Full text of DOI:10.1046/j.1526-0984.2000.71002.x

G O D S C H A L K E T A L . : C O A S T A L H A Z A R D M I T I G A T I O N 13
Avoiding Coastal Hazard Areas: Best State
Mitigation Practices
DAVID R. GODSCHALK, RICHARD NORTON, CRAIG RICHARDSON,
and DAVID SALVESEN
Department of City and Regional Planning, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3140
through advance action rather than simply providing postdi-
saster aid programs? The answers are found in the practice
of hazard mitigation.
Hazard mitigation protects people and property from de-
structive impacts of coastal hazards by:
ABSTRACT
•
Extreme weather events, such as hurricanes and severe coastal
storms, occur frequently in predictable locations. These extreme
events become disasters only when they intersect with concen-
trations of human population and development. State govern-
ments whose coastlines are vulnerable to hurricanes and coastal
storms can create programs to reduce the exposure of people
and property to such hazards. Such mitigation programs include
mapping hazard areas, notifying the public about potential haz-
ard locations, restricting public subsidies that encourage devel-
opment in hazard areas, and acquiring property in hazard areas
to prevent its development. A number of states operate such pro-
grams, including Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and
Texas. This article reviews current state coastal hazard mitiga-
tion programs to identify “best practices” and to recommend a
comprehensive package of mitigation actions to reduce expo-
sure to hazards.
•
•
Avoiding hazard areas—directing new development
and relocating existing development to safe locations;
Strengthening buildings and infrastructure—using build-
ing codes and engineering design to increase the resil-
ience of structures exposed to hazards; and
•
Maintaining protective environmental features—dunes,
maritime forests, vegetation, and wetlands which re-
duce wind and wave impacts.
In this article, we review mitigation programs primarily
directed at increasing avoidance of hazard areas through
four means: (1) hazard area definition, (2) hazards notifica-
tion, (3) restriction of public subsidies, and (4) hazard areas
1
acquisition. Hazard area definition provides public infor-
Key Words: acquisition, best practices, coastal hazards, notifica-
mation about the location and intensity of potential hazards,
such as flooding and storm surge. Hazards notification
warns potential purchasers of property about where they can
expect to encounter hazards, so that they may avoid them or
take other mitigation measures, such as elevation or build-
ing strengthening. Restriction of public subsidies limits
government expenditures for construction of infrastructure,
such as roads and bridges, in hazard areas, reducing both
exposure of such infrastructure to hazard forces and devel-
opment-inducing effects of providing infrastructure in
hazard areas. Hazard areas acquisition curtails new con-
struction in hazard areas by acquiring property for public
purposes, such as recreation, and allows owners of threat-
ened or damaged property to sell and relocate to a safe area.
Acquisition also may help to maintain protective natural
features, such as dunes, wetlands, and maritime forests.
tion, state hazard mitigation, subsidy restriction.
INTRODUCTION
•
Recent hurricane devastation has risen to catastrophic
proportions. In 1992, Hurricane Andrew resulted in more
than $25 billion in damages, the highest total of any natural
disaster in U.S. history. Between 1988 and 1996, 21 hurri-
canes were presidentially declared disasters, affecting 326
counties in 15 states. More than 36 million people now live
in counties fronting the Gulf of Mexico or the Atlantic
Ocean, the areas most susceptible to hurricanes and one of
the most rapidly growing areas of the country (Federal
Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 1997).
Can states do anything to mitigate this rising tide of de-
struction? Is there any way to reform the present inadequate
system of state laws, policies, and programs that deal with
hazards on the assumption that such disasters are inevitable
acts of God rather than preventable occurrences? Have any
states assumed responsibility for avoiding coastal disasters
1The genesis of our study (Godschalk et al., 1998) was a recommendation by the 1997 North Caro-
lina Disaster Recovery Task Force, following Hurricanes Bertha and Fran, that the state consider (1)
legislation that requires full disclosure and hazard notification to persons acquiring property on bar-
rier islands; (2) legislation restricting future state subsidies and support of development in desig-
nated high hazard areas on barrier islands, and (3) establishment of a state hazard area acquisition
program. In response, we assembled information on mitigation programs in other states on how to
(
1) define coastal high hazard areas, (2) notify the potential purchasers of property within those ar-
eas about the hazards present, (3) limit public subsidies to development in those hazard areas, and
4) acquire threatened property in hazard areas for public purposes. For a review of other mitigation
(
©
2000, AAPG/DEG, 1075-9565/00/$15.00/0
approaches, such as structural strengthening, environmental protection, and other types of programs,
see Godschalk et al. (1989).
Environmental Geosciences, Volume 7, Number 1, 2000 13–22

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E N V I R O N M E N T A L G E O S C I E N C E S
Based on the evidence of current practice, we conclude
that state coastal hazard mitigation directed toward avoiding
hazard areas is both possible and desirable. We review ex-
isting programs, identify the characteristics of best practice,
and recommend a comprehensive package of state mitiga-
tion actions. We emphasize that to be most effective, coastal
hazard mitigation programs should be integrated packages
of related actions. The way that hazard areas are defined in-
fluences how disclosure and subsidy limitation are applied.
Failure to notify potential buyers can increase unwise devel-
opment in hazard areas. Failure to restrict subsidies can in-
flate property values, thereby undermining the feasibility of
public acquisition of property in hazard areas. Every part of
a hazard mitigation program is linked to every other part.
