Full text of DOI:10.1093/pa/53.2.219

Government and Administration 1998–99:
Overcoming ‘Conservatism’—A Job Half Done?
BY ANDREW GRAY AND BILL JENKINS
FOR the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, the twenty-first century
will be characterised by progressive politics in which the potential of all
is liberated in a system based on social justice. To bring this about, he
told the Labour Party Conference in September 1999, the forces of
conservatism must be defeated. These are not so much Her Majesty’s
Opposition but ‘the cynics, the elites, the establishment, those who will
live with decline, who yearn for yesteryear, those who prefer to criticise
rather than to do’ in the public sector. However, the battle for change
will not be easy. ‘You try getting change in the public sector,’ Tony
Blair told a meeting of venture capitalists, ‘I bear the scars on my back
after two years in government.’
Such public statements have fuelled the idea that Mr Blair has a
distinctive, even antipathetic view of traditional public bureaucracies
and professional groups as the counterpart to old Labour and hence in
need of radical modernisation. If so, this is in tune with Philip Gould,
one of the main drivers behind recent the Labour Party changes, and
Charles Leadbeater, a member of the DEMOS think-tank.1 Gould sees
continual modernisation of institutions, policies and politics as essential
to cope with a new world characterised by global financial markets,
shifting political alliances and fragmenting social groups. Leadbeater,
in a book ringingly endorsed by Mr Blair, questions the ability of the
traditional public sector to cope with the demands of the new ‘thin air
economy’ where knowledge is paramount, work redefined and institu-
tions inadequate unless infinitely flexible. The vision, therefore, is a
world in which the old public sector is too rule-bound, risk averse and
hostile to innovation to be of much value. Instead, a totally changed
system needs to embrace government (ministers for problems rather
than departments), extensive financial and political decentralisation and
a new breed of public sector entrepreneurs.
Following the Prime Minister’s Labour Conference speech, ministers
went on the offensive against the forces of conservatism. They threat-
ened the teachers for resisting performance-related reward systems and
doctors for doubting walk-in clinics or the development of health
telephone helplines. Even the most senior civil servants were subject to
accusations of sloth in delivering the government’s programme and
Permanent Secretaries found themselves in October at the Civil Service
Ą Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government 2000
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College to work out how to change their management culture for a
millennium in which the priorities were to ‘deliver, deliver, and deliver’.
Yet some have been wary of throwing out too much of the baby with
the old Labour bathwater. The Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott,
reminded the Local Government Association in Harrogate that public
servants and elected local councillors had forged the civilised modern
society. ‘It was the public sector who made possible universal education,
provided affordable and good quality housing, maintained parks and
open spaces and organised care for those most in need.’2 Others, amidst
the praise, pointed out contradictions between rhetoric and practical
policy and expressed a fear that attacks on conservatism were really a
shorthand condemnation of all criticism. Commenting on the Prime
Minister’s Conference speech that also announced compulsory drug and
DNA testing for all offenders, the Economist (2.10.99) noted Mr Blair’s
admission that he was ‘sick of libertarian nonsense masquerading as
freedom’. There was therefore a danger that words were being devalued
to the extent that progressives were those who agreed with proposed
reforms and conservatives those opposed.
Yet there may be implementation problems that are not attributable
simply to vested public service interests but to the characteristics of
policy. In the following sections we explore some of these tensions and
contradictions as they have emerged during the past year in British
government and administration before returning, in the conclusion, to
assess institutional conservatism in the public sector.
Cabinet and machinery of government:
joining up the centre?
In late 1998 Sir Christopher Foster, management consultant and adviser
to governments, addressed the Public Management and Policy Associ-
ation on ‘The End of Cabinet Government?’. He was pursuing an old
hobby horse, i.e. that that recent changes to political and economic
environment have undermined the effectiveness of central policy-making
and coordinating mechanisms and notably those of ministers acting
collectively in Cabinet. His prescription is to engineer the Cabinet
system as a centralised strategic capacity to assist policy formulation
and enhance implementation, both of which increasingly involve inter-
departmental issues.3
Unlike many consultants, Foster rejects any private sector practice
template for this machinery. Cabinet decisions are too complex and the
political and public scrutiny of policy too intense for such a model. Yet,
some elements of good corporate governance can be shaped to fit a
political environment. These include a new policy-monitoring and coor-
dinating body at the centre of government to serve the Cabinet system
rather than the Prime Minister, and better processes. For Foster, just as
‘large complicated private sector businesses do not run or implement
innovation well without good processes, neither can government’.

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Such processes, of course, have to accommodate strong political
forces within the core executive system. These have been witnessed in
abundance during the past year, including in the various changes to the
organisation of the Cabinet and Prime Minister’s Offices and the
comings and goings of senior ministers and their advisors.
The latter culminated in the Cabinet reshuffle of October 1999. The
Prime Minister promoted Alan Milburn, a loyal moderniser, to the
Department of Health in a clear indication of the determination to
engage more actively with the ‘forces of conservatism’ in the health
services than had Frank Dobson, who left the Cabinet to seek the
Labour nomination for mayor of London. Mo Mowlam, who had been
Northern Ireland Secretary since the election, took over as Chancellor
for the Duchy of Lancaster (responsible for the Cabinet Office and
public service) with a brief to promote ‘joined up government’ and
shake-up the forces of conservatism in the civil service. She succeeded
Jack Cunningham, who retired to the backbenchers.
All this might appear to be simply Mr Blair fine-tuning his ministerial
team to reflect New Labour’s modernising image. However, the most
significant feature of this reshuffle was the return to Cabinet as
Northern Ireland Secretary of Peter Mandelson, who had resigned
controversially in December 1998. The Mandelson saga was not only
complex, as the House of Commons Standards and Privileges Commit-
tee later discovered (HC 611, 1998/9), but also indicative of the
potential of political forces and events to upset the dynamics of any
Cabinet as a system.
It emerged that Mr Mandelson had in Opposition secured a sizeable
personal loan from Mr Geoffrey Robinson, a wealthy industrialist and
fellow Labour MP, in order to purchase a London home. This loan had
not been publicly declared on the Common’s register of interests nor to
his Permanent Secretary when later, in government, he found himself at
the head of a department (Trade and Industry) which was investigating
Mr Robinson’s business affairs. By this time Mr Robinson was also a
government minister. When the press broke this news, Mr Mandelson
attempted to explain events away but, rapidly recognising the futility of
this position, resigned. So too did Mr Robinson who had already been
censured in the House on more than one occasion for failing to register
business interests (HC 975, 1997/8; HC 1190, 1997/8; HC 292, 1998/
9; HC 975, 1998/9). A later casualty of the affair was Charlie Wheelan,
press officer to Chancellor Gordon Brown. He had apparently briefed
the press on Mr Mandelson’s problems as part of a running battle
between the two ministerial camps dating back to differences at the
time of the last Labour leadership election.4
The departures of Mr Mandelson and Mr Robinson led to minor
changes in the government team, but by July 1999 rumours were rife
(apparently initiated and fuelled by the Prime Minister’s own press
office) that a major ministerial reshuffle was imminent. In the event, Mr

