Full text of DOI:10.1111/1467-954X.00245

`The downright torture of women': moral
lobby women, feminists and pornography
Donna Luff
Abstract
Apparent alliances between moral campaigners and certain feminists in opposition to
pornography have been the subject of discussion both in the United States and in
Britain. Drawingon a wider study of the views of women in British moral and pro-
family organisations, this article examines the attitudes of such women to
pornography. It then compares these views with those of anti-pornography feminists,
commentingin particular on the moral reasoningunderliningdifferent perspectives.
Attention to moral reasoning, it is argued, helps to further explicate the charges of
`alliance' between the moral lobby and anti-pornography feminists, even where such
alliance is neither sought or desired. The potential difficulties and uses of an
assessment of pornography as `moral' concern for the development of feminist ethics
are then considered. Finally, the apparent willingness of moral lobby women to
express support for anti-pornography feminists is examined. The article concludes by
suggesting that this support reflects both complexities of gender identification
amongst moral lobby women, and, crucially, power imbalances between anti-
pornography feminists and the moral lobby rooted in the institutionalisation of
heterosexuality. The implications of these findings for sociologists and for feminist
theory and activism are outlined.
Pornography has been one of the most controversial topics of feminist activism
and theory in recent years. The divisions amongst British feminists on
pornography have been a well-documented feature of feminist activism during
the 1990s. In contributingto the growingliterature about these debates, my
aim is somewhat different from many previous commentators. The reflections I
present here have their origins in a wider research project about the views of
women involved in British moral and pro-family campaign groups,1 and in
particular these women's relationship to feminist ideas and activism 4Luff,
1997). This research was informed by feminist perspectives, and aimed to
explicate the gender perspectives of women who have been characterised as
clearly and publicly opposed to women's liberation. Throughout I was
concerned to look at the dynamics between apparently oppositional social
movements. In particular, I was intrigued by charges that some moral and pro-
family groups had allied themselves with certain feminists in opposition to
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The downright torture of women
pornography 4Thompson, 1994). Therefore, in my discussions with moral
lobby women I sought their attitudes on issues also of concern to many
4differing) feminists, notably pornography and new reproductive technologies.
In this article I will focus on the key concerns of moral lobby women about
pornography and compare these with anti-pornography feminist perspectives.
A key dimension of my original research was to comment on the potential
learningfor 4differingrgoups of) feminists from any sharingof feminist
positions by moral lobby women. In keepingwith this aim, I will offer an
analysis of the similarities and differences between moral lobby and anti-
pornography feminist perspectives, and outline some possible implications for
feminist theory and activism. I also present this analysis as a contribution to
developing feminist and sociological knowledge about women in British moral
and pro-family movements.
An unholy alliance?
Feminism today crusades against pornography almost as vehemently as
Mary Whitehouse ± and indeed in many respects Mrs Whitehouse and
Germaine Greer are sisters under the skin 4Kenny, 1986: 65).
The campaign against `obscenity', of which opposition to pornography is a key
part, has been a central and relatively successful feature of recent moral
crusades and a long-standing component of evangelical activism 4Durham,
1991; Thompson, 1994). Most clearly and unequivocally associated with Mary
Whitehouse and NVALA,2 other moral lobby groups have also been actively
involved 4Durham, 1991). It is, of course, also in the area of pornography that
`alliances' have been suggested between certain, primarily revolutionary or
radical feminists, and moral conservatives 4Smart, 1989; Norden, 1990;
Durham, 1991; Segal and McIntosh, 1992; Thompson, 1994). In particular,
the apparent relationship between American anti-pornography feminists
Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin and the Moral Majority3 fueled
much debate on both sides of the Atlantic. In this country similar concerns that
anti-pornography feminists were playing into the hands of the British moral
lobby on pornography were brought into focus around Labour MP Clare
Short's attempts to ban Page Three of the Sun, the Primarolo 4Location of
Pornographic Materials) Bill, and actions to remove pornographic magazines
from newsagents 4Thompson, 1994).