Category 1–5 hurricanes. (Florida adopted the Category
1 hurricane evacuation area as its high hazard area fol-
lowing Hurricane Andrew.) SLOSH maps provide the
most specific delineations of hurricane hazards but do
not show coastal erosion areas and are not generally
available to the public.
• Use state-defined, hazard-related Areas of Environmen-
tal Concern (AECs), such as those specified under the
North Carolina Coastal Area Management Act: ocean
erodible areas, high hazard flood areas, inlet hazard ar-
eas, unvegetated beach areas, and estuarine shorelines
(Owens, 1994). Such AEC definitions may include mul-
tiple hazard areas, including erosion, but some are not
available to the public on published maps, and most do
not include storm surge areas.
•
Develop a more comprehensive new system of hazard
area definition, such as (1) the Coastal Risk Assessment
Method applied to the North Carolina coast by the Duke
Center for Study of Developed Shorelines, which com-
bines elevation (by NFIP flood zone) and presence of
vegetation with various secondary factors (e.g., erosion
rate, dunes, inlet movement, storm history, engineering,
and finger canals); (2) the Nags Head hazards Geo-
graphic Information System database used to guide land
use planning, which overlays property ownership maps
with information on storm surge, incipient inlets, and an
oceanfront zone; or (3) the Arbiter of Storms model, which
combines wind, wave, and rainfall damage, along with
coastal erosion and other factors (these three systems
are described in Godschalk et al., 1998, appendix 1A).
DEFINING HAZARD AREAS
What constitutes the coastal high hazard area? This is an
important question because notification, subsidy limits, and
acquisition all depend on clear identification of those haz-
ardous locations where these programs will apply. Although
federal and state agencies identify various types of coastal
hazard areas, such as expected flooding or erosion areas,
few states currently designate or map high hazard areas—
those areas where combinations of hazard forces pose ex-
treme dangers to people and property. Thus, it is important to
first define the hazards involved and the threats they pose.
Coastal hazards include periodic extreme events, such as
hurricanes and severe coastal storms, as well as ongoing
processes, such as regular wave, current, and wind action.
Hurricanes and coastal storms generate destructively high
winds, tornadoes, rainfall, flooding, waves, and storm surges
that can severely damage buildings, infrastructure (e.g.,
roads, bridges, and sewage treatment plants), natural sys-
tems (e.g., dunes, beaches, and marshes), homes, and busi-
nesses. Ongoing coastal processes erode beaches, move
inlets, damage vegetation, and reshape dunes as well as
threaten buildings, infrastructure, and natural systems, al-
though in a more gradual fashion. Together, they make up a
complex hazard system.
Effective hazard area avoidance requires the designation
and mapping of hazard areas so that people understand
where danger exists. Accurate hazard area maps must be
based upon solid coastal science and engineering data as
well as careful judgement; they are not simple or inexpen-
sive to provide. Best practice criteria for selecting appropri-
ate hazard area definitions include (1) availability to the
general public and to decision makers; (2) accuracy of haz-
ard area boundaries; (3) inclusiveness of hazard areas; (4)
feasibility of mapping hazard areas; and (5) ability to distin-
guish hazard intensities, such as high, medium, and low
hazard areas.
States have several possible alternative approaches to de-
fining coastal high hazard areas. They can:
•
Use existing coastal flood hazard areas—“A Zones”
100-year floodplain) and “V Zones” (wave velocity)—
specified in the National Flood Insurance Program
Best practice recommendations for hazard area definition
include the following:
(
(
(
NFIP) and mapped on Flood Insurance Rate Maps
FIRMs) by FEMA. FIRMs define areas subject to rising
• Coastal hazard areas should be identified on state-pro-
vided maps that are readily available to the general pub-
lic, regularly updated, and easily understandable, similar
to state highway maps.
• Hazard area boundaries should be delineated with sys-
tematic scientific studies so that the necessary data can
be assembled to accurately map and regularly update
the maps to enable users to have confidence in them.
water flooding, although not to hurricane storm surge or
coastal erosion. In many areas, FIRMs are not up-to-date.
Use hurricane storm surge hazard areas defined by the
SLOSH (Sea, Lake and Overland Surge from Hurri-
canes) modeling program, produced by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers to show potential surge areas for
•

G O D S C H A L K E T A L . : C O A S T A L H A Z A R D M I T I G A T I O N 15
•
•
•
All types, intensities, and locations of potential coastal haz-
their lack of understanding about hazard conditions. Studies
also suggest that education of financial institution execu-
tives about hazards influences their decisions about the wis-
dom of lending for development in hazard areas (Palm, 1990).
ards should be identified on the map, both those result-
ing from extreme events such as hurricanes and those
resulting from ongoing coastal processes such as erosion.
States should create funding sources (e.g., from coastal
management program funds or special hazard area
taxes) and appropriate sufficient funds to delineate and
map designated hazard areas at desired accuracy.
Hazard maps should indicate relevant degrees of hazard
intensity (such as 100-year flood or Category 3 hurri-
cane storm surge) so that users can understand the ex-
tent of exposure at various locations.
State Notification Programs
South Carolina and Texas have adopted coastal hazards
notification requirements. California’s earthquake fault zones
hazard notification requirement is also of interest, even though
not a coastal hazards program, because it is the most com-
prehensive and longstanding hazards notification program
in the nation. Table 1 outlines the general features of each of
these programs.