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Blair made extensive changes to the junior ministerial ranks but not the
Cabinet. Journalist critics of ‘the most bathetic reshuffle in history’
(Economist, 31.7.99) overlooked the significance of these changes in
the attack on the forces of conservatism. They also failed to appreciate
incipient developments that included the elevation of Defence Secretary
George Robinson to Secretary General of NATO, a lull in the Northern
Ireland peace process and pressure on Frank Dobson to run for Lon-
don’s mayor.
When the changes came, Ms Mowlam took over the Cabinet Office
portfolio from Jack Cunningham. Some commentators had been less
than impressed with Dr Cunningham’s record. Yet, in terms of initia-
tives, his last year brought important changes to the central machinery
of government. Some of these followed from Sir Richard Wilson’s
report5 involving the new Performance and Innovation Unit and the
Centre for Management and Policy Studies, others from the White
Paper, Modernising Government (Cm. 4310) published in March 1999.
In the Cabinet Office the latter resulted in a strengthening of the Better
Regulation Unit, renamed the Regulation Impact Unit and given powers
to question any department policy that was likely to impose regulatory
burdens on the private sector, as well as the creation of the Modernising
Public Services Group which brought together the former Effective
Performance Division (responsible for benchmarking, Next Steps Agen-
cies, market testing, etc) and Service First (the former Citizens Charter
Unit). The latter merger was designed to meet the government’s White
Paper promise to respond to user needs and enhance service effective-
ness by joining up government.
This commitment to ‘joined up government’ was also realised in the
activities of the Performance and Innovation Unit and the Social Exclu-
sion Unit. PIU projects included the development of electronic com-
merce in the UK, central government’s role at the regional and local
level (‘joined-up delivery’) and the incentives and accountability barriers
to achieving ‘joined up government’. Similarly, the Social Exclusion
Unit, working though a variety of policy action teams and interdepart-
mental groups, reported on neighbourhood renewal, teenage pregnancy,
and opportunities for 16–18 year olds, while initiating studies on poor
neighbourhoods and teenage parents.6
In the meantime, the responsibility for advancing another modernis-
ing theme, improving policy-making, fell to the Centre for Management
and Policy Studies. The Action Plan for implementing the White Paper
expects the Centre to create a centre of expertise in policy evaluation,
design a model of good policy-drawing on good policy-making practices
in other countries, and develop seminars on policy-making for both
ministers and senior civil servants.7 Later, in September 1999, the
government announced that a research capacity would be added to the
Prime Minister’s Policy Unit to provide Mr Blair with factual informa-
tion. How such an addition would gel with developments in the Cabinet

Government and Administration
223
Office was not spelt out. Nevertheless, there is here a concerted attempt
to enhance central capacity.
Constitutional reform:
devolution, regions and local government
In July 1999 the Queen opened the new Scottish Parliament in Edin-
burgh, an occasion described by former Liberal Leader Lord Steel as
the most significant event in Scotland’s history for 300 years. There
were no carriages or other ceremonial dress, but the new members of
the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) emerged to the tones of a commissioned
fanfare played by a live orchestra. That proceedings were screened live
on the internet might be seen as confirmation of gimmickry or a
reflection of the sea-change in parliamentary politics brought by inno-
vative procedures and organisation, a new electoral system, the coali-
tion politics that this produced, and the subsequent flexing of devolved
political muscle against Westminster and the Labour Party’s Millbank
machine.
The new chamber differs markedly from its Westminster counterpart.
A semi-circular layout, electronic voting and public involvement in
committee stages of bills are accompanied by an unusual sobriety as
members address each other as Mr, Mrs and Ms without the benefit of
alcohol (there will be no bars for the first two years). Yet if the
Parliament is innovative (described as an ‘unparalleled democratic
innovation’8), so was the proportional method of electing it and the
Welsh Assembly in May 1999. In Scotland, for example, voters were
asked to cast two votes, one for a constituency MSP to be elected by
the first-past-the-post system (73 MSPs) and the second for a party list
(56 MSPs).9 Both in Scotland and Wales the results confirmed the worst
fears of supporters of two party government as the Scottish National
Party, the Liberal Democrats and Plaid Cymru in Wales picked up
enough seats to prevent Labour achieving an overall majority. In
Scotland, Labour negotiated a coalition of its 58 seats with the Liberal
Democrats’ 17, leaving the Scottish Nationalists with 35 seats as the
main opposition. The Liberal Democrats insisted on a formal concordat
ceding to them not only executive positions but policy concessions on
student tuition fees, extra education funding and a consideration of
extending proportional representation to local government elections.
This, and the tendency of some MSPs to talk of ‘Scottish’ interests,
triggered shock waves in Labour’s London political machine. However,
as former minister Roy Hattersley was quick to point out, ‘exercising
devolved powers is not an excess’ (Guardian, 17.5.99).
Labour’s schizophrenia towards forces of conservatism in devolved
parties was manifested earlier, when the resignation of Ron Davies as
Welsh Secretary and Leader of the Welsh Labour Party led to an
embarrassing battle over the leadership succession between his Cabinet
successor Alan Michael and backbench MP Rhodri Morgan. Mr

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Michael was eventually elected via an electoral college that many saw
as created to ensure Mr Morgan’s defeat, despite his support amongst
the party members. Michael’s legitimacy was further undermined as he
scraped into the Welsh Assembly courtesy of his party list and then
found himself in charge of minority administration (28 seats) weakened
in a low turnout by a strong Plaid Cymru vote (17 seats). Conservatives
gained 9 seats and the Liberal Democrats 6.10 The powers of the
Assembly (essentially those of the former Secretary of State for Wales)
are considerably fewer that those of the Scottish Parliament but it may
still remain a force to be reckoned with as the relationships between
Westminster and Cardiff develop.
The significance of devolution for representation at Westminster has
long been a concern of the Scottish but anti-devolutionist MP Tam
Dalyell. His single-minded attention to this issue earned him the ‘back-
bencher of the year’ award by the Spectator. He has no doubt been
musing on the exclusion of devolved matters from parliamentary ques-
tions in Westminster and the proposals for reducing the number of
Scottish MPs in the House of Commons. But what of England? Is the
Opposition leader, William Hague justified in warning of the ‘timebomb
of English nationalism’? Certainly, Tony Travers argued that a possible
consequence of devolution was an imbalance in regional public finances
with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland ‘featherbedded’ by the
southern English (Guardian, 21.4.99). Partly in response, Jacobs and
Kelly observed (Guardian, 9.6.99) the inherent tension between two
major objectives of government policy—devolution and redistribution
—and the consequent need for a debate on fiscal policy and
regionalisation.
Although the government has shown no urgency to pursue regional-
ism in a political sense, it established eight Regional Development
Agencies (RDAs) on 1 April 1999. Their task is to inject economic
stimulus into their areas. Although some have questioned this remit
(e.g. the Commons Environment Committee, HC 232, 1998/9), the
government argued that in parallel with regional Chambers of council-
lors and businessmen, RDAs could act as catalyst for other develop-
ments. But regional assemblies remain off the agenda except in London.
The Greater London Bill spelt out the powers of the mayor and
Greater London Assembly (GLA). Unveiling the bill in December 1998,
John Prescott argued that the mayor’s priority would be transport.
However, observers noted that responsibility for London Underground
(the subject of private-partnership financial schemes) was unclear, while
the constitutional relationships between mayor and assembly remained
ambiguous and 115 powers were explicitly designated to the Secretary
of State for the Environment rather than the mayor.
As the bill moved through the Commons, mayoral candidates
emerged as characters in a French farce. Throughout the summer and
autumn, the Labour Party provided most of the drama and featured the

