 22 November 1995).
was acted upon.
Following its re-election, it was not long
Commitment to tackle salinity began when before the government’s strategy came under
the Liberal Party (then in Opposition) started attack, principally due to the lack of any
planning its 1993 election strategy. The Party’s consultation with salt-affected farmers and its
Fightback manifesto declared: ‘The Liberals will failure to adequately address the issue of
make land degradation, which is currently infrastructure damage in salt-affected towns.An
Western Australia’s number one economic and extensive process of gathering submissions was
environmental disaster, the target of a rehabilita- undertaken by the Salinity Council which, in turn,
tion program unprecedented in Australia’s fed into a new Draft Strategy, released in
history’. The centrepiece of this commitment was November 1998. By this stage, commitment of
‘a massive $600 million 20-year program to funds had been drastically downgraded. A
control and reduce salinity and other forms of further 18 months elapsed before the Draft
land degradation in Western Australia’.
Strategy was officially launched as government
Once elected, progress on formulating a policy. One interpretation of this delay was raised
detailed plan was slow. The initial task was given by The West Australian when it editoralised that
© National Council of the Institute of Public Administration, Australia 2001

The Salinity Crisis in Western Australia
33
the government was ‘cowered by the enormity
There are a number of problems flowing from
of the problem’ (The West Australian, a limited view of the role of government on this
22 November 1995).
issue. The first is what might be termed the moral
argument. A strong case can be made out to
show that the emerging crisis of salinity in the
Wheatbelt is a direct consequence of govern-
Reviewing the State Salinity Strategy
Even though, as outlined above, the state ment policy in pursuing such vigorous land
Coalition government struggled to devise a
policy approach to salinity, the launch of its
strategy in April 2000 represented a significant
development not least because it was the first
occasion a Western Australian government was
prepared to acknowledge the seriousness of
salinity and the need for long-term measures.
Yet, the strategy contains serious shortcomings
which it is timely to examine in light of both the
ongoing activity in this area and the enormity of
the challenges facing government. As salinity
researcher, John Bartle (2000:118) has written:
clearing for agriculture while simultaneously
ignoring the warnings of experts cautioning
against such development. In other words,
governments failed to act with sufficient duty of
care to ensure their development plans were
sustainable for the people encouraged to settle
the region. This particularly applies to the areas
opened up in the decades after the World War
II.
Relying on local communities to take ‘the
largest role’ in managing salinity on both private
and public land may be both desirable and
necessary, but no analysis is offered indicating
Both the problem and the solution are such
big, dispersed and complex issues that they that such a strategy is capable of addressing
appear to be beyond resolution … Further,
informed opinion in many areas has led to
the decision that it is all too hard. The
concept of triage is discussed — that is,
selecting a few high value areas for remedial
action and, by implication, permitting the rest
to degrade.
salinity on the scale predicted. The potential for
social and economic dislocation is considerable
with the livelihood of many farmers threatened
along with those living in the more than 30 towns
potentially affected by a rising water table. There
is already plenty of accumulated experience with
the Commonwealth government’s Landcare
program to show the limitations of this approach:
that while it has raised community awareness
about the rural environment, and made
noteworthy contributions to addressing land
degradation, it is not capable of addressing the
scale of the problems of salinity and erosion
(Australian Bureau ofAgricultural and Resource
Economics 1998). Many Landcare participants
become frustrated with the bureaucratic
approaches to funding and experience
There has been little acknowledgment of this
complexity in public debate about salinity and
the implications it carries for the role of
government.
Government and Salinity
The State Salinity Strategy does not advocate a
strong leadership role for government. It states
that: ‘Some lands and waters will need direct
government support to protect high priority difficulties sustaining their involvement over
public assets. However, private landholders and
communities have the largest role in managing
community and private lands and waters’ (State
Salinity Council 2000:26). This is consistent with
a view held by some that salinity occurs mainly
on private land which farmers should have better
managed. Agricultural economist David Pannell
(2000:5) sums up this view: ‘some would argue
there is no justification for spending public
money to preserve what is really a private asset
— that salinity treatments intended to conserve
agricultural land should be considered by farmers
on their economic merits and paid for by farmers
if they choose to do so’.
many years. Together with the ageing of the
population in the wheatbelt, a strategy based
primarily on voluntary solutions to addressing
salinity is not likely to be effective.
