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Psychoanalysis and Epistemology: The
Interrelation Between Clinical Work, Culture
and Metapsychology
Ana Boczar , Ana Cristina Teixeira da Costa Salles , Arlindo Carlos
Pimenta , Carlos Roberto Drawin , Eliana Rodrigues Pereira Mendes ,
Marília Brandão Lemos Morais , Suzanne Beaudette Drummond & Minas
Gerais
Published online: 06 Nov 2010.
To cite this article: Ana Boczar , Ana Cristina Teixeira da Costa Salles , Arlindo Carlos Pimenta , Carlos
Roberto Drawin , Eliana Rodrigues Pereira Mendes , Marília Brandão Lemos Morais , Suzanne Beaudette
Drummond & Minas Gerais (2001) Psychoanalysis and Epistemology: The Interrelation Between Clinical Work,
Culture and Metapsychology, International Forum of Psychoanalysis, 10:2, 145-150
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08037060121425
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Int Forum Psychoanal 10:(145–150), 2001
Psychoanalysis and Epistemology: The Interrelation Between Clinical
Work, Culture and Metapsychology
Ana Boczar, Ana Cristina Teixeira da Costa Salles, Arlindo Carlos Pimenta, Carlos Roberto Drawin,
˜
Eliana Rodrigues Pereira Mendes, Mar´õlia Brandao Lemos Morais and Suzanne Beaudette Drummond,
Minas Gerais, Brasil.
The paradigmatic theory of modern epistemology holds psychoanalysis in its scientiŽ c statute.
Even if there is no explicit epistemology in the Freudian writings, it is undeniable that the genesis
of psychoanalysis has a rigorous dialetic between theorization and clinical observation. Metapsy-
chology is an organized and consistent set of concepts, capable of explaining and coordinating the
analytical experience. It is through metapsychology that clinical work encounters the possibility of
universalization, while metapsychology Ž nds the possibility of fulŽ llment in clinical work. Clinical
experience also conŽ rms the interrelation between psychopathology and culture. Modern times
have brought about new versions for psychopathological symptoms, which, in turn, have special
effects on the narcisistic personalities and the manifestations of anxiety, giving place to different
neurotic conŽ gurations.
Address for correspondence: Rua Pirapetinga, 322/504 – Serra – Cep. 30220-150 – Belo Horizonte –
Minas Gerais – Brasil
An Introduction to Epistemological
Questions
demarcate the Ž eld of science, distinguishing it
from other Ž elds such as Theology, Philosophy and
Humanities. The search for a solution to this
problem has enlarged the separation between the
philosophy of contemporary science and empiri-
cism. The possibility of reducing theoretical
propositions to veriŽ able laboratory propositions
has proven impossible. Total acceptance of this
scientiŽ c criterion would imply the drastic exclu-
sion of vast areas of knowledge that are already
under the domain of science. Entire Ž elds of
knowledge could never be legitimated. So being,
there could never be a sensitive veriŽ cation of
history or a direct observation of past happenings.
The epistemological debate about veriŽ ability
brought severe criticism to empiricism and induc-
tive logic, as was expounded in the “Principle of
VeriŽ ability” initially proposed by Moritz Schlick.
This principle lost its dogmatic rigidity, being
reformed in the more  exible direction of the
“Principle of FalsiŽ ability” presented by Karl
Popper (2). According to Popper, scientiŽ c the-
ories cannot be sustained by inductively general-
ized veriŽ cations, because all veriŽ cations are
precarious when conceived as proof. Theories are
founded on the confrontations of deductively
obtained consequences that are reached through
According to the classical conception of truth,
which stems from Plato and Aristoteles, truth is an
equation between a sign, a concept and reality.
Therefore, truth relates to reality. As the Italian
scholastic philosopher Saint Thomas of Aquinas
said: “Truth is the correspondence between the
intellect and the thing” (1). It is a semantic
conception that pertains to ontological presump-
tions about the nature of the concepts “existence”,
“a priori” and “reality” that prevailed in past
centuries. “Things” were there, they were immedi-
ate data from one’s senses, and truth was a
linguistic translation of this “something” that had
already been previously given. This interpretation
re ects the empiricism that dominated the natural
consciousness and characterized the pre-critical
mode of thought, predominant at the time.
In our century, however, the emphasis has been
transferred from speciŽ c ontological questions to
epistemological themes. The contemporary episte-
mological problem consists of establishing a
relation between theoretical propositions and ob-
servational terms so as to found an empirical basis
for a speciŽ c theory. The principal objective is to
Ó
2001 Taylor & Francis. ISSN 0803-706X

146 A. Boczar et al.
Int Forum Psychoanal 10, 2001
hypotheses and conjectures. This modiŽ cation has “Child Development” or “Psychodiagnostics”,
resulted in the scientiŽ c criteria of deduction- gained in importance and began being taught in
falsiŽcation, instead of veriŽ cation-induction.
speciŽ c disciplines.