The divisions between feminists on pornography have been well-documen-
ted and need only brief summation here 4see Willis, 1983a; Wilson, 1989;
Norden, 1990; Rodgerson and Wilson, 1991; Itzin, 1992, 1994; Segal and
McIntosh, 1992; Wingfield and Scanlon, 1992). Divisions have been most stark
in the US but have also been apparent in Britain, with the formation of
feminist campaign groups around pornography in the 1980s and 1990s.
Campaign Against Pornography and Campaign Against Pornography and
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Censorship have been most closely associated with an `anti-pornography'
stance, seeking to limit the sale and production of pornography by both legal
and direct action initiatives. The `other side' of the debate has been publicly
represented by Feminists Against Censorship, who have opposed further
restrictions on pornography. Briefly, the issues that have divided these
feminists centre on the extent to which pornography is a cause, or indeed the
cause, of women's oppression or whether it is another expression of this
oppression. In other words, anti-pornography feminists have tended to see
pornography as constitutive of oppression, whereas anti-censorship feminists
have tended to see it as reflective of oppression. Further, the extent to which
pornography may be implicated in violence against women is disputed. Anti-
pornography feminists argue that pornography can be convincingly linked to
acts of violence against women and, moreover, the making and existence of
pornography in itself is a form of violence towards women. Anti-censorship
feminists dispute these links and the idea of all pornography as violence.
Not surprisingly, these perspectives have led to very different ideas about
what might be the `solution' to the problem of pornography. The logic of anti-
pornography positions follows that if pornography is a principal cause of
oppression then it is irredeemable and must be stopped. This has led to moves
to introduce anti-pornography legislation and to remove it from display and
sale. For anti-censorship feminists, who see pornography as representative but
not constitutive of women's oppression, pornography can be open to
manipulation. In certain contexts, pornography may indeed be liberatory,
for example in the form of feminist erotica and some gay and lesbian
pornography. Specifically, there have been charges from some anti-censorship
feminists that, like their US counterparts, British anti-pornography feminists
hold `victim' views of women 4Hunt, 1990; Segal and McIntosh, 1992), and use
a problematic `moral' language to justify their opposition to pornography,
which ultimately plays into existingreactionary notions of female sexuality
4Smart, 1989, 1992). There has also been concern that new anti-pornography
legislation in this country would target gay and lesbian materials and therefore
can play into the hands of, or lead to unacceptable compromises with, sexual
conservatives 4Smith, 1993; Thompson, 1994).4 Allegations of such alliances
with sexual conservatives have been viewed as underminingthe credibility of
the wider women's movement 4Thompson, 1994), and indeed critics of
`feminism' have not been slow to use the words of anti-pornography feminists,
supposedly supportingmoral campaigners, to justify their attacks 4Lyndon,
1992).
The basis for these charges of alliance with the moral lobby in Britain has
been most comprehensively documented by Martin Durham 41991) and Bill
Thompson 41994). Durham 41991) notes that the emergence of feminist anti-
pornography campaigns was tentatively welcomed, and some of their
arguments praised, by even the most anti-feminist stalwarts of moral
campaigning, and grounds for possible alliance mooted by Festival of Light
4now CARE). Bill Thompson 41994) claims that a workingrelationship
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between Campaign Against Pornography and CARE did develop, as CARE
themselves have hinted, despite strenuous denials from CAP 4Thompson,
1994). For their part, of course, anti-pornography feminists have responded to
these kinds of arguments with their own counter-claims. Anti-pornography
feminists have strenuously denied charges of collusion with the right 4Kelly,
1992) and argued that their position has been misrepresented by apologists for
pornography, who are themselves involved in dubious alliances with
libertarians and pornographers 4Jeffreys, 1990; Wingfield and Scanlon, 1992).