Government and Administration
225
candidature of Ken Livingstone MP. Mr Livingstone was the last leader
of the Greater London Council when it was abolished by the Conser-
vatives in 1986. Opinion polls began to suggest that he was favoured
both by Labour supporters (who approved of his pro-London stand,
especially on transport) and Conservatives (who felt he would be the
best opposition to New Labour). Other candidates included media
columnist Trevor Phillips, former Environment Minister Glenda Jack-
son, and the junior minister for London Nick Rainsford.
There was speculation that Labour Party headquarters was seeking
to stop Mr Livingstone at all costs, fearing such an Old Labour figure
would distract attention from the modernising agenda. Certainly there
was a great effort to find a political heavyweight to ‘stop Ken’, which
came to fruition when Health Secretary Frank Dobson declared his
candidature. Further, many commentators detected an electoral fix in
Dobson’s favour when the party announced that the candidate would
be selected by an electoral college made up of local London party, MPs,
MEPs and trade union representatives. This was a similar discredited
mechanism to that used to ensure the victory of Alan Michael in Wales.
Unsurprisingly, a number of trade unions took the precaution of
announcing they would be consulting individual members before
declaring.
Meanwhile, the Conservatives were proceeding to their candidature
in good order and making political capital out of Labour’s discomforts.
In September, London party members directly elected former party
chairman Lord Archer as their candidate in preference to former
Transport Minister Stephen Norris. In an otherwise sober campaign,
Mr Norris was famously captured on television resolving not to support
Lord Archer ‘dead or alive’. It was a view which with hindsight
suggested he had the measure of his opponent, for in November Lord
Archer, in what will surely not be the final twist to the choice of a
London mayor, withdrew following further allegations of impropriety
in his erratic political career.
New Labour’s commitment to local government reform was taken
forward in a consultation paper Local Leadership, Local Choice (Cm.
4298, March 1999) and the Local Government Bill was published in
November. These reinforced themes in the 1998 Modern Local Govern-
ment White Paper (Cm. 4014), arguing that traditional modes of
council operation were inefficient and that councils should consult
directly with local communities on the way they wished to be governed.
The public discussion of these proposals included Local Government
Minister Hilary Armstrong berating local authorities for their reluctance
to change: ‘Those who oppose modernisation are setting themselves up
as conservatives with a small ‘c’ defending an institution as outdated as
the hereditary peerage’ (Guardian, 7.7.99). Perhaps she had in mind the
revelations of Channel 4’s series on ‘Tony’s People’, which examined
Labour’s agenda using the Prime Minister’s constituency for its mater-

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ial. It portrayed a latter-day ‘rotten borough’ in which the majority of
ward elections were uncontested and candidates paid more attention to
the greasy pole of party patronage than to their own constituents.
The idea that the reform of local authority structures and processes
is essential to enhance local government legitimacy and participation
has been widely discussed in this journal.11 It has also been reviewed by
a special Joint Lords/Commons Committee for Local Government
Organisation and Standards, established to examine what constitutional
adjustments might be required to effect the required change. However,
despite one or two adventurers such as Lewisham and Liverpool, which
have committed themselves to executive mayors and cabinet systems,
and a few experiments with proportional representation and service
delivery via information technology, there appears little enthusiasm
amongst authorities to follow the government’s line. To counter this
institutional inertia, a Local Government Network (made up of practi-
tioners and academics) has been formed to push through change. It has
proposed forcing the largest urban authorities to hold referendums on
elected mayors rather than leaving this to local discretion. Although
attractive to ministers, this and similar universalist prescriptions are
opposed by the Local Government Association, which argues that local
government is keen to reform in a way that is sensitive to local needs
and provides greater financial freedom. The government, however, in
repealing Compulsory Competitive Tendering and enacting the ‘Best
Value’ regime, retained reserve powers to control council taxes.
Early in 1999, Milton Keynes attempted to lead the way on both
participation and financial freedom by asking its electors to express a
preference between a range of council tax rises and cuts in council
service levels. In a 45% turnout, over 70% opted for an increase of
10% or more (the government limit for the year was 5%). The
Department of Transport, Environment and the Regions described the
results as ‘interesting’ but advised that the government’s fiscal generosity
had rendered steep council tax rises unnecessary (Guardian, 24.2.99).
Milton Keynes’ successful turnout was not matched in the national
local government elections in May 1999: only 30% of the total elector-
ate bothered to vote, and in many urban areas fewer than 20%. Rallings
and Thrasher noted that some government ministers ascribed such low
levels of turnout to high voter contentment, in which case a truly
contented democracy would have a zero turnout.12
Parliament, party funding and electoral reform
Constitutional change extended into Parliament by the reform of the
House of Lords. After announcements in the Queen’s Speech (Novem-
ber 1998), the government outlined how hereditary peers would be
debarred from membership of the House and later a new second
chamber would be established on the basis of recommendations of a
Royal Commission (Modernising Parliament, Cm. 4183, January

Government and Administration
227
1999). The Commission, chaired by former Tory minister Lord Wake-
ham and including Lord Butler (former Cabinet Secretary), Lord Hurd
(former Tory Foreign Secretary), Gerald Kaufman (Labour MP and
former minister) and Sir Michael Wheeler-Booth (former Clerk to
Parliament), received written and oral evidence throughout the summer
of 1999.13 In the meantime, Labour’s efforts to move its proposals
through the Lords ran into difficulties. In December 1998 Tory Leader
William Hague dismissed Lord Cranborne, then leader of the Conser-
vative peers, for trying to do a deal with the government behind his
back. However, the Cranborne deal, which drew on ideas of former
Speaker of the Commons Lord Weatherill and supported the govern-
ment’s proposals in exchange for the retention of 91 hereditary peers
pending the Royal Commission’s report, was agreed. In October 1999
the Lords approved the abolition of hereditary peers in its House by
221 votes to 81.
Meanwhile there has been plenty of argument over what form the
new second chamber should take. After a report from Lord MacKay of
Calshfern, the Conservative Party moved closer to accepting an elected
second chamber, in contrast to the government’s apparent preference
for an appointed assembly. The Royal Commission’s Consultation
Document appeared to indicate a preference for a chamber with
enhanced powers of scrutiny that could contribute to ‘better govern-
ment’. Labour’s submission emphasised a broad representation of gen-
der, colour and political opinion without replicating the Commons and
challenging the latter’s pre-eminence. This was in sharp contrast not
only to Lord MacKay’s ideas but also those of Lord Richard, former
Labour leader in the Lords, who also advocated a partly elected second
chamber.14 ‘What’, asked the Economist (8.5.99), ‘prevents a poten-
tially great modernising Prime Minister from seeing the force of these
arguments? Perhaps Mr Blair’s fear is not that the Commons would
become weaker in relation to the Lords, but that Parliament would
become stronger in relation to the Prime Minister?’
If the second chamber is to be directly elected, there is plenty of
choice of electoral system. Indeed, the United Kingdom in 1999 was ‘a
paradise for electoral theorists and a nightmare for voters’ (Economist,
17.4.99), with elections for devolved assemblies, local government and
the European Parliament conducted under different voting systems.
Representation at Westminster came under scrutiny earlier by the
Commission on Electoral Reform, chaired by Lord Jenkins. This ful-
filled Labour’s manifesto commitment to investigate proportional rep-
resentation and rewarded Liberal Democrat cooperation with other
constitutional reforms. Its brief was to recommend a system that met
the requirements for broad proportionality, stable government and the
link between MPs and geographical constituencies.
The Jenkins report (Cm. 4090, October 1998) offered two changes.
First, 80% of MPs should continue to be elected in single constituencies,

