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Olympio et al.1 1 demonstrated that even when res-
idents attempt to check their equipment, the check is
frequently incorrectly or incompletely performed,
which further limits their ability to identify machine
faults. In our study, we did not assess the effectiveness
of checking procedures; we do not know if the partic-
ipants understood what they were doing, or how
effective were the checks they performed.
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ANESTHESIA
There have been criticisms of these checklists
because of perceived incompleteness or ineffective-
ness,2 0 and because of time constraints as discussed
above. Some effort has been made to produce abridged
versions of the checklists,2 1but it is unclear whether this
produces unacceptable reductions in the ability to iden-
tify equipment faults.
2 2
Berge et al
.
have used an anesthesia simulator in a
novel approach to training personnel in the detection of
machine faults. Their simulator uses an anesthetic
machine which is normal in external appearance but
which is internally modified such that multiple machine
dysfunctions may be reproduced. This has the potential
to improve the understanding of the machine by trainees,
by mimicking faults which may be infrequent but impor-
tant in clinical practice. Such technology is expensive and
not widely available, however, limiting its usefulness.
Our study indicates that the performance of resi-
dents is as poor as the performance of consultants, sug-
gesting that experience alone is unlikely to improve
checking practices. Current teaching places little
emphasis on this vital part of anesthesia practice. There
may be a role for compulsory inclusion of refresher
courses in pre-use checking procedures in continuing
medical education.
To improve compliance with checking procedures,
measures may be taken at an institutional or national
level to require anesthesiologists to document what
checks they have performed at the start of each case.
If pre-use checks are truly a patient safety issue, it is no
longer sufficient to make these checks an optional part
of an anesthetic. Failure to check represents a rule-
based error in anesthesia, which should be reducible.2 3
There is widespread acknowledgment in the field of
anesthesia that pre-use equipment checking proce-
dures are important in patient safety. Although there
are no randomized, controlled trials published to
prove that efficient checking procedures reduce the
frequency of incidents or accidents in anesthesia, “fail-
ure to perform an adequate check” is repeatedly iden-
tified as the primary error in one-quarter to one-third
of all critical incidents.1–3
It is possible that, with continued improvements in
monitoring over the last 15-20 yr, anesthesiologists
have come to rely on a combination of vigilance and
monitoring to warn them when there is something
wrong with their equipment. In the Australian Incident
Monitoring Study of 2000 critical incidents, about 75%
of equipment failures were, or could have been, identi-
fied by a combination of standard monitors and anes-
thetic vigilance.1 7 To rely on monitors in this way is to
reduce the margin of patient safety, as monitors often
indicate problems only after considerable harm or phys-
iological disturbance has occurred. In the confusion
which can surround a critical incident, it should be reas-
suring to the anesthesiologist that the equipment was
checked and in working order at the start of the case.
This of course does not preclude the possibility of unex-
pected equipment failure, emphasizing the need for
effective emergency response and crisis management.4
Given the results of this and previous studies, how
can the performance of preanesthesia checks be
improved? As detailed above, recommendations from
national professional bodies and warnings from critical
incident reviews have not been sufficient.
Olympio et al.1 1 attempted to improve the perfor-
mance of resident anesthetists by intensive training ses-
sions, involving videotaping of residents’ performances,
followed by review with faculty and then repeat exami-
nation of checkout procedures several weeks later.
Subjects who received the extra training and review ses-
sions scored higher than controls on repeat testing, but
there was no long-term follow-up and it is unclear
whether differences would have been sustained.
Checklists and visual aids have been formulated
with the aim of making it easier for anesthesiologists
to perform pre-use checks rapidly and completely.5–7,18
Use of these is not widespread in clinical practice.
There is some debate as to whether their use improves
performance when compared with an anesthesiolo-
gist’s usual checkout methods.15,19 Groves et al.1 4
found that the use of the visual aid produced by
Adams1 8 (based on the checklist of the Association of
Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland) resulted in
overall improvement in fault detection, although some
of their prearranged machine faults were discovered
less often when the aid was used.
It is not uncommon to find major faults in equip-
ment in routine use. Barthram and McClymont,2 4
using the Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain
and Ireland’s checklist for anesthetic machines, found
faults in 60% of machines checked. 18% of these were
deemed to be serious, i.e. having the potential to lead
to rapid disaster.
In other areas of human endeavour, where the
results of an error may be catastrophic (the analogous
nature of aviation is often cited), formal equipment
checking procedures are frequently instituted.