For the past 25 years, California’s Alquist-Priolo Earth-
quake Fault Zoning Act has required notification to poten-
tial purchasers of property located in earthquake fault zones
Once hazard areas have been defined and mapped, then it
is relatively simple to notify prospective purchasers of
coastal property about the location, type, and intensity of
hazards they are likely to encounter.
(properties within 0.25 mile of an earthquake fault trace) about
the potential hazard conditions of the property (Section 2621.9,
California Public Resources Code). The state maps the loca-
tion of these zones and makes the maps available to the public.
The original legislation was general about what was required
to be disclosed other than that the property was located in an
earthquake fault zone. During implementation, the general na-
ture of the notification provision was identified as a problem.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the legislation was amended to
address these concerns. Statutory language was added to
specify how disclosure should be provided. A manual on
earthquake fault zone disclosure was prepared, and a model
contract addendum was designed for disclosure purposes. In
1991, the state initiated additional efforts to provide better
and more detailed information about hazard conditions to
purchasers both inside and outside the earthquake fault
zones before they bought homes built before 1960 (Califor-
nia Seismic Commission, 1992) or commercial buildings
constructed prior to 1975 before the state’s modern building
requirements were in effect (California Seismic Commis-
sion, 1993).
South Carolina’s Coastal Tidelands and Wetlands chapter
requires notification to potential purchasers of property af-
fected by the state’s coastal baseline and coastal setback
regulations. Notification is provided through a disclosure
statement that the property may be affected by the baseline
or setback regulations as well as disclosure of the local ero-
sion rate of the property. A model disclosure form has been
prepared by the state and distributed to real estate profes-
sionals in the coastal area, and a set of orthophoto maps of
the state’s coastal baseline is available to property owners
who need to determine whether these lines affect their prop-
erty (B. Eisler, 1997, personal communication). However,
disclosure occurs fairly late in the purchase process, be-
cause the disclosure statement is required to be part of a
contract for sale or transfer of property (Section 48-39-330,
South Carolina Statutes).
HAZARDS NOTIFICATION
Coastal hazards notification is accomplished by requiring
disclosure of coastal hazard conditions to potential purchas-
ers of property (as well as other interested parties, such as
insurance companies and lending institutions) prior to pur-
chase. Disclosure information allows purchasers to make in-
formed decisions either to avoid the area by buying property
in a different location or to purchase property in the hazard
area and then pursue mitigation measures like hazard insur-
ance or structural reinforcement (Palm, 1982).
Research indicates that the methods of notification (tim-
ing and materials) as well as the perceptions about notifica-
tion created by the professionals involved in the process
have the greatest influence on notification effectiveness
(Palm, 1981, 1982, 1990; Palm et al., 1983; Palm and Hodg-
son, 1992). The potential buyer needs to learn about hazard
conditions during information gathering and evaluation of
properties. Ideally, notification should occur when the pur-
chaser begins evaluation of the properties available for pur-
chase (not during preparation of or just prior to execution of
a contract to purchase, because the purchaser becomes com-
mitted to making an offer without the opportunity to fully
consider hazard conditions).
The purchaser also must understand the notification mes-
sage (Palm, 1982). Notification should clearly and firmly
describe hazard conditions and their potential impact on
property. The notification message should also be in suffi-
cient detail so the purchaser understands its content.
Perceptions created by real estate professionals (e.g., lenders,
real estate agents and brokers, and attorneys) strongly in-
fluence buyer perceptions about the seriousness of hazard
conditions on property. If professionals downplay the im-
portance of disclosure, it is given less credence by the pur-
chaser. Prior studies show that real estate agents have not
been effective in conveying the hazards message because of

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E N V I R O N M E N T A L G E O S C I E N C E S
TABLE 1. States with notification requirements.
State Programs
Hazard/Location
Program Parameters
Mandatory program
Agent/seller notification
Maps affected properties
Residential and commercial
Notification prior to signing of
real estate agreement
Results
California:
Alquist-Priolo Earthquake
Fault Zone Act
Earthquakes
Notification to purchasers, but
general in nature, with
minimal effect on purchaser
decisions
Standard form notification
State and private enforcement
South Carolina:
Coastal Tidelands and
Wetlands chapter
Ocean-related hazards
Flooding
Mandatory program
Seller notification
Uses definitions to identify
affected properties; orthophoto
maps provided
Notification provided; program
appears to fulfill its purpose
All type of property
Notification prior to signing real
estate agreement
Notification form provided
Private enforcement
Texas:
General beachfront
and barrier island
Mandatory program
Seller notification
Notification provided; program
appears to fulfill its purpose
Notification to buyers of
property seaward of
the Gulf Intracoastal
Waterway (Natural
Resources Code)
Uses definitions to identify
affected properties
All types of property
Notification prior to signing real
estate agreement
No standard form
State and private enforcement
Massachusetts:
Coastal flooding
Mandatory program
Not applicable; bill did not pass
Notification to buyers of
property in the 100-
year floodplain or
special flood hazard
area (proposed bill; not
enacted)
Seller/agent notification
Uses maps and definitions to
identify affected properties
All types of property
Notification prior to signing of
real estate agreement
Standard form
State and private enforcement
Texas adopted statewide legislation requiring persons who
sell property located seaward of the Gulf Intracoastal Water-
way to provide specific notification to potential purchasers
that the property is located in a coastal area, that it might be
contiguous to the public easement that runs along the Texas
coast, and that no structures can be built in the public ease-
ment (Section 61.025[a], Texas Natural Resources Code).