Appropriate Levels of Funding
Addressing salinity on the scale it is spreading
in the wheatbelt calls for enormous financial
resources. In its 1998 Draft Strategy, the
government estimated that $100 million a year
for 30 years was required just to ensure the
revegetation of the region. This figure takes no
account of the broader social costs mentioned
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Beresford, Phillips and Bekle
34
above or the costs associated with the to realise that it would be in everyone’s interests
protection of biodiversity which are also to pay to overcome this problem’ (The West
potentially substantial.
Australian, 18 February 2000). An opinion poll
In recognition of the costs involved, some conducted during this phase of the debate
interest has been shown in the introduction of a showed that 60 percent of voters supported a
salinity levy. Yet, neither of the major political levy (The West Australian, 18 February 2000).
parties has been prepared to endorse the
However, the Coalition was split on the
proposal, leaving the strategy seriously under- proposal. At the beginning of March, Court
funded. The proposal for a levy to fight salinity stamped his authority on the debate by saying
was extensively canvassed in 1995 in response no levy would be included in the forthcoming
to the Environment Minister Peter Foss’ claim salinity strategy, while the Deputy Premier and
‘that he cannot allocate resources to the land Leader of the National Party, Hendy Cowan,
degradation problem in rural western Australia publicly supported the calls for a levy (TheWest
because city voters don’t give it high priority’ Australian, 18 February 2000). However, it was
(TheWestAustralian, 22 November 1995). In fact, the Premier’s position which prevailed.
The West Australian, had been polling on the
The Court government estimated that it was
issue of funding and a levy since 1993. In its spending $40 million a year fighting salinity, but
December 1995 poll, 54 percent of voters stated this figure may be an inflated one as many of the
that salinity was a serious concern, with an equal programs identified in the strategy are part of
number prepared to pay a levy. This response broader, ongoing government programs.
was up from the 1993 figure of 43 percent who Funding was raised again with the announce-
rated it a serious issue (ibid). Despite this strong ment of $700 million through the Prime Minister’s
support, Court ruled out the introduction of a Statement on Salinity. However, it transpired that
levy mindful, no doubt, of the political risks Western Australia’s share of this money was
involved: the lukewarm response from the $150 million and conditional upon matching state
Farmers’ Federation whose president thought the funds to the amount available to the state
money would simply be wasted by the government, again well short of the estimates
bureaucracy, and the opposition from the Labor needed.
Party.An election was little more than a year away.
The levy proposal re-emerged at the beginn-
ing of 2000 in the lead-up to the official release
Research and Development
Although revegetation of the wheatbelt is widely
regarded as one of the major solutions to ensure
that the worst predictions about salinity do not
materialise, farmers are unlikely to undertake this
work unless there is a commercial incentive to
do so. Thus, funding is especially needed into
research and development of commercial
alternatives to the cereal and pastoral industries.
Sometimes referred to a deep-rooted woody
perennials (such as plantation timbers and
commercial Eucalyptus), they are capable of
holding down the water table by mimicking the
functions of the original native vegetation. The
key issue is the funding of such research. The
Salinity Action Strategy stated:
of the Salinity Action Strategy. There was
speculation the government would include a levy
as part of its Strategy. On this occasion the
proposal received wide support: the Primary
Industries Minister Monty House stated his
belief that ‘there would be an environment levy
at some time’. Conservation groups including
GreeningAustralia and the Conservation Council
backed the proposal. This time the Farmers’
Federation was also strongly supportive, arguing
a levy reflected the need for collective respon-
sibility for the salinity crisis: ‘state governments
had encouraged or required farmers to clear their
land for agriculture until about 25 years ago. All
West Australians had shared the benefits and
all should help pick up the tab’ (The West
Australian, 12 November 1996). Championing
the levy also was The West Australian which
argued: ‘Given the size and severity of the
problem, a levy seems inevitable. It would draw
some protests. But it is a fair assessment of WA
community values that most people would come
The rural industry, including agri-business,
must play a larger role in addressing salinity
and in developing new and innovative
agricultural products. Sustainable manage-
ment practices underpin the productivity and
profitability of these industries (State Salinity
Council 2000:27).