This epistemological transformation has
We should not, however, be confused by the
avoided subjective dogmatism that can be typical climate of tolerance. At present, the neurosciences
of empiricism, by assuring an intersubjective and the different varieties of biological and
opening to science. It makes us think of one of organicist theories are, in their aggressive advance,
Freud’s manners of elaborating knowledge; many putting pressure on psychoanalysis. For this
of his metapsychological contructions occur “a reason, an epistemological elucidation has become
posteriori” (from effect to cause). We know that essential in order to distinguish psychoanalytic
the universal metapsychological concepts are theory and praxis from the extremely confused
deduced from clinical work and that, besides this, universe of numerous psychotherapeutic propo-
there is no other empirical veriŽ ability for these sals.
concepts. Metapsychology is theoretical Ž ction
that deals with the phenomena that appear in
clinical psychoanalysis.
II. Epistemology and Psychoanalytic Theory
ScientiŽ c progress should no longer be con-
ceived as an advance in knowledge about objective The epistemological elucidation of psychoanalysis
reality. It should be understood in a historical and
sociological sense: the acceptance or rejection of
hypotheses depends upon the parameters imposed
is not, however, an easy task. Freud’s itinerary,
during the epic period which was denominated –
maybe unproperly – “splendid isolation” is well
by paradigmatic theory, which should be consid- known: A series of terminological and conceptual
ered as a model for all procedures of result transformations occured between the “Project”,
validation and evaluation. Paradigmatic theory is 1895, and the Seventh Chapter of “The Interpreta-
instituted by a certain scientiŽ c community in a tion of Dreams”, 1900. The neuropsychological
determined historical period, thus being what reference was gradually substituted by another that
deŽ nes “normal science”. Or, in the words of became known as metapsychology. These theore-
Thomas Kuhn, “well established research is based
upon one or more results that have been reached by
science in the past. These results are recognized by
tical reconsiderations – that can be clearly
described by any historian – were never explicited
by Freud. In spite of constant efforts towards
a speciŽ c scientiŽ c community for a certain period metapsychological construction, the scientiŽ c am-
of time, so enabling the fundamentation of its bitions continued throughout Freud’s works; his
ulterior praxis. . . (a seriously commited commu- hopes to Ž nd a biochemical comprovation for his
nity). . . with the same rules and patterns for discoveries were never abandoned, neither were
scientiŽ c practice” (3). Accordingly, the neo- the philogenetic speculations at some of the most
positivist certainties fell into ruins and the idea of crucial points in his argument (4).
a unitary science – a Ž eld, rigidly uniformized by
a-historic criteria – became seriously affected.
This epistemological transformation can be
One of the rare Freudian articles which contains
an explicit epistemological consideration is the
introductory page to “Instincts and their Vicissi-
clearly seen in the domain of Human Sciences tudes”, 1915. There we can see a compromise
and/or Social Sciences where the reign of the solution: Freud compares psychoanalysis to phy-
scientiŽ c method as criterion for the admission of sics and declares that the fundamental concepts of
theories and disciplines to the academic world has both are constructions of heuristic research value,
been contested. In the Psychology Departments at although neither of them is immediately derived
Brazilian Universities, for example, the conception from available empiric material.
of a unitary science, solidly based upon the
experimental method that was guaranteed by the
hegemony of Behaviorism, gave way to pluralism
Freud’s doctrinarian position was directly in u-
enced by Ernst Mach’s empiriocriticism – which
had been amply diffused in Vienna at the begining
and fragmentation. Psychoanalysis, which had of the century. Empiriocriticism is a theory that
been antagonized, being only marginally present strived to differentiate itself from empiricism by
in the disciplines of “Theories of Personality”, using a conventional phenomenalistic base. Fol-

Int Forum Psychoanal 10, 2001
Psychoanalysis and epistemology 147
lowing the phenomenalistic line of thought, con- – but, from then on, referred to the phantasmatical
cepts such as Instinct (trieb) would not necessarily space of representation. Repression’s theoretical
have to stem from empirical observations, but dislocation did not happen by pure speculation; it
could be adopted as “mythology” or as “theoretical was determined through clinical observations with
Ž ction”; which are types of Ž ction that are of great psychoneuroses and above all, hysteria. Therefore,
value toward a more consistent comprehension of we can generically declare that if there is any form
clinical phenomena.