The underlying purpose of notification is to protect the pub-
lic’s access to the Texas coast. As in the South Carolina law,
notification required by the Texas statute occurs fairly late,
in the agreement to sell. Strong enforcement provisions are
included both for the state and for private parties.2
sessions. The bill would have required sellers of property lo-
cated in the 100-year floodplain of the Massachusetts coastal
zone (or in a special flood hazard area if the 100-year flood-
plain map is unavailable) to notify prospective purchasers in “a
reasonable time preceding execution of the purchase and sales
agreement” about the location of the property in the 100-year
floodplain or in the special flood hazard area (Massachusetts
House Bill No. 4263). The proposed legislation also would
have required that the purchaser be notified if the property is a
repetitive loss structure and, where applicable, of the history of
erosion and the average annual rate of erosion of the shoreline.
Remedies for failure to comply with the notification provision
3
The Massachusetts legislature considered a coastal hazards
notification provision during both its 1997 and 1998 legislative
were strong. However, the bill did not receive sufficient sup-
port to pass (M. Malloy, 1997, personal communication).
2Failure to include the notification in the agreement to purchase provides the purchaser grounds to
terminate the contract and a right to recover any earnest money (Texas Natural Resources Code,
Section 61.025[b]). Failure to provide notification prior to closing is also considered a deceptive act
under the state’s business and commerce code, providing the purchaser and the state additional civil
penalties against the seller (Texas Natural Resources Code, Section 61.025[d]).
3Failure to notify results in rescission of the sale agreement, without penalty, and receipt of any de-
posit paid. In addition, failure to comply with the notification requirement exposes seller or seller’s
agent to “damages caused by such failure.” Finally, violation also subjects persons engaged in com-
merce or trade (the real estate agents) to the legal remedies in the state for “unfair or deceptive act[s]
or practice[s],” which allows treble damage awards (Massachusetts H.B. 4263).

G O D S C H A L K E T A L . : C O A S T A L H A Z A R D M I T I G A T I O N 17
Best Notification Practices
ment subsidized by government, federal disaster relief helps
rebuild the damaged properties and public infrastructure. By
reducing market influences on buyer behavior, public subsi-
dies can discourage sound economic decisions by artifi-
cially lowering the cost of developing property and creating
a market bias in favor of development and against preserva-
tion of property in its natural state (Kuehn, 1984).
In response to this vicious cycle, some states and the fed-
eral government have withdrawn subsidies that encourage
private development in designated coastal hazard areas. If
government subsidies are withdrawn, the costs for develop-
ment will reflect the true development costs, requiring de-
velopers and buyers, rather than taxpayers, to bear the entire
risk and cost of private development.
Based upon a review of state experience and literature on
hazards notification, five factors appear to influence notifi-
cation effectiveness: (1) timing and material of the disclo-
sure message; (2) purchaser understanding of the notifica-
tion message; (3) perceptions of the professionals involved in
the purchase decision; (4) availability of adequate data to im-
plement the program; and (5) strong enforcement provisions.
Recommended best practices in the design of a coastal
hazards notification program need to be framed around
these factors:
•
Provide notification as early as reasonably possible,
ideally when the purchaser begins to evaluate properties
available for purchase.
•
Notification should be clear and direct, identifying the
nature of hazard conditions and their potential impact
on property, and be provided in sufficient detail for the
purchaser to understand its content. Model disclosure
statements and manuals that explain hazards in lay-
man’s language also should be distributed to the public.
Professionals involved in the notification process (e.g.,
lenders, real estate agents and brokers, and attorneys)
should be educated about the meaning and importance
of the notification through educational materials and
seminars.
Sufficient data should be made available to the public,
including maps or other forms of information identify-
ing lands subject to hazards, so that the program can be
easily and efficiently administered.
Enforcement provisions should be strong, clear, and
easy to enforce. They should (1) allow for rescission of
the agreement without penalty and return of the deposit
for failure to adequately notify; (2) subject professionals
involved in the process to liability for damages when
they fail to notify; and (3) subject the notification re-
quirements to the state’s unfair and deceptive trade laws.
Subsidy Restriction Programs
The most well-known example of the restriction of public
subsidies, sometimes called the expenditure limitation ap-
proach, is the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (CBRA) of
1
982, which prohibits federal expenditures for infrastruc-
ture, such as roads and bridges, as well as federal flood in-
surance in coastal barriers designated under the act. CBRA’s
goals are to save lives, reduce federal spending, and protect
natural resources. The philosophy behind CBRA is that the
risk associated with new development in areas that have
been identified as high risk, damage-prone areas in which to
build should not be borne by the American taxpayer. Con-
gress initially designated 186 CBRA units, comprising
ف453,000 acres along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. The
units range from small, isolated shoals of sand scarcely
above sea level to chains of islands stretching hundreds of
miles. These designated units comprise the Coastal Barrier
Resource System (CBRS). In 1990, Congress expanded the
system to 560 units.
•
•
•
A number of states also limit the expenditure of public
funds in hazard-prone areas of the coast. Florida and Massa-
chusetts initially developed expenditure limitation policies
through executive orders and subsequently through legisla-
tion. Other states rely on their coastal zone policies to curtail
public expenditures in coastal hazard areas (see Table 2).