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with the remainder selected from regional party lists according to a
party’s proportion of the vote. This should provide more even geo-
graphical representation. Second, constituency MPs would be elected
on the basis of the alternative vote. This should ensure that each MP
was elected by a majority of those voting and encourage candidates to
seek broad support. David Lipsey, political journalist and Commission
member, argued that the proposals were not only expedient but also
came close to resolving the Commission’s conflicting terms of reference
(Economist, 31.10.98). Actual reform, however, requires not only
prime-ministerial and Cabinet support but also clear public backing.15
The doubts of some Labour ministers were reinforced by the serious
Labour losses in the proportional representation systems of the devolu-
tion and European elections. Labour’s manifesto pledge was to hold a
referendum on electoral reform before the next general election. To
date there seems little prospect of this being met.
Also in the autumn of 1998 the Committee on Standards in Public
Life, chaired by Lord Neill, reported on party funding (Cm. 4057).
This, too, was a manifesto commitment and included in the 1997
Queen’s Speech.16 The report recommended banning foreign donations,
abolishing blind trusts, publishing all major donations to parties at
national and local level, and limiting general election campaign budgets
to £20 million. Referenda should be supported by equal state finding
for ‘yes’ and ‘no’ campaigns (the Committee had been disturbed by the
extent of underfunding for the ‘No’ campaign in the Welsh referendum)
and governments should remain neutral throughout a referendum. The
government accepted its general recommendations. In referenda, how-
ever, it preferred to limit the period of government neutrality to 28 days
before a poll (arguing that it should not be unduly constrained from
pursuing its own policies) and suggested spending caps to favour
parliamentary parties with two or more members in the Commons over
smaller fringe groups and individuals (Cm. 4413).
Modernising the representative process extended to the workings of
the House of Commons itself. Under a government with such a large
majority, it is hardly surprising that the efficacy of the House of
Commons’ scrutinising role was questioned. The Fabian Society argued
MPs should devote less time to constituency problems and more to
holding the executive to account.17 In practice, more attention has been
paid to shortening the working week and releasing MPs for more
constituency work (HC 60, 1998/9; HC 719, 1998/9).
Perhaps the perceived ineffectiveness of the House under such a large
government majority is affecting public attitudes to it. The Hansard
Society reported that audiences for parliamentary TV and radio pro-
grammes have been in steady decline, a fact attributed by some on the
limits placed on broadcasters by Parliament.18 Another cause may be
the continued accusations of misconduct, including Labour MPs who
leaked draft Select Committee reports to ministers. Certainly, the Stan-

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229
dards and Privileges Committee had a busy session. As reported above,
it spent some time on the misconduct of former ministers Geoffrey
Robinson (HC 975, 1997/8; HC 1190, 1997/8; HC 292, 1998/9, HC
362, 1998/9) and Peter Mandelson (HC 611, 1998/9). It also chastised
Ernie Ross for passing a copy of the Foreign Affairs Committee draft
report to the Foreign Office (HC 607, 1998/9).19 Mr Ross eventually
resigned from the committee, apologised to the House and was pun-
ished by a short suspension. Later, a similar leak from the Social
Security Committee led to the resignation of one of Gordon Brown’s
Political Private Secretaries, Don Touhig MP, and apologies from him
and from a Labour committee member, Kali Montford (HC 747, 1998/
9) for ‘errors of judgment’.
Meanwhile, as these events were unfolding, the Committee on Stan-
dards in Public Life decided to revisit its first report (chaired by Lord
Nolan) and assess its impact on practice. In the summer of 1999 it saw
72 witnesses, including ministers past and present, parliamentarians,
former civil servants and others. This group included Neil Hamilton,
who complained about perceived injustices at the hands of the Stan-
dards and Privileges Committee, and former Parliamentary Commis-
sioner for Standards, Sir Gordon Downey, one of the objects of Mr
Hamilton’s complaints. The committee also saw Tony Benn, veteran
Labour backbencher and former minister. Mr Benn had observed that
‘representation had been driven out of democratic politics by New
Labour’ and that he intended to stand down from Parliament at the
next election ‘to devote more time to politics and to have more freedom
to do so’. No doubt some in New Labour will not be best pleased at
the prospect of Mr Benn having more time to strengthen his own
particular force for conservatism.
Persisting with prudence: current and capital spending
When in September 1999 the Chancellor of the Exchequer took time
out from the International Monetary Fund Meeting in Washington to
travel to the Labour Party Conference, he may have reflected on how
one of his predecessors, Dennis Healey, had been summoned from the
airport in 1976 to explain himself to a critical Conference just as he
was to depart to seek an IMF loan. Mr Brown, in contrast, shook off
his jet lag to make a rousing speech committing the government to
combat child poverty and end unemployment within a generation.
However, he made no specific spending pledges. On the contrary, he
warned that the development of a credible and radical fiscal socialism
required money to be spent only when earned.
This is the style that has endeared the Chancellor to the IMF as
exemplar rather than supplicant. Based on twin concerns for recurrent
expenditure control and enhancing capital investment, he has vigorously
pursued prudent fiscal policies. With interest rate policy transferred to
the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England (a move

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endorsed by the Commons Treasury Select Committee (HC 505, 1998/
9)) and economic growth rising from 1% in the autumn of 1998 to
1.8% a year later, Mr Brown delivered his 1999 budget with a flourish.
His ‘package for enterprise and fairness’ included cuts in income and
business tax rates, increased benefits to children and pensioners, extra
cash for the National Health Service, education and crime prevention,
and incentives for entrepreneurship. Although the Financial Times
(10.3.99) attributed a ‘fiscal illusion’ to an improved economy and
some skilful financial scheduling by the Treasury, Mr Brown claimed
he would spend £18 billion less over three years than originally pre-
dicted, confirming surveys showing public spending as its lowest for
forty years. Yet the aim is not public expenditure control per se. Mr
Brown told the Guardian (23.3.99) that the commitment to fiscal
prudence was the start of a journey which would bring welfare state
reform (‘so that employment opportunity is provided for all’) and the
enhanced delivery of public services such as education and health.
Public Service Agreements (PSAs), described by the then Treasury
Chief Secretary Alan Milburn as ‘contracts with the people’ (Public
Finance, 21.5.99), are central to this journey. PSAs are quasi-contracts
in which spending departments and ministers agree to a set of objec-
tives, targets and performance improvement regimes in return from
three-year allocations of resources. PSAs are thus an effort to provide a
medium-term planning framework in which service improvement and
resource control can be planned together. Their implementation will be
monitored by a new Cabinet committee (PSX), chaired by the Chancel-
lor, which will demand evidence of departmental progress and effective
management to keep outturn to the agreement. To assist PSX, the
Treasury has established a Public Services Productivity Panel made up
of private sector managers and consultants to advise on improving the
productivity of departments and other public agencies.
Introducing the first set of PSAs (Cm. 4181, December 1998),20 the
Prime Minister praised such instruments of modernisation that
increased democracy and accountability and showed what the public
got for its money. The Treasury Select Committee (HC 378, 1998/9)
was not quite as enthusiastic. It noted the failure to pilot the system
before its introduction, warned against a failure to build service quality
into targets, and questioned the responsibility for setting targets and the
accountability for their delivery (HC 378, 1998/9).
The Committee also stated its intention to monitor the Private
Finance Initiative (PFI). Inherited from the Conservative administration,
the PFI is a device which its supporters see as relieving public-sector
borrowing and transferring financial and operational risk by contacting
with private-sector organisations to finance and manage public facilities
in return for guaranteed revenue streams. Opponents, including succes-
sive Labour Party Conferences, see this as a mortgaging of the public
sector’s assets in which the cost to the public purse will turn out to be