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The Salinity Crisis in Western Australia
35
However, there must be considerable doubt but about 10 percent of the original native
about the willingness of the private sector to vegetation was removed (Select Committee into
take on investment in new enterprises when the Land Conservation 1990:69). Even with this rate
risks of a successful outcome appear quite of native vegetation loss, the wheatbelt remains
uncertain. As agricultural economist Pannell ‘one of the richest non-tropical botanic provinces
(1998:2) argues:‘there are currently large areas in the world’ (Soil and Land Conservation
of the agricultural region for which there is no Council of Western Australia 2001). However,
woody perennial available which generates a the 1990 Western Australian Parliamentary
significant direct financial return’. The scale of Select Committee into Land Conservation (73)
investment required to develop these commercial found that the remnant vegetation may be
alternatives is unlikely to happen without sub- deteriorating at the rate of 2 percent or 50,000
stantial public investment, given that no readily hectares annually through salinity, dieback and
marketable alternative crop (or crops) exists stock damage. Throughout the 1990s, clearing
capable of addressing the scale of the salinity of land continued to be tolerated on farms,
problem.
further diminishing the stock of native vegeta-
One of the emerging alternatives with tion and wildlife habitat. Only in 1999 did the
significant potential is mallee oil and residue, state government toughen the regulations
derived from various species of Eucalyptus, sufficiently to stop indiscriminate clearing but
which has uses as alternatives to fossil fuels in these regulations fell short of an outright ban
the transportation and electricity sectors. Yet, on clearing.
as one of the key researchers in this field has
The Salinity Action Strategy gives due
written (Bartle 2000), establishing such an acknowledgment to the need to protect the
industry in the wheatbelt requires vision and region’s biodiversity. While the Department of
public investment to establish a national renew- Conservation and Land Management has
able fuels economy with additional export initiated some significant projects to protect
potential. Significant developmental steps are individual species and habitats, this effort will
being taken in the lower rainfall areas of the be a limited and reactive one unless it is
wheatbelt to establish such an industry. Yet, to supported by a broader framework. The recent
achieve a 6 percent revegetation of the region Industry Commission’s report (Industry
— which will not make a sufficient impact on Commission 1998: 34) into ecologically
salinity — through a renewable fuels economy sustainable land management highlights some
based around mallee oil and residue would of the emerging policy issues. In acknowledging
require a $4 billion investment in planting and the significant public demand to retain the
infrastructure (Bartle 2000).
richness ofAustralia’s biodiversity, it recognises
Despite the potential for an oil mallee the cost of doing so:
industry, and assuming state and federal govern-
particularly the setting aside (or limiting the
ments will commit to such a venture, sceptics
caution against seeing this as a single solution.
As Pannell argues, ‘the nature of agriculture is
that even if oil mallees are highly successful,
they will only be suitable for certain niches within
the farming system’ (1998:2). Thus the challenges
to develop new farming systems remain
formidable. Without substantial research and
development the chances of avoiding a environ-
mental, economic and social disaster will be very
much reduced.
use of) significant areas of land to maintain
essential habitat. Much of this will need to
be in areas currently used for agricultural or
pastoral activity. However, the nature of the
public demand is such that conservation is
not able to be, or is poorly, delivered by the
existing market system. Landowners face
incentives to use their land for commercial
purposes, while there is only a very weak
mechanism to reward private use for
conservation, even if that use is of great
value to society.
Protection of Biodiversity
Such comments have a special significance for
The scale of land clearing in the wheatbelt from the wheatbelt with such a large number of
the 1920s to the 1970s was simply immense: species threatened with extinction from the loss
covering approximately 30 million hectares, all of remnant native vegetation to salinity. The
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Beresford, Phillips and Bekle
36
SalinityAction Strategy acknowledges the need and agencies with a stake in salinity have
for supporting biodiversity legislation and a included: Agriculture WA, Water and Rivers
government biodiversity strategy but such pro- Commission, Water Corporation, Ministry of
posals have been promised for some years, and Planning, Main Roads Department, Department
the strategy fails to articulate how such of Conservation and Land Management and the
initiatives might work. Moreover, although Environmental Protection Authority. Each has
schemes to work with farmers to protect native different priorities and statutory responsibilities.
vegetation have been funded by the state To achieve coordination between these various
government since the late 1980s, broader options agencies the Coalition government established
have been called for, including requiring land- two institutional arrangements: a cabinet sub-
holders to manage their properties with regard committee on salinity and the State Salinity
to particular values such as vegetation or wildlife, Council that brought together not only
subsidising them to carry out this work, and buy- representatives from government agencies and
back schemes in cases where landholders no from community interest groups.
longer wish to own their remnant vegetation.