of confrontation in psychoanalysis, it no doubt
The Freudian solution seems to have been occurs in the clinical domain.
somewhat simple; narrow scientiŽ cism was dis-
Yet, the question that structures our commu-
missed even if scientiŽ c pretensions were not nication is: what is the speciŽ city of the clinical
abandoned. No concessions were made that would phenomenon? Could there be something like “the
permit a critical revision of Freud’s scientiŽ c ideal. clinic”, something with objective consistency that
To tell the truth, Freud merely stated that a could act as a test for the refutation (or not) of
“supposed formal analogy” existed between the enunciations of any theoretical proceedings?
fundamental concepts of physics and psychoana- Would the psychoanalytic clinic – that which
lysis. It is exactly this analogy that was ardently happens in a determined setting, with its own
contested by contemporary epistemology, espe- mode of “hearing”, in accordance with certain
cially by Popper (5). Theoretical constructions, theoretical presuppositions – be the same clinic
even when not inductively established, cannot that is experienced by behaviorist, existential, or
prescind a rigorous empiric confrontation. In the transpersonal therapists?
case of Physics, the phenomenic Ž eld (in which the
If we accept the development of epistemological
confrontation operates) possesses a certain opera- thinking, must we then also accept the non-
tional deŽ nition. One can observe a degree of existence of a purely clinical Ž eld, a Ž eld that
objectiveness that permits the establishment of could be completely free of theoretical in uence?
inter-subjectively controllable experiments, which Just as “pure facts” don’t exist, neither does pure
are falsiŽ able by tests that may be repeated by observational data, (data that is entirely free of
independent researchers. This does not occur in the suppositions or linguistic conditioning). If any
Ž eld of psychoanalysis where concepts are not clinical work could be used as an instance of
generally falsiŽ able; all possibilities of refutation confrontation, it would have to be clinical work in
are previously discarded by the internal resources psychoanalysis, a phenomenic Ž eld that has
of the very theory. In this manner, psychoanalytic already been delimitted by theory. On the other
theory tends to be immunized or converted into a hand, we cannot expect to prove the existence of
type of doctrine, or dogma, or unreachable belief, a-historic, extra-linguistic, almost-natural realities
for it is exactly the possibility of refutation that such as the “unconscious”, “instinct” (drive) or
deŽ nes the scientiŽ c nature of any theory (6). “repression”. This kind of comprehension would
Therefore, there is a fundamental difference be a typically realistic, pre-critical understanding
between psychoanalysis and other disciplines that formed by the substantiation of concepts together
recur to the experimental method.
with the conception of “images” and “representa-
However, even if there is no explicit and well- tions” of the things that are immediately appre-
articulated epistemology in the Freudian writings, hended through our senses and named in ordinary
it is undeniable that the genesis of psychoanalysis language. There is no “reality” that is similar to the
upholds a rigorous dialectic between theorization “unconscious”, but even so when we use it, we are
and clinical observation. The concepts were not not in the terrain of free will and total lack of
created arbitrarily; on the contrary, they were rational control. Metapsychology is an organized
adopted only when they were able to bring about and consistent set of concepts that, since Freud’s
some advances in the comprehension of clinical works, has been able to explain and coordinate: the
phenomena, in which they found their very experience of psychoanalytic clinical work. This
conŽ rmation. For example, the concept of repres- experience is shared by a transcultural community
sion acquired a new theoretical statute with the of researchers that has been maintained for almost
modiŽ cation of the trauma concept. It no longer a century. In this perspective of post-empiristic
referred to an external, empirical event – seduction epistemology, the function of the hard nucleus of

148 A. Boczar et al.
Int Forum Psychoanal 10, 2001
psychoanalytic theory (its fundamental concepts) one, but several metapsychologies? Does the Ž eld
is to enable the understanding and the judgment, that is denominated “psychoanalysis” really hide a
the consensus and the dissension of deeply hetero- plurality of perspectives that are incommensurable
geneous experiences. In other words, with theory it and irreductable to each other? Or, should we
is possible to some extent, to go beyond the recognize that an apparently uniform terminology
singularity of clinical knowledge and to establish conceals several different kinds of psychoanalyses
a certain level of communication that permits one that stem from different clinical and cultural
to deŽ ne psychoanalysts and their institutions as a contexts?
research community with its speciŽ c tradition.
