The justification typically given nowadays for spe-
cial software protection is that, without it, no one will
produce any software because programmers will have
no incentive to do so. Clearly, this is self-serving non-
sense. Corporations have long paid programmers to
produce software in the absence of software protec-
tion. Open source software continues to thrive in the
open and even to outpace closed, commercial com-
petitors.
erhaps the strangest thing about discussions of
intellectual property law and digital technology
P
is that the two least practical forms—patents
and copyrights—get the most attention, whereas the
two most appropriate forms get the least. Industrial-
design registration gives a monopoly over a vendible
product’s visual appearance, while trademark regis-
tration gives a monopoly over a mark used to identify
a product’s source. Both these protections aim to pre-
vent unfair competition; neither blocks the free spread
of ideas and techniques.
It is sad that the US government overlooks
that the basic arguments in favor of free
trade, which it supports so fervently in the
World Trade Organization, apply equally to
the free movement of ideas, which it opposes
so avidly through the WTO and the World
Intellectual Property Organization.
The evitability of software patents does not ensure
they will be avoided. However, we can make good
arguments for avoiding software patents, and for
other more practical and just forms of monopoly for
software. If members of the computing profession
widely disseminate those arguments, there is at least
some chance we can avoid such patents. ✸
far less—from the patent system in its current form
than it would enjoy if no patent system existed. The References
1. K. Nichols, “The Age of Software Patents,” Computer,
current situation benefits business concerns exclu-
sively, either giant corporations that seek advantage
over their competitors, or opportunistic corporations
that acquire software patents solely to extract licens-
ing fees from their competitors. As Brian Kahin8
observes, the whole situation is a dreadful mess.
Given the volatility of software development and
the industry’s speed of innovation, software’s long-term
benefit (if any) to the public is of much shorter dura-
tion than the benefit of the monopoly a software patent
grants. Worse, corporate pressure and, internationally,
US government pressure have forced the extension of
patent monopoly terms to 20 years, further reducing
if not eliminating the possibility of public benefit.
With regard to the public benefit of copyright—at
least in the Jeffersonian US—the intent was that “ideas
should freely spread from one another over the globe.”
Thus, the intended public benefit is now absent from
copyright as well. It is sad that the US government
overlooks that the basic arguments in favor of free
trade, which it supports so fervently in the World
Trade Organization, apply equally to the free move-
Apr. 1999, pp. 25-31.
2. L. Lockhard, “That Professional Look,” Astounding Sci-
ence Fiction, Jan. 1954, pp. 96-110.
3. G. Gimlan, “Relax, Not Everyone Is Out to Sue You,”
Letters, Computer, May 1999, p. 4.
4. US Patent and Trademark Office, “Examination Guide-
uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/software/analysis/
computer.html.
5. B.E. Hayden, “The Claims Hold the Key,” Letters, Com-
puter, May 1999, pp. 4, 6.
6. J. Geringer, “Are Software Patents Really Different?”
Letters, Computer, June 1999, pp. 7-8.
eff.org/pub/Intellectual_property/idea_economy.article.
8. B. Kahin, “The Software Patent Crisis,” Technology
Rev., Apr. 1990, pp. 52-58.
9. “The Standard Question,” The Economist, 15 Jan.
2000, p. 91.
ment of ideas, which it opposes so avidly through the W. Neville Holmes is a lecturer under contract at the
WTO and the World Intellectual Property University of Tasmania’s School of Computing. Con-
Organization.9
tact him at neville.holmes@utas.edu.au.
34
Computer