Little can be said about the effectiveness of
However, such propositions are potentially these arrangements due to the short time in
controversial with significant divisions of which they have been operating. However,
opinion among interest groups. It is likely, too, several observations of a general nature can be
that pressure will be ongoing for the state to made. First, salinity is not only a very technical
meet its national–international biodiversity issue for ministers to grapple with, it is an issue
obligations created by Australia’s being a on which in some key areas science is either
signatory to the international Convention on divided or provides no clear answers. For
Biological Diversity, developed by the United example, there is no consensus on the proportion
Nations in 1992, and other international of the wheatbelt which needs revegetation or
conventions covering wetlands and migratory on whether various pumping and drainage
birds.
schemes are likely to be effective, and, as
previously mentioned, much of the basic science
on alternative crops has not yet been undertaken.
In other words, salinity is not a policy issue which
Institutional Arrangements
Managing salinity involves devising a set of can be fully addressed by ministers in a
institutional arrangements across federal, state traditional manner which might include selection
and local government levels. Doubts exist as to of options for their ideological compatibility,
whether this complex process of decision-making engaging in some form of rational model of
will impede the development of strategic decision-making where the information on
approaches especially given the range of difficult options is readily available, or adjusting in
issues facing governments.
incremental fashion existing arrangements.
The October 2000 announcement by the
A coordinating body of bureaucrats and
Prime Minister, John Howard, of a national interest groups, such as is represented on the
salinity strategy added a new layer to the policy State Salinity Council, has a number of potential
development process on salinity. The offer of problems in being effective. First, there is a degree
federal government funds to address salinity was of politicisation about the solutions to the
accompanied by a proposal to establish a single, problem which has made any consensus about
national ministerial council, the Natural Resource strategic direction difficult to obtain. Second, it
Management Council, which will involve the may be asking too much of such a large and
Commonwealth and the states agreeing together disparate body to advise government on the far-
to targets and standards. However, it is not yet reaching issues widely claimed to be at the core
clear how Western Australia’s participation in of a successful salinity strategy such as:
this council will be integrated into the work of restructuring agriculture along sustainable lines,
its own policy forum, discussed below.
the need for public investment in alternative
At the state level there are issues crops, and the application of a triage approach
surrounding the most effective way to coordinate to managing the problem.
the various government departments dealing
At the local level, the issues of salinity
with salinity. In recent times those departments management are no less complex. The Western
© National Council of the Institute of Public Administration, Australia 2001

The Salinity Crisis in Western Australia
37
Australian government has for some time became the first to adopt a long-term approach
supported an integrated approach to catchment to the problem, it fell well short of being an
management. This refers to the practice of effective strategy. The government’s
managing natural resources using water unwillingness to fully fund the strategy and to
catchment systems as the unit of management, set key priorities for research and development
and involves bringing together all stakeholders and the management of available salinity tools
to form a plan of action to address ecological, is likely to mean that it will have little impact on
economic and social concerns within a catchment the overall problem. Neither will, it seems, the
system (House of Representatives Standing Prime Minister’s national strategy which, while
Committee on Environment and Heritage positively focusing on targets and outcomes, is
2000:25). It is therefore widely regarded as an also vastly under-resourced. Thus, policy
appropriate means to manage a range of land responses to salinity conform to a pattern of
and water degradation problems and especially recent initiatives by both Labor and Liberal
salinity.
governments, and including Landcare and the
Yet, much remains to be done in Western National Heritage Trust, in being strong on
Australian to make such an approach effective. rhetoric and the promise of participation, but
As the House of Representatives Standing short on realistic levels of funding and bold
Committee on Environment and Heritage’s supporting policy frameworks.
inquiry into catchment management found, no
single group or agency has overall responsibility
for catchment management and there is no
References
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Bartle, J 2001 ‘New Perennial Crops Mallee
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Salinity is very much a case study of the general
critique about the lack of effectiveness of
government policy-making capacity on the
environment and especially inAustralia’s federal
system. Governments have shown considerable
reluctance to fully realise their leadership
responsibilities following decades of denial
about the damaging consequences of the
development policies pursued by all
administrations up until the early 1980s. The
policies may have had broad electoral appeal
but it cannot be said that governments
effectively educated the public about the threat
of salinity emanating from the findings of officials
and to which it had ready access.
Glynn, S 1975 Government Policy and Agricultural
Even though the state Coalition government
© National Council of the Institute of Public Administration, Australia 2001

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© National Council of the Institute of Public Administration, Australia 2001