Government and Administration
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significantly greater and have adverse consequences for public employ-
ment and policy control. Reporting on PFI schemes in the NHS, the
Health Service Select Committee warned that the PFI might create
institutional apartheid and called for a pause prior to a proper evalua-
tion (HC 38, 1998/9).
The debate about the PFI continues to be impassioned. An evaluation
published by the British Medical Journal condemned the PFI as ‘perfid-
ious idiocy’, arguing that its effects have included wrongly located
hospitals and perverse bed provision.21 The Financial Times (8–9.7.99)
condemned the programme’s political management and early failures to
correct weaknesses inherited from the previous administration. On the
other hand, the government’s commitment to breathing new life into
the scheme had ‘by and large been a success’.
This mixed view of the PFI was shared by the House of Commons
Public Accounts Committee. Its report (HC 583, 1998/9) was based on
a succession of investigations by the National Audit Office. For the
Public Accounts Committee, the PFI is important and potentially advan-
tageous to the taxpayer. But it is also inherently complex and risky. It
therefore offered advice on managing procurement, obtaining the best
available deals and achieving value for money. In this light the Comp-
troller and Auditor General, Sir John Bourn, set out the National Audit
Office’s approach to auditing PFI projects and elaborated its analytical
framework and guidance to bodies seeking to negotiate PFI schemes.
For Sir John, ‘the new approach brings with it new pitfalls and risks to
value for money. Hence securing potential benefits requires new public
sector skills’ (HC 739, 1998/9).
Once sceptical of the PFI, the Labour frontbench has now embraced
it. It is regarded as central to the Chancellor’s plan to balance control
of recurrent public spending with enhancing public sector investment.
Thus the government has not only reversed the original Labour Confer-
ence opposition but also taken the scheme forward. A new agency,
Partnerships UK, will take over from the current Treasury PFI taskforce.
It will employ city expertise to get the best public-private partnership
deals and act as project manager and broker in return for fees. But if
Mr Brown’s public expenditure coffers are so full, do public-private
partnerships still represent good value given the risks and uncertainties
that surround them? For many public-sector unions it is clearly not.
The government, however, regards such opposition as further examples
of institutional conservatism.
A civil service for the millennium?
Modernising government and freedom of information
February 1999 saw the publication by the Public Management and
Policy Association of a report on Modernising the Policy Process by Sir
Michael Bichard. As well as being chairman of the Association, Sir
Michael is Permanent Secretary of the Department of Education and

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Employment and contributed to an impressive series in which senior
officials reflected openly on their craft.22 His tone was notably didactic.
As a ‘creative industry’, the civil service should be ‘brimming with ideas,
excitement and challenge; welcoming new approaches and new people,
judging itself on the values it adds; satisfied only when it is admired not
just for its impartiality, integrity, fairness and objectivity, but also for
the quality and the originality and effectiveness of its policy’. This
creative civil service required a modernisation of policy-making, service
delivery and people management. Making policy more deliverable
called for evaluation, research and evidence from the front-line. It also
required addressing the issues ‘as they are recognised by real people—
not as they are defined by our various bureaucracies’.
It is thought that Sir Michael holds views Mr Blair would like to see
all senior civil servants adopt. However, there were signs that by the
autumn of 1999 the Prime Minister was unhappy with the pace of
change in Whitehall. He appointed the industrialist Lord Simon to the
Cabinet Office to speed up reform and asked Sir Richard Wilson,
Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service, to organise a
meeting of senior officials at the Civil Service College to prepare a
Whitehall for the twenty-first century. This meeting determined that the
service needed a clear sense of direction, a sharper focus on results, a
wider base of recruitment, and ways to promote leadership and encour-
age talent.23
The reform agenda was set in March 1999 by the government’s long
awaited White Paper on public sector reform, Modernising Government
(Cm. 4310). This had been promised for a year earlier by the then
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, David Clark as part of a ‘Better
Government’ initiative. Designed as ‘a vision for transforming the way
government works’, it set out to provide an agenda for modernising
policy-making, providing responsive and high quality services, introduc-
ing new technology, meeting citizens needs, and utilising public servants
as agents of change.
In policy-making, there was a strong thrust for a more corporate
approach that would make more use of policy evaluation and joint
training of officials and ministers to create a government-wide, out-
come-focused and ‘joined-up’ culture. Innovations such as the Cabinet
Office’s Performance and Innovation Unit and cross-cutting pro-
grammes such as Sure Start were endorsed. Benchmarking and Best
Value were described as crucial elements in an integrated system to be
developed by a new Quality Management Task Force.
Public access and service responsiveness to users were addressed
through an information technology strategy embracing both the centre
and sectors such as the NHS (e.g. NHS Direct) and education (the
National Grid for Learning). Access to services would be enhanced,
with 25% of dealings with the public ‘on line’ by 2002 and 100%
available by 2008. One-stop shops in local authorities, work-focused

Government and Administration
233
gateway projects and strategic area based programmes such as action
zones were cited as exemplars of good practice in partnerships and joint
working. As future initiatives will require a new public service acting as
an agent of change, the White Paper extols the need for a culture of
‘improvement, innovation and collaborative purpose’ in which public
servants will be encouraged to experiment, innovate and deliver a better
product. The prerequisite is wider recruitment (most notably from
outside the service), new reward systems and new working practices.
In July 1999, Jack Cunningham, as minister responsible for the
Cabinet Office and Pubic Service, published an Action Plan for putting
the White Paper into effect.24 The plan announced that 38% of govern-
ment services were already available electronically, that peer review
teams had been established in Whitehall to check modernisation pro-
gress, and that the Centre for Management and Policy Studies in the
Cabinet Office had been asked to ‘design joint training for minister and
civil servants on policy-making’. It also set out implementation details
for 62 separate commitments.
The reception of Modernising Government was mixed. As with many
such announcements of intent, the sceptics were quick to pronounce.
There were warnings, for example, that many citizens’ experiences with
recent crisis at the Passport Office Agency or the Benefits Agency (both
as a result of the introduction of new computer systems) would hardly
endear them to any new information technology. There was even the
danger of aggravating social exclusion through the development of an
information underclass.25 There were also more systemic concerns.
Professor Richard Chapman, while welcoming the broad thrust, ques-
tioned the meaning of the modernising message, chastised the sweeping
criticisms of traditional civil service practice in a document which
espoused a rejection of bureaucracy baiting, and speculated on the
consequences of a risk-taking public service culture.26
Risk-taking was not a notable feature of the government’s approach
to freedom of information. After David Clark’s departure in 1998 from
the Cabinet, responsibility for freedom of information legislation was
transferred to the Home Secretary, Jack Straw. The latter set up an
Advisory Group on Openness in the Public Sector, chaired by junior
minister Lord Williams and including civil servants and academics, to
brief him on how a climate of public sector openness was to be
created.27 However, it appears that Mr Straw was simultaneously
seeking in Cabinet committees to dilute proposals (Guardian, 21.6.99).
Hence, his draft bill of May 1999 differed from the Clark White Paper
(Cm. 3818) in several major aspects. The test of ‘substantial harm’ for
withholding information from the public was replaced by the test of
whether disclosure would ‘prejudice’ government operations, the pow-
ers of the proposed information commissioner were severely curtailed,
and exemptions to the release of information were extended.
The immediate reaction to the bill was notably hostile. While the