Florida prohibits the construction of bridges to coastal
barriers that are not currently accessible by bridge (origi-
nally through Executive Order 81-105 and now through
Coastal Infrastructure Policy, Chapter 380.27, Florida Stat-
RESTRICTING PUBLIC SUBSIDIES IN
COASTAL HAZARD AVOIDING
For decades, the federal government has encouraged pri-
vate development in coastal hazard areas, particularly vul-
nerable coastal barrier islands, through financial assistance
for the construction of highways and bridges, water supply
and wastewater treatment facilities, and beach stabilization
projects as well as through disaster relief and flood insur-
ance. Similarly, state and local governments have facilitated
development in coastal hazard areas through cost sharing of
infrastructure projects and through land use policies.
4
utes) and requires local governments to adopt comprehen-
sive plans that include policies limiting public expenditures
that subsidize development in coastal high-hazard areas
4Executive Order 81-105 directs state agencies to give coastal barriers high priority in land acquisi-
tion programs, to not use state funds and federal grants to subsidize growth or postdisaster redevel-
opment in hazardous coastal barrier areas, and to encourage growth management to ensure that pop-
ulation and property in coastal barrier areas are consistent with evacuation capabilities and hazard
mitigation standards. Chapter 380.27, Coastal Infrastructure Policy, states that no state funds shall
be used to construct bridges or causeways to coastal barriers not accessible in 1985, that no state
funds will be expended for projects that increase infrastructure capacity unless consistent with the
local government approved coastal management element in the comprehensive plan, and that an an-
nual report shall assess the effectiveness of the policy on growth and development.
These public subsidies perpetuate an unending cycle of
subsidized development, destruction, and subsidized rede-
velopment. After a major coastal storm or hurricane sweeps
across a coastal barrier, damaging or destroying develop-

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E N V I R O N M E N T A L G E O S C I E N C E S
TABLE 2. Subsidy restriction programs for selected coastal states.
State Programs
Program Characterstics
Results
Connecticut:
Coastal Management Act
Restricts extension of water and sewer to
developed and undeveloped barrier islands.
Administered by local land use boards; policy
rarely, if ever, implemented.
Florida:
EO 81-105
Coastal Infrastructure Policy
Local Government
Local governments required to adopt
comprehensive plans that include policies
to restrict public expenditures for
Most counties have complied with state
planning requirements; local plan policies
restrict public spending in high-hazard
areas; local policies appear effective.
a
infrastructure in coastal high-hazard areas.
Comprehensive Planning
and Land Development Act
Maine:
Coastal Barrier Resources
System
Mimics federal CBRA; prohibits use of state
or federal funds for infrastructure in
designated coastal areas.
No lead agency identified; implementation
appears weak or nonexistent.
Massachusetts:
EO 181 and
Coastal Zone Management
Act
EO prohibits use of federal or state funds for
projects that promote growth in hazard-
prone areas of barrier beaches; coastal
policy also restricts public funds for water
and sewer
EO administered by state Coastal Zone
Management office; the order and Coastal
Zone Management policies appear
effective in limiting public funds,
especially for water and sewer, although
administration is weak
Rhode Island:
Coastal Management
Program
Coastal barriers divided into three categories:
undeveloped, moderately developed, and
developed, with different restrictions on
development for each
Policies very effective at limiting
development on undeveloped and
moderately developed barriers; less
effective on developed barriers
Texas:
Coastal Management
Program
State agency to consider impacts to barriers
when reviewing applications for special
utility districts
Program is new and untested
aEO, Executive Order.
(
Rule 9.J-5.012, Florida Administrative Code). Massachu-
In addition, many state programs have not been tested.
Rhode Island’s policies restricting state spending on coastal
barriers is perhaps the most strict, at least on paper. How-
ever, most of the coastal barriers that are not already devel-
oped are in public ownership. Similarly, Connecticut’s pro-
gram has rarely been tested, primarily because there are few
undeveloped barrier beaches in Connecticut. Like Rhode Is-
land, Maine’s Coastal Barrier Resources System legislation
also is strict regarding the use of public funds for roads,
bridges, and airports in designated coastal areas. Yet, there
seems to be little or no implementation of the law. State
coastal officials contacted were unaware of the law’s exist-
ence. Finally, the Texas coastal zone management program
is still too new to draw lessons from.
At the federal level, the majority of CBRS units have re-
mained largely undeveloped. However, most CBRS units are
remote and relatively inaccessible by automobile, and others
contain primarily wetlands and would be difficult to develop
or are in public ownership and are off-limits to development.
Meanwhile, a substantial amount of development has oc-
curred on at least 12 units in the CBRS, raising questions
about the effectiveness of a policy that relies on disincentives
alone to control land use (Salvesen and Godschalk, 1998).
CBRA’s weakness lies in its lack of a strong administra-
tive framework plus the presence of several loopholes. Con-
setts uses coastal zone management policies to limit public
expenditures on barrier beaches. Connecticut relies on its
control over the location of water and sewer extensions to
steer development away from coastal barriers and toward
areas that can more readily accommodate additional devel-
opment. Maine expressly prohibits the use of state funds in
designated coastal areas for construction of roads, airports,
boat landings, bridges, causeways, or erosion control mea-
sures (38 Maine Revised Statutes Annotated Section 1901).
Rhode Island prohibits the construction or expansion of new
infrastructure or utilities, including water, gas, and sewer
lines, on all barriers. Adopted in 1996, the Texas coastal
management zone program requires the state, when creating
or approving bonds for special utility districts in CBRA ar-
eas, to consider the impacts of development in such areas.
Without supporting policies, however, the effectiveness
of state and federal programs that restrict public subsidies in
specified coastal areas is limited. In the 1980s, Florida offi-
cials denied funds to expand a bridge to Hutchinson Island
after the Florida Department of Transportation determined
that financial assistance would violate the intent of Execu-
tive Order 81-105, yet recent decisions by local govern-
ments have encouraged development on Hutchinson Island
(Salvesen and Godschalk, 1998).