Despite the differences in interpretation and
semantic dislocations, psychoanalysts may be
identiŽ ed by their introductory manuals, common
III. Epistemology, Culture and Clinical
Psychoanalysis
language, and abundant literature that are assimi- These questions are not without consequence. It is
lated and discussed by different groups, Above all obvious that contemporary psychoanalysts no
they are identiŽ ed for their ability to uphold the longer have the same clinical experiences as Freud
dynamics of differences and complex identities in did, due to the cultural transformations that have
the same communicational horizon. Therefore, all occured in the last century. Psychoanalysis was
new “discoveries” and “hypotheses” are incorpo- founded in a society characterized by rigid morals,
rated or rejected after a long process of discussion
and persuasion in the midst of the psychoanalytic
community.
in which sexual repression and emotional conten-
tions were the social norm. We now meet other
types of patients who differ from the hysterical
This means that psychoanalysis does not reveal patients those that inspired Freud at the end of the
a “deep reality”. The Freudian text can and should 19th century. Contemporary patients present new
be studied and analyzed. It deŽ nitely should not be versions and symptoms.
an object of ritualistic repetition that carries the
Clinical work seems to conŽ rm the intimate
risk of excommunication, for anyone who repeats interrelation between psychopathology and cul-
it incorrectly. On the contrary, we must acknowl- ture. At present we can observe new psychopatho-
edge that psychoanalytic concepts have to be
historically understood, which does not mean that
we surrender to relativism and irrationalism.
logical conŽ gurations such as invasive manifesta-
tions of anxiety and neo-narcisistic affections.
These manifestations are typical of the exarcer-
Psychoanalysis has an epistemical identity; an bated individualism that exists in post-modern
identity that does not rest upon an abstract truth, societies, side by side with the helplessness of
but on one that Ž nds its historical weight in a individuals who belong to a symbolically impo-
community that is still able to assure articulation verished culture that is immersed in imaginary
between theory and praxis. Therefore, it is through fantasies. Modern individuals are cast into specular
metapsychology that we are able to universalize mazes in which they rotate at such a high velocity
clinical work and it is through clinical work that
metapsychology Ž nds the possibilty of fulŽ llment.
However, it is the recognition of the historicity of
that they can no longer count on past experiences
or future expectations to guide them (7).
Modern day permissive society can be charac-
concepts and psychoanalytic experience that ob- terized by abundance, rather than privation, of for
liges us to ask if psychoanalysis can still be instance communication, media, propaganda, gad-
considered a paradigm in the psychic Ž eld or if gets, technology, sex, etc. This creates a mental
the psychoanalytic community has been irrepar- pathology (that obeys the laws of high velocity),
ably fragmented to the point of not being able to while reducing the Ž rmness of cultural values and
contain the intellectual tradition that was inaugu- dilluting the points of stable references. Neurotic
rated by Freud. Is it possible that the psycho-
analytic community no longer stands as a condition
that enables communication and confrontation
repression is gradually being susbstitued by narci-
sistic  uctuation. Emotional emptiness, the impos-
sibility of feeling, and the dissubstantiation of the
between diverse hermeneutic options? Or, to the ego reveal the truth of the narcisistic process that
contrary, should we acknowledge the existence of is a strategy for this emptiness. According to
not only one, but several clinical matrixes, not only Christopher Lasch, in his book “The Culture of

Int Forum Psychoanal 10, 2001
Psychoanalysis and epistemology 149
Narcissism” (8), personal relations nowadays we Ž nd in contemporary psychoanalytic clinical
present high risks of instability. Furthermore, he work. The psychoanalysts’s task is to bring out the
argues that what people aspire to most is emotional subject of one’s self, where he pretends to be dead.
detachment because it gives them the feeling of The psychoanalyst is guided by the available
invulnerability and emotional independence.
Gilles Lipovetsky, in “The Era of Emptiness”
(9), afŽ rms that exaggerated sexual liberation,
universal references – metapsychology (13).
aggressive feminism and pornography all tend IV. Conclusion
toward the same Ž nality, namely, to erect barriers
As a conclusion we can only recognize the
against emotions and maintain emotional intensi-
ties at a distance. Paradoxically, however, men and
women desire the intensity of privileged relations,
but, the stronger the expectation is, the rarer and
briefer becomes the miraculous fusion. The hyper-
invested body lives under the command of “youth
and beauty”, even though this doesn’t mean a
complete experience of sexuality. On the contrary,
narcisistic fascination generally renders a couple’s
sexual experience more difŽ cult. Sexual identity
also follows the same rules of uncommitment; bi-
sexual identity is for instance becoming more and
more frequent. Through this double identity people
hope to experience all the good things that both
sexes have to offer, without relinquishing any
pleasure (10). We suppose that modern sexual
identity has been strongly in uenced by the decline
of the paternal function and the dissolution of the
nuclear family.