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opening up of health and education was welcomed, many criticised the
limited access to central government. The Daily Telegraph (25.5.99)
described the bill as ‘a step backwards’ from access rights available
under John Major’s Open Government Code, replacing ‘the existing
binding public interest agreement with a voluntary commitment’ and
Hugo Young questioned Mr Straw’s liberal credentials (Guardian,
26.6.99). Both the House of Commons Public Administration Commit-
tee (HC 570, 1998/9) and the House of Lords (HL 97, 1998/9) pointed
out that the proposals fell short of international standards and argued
for a clear presumption in favour of disclosure as a right of citizenship,
with enforceable rights of access in place of discretionary powers of
release.
In October 1999 Mr Straw announced to Parliament a modest
retreat, confirmed in November by the publication of the bill. Admitting
that the original legislation was a little ‘rough at the edges’, he proposed
a number of minor changes that included enhancing the Commissioner’s
brief and relaxing the exemptions (HC 831, 1998/9). He insisted,
however, that a balance had to be struck between the public’s right to
know and the efficient operation of government. Opponents described
the legislation as still seriously defective, suggesting that on this occa-
sion the conservative force was Mr Straw himself.
Reforming regulation: joining up the pieces?
After thirty people died in a crash between two trains near London’s
Paddington Station in October 1999, the Deputy Prime Minister and
minister responsible for transport, John Prescott told the House of
Commons that he recognised the national concern with rail safety and
announced a public inquiry. He also confirmed that an early report
from the Chief Inspector of Railways had identified general problems
with safety regimes in the privatised rail industry.
Indications of such problems in Railtrack, the company responsible
for the track network, had been flagged up earlier by the House of
Commons Select Committee on Environment and Transport (HC 30,
1998/9; HC 352, 1998/9). As a result, the government asked the Health
and Safety Commission to investigate. Its report was highly critical of
Railtrack and advised transferring safety functions away from the
company. The Economist (9.10.99), however, argued that while safety
lapses could not blamed on privatisation itself, fault could be found
with the complexity of privatisation including the ‘mind-boggling’
network of interactions between more than a hundred different firms. If
so, this might have a bearing on the government’s proposed partial
privatisation of Air Traffic Control on which the Environment and
Transport Select Committee had already expressed safety reservations
(HC 122, 1998/9; HC 794, 1998/9).
An active participant in developments after Paddington was the rail
regulator, Tom Winsor. He threatened both Railtrack and the train

Government and Administration
235
operating companies with enforcement action if they were found to be
in breach of licence conditions over the affair. He has also threatened
Railtrack for underperformance on its investment commitments. The
regulator is a key player in Mr Prescott’s plans (Draft Railway Bill, July
1999) to devise a new regime for a privatised rail industry in which
there is ‘a massive gulf between the opulence of the rail companies and
the misery of their passengers’ (Economist, 3.7.99). With privatisation
too expensive and difficult to reverse, the Deputy Prime Minister’s
reform proposes a rationalisation of regulatory roles, a tougher sanc-
tions regime and greater prominence for rail users’ views. The bill seeks
to enshrine the powers of the Rail Regulator and a new Strategic Rail
Authority in primary legislation. The latter, headed by former Eurotun-
nel chief executive Sir Alastair Morton, is to promote a strategic vision
for the industry and assume the responsibility for the consumer protec-
tion role of the Rail Regulator.
These changes may be seen as part of a long-term intention by the
government to reinforce the regulatory regimes in the privatised utilities.
Primary legislation will be introduced to replace regulators (other than
in the water industry) by full time executive regulatory boards and to
strengthen regulatory enforcement (Cm. 3898, March 1998; and Parlia-
mentary Written Answer by Mr John Battle, 27.7.99). In the meantime,
it has merged the Electricity and Gas Regulators into the Office of Gas
and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) and appointed a single regulator,
Callum McCarthy. According to the draft legislation, he will be sup-
ported by a flexible framework designed to allow the regulator greater
discretion to respond quickly to events while safeguarding the invest-
ment plans and interests of regulated businesses.28 Mr McCarthy has
already accused electricity generators of cheating customers by manip-
ulating prices and stunned energy distributors with proposals that they
should return some of their recent efficiency gains to consumers by
cutting costs and reducing domestic electricity bills.
Elsewhere, the saga of the Post Office continues. Although, the Post
Office has been financially successful, it has sought more freedom to
invest so that it can compete in an increasingly competitive market.
This conflicts with the Treasury’s public borrowing regime. Thus, the
issue for successive governments has been which of various forms of
ownership and financing regimes will allow the Post Office to fulfil its
national role. The Commons Trade and Industry Select Committee
favoured more independence (HC 380, 1997/8) and elements in the
Post Office’s management have lobbied for full or partial privatisation.
Mr Mandelson, as Secretary for Trade and Industry, decided in
December 1998 to keep the Post Office within the public sector, increase
its borrowing powers and establish an independent regulatory regime
to protect consumer interests, regulate prices and enforce competition.
The Select Committee reported again (HC 113, 1998/9) with a useful
catalogue of issues yet to be resolved: the degree of governmental

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control over borrowing, the nature of the proposed regulatory regime
and reductions in the Post Office monopoly. In the event, the White
Paper (Cm. 4340) introduced by Mr Mandelson’s successor, Stephen
Byers (July 1999), sought to couple a greater liberalisation of the
organisation with a phasing out of its monopoly right to deliver mail.
The Post Office would be structured as a public limited company (plc)
but remain in public ownership. It would be granted enhanced borrow-
ing powers and allowed to retain more of its profits for investment
purposes. The Times (8.7.99) described these proposals as a politically
deliverable curate’s egg. Certainly, the Post Office management was
unhappy at the suggested erosion of the monopoly, but it would not be
realistic to expect more commercial freedom without exposure to a
range of competitive forces and regulation.
An opinion poll taken shortly after the Paddington rail crash indi-
cated the public would like railway privatisation reversed. As we have
observed, this is not financially feasible. It also offends the government’s
new commitment to public-private partnerships. However, the latter is
supported by an intention to consolidate and toughen regulatory
regimes. The community of regulators has endorsed this approach and
announced that it will contribute by strengthening joint working. It
will, for example, share information on the implementation of the 1998
Competition Act, the behaviour of the markets, price information and
service delivery standards. The regulators intend that this closer and
more transparent collaboration will equip them to meet the challenge
of changing patterns of ownership and control and the crossing of
sectoral boundaries.29 The regulators thus appear to regard themselves
as the champions of modernisation.
The National Health Service and social care:
wrestling with wicked issues?
A survey of 60,000 people by the National Centre for Social Research
reported in the autumn of 1999 that over 25% of patients waited more
than four days for a GP appointment and 20% put off appointments as
surgery hours were inconvenient. For Alan Milburn, who had only just
succeeded Frank Dobson as Secretary for State for Health, ‘this shows
people want change in the NHS and they want it now’. Mr Milburn, a
foremost moderniser, intends to respond.
The NHS internal market, a corner stone of the Conservatives NHS
reforms, officially ended with the termination of General Practice
fundholding in April 1999. In England (different arrangements are in
place for Wales and Scotland), fundholders’ commissioning powers
were transferred to Health Authorities, supported by the advice of
Primary Care Groups which came into being in April 1999. The long-
term intention is for the latter to take over budgets with some becoming
trusts in their own right and running community hospitals and district
nursing services. In the government’s eyes this will develop a health