G O D S C H A L K E T A L . : C O A S T A L H A Z A R D M I T I G A T I O N 19
gress designated the Department of Interior, U.S. Fish and
1997; Godschalk et al., 1999). These sources point out that
hazard areas acquisition has both advantages and disadvan-
tages and that different states have tailored programs to
meet their own hazard mitigation needs using similar key
program components.
Wildlife Service (USFWS), as the lead administrative agency.
Yet, federal agencies only have to consult with the USFWS
to determine whether a proposed project violates CBRA.
Agencies can then ignore the advice of the USFWS, as hap-
pened with the Department of Transportation’s reconstruc-
tion of Highway 87 in Texas after Hurricane Alicia, even
though the road already had been destroyed three times by
coastal storms. USFWS has no veto power overagency deci-
sions (Jones, 1991).
Researchers consistently identify two principal advan-
tages of acquisition as compared to other hazard mitigation
options such as land use regulation. First, acquisition offers
a way to permanently reduce or eliminate susceptibility to
flood damage in the highest risk areas at the lowest cost
over the long term (Field and Associates, Inc., 1981; Asso-
ciation of State Floodplain Managers, 1995). Although
states and localities cannot afford and do not want to ac-
quire entire floodplains for mitigation purposes, properties
subject to frequent and severe flood, wave, or wind action
(e.g., coastal V zones or high erosion inlet zones) are strong
candidates for acquisition because it is less expensive and
less life threatening in the long run to acquire such proper-
ties and remove them from development rather than pay re-
peatedly for disaster relief following storm events. Second,
acquisition can facilitate other important hazard mitigation
goals, such as increasing floodplain storage capacity, as
well as environmental protection and community goals such
as the preservation of ecologically important wetlands, mar-
itime forest, estuarine ecosystems, and beachfront areas and
the provision of open space areas, parks, and public beach
access (Field and Associates, Inc., 1981; Burby and Kaiser,
1986; Association of State Floodplain Managers, 1995).
At the same time, acquisition programs pose real disad-
vantages. Chief among these is that such programs can im-
pose substantial short-term costs for acquisition itself and,
to a lesser extent, long-term costs in the form of mainte-
nance expenses, liability, and foregone local property tax
revenues (Field and Associates, Inc., 1981; S. Jandoli, 1997,
personal communication). In addition, successfully imple-
menting an acquisition program requires identifying and co-
ordinating a complex set of funding sources and mitigation
incentives and, frequently, overcoming landowner objec-
tions (Field and Associates, Inc., 1981; Burby and Kaiser,
Best Subsidy Restrictions Practices
The chief attractiveness of the subsidy restriction ap-
proach is that it is a nonregulatory tool relying on market
forces rather than government regulations to discourage de-
velopment in high hazard areas of the coast. This is also its
greatest weakness. Development can still occur in areas
subject to the subsidy limitation. Thus, the technique may
delay or inhibit development in designated areas but will
not necessarily prevent it.
Even though an important component of hazard mitiga-
tion programs, state restrictions on public expenditures in
coastal hazard areas are not likely to be effective without
supporting policies. To make a difference, subsidy restric-
tions should be allied with coastal management programs
for acquisition, notification, zoning, beach and dune set-
backs, and wetlands protection.
Best subsidy restriction practices include:
•
Identify coastal hazard areas that are (1) relatively un-
developed, such as coastal barrier islands with limited
access, where expenditure limitations can have an ef-
fect in constraining future development; and (2) subject
to repeated damage, such as repetitively damaged struc-
tures, where expenditure limitations can prevent unwise
redevelopment.
•
•
Formulate expenditure limitation policies that limit fu-
ture development-inducing public subsidies for infra-
structure and facilities both for relatively undeveloped
areas and for postdisaster areas where redevelopment
may not be the most desirable policy.
Couple expenditure limitation policies with other hazard
mitigation policies, such as acquisition of hazard areas
and land use and environmental policies to strengthen
the cumulative hazard mitigation effects.
1
986; Association of State Floodplain Managers, 1995).
The Association of State Floodplain Managers (1995) has
identified 22 states that employ acquisition programs specif-
ically for hazard mitigation purposes in flood prone or other
high hazard locations. Thirteen of these 22 states use dedi-
cated funds for direct state acquisition or for local acquisi-
tion. A number of these states, as well as the remaining nine
states, also help local governments obtain federal postdisas-
ter funds, including primarily FEMA Section 404 (or Stafford
Act) Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funds.