Concerning anxiety, we have focused on two
situations. The Ž rst is the anxiety signal that
appears as a protection to the integrity of the ego;
it is also the element that propells the analytical
experience, and we can even say, the very human
experience. This anxiety signal, however, is
frequently quite inefŽ cient, so it often gives way
to a second kind of anxiety that is a  uctuating or
even annihilating, destructive anxiety. That remits
the individual to structural helplessness and aban-
donment, along with other primitive traumatic
experiences. This is when we encounter panic
disorder conŽ gurations (11). In the midst of
annihilating and  uctuating anxiety, this disorder
is bound to post-modernity by the crises of values,
by the reinvention and reŽ nement of violence in
the social space, and also by the increase in the
forms of discomfort that surge in civilization.
Psychosomatic phenomena can also be included in
this anxiety group. They are heirs to the impossi-
bility of symbolic elaboration and to the Ego’s
surrender to the real of the body (12).
inconclusive nature of our thoughts. Psychoanaly-
sis is modernity’s daughter, therefore she suffers
from the very era that she helped to create. We then
ask, considering the abrupt changes of present
times, what has happened to subjectivity? Does the
Freudian metapsychology remain entirely valid or
will it have to be modiŽ ed in order to attend the
new subjectivity of modern individuals? Have the
cultural transformations merely affected the sur-
face of clinical phenomena or have they reached
the deepest structures of the psyche? In the area of
psychoanalytic psychopathology, how should we
deal with phenomenological approaches – that are
more sensitive to the singularity of clinical
manifestations – and the structural approaches –
that try to express the deeper logic of the psyche?
Would not a joint effort between psychoanalysis
and epistemology be able to re-think the place of
this modern subject in crisis and also elaborate the
different vicissitudes of different clinical ap-
proaches?
These questions are extremely complex, how-
ever the object of our studies is the interrelation-
ship between clinical work, culture and
metapsychology. We believe that this kind of
discussion is essential if we want to release
psychoanalysis from the dogmatic space of eso-
teric doctrines and institutions.
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Paido´s, 1988.
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conhecimento objetivo – Uma abordagem evoluciona´ria. Belo
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7. Drummond SB. Uma questa˜o de velocidade. Belo Horizonte:
°
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Summaries in German and Spanish
Psychoanalyse und Epistemologie: Die Beziehung zwischen Psicoanalisis y Epistemologia: la interrelacio´n entre Trabajo
Klinik, Kultur und Metapsychologie. Clinico, Cultura y Metapsicologia.
Die paradigmatische Theorie moderner Epistemologie La teor´õa paradigmatica de la epistemologia moderna sostiene
schließt die Psychoanalyse in ihre Statuten ein. Auch wenn al psicoanalisis en su estatuto cientiŽ co. Aunque no hay una
es keine explizite Erkenntnistheorie in Freuds Schriften gibt, epistemologia explicita en los escritos Freudianos es inneg-
ist es unleugbar, daß die Entstehung der Psychoanalyse mit able que la ge´nesis del psicoanalisis tiene una rigurosa
einer rigorosen Dialektik zwischen Theoretisierung und dialectica entre teorizacio´n y observacio´n clinica. La Meta-
klinischer Beobachtung verbunden ist. Metapsychologie ist psicologia es un conjunto de conceptos consistentes y
ein organisiertes und konsistentes set von Konzepten. Sie organizados capaces de explicar y coordinar la experiencia
¨
kann die psychoanalytische Erfahrung erklaren und koordi- analitica. Es a trave´s de la Metapsicologia donde el trabajo
¨
nieren. Sie schafft die Moglichkeit, klinische Arbeit zu clinico encuentra la posibilidad de universalizacio´n, mientras
universalisieren und sich zugleich in der klinischen Arbeit que la Metapsicologia halla la posibilidad de realizacio´n en el
zu erfullen. Die Klinische Arbeit ihrerseits bestatigt die trabajo clinico. La experiencia clinica tambie´n conŽ rma la
wechselvolle Beziehung zwischen Psychopathologie und interrelacio´n entre psicopatologia y cultura. Los tiempos
Kultur. Die Moderne hat neue Versionen psychopatholo- modernos han traido nuevas versiones para los sintomas
gischer Symptome hervorgebracht, die ihrerseits besondere psicosoma´ticos que sucesivamente tienen efectos especiales
¨
¨
¨
Wirkungen auf narzißtische Personlichkeiten und die Aus- sobre las personalidades narcisistas y las manifestaciones de
gestaltungen der Angst haben, so daß differenzierte neuro- ansiedad, dando lugar a una conŽ guracio´n neuro´tica diferente.
¨
tische KonŽ gurationen entstehen konnen.