Government and Administration
237
system led by primary care. Primary Care Groups, however, are entirely
new and challenging forms of agency, bringing together GPs, commun-
ity nurses, social workers and lay representatives. Can such groups, so
dominated by producers, collaborate and discharge effectively a com-
missioning role? The House of Commons Select Committee on Health
advocated a careful monitoring and evaluation of the initiative’s pro-
gress (HC 153, 1998/9) to find out.
For Mr Dobson, the winter of 1998–99 was one of discontent. The
intractable problem of waiting lists escalated into a minor crisis as an
influenza epidemic revealed staff shortages, especially in nursing and
ancillary care. In an effort to address this, the government accepted the
recommendations of the 1999 pay review bodies (Cm. 4240; Cm.
4241), awarding a third of qualified nursing staff and therapists an
increase of over 8% and others 4.7%. Yet for the Commons Health
Committee, staffing and pay remain intractable due to the diversity of
NHS pay systems and groups. It suggested the amalgamation of the
various pay review bodies, more integrated pay systems, more system-
atic personnel planning, and an immediate expansion in medical student
and consultant recruitment (HC 38, 1998/9).
The strain on acute facilities is attributable to a neglect of health care
amongst the general population. Smoking, for example, is a primary
cause of chronic illness. A White Paper, Smoking Kills (Cm. 4177), set
out priorities for action, including protecting young people and chil-
dren, developing a smoking cessation programme and a combating
passive smoking through a ‘clean air’ charter. Mr Dobson recognised
that this would bring difficulties in dealing with the tobacco industry.
The British Medical Association welcomed the initiative but warned
against government timidity.
Addressing such problems as smoking means tackling health inequal-
ity. The government’s later public health White Paper (Cm. 4386)
recognised this in seeking to reduce deaths from heart disease, stroke,
cancer, accidents and suicide. It sought to raise the profile of public
health by establishing public health regional observatories and creating
a new post of public health specialist with medical consultant status. It
also attempted to address some of the problems of previous public
health initiatives which, as Professor David Hunter pointed out (Guard-
ian, 12.5.99), have often lacked focus, a clear strategy for implementa-
tion, a poor evidence base and ineffective performance management
systems. Yet there remains the need to integrate the public health
interests of health authorities and local government. In the White Paper
this has been left to local rather than central initiative.
Such a preference for localism was also a feature of a proposal in
December 1998 to reform the Patients Charter.30 Greg Dyke, commis-
sioned by the government to review progress (and incidentally
appointed in 1999 as the British Broadcasting Corporation’s new
Director General), argued that while the old charter had succeeded in

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raising consumer awareness, staff often found its demands irrelevant
and patients had little faith in its sanctions. Mr Dyke’s preference was
for national guidelines coupled with local charters based on local
priorities. Such a proposal raises the old dilemma of local discretion
and national uniformity of standard.31 While the government described
local charters as ‘a helpful starting point for debate’, health pressure
groups argued that they might reinforce unacceptable variations in
health.
By coincidence, Mr Dyke’s report was published on the same day as
the last set of NHS league tables in their old form. In future, clinical
indicators will be used to produce tables on effectiveness and quality of
treatment. This change is linked to an initiative to enhance clinical
governance through the National Centre for Clinical Excellence, for-
mally established as a Special Health Authority on 1 April, and the
Commission for Health Improvement. Thus the Department of Health
published new sets of tables in June 1999 that included comparative
data on hospital death rates after non-emergency surgery. Mr Dobson
hailed them as a landmark in assisting public assessment of NHS
performance and the quality of clinical care. However, it was also
recognised that the quality of the data was variable and people were
warned against reading too much into the differences.32
The medical profession, perhaps now warming to its role as a force
for conservatism, reacted cautiously to many of these initiatives. Vari-
ous groups argued that while the new league tables were an improve-
ment on previous measures, they could not be used to assess definitively
the quality of care. Health telephone advice lines (NHS Direct) and
walk-in clinics for patients were also criticised at BMA meetings for
threatening the doctor-patient relationship and removing the gatekeeper
role of general practitioners. Such reactions led ministers to accuse the
medical profession of seeking to sabotage the modernisation agenda.
Perhaps as a counter to this, a National Health Network (similar to the
Local Government Network) was launched ‘to promote NHS moderni-
sation by stimulating an environment of innovation and change’. Com-
prising NHS administrators, academics and others, this group seeks to
encourage debate on a way forward for the service (Guardian, 28.4.99).
Underlying these attempts to reform health care is the constant
problem of managing and satisfying demand in areas as wide-ranging
as the provision of increasingly sophisticated drugs and care for the
elderly. The latter was subject to a Royal Commission (the Sutherland
Commission) (Cm. 4192) which advocated the provision of nursing and
personal care without means testing the beneficiaries. This was
unceremoniously sidelined by Mr Dobson in spite of a warning from
the Commons Health Committee that failure to act would be a serious
dereliction of duty (HC 318, 1998/9). However, it is these wicked issues
that continue to plague the service in a system where, as Klein has
argued, a greater transparency in assessment and performance measure-

Government and Administration
239
ment may expose ministers more than professionals to censure if the
service fails to deliver.33
Conclusion: forces of conservatism or mid-term frustration?
In July 1999, just before the summer reshuffle, the Prime Minister
presented his government’s second Annual Report (Cm. 4401). The
contents had been leaked when Tesco (selected by the government to
distribute the report) inadvertently put it on sale a day in advance.
Undismayed, Mr Blair claimed that the government had delivered on
90 of its 177 election pledges with 85 on course for action. It had made
a good start. At the same time, we observed at the beginning of this
article that the Prime Minister had stridently attacked the forces of
conservatism. So, what is he complaining about? What are these forces
and what gives rise to them?
Undoubtedly, the government sees itself as a reconstructionist govern-
ment, much in the style of the Liberals in 1905, Labour in 1945 and
Conservatives in 1979. There are, it appears, three strands to its
modernisation programme: (1) the constitution (e.g. devolution, House
of Lords, electoral participation and possibly Europe); (2) policy man-
agement (e.g. the machinery of government and the processes of joined
up policy-making); and (3) service delivery and effectiveness (e.g. out-
come achievement). This makes its agenda rather more similar to that
of 1905 than either 1945 or 1979. The last two governments saw
modernisation in essentially economic and social terms (and thus took
on a rather less severe challenge), while the Liberals of 1905 and
Labour of 1997 share the additional challenge of constitutional reform
which can in itself require the lion’s share of a government’s political
and intellectual capital.
This suggests that the government has taken on rather a large portfolio
of change. How is it faring? Several commentators have noted difficulties
in key areas such as health and transport. The Economist (31.7.99) also
questioned the Prime Minister’s claim to be a radical reformer (other
than in terms of constitutional change) and, with the aid of various
academic experts, commissioned its own assessment. It gave the govern-
ment reasonable marks in areas such as education and the economy but
questioned the extent of achievements in welfare and health.
This turned out to be only a provisional assessment, for in a later
article (21.8.99) the same journal argued that Mr Blair was indeed
‘reinventing’ the centre of British government by disempowering depart-
ments (and ministers) and strengthening the coordination and control
at the centre, i.e. No. 10, the Cabinet Office and the Treasury, with the
supporting mechanisms of media management. Enabled by the sorts of
changes in central strategic capacity advocated by Sir Christopher
Foster (see above), the government is gaining its effect. Intriguingly, this
is a rather similar time span to that required for the first Thatcher
administration to make a difference.