HAZARD AREAS ACQUISITION
The acquisition of hazard areas as an option for flood-
plain management and hazard mitigation has been discussed
in the literature and in various policy guidebooks since at
least the late 1970s (e.g., see Kusler, 1979; Field and Asso-
ciates, Inc., 1981; Handmer, 1985; Burby and Kaiser, 1986;
Association of State Floodplain Managers, 1995; FEMA,
State Hazard Area Acquisition Programs
Table 3 summarizes the principal program components of
three Atlantic coastal states that have substantial coastal

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E N V I R O N M E N T A L G E O S C I E N C E S
TABLE 3. Acquisition programs for selected Atlantic coastal states
State Program
Program Characteristics
Results
Florida:
Comprehensive program for acquisition of a variety
of conservation and recreation programs
Coastal hazard mitigation has been a principal
emphasis of the program
Since 1974, Florida has spent nearly $1.2
billion to acquire nearly 630,000 acres of
lands for conservation purposes, including
coastal hazard mitigation
Conservation and
Recreation Lands
Program adopted 1974
State funds come in part from documentary stamp
and phosphate severance tax revenues
New Jersey:
Coastal Blue Acres
Program adopted 1995
Pre-storm acquisition of undeveloped, high-hazard
coastal areas and post-storm acquisition of
damaged areas
State funding comes from general obligation bonds
Localities purchase and manage land as open space
No poststorm acquisitions have been made
New Jersey recently appropriated $5 million
for pre-storm acquisition of ف60 acres in
nine different projects across seven
counties
Maryland:
Flood Plain
Management Program
adopted 1976
Pre-storm acquisition of flood hazard lands,
including coastal areas, and poststorm acquisition
of damaged areas
State funding, provided primarily in conjunction
with HMGP funds, comes from general obligation
bonds and the state’s open space program
Localities purchase and manage land as open space
Since the early 1980s, the state has
facilitated local acquisition of 400
separate properties for hazard mitigation
hazard areas acquisition programs—Florida, New Jersey,
and Maryland. State acquisition efforts typically include the
acquisition of property in hazardous or repetitively flooded
areas, the demolition of existing structures, and the perma-
nent dedication of the acquired land to some type of open
space use, usually nature preserve or beach access. The pre-
cision with which states define and delimit areas for acqui-
sition varies somewhat, although the focus generally is on
areas that have suffered substantial damage following a ma-
jor storm event, areas that have suffered cumulatively sub-
stantial damage from smaller repetitive events, or some
combination of the two.
all three states rely primarily if not exclusively on voluntary
acquisitions rather than the power of eminent domain, all
three use valuation processes designed to ensure that prop-
erty owners receive fair market values for acquired lands,
and all three employ competitive selection processes for
identifying the highest priority sites for acquisition. Under
these selection processes in particular, individual landown-
ers or localities first nominate areas for acquisition and the
state then prioritizes properties to be acquired using criteria
such as flood repetitiveness, shoreline erosion rates, or re-
ductions in property values from storm damage.5
The efforts of these states also vary somewhat with regard
to funding mechanisms and the disposition of acquired land.
New Jersey, for example, uses state appropriations on a
state–local cost-share basis for the local acquisition of prop-
erties (New Jersey Department of Environmental Protec-
tion, 1997; S. Jandoli, 1997, personal communication).
Maryland primarily uses state appropriations to augment
federal HMGP funding for the local acquisition of proper-
ties (Association of State Floodplain Managers 1995; W.
Parrish 1997, personal communication). In both of these
states, the localities own and manage the land following ac-
quisition with the mandate that the land be maintained in a
manner consistent with hazard mitigation. Florida, in con-
trast, uses several funding sources under its Conservation
and Recreation Lands program, including documentary
stamp and phosphate severance tax revenues, to acquire and
manage lands itself for a variety of conservation and preser-
vation purposes, one of which is hazard mitigation (Florida
Department of Environmental Protection, 1997).
Best Hazard Area Acquisition Practices
Four key components of successful hazard area acquisi-
tion programs can be identified, which should apply to any
coastal hazards area acquisition program. First, acquisition
efforts should be targeted on only the most hazardous areas,
where property is repetitively damaged, lives threatened,
and development at extreme risk. To that end, states like
New Jersey, Maryland, and others employ a competitive
process and articulated criteria to select priority sites (New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 1997; W.
Parrish, 1997, personal communication).
Second, because most state programs lead to the acquisi-
tion and long-term maintenance of the hazards areas by lo-
calities, most programs provide for substantial financial
5A number of noncoastal states and localities have established similar programs designed expressly
for the acquisition of lands in high hazard areas and specifically in high flood hazard areas. Like
Maryland, these states and localities have relied primarily on federal HMGP funds to purchase high
hazard areas, clear those areas, and dedicate them for floodplain management and public recreation
purposes. Prominent examples include Missouri’s extensive buy out program created in the wake of
the 1993, 1994, and 1995 Midwestern floods (Missouri State Emergency Management Agency,
1995; FEMA, 1997) and efforts undertaken by historically flood-ravaged Tulsa, Oklahoma follow-
ing the 1984 Memorial Day flood (Patton, 1993; Meshek and Associates, 1994). Other states that
have established programs for the acquisition of land in floodplain or other high-hazard areas in-
clude, for example, Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin (Association of State Floodplain Managers 1995).
Despite these differences, the Florida, New Jersey, and
Maryland programs share notable similarities. Specifically,

G O D S C H A L K E T A L . : C O A S T A L H A Z A R D M I T I G A T I O N 21
assistance to localities using primarily direct state appropri-
lic participation to build consensus for the need for and
desirability of hazard area acquisition programs.
ations. Perhaps more importantly, states also provide assis-
tance to help localities through the complex maze of funding
applications (D. W. Owens, 1997, personal communication;
T. Murphy, 1997, personal communication) in order to tap
into the substantial and largely untapped federal HMGP
funds (see Godschalk et al., 1999, chapter 10).
CONCLUSION
•
Our review of state coastal hazard mitigation programs
discovered a number of effective state initiatives. At the
same time, it revealed several less effective programs. It is
clear that to be very successful in mitigating coastal haz-
ards, states need comprehensive programs that bring to-
gether hazard definition, notification, subsidy restriction,
and acquisition in an integrated fashion.
Third, because most state programs rely primarily on vol-
untary acquisitions rather than eminent domain, state pro-
grams undertake multiple land assessments in conducting
their negotiations and strive to offer pre-storm fair market
values for high priority properties to provide an adequate in-
centive to sell. Equally important, state officials managing
acquisition programs stress that acquisition efforts need to
be integrated into a comprehensive mitigation program so
that other state policies do not undercut incentives to sell (S.
Jandoli, 1997, personal communication; W. Parrish, 1997,
personal communication). Such counterproductive policies
include, for example, the provision of disaster relief despite
a pre-storm failure to participate in the NFIP or the state
subsidization of infrastructure repairs that maintain artifi-
cially high private property values.
Finally, whether an acquisition program is administered
primarily by a state agency or by local governments, it is vi-
tal that the state support local acquisition efforts. Necessary
support includes technical assistance, public outreach and
education, and public participation opportunities generally,
all of which provide local governments with the information
they need to provide strong local leadership, ensure effec-
tive and equitable acquisition efforts, and enhance the polit-
ical acceptability of the program generally (Field and Asso-
ciates, Inc., 1981; Handmer, 1985; Burby and Kaiser 1986;
Patton, 1993; Missouri State Emergency Management
Agency 1995; Florida Department of Environmental Pro-
tection 1997; S. Jandoli, 1997, personal communication; D.
W. Owens 1997, personal communication).
There is also a clear need to bring together state and fed-
eral programs so that they reinforce each other rather than
work at cross purposes. The federal CBRA program has been
undercut by state and local government zoning and develop-
ment subsidies in a number of instances, such as on Hutch-
inson Island, Florida and Topsail Island, North Carolina
(Salvesen and Godschalk, 1998). Yet there are opportunities
to coordinate CBRA and the Coastal Zone Management
Act, along with the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act and the National Environmental Policy Act,
with state and local hazard mitigation plans and programs.
Together, their accomplishments could be far reaching; sep-
arately, they leave much to be desired.
REFERENCES
•
Association of State Floodplain Managers. (1995). Floodplain
management 1995: State and local programs. Madison, WI: As-
socation of State Floodplain Managers.
Burby, R. J., and Kaiser, E. J. (1986). An assessment of urban
floodplain management in the United States: The case for land
acquisition in comprehensive floodplain management. Chapel
Hill, NC: Center for Urban and Regional Studies, University of
North Carolina.
California Seismic Commission. (1992). The homeowner’s guide
to earthquake safety. Sacramento, CA: California Seismic Com-
mission.
Based upon this summary of the literature and state expe-
rience, best practice recommendations for hazard area ac-
quisition programs include:
California Seismic Commission. (1993). The commercial property
owner’s guide to earthquake safety. Sacramento, CA: California
Seismic Commission.
•
Target acquisition programs on repetitively damaged or
extreme-risk developed areas and vulnerable environ-
mental areas (e.g., dunes and wetlands) that offer pro-
tection from hazards, particularly those that also can
serve as future beach access areas, public recreation ar-
eas, or wildlife habitat areas.
Provide both state financial assistance and state techni-
cal assistance to localities to acquire and maintain haz-
ard areas.
Build adequate incentives into voluntary acquisition
programs and coordinate them with related state poli-
cies, such as infrastructure expenditure limitations.
Develop strong ties with local leaders and stakeholders
through technical assistance, public education, and pub-
Federal Emergency Management Agency. (1997). Report on costs
and benefits of natural hazard mitigation. Washington DC: Fed-
eral Emergency Management Agency.
Field, R. M., and Associates, Inc. (1981). State and local acquisi-
tion of floodplains and wetlands: A handbook on the use of ac-
quisition in floodplain management. Washington DC: U.S. Wa-
ter Resources Council.
•
•
•
Florida Department of Environmental Protection. (1997). Conser-
vation and recreation lands 1997 annual report: A 10 year ac-
quisition plan. Tallahassee: Florida Department of Environmen-
tal Protection.
Godschalk, D. R., Brower, D. J., and Beatley, T. 1989. Cata-
strophic coastal storms: Hazard mitigation and development
management. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

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Owens, D. W. (1994). Coastal management law in North Carolina:
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mitigation: Recasting disaster policy and planning. Washing-
ton, DC: Island Press.
Handmer, J. W. (1985). Local reaction to acquisition: An Austra-
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Palm, R. (1982). Earthquake hazards information: The experience of
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS
•
David R. Godschalk
Dr. Godschalk is the Stephen Baxter Pro-
Craig Richardson
Mr. Richardson is a land use lawyer and
fessor of City and Regional Planning at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill. A fellow of the American Institute of
Certified Planners, he has done extensive
research on hazard mitigation, growth
management, and land use planning.
planning consultant with extensive practice
experience in the implementation of land
use and growth management programs. He
is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of
City and Regional Planning at the Univer-
sity of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
Richard Norton
Mr. Norton is a lawyer and doctoral can-
David Salvesen
Mr. Salvesen is a doctoral candidate in
didate in the Department of City and Re-
gional Planning at the University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill. Currently studying
land use plan implementation for his dis-
sertation, he worked as a consulting envi-
ronmental policy analyst and planner in
Washington, D.C. and San Francisco be-
fore returning to graduate school.
the Department of City and Regional Plan-
ning at the University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill. Formerly, he worked as a se-
nior policy analyst at the Urban Land Insti-
tute in Washington, D.C. and as a private
planning consultant.