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Parliamentary Affairs
Labour’s modernisation shares with the Conservatives of 1979 the
way its reconstruction is seen by a large and established public service
community as a threat to standards of provision as well as its own
position. However, there are at least two reasons for suggesting that
the forces involved with change are more complex than implied by the
argument of self-interest. First, there is some evidence that political
competition makes for administrative innovation. In large parts of local
government, competition is limited by one-party systems and in much
of the rest of the public sector electoral elements have been removed
entirely by the fiats of previous administrations. Thus, in much of our
system of government, much criticised for its adversarial properties,
there may be too little structured competition.
Second, the most important resource in political and administrative
change is people. We were struck by one headmaster (of a ‘beacon
school’) who, in partial defence of his colleagues throughout public
service, asked who had actually made many of the often poorly thought-
through schemes work? His response, of course, was ‘teachers, doctors,
nurses; certainly not ministers’. While there are undoubtedly some in
public service who regard their positions as licences to inertia, most
carry a sense of stewardship of ideals and standards. Changing these
frames of reference has generational tendencies. We recall the irony of
Mrs Thatcher’s reforms being delivered in the mid-1980s by cadres of
Assistant Secretaries brought into the civil service of Prime Minister
Edward Heath’s managerialism. There they gained the inclination and
the tools, but it was Mrs Thatcher who provided the opportunity to use
them.
Thus, we doubt that the forces of conservatism are disproportionate
to Labour’s agenda. No doubt, the government came to power with a
timetable which required it to establish its style with the instruments of
government within the first 18 months (November 1998), deliver
tangible benefits to the electorate over the next 24 months (November
2000), and then consolidate in time for a general election in June or
October 2001. A likely explanation for the sensitivity to the forces of
conservatism is thus the realisation that Labour is now in the second
half of that delivery period. Frustration comes with this territory.
Moreover, big projects are dangerous. They threaten differentiated
interests and invite strange coalitions of disaffection. Administrative
politics are alive and well in a government’s mid-term.
1
P. Gould, The Unfinished Revolution, Little Brown 1998; and ‘New Labour is the most radical option
in town’, Guardian, 24.8.99; C. Leadbeater, Living on Thin Air: The New Economy, Viking, 1999.
John Prescott, Speech to Local Government Association, Harrogate, July 1999.
C. Foster, The End of Cabinet Government, Public Management and Policy Association, January
1999; see also The State Under Stress (with F. Plowden), Open University Press, 1996, and ‘Ministerial
Overload and Effective Government’, Parliamentary Affairs, April 1999.
2
3
4
5
Such claims are made in P. Routledge, Mandy, Simon & Schuster, 1999.
This is discussed in A.G. Gray and W.I. Jenkins, ‘British Government and Administration and

Government and Administration
241
Administration 1997–98: Modernisation and Democratisation’, Parliamentary Affairs, April 1999; also
see M. Burch and I. Holliday, ‘The Prime Minister’s and Cabinet Office: An Executive Office in All But
Name’, Parliamentary Affairs, January 1999.
6
See, for example, Performance and Innovation Unit, e.commerce࠽its.best.uk (report on electronic
commerce), Cabinet Office, September 1999; Cm. 4045, Bringing Britain Together: A National Strategy
for Neighbourhood Renewal, Cabinet Office Social Exclusion Unit, September 1998; Cm. 4342,
Teenage Pregnancy, Cabinet Office Social Exclusion Unit June 1999; Cm. 4405, Bridging the Gap:
New Opportunities for 16–18 Year Olds, Cabinet Office Social Exclusion Unit, July 1999.
See Modernising Government: Action Plan, Cabinet Office, July 1999; Professional Policy Making for
the Twenty-First Century, Strategic Policy-Making Team, Cabinet Office, September 1999.
C.F. Smith and P. Gray, ‘The Scottish Parliament (Re-)Shaping Parliamentary Democracy in the
Information Age’, Parliamentary Affairs, July 1999.
7
8
9
J. Mitchell, ‘Creation of a Scottish Parliament’, Parliamentary Affairs, October 1999; D. Denver, ‘The
Scottish Parliamentary Elections’, Politics Review, 9(1), 1999.
10 L. McAllester, ‘The Road to Cardiff Bay: The Process of Electing a National Assembly for Wales’,
Parliamentary Affairs, October 1999.
11 D. Wilson, ‘The Limits of Public Participation’, Parliamentary Affairs, April 1999; ‘Threats and
Promises: New Labour and Local Government’, Politics Review, 8(4), 1999; S. Leach, ‘Introducing
Cabinets into British Local Government’, Parliamentary Affairs, January 1998; L. Pratchett, ‘New
Fashions in Public Participation: Towards Greater Democracy’, Parliamentary Affairs, 52(4), October
1999
12 C. Rallings and M. Thrasher, ‘Election Report: The 1999 Local Elections’, Politics Review, 9(1), 1999;
‘An Audit of Local Democracy in Britain: Evidence from Local Elections’, Parliamentary Affairs, 52(1),
January 1999
13 Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, Reform of the House of Lords: A
Consultation Paper, 1999; see also P. Lynch, ‘Reform of the House of Lords’, Politics Review, 9(1),
1999.
14 Lord Ivor Richard, Unfinished Business, Vintage, 1999.
15 See also D. Agnew, ‘Electoral reform in the United Kingdom’, Politics Review, 8(4), 1999.
16 J. Fisher, ‘The Future of British Political Finance’, Politics Review, 8(4), 1999.
17 G. Powell, Representatives of the People: the Constituency Role of MPs, Fabian Society, 1998.
18 Hansard Society, Electronic Media, Parliament and the People, 1999; J. Snow, ‘Is this still the best we
can do?’, Guardian, 19.7.99.
19 Also considered earlier by the Foreign Affairs Committee itself (HC 293, 1998/9; HC 365, 1998/9).
20 An additional set was announced in Cm. 4315.
21 D. Gaffney et al, ‘NHS Capital Expenditure and the PFI’, British Medical Journal, 3.7.99.
22 The Association also heard in 1999 from Faith Boardman of the Child Support Agency and Sir Richard
Mottram of the Department of Environment, Transport and Regions.
23 ‘Modernising Government: Message to All Civil Servants’, Cabinet Office, 4.10.99; see also Sir Richard
Wilson, ‘The Civil Service in the New Millennium’, Cabinet Office, May 1999.
24 Modernising Government: Action Plan, Cabinet Office, July 1999.
25 N. McKintosh, ‘The new poor: an information underclass is developing’, Guardian, 22.7.99.
26 R. Chapman, ‘The Importance of Modernising Government’, Teaching Public Administration, Spring
1999; see also N. Flynn, ‘Modernising British Government’, Parliamentary Affairs, October 1999.
27 Advisory Group on ‘Openness in the Public Sector: Minutes and Papers’, Home Office, 1999.
28 A Fair Deal for Consumers: Modernising the Framework for Utility Regulation, The Future of Gas
and Electricity Regulation, The Government’s Proposals for Legislation, Department of Trade and
Industry, October 1999.
29 Statement by OFTEL, OFGEM, OFWAT, ORR and OFFER on Joint Working, Office of Telecommu-
nications, October 1999.
30 G. Dyke, The New NHS Charter: A Different Approach, Department of Health, December 1998.
31 Also discussed in relation to central-local relations in A.G. Gray and W.I Jenkins, ‘Democratic
Renewal: Continuity and Change’, Local Government Studies, 25/3, 1999.
32 Quality and Performance in the NHS: High Level Performance Indicators and Clinical Indicators,
NHS Executive, Department of Health, June 1999.
33 R. Klein, ‘Has the NHS a Future?’ in Healthcare UK 1999–2000, Kings Fund, 1999.