In my research with women in the pro-family groups, therefore, I sought to
discuss their views on pornography, in particular what they felt should be done
about it, and their opinions on workingwith anti-pornography feminists on
this issue. A fuller account of these discussions can be found elsewhere 4Luff,
1997). Here I will highlight common areas of concern about pornography
amongthe moral lobby women and also draw on moral lobby literature, in
particular from CARE who have been most publicly associated with claims of
`alliance' with feminists. I then offer some comparison of moral lobby
perspectives with the positions of anti-pornography feminists. In particular I
will comment on the `moral reasoning' implicit in varying positions on
pornography. Throughout I will be concerned with the contradictions and
continuities in the support of moral lobby women for specific strands of
feminist activism and thought, notably radical=revolutionary feminisms, and
any implications for feminist theory and action.
Moral lobby women's attitudes to pornography
All of the moral lobby women with whom I discussed pornography were
unanimous in their opinions in three areas. First, they all favoured some kind
of restriction on the distribution and sale of pornography, but they were
pragmatic in their opposition. They all welcomed tighter controls, especially in
restrictingchildren's access to porn, but rejected as impractical, or in a few
cases undesirable, calls for a total ban.
Secondly, as might be expected, moral lobby women were unanimous in
their concern about the detrimental effects of pornography on the stability of
the family, and particularly on children. All expressed horror at, and
condemnation of, both children's exposure to and exploitation in pornogra-
phy. This is not to say that they ignored or were unconcerned about the effects
on women. Indeed, several women expressed these concerns in ways that would
seem to tally with some arguments of anti-pornography feminists, as I will
explore later. Rather moral lobby womens' consistent return to placingtheir
concerns within a familial framework reflected their broader world views and
socio-political vision.
Thirdly, all the women felt that this was an issue on which they could work
with feminists, and further one on which they valued and supported feminist
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contributions. Which feminists' contributions moral lobby women valued and
how this related to their other views on feminism4s) is a key area for discussion.
Central to these broad areas of consensus on pornography are values, based
in Christian faith, about the nature of 4hetero)sexual relationships 4Thompson,
1994). Several women stressed that they were not anti-sex, but saw sexuality as
wonderful gift from God within its appropriate context, ie, marriage:
We believe sex is good, and we think sex is great but within the constraints
of beingmarried, and a lovingrelationship and a committed relationship,
you know, stampingwomen's bits to the table is not a jolly good idea!
4ML1)
Nigel Williams of CARE has stated `We should be against pornography
because we are for sex as God intended it' 41991: 20), and in a more recent
CARE discussion, it is argued that `although this book may be against
pornography, it is certainly for sex' 4Wilson-Thomas and Williams, 1996: 38;
original emphasis). Throughout the discussion of pornography, and elsewhere,
the parameters of beingfor `sex as God intended it' are however made clear:
Sexual union and the joy that goes with it belongs to marriage and nowhere
else 4CARE, BriefingPaper 16, hereafter BP16).
Pornography is also abhorred because of its exposure to public voyeurism of
the private and `sacred experience' of sexual relations properly confined to
marriage 4CARE, BP16). Pornography is intrusive because it `denigrates and
perverts that intimacy' 4CARE, BP16). This idea of transcendence in sexual
relations has also been evident in NVALA's anti-pornography stance 4White-
house, 1977, 1993a, 1993b; Tracey and Morrison, 1979). Pornography is no
substitute for a committed 4married) relationship and may distort sexual
impulses by detractingfrom formingthese relationships. This idea of the
sanctity and satisfaction of married sexual relations was a feature of all the pro-
family women's critiques. Women in all the groups, stressed the joys of married
sexual relations, that `the best sex is in marriage', and that `there are certain
parameters within which sex is good and others in which it isn't good' 4ML4). I
would argue that the idea of `good' here is meant to refer to both society and
the individual; what is sexually the `best' for one 4society) beingalso what is
best for the other 4the individual).
This emphasis on the pleasures of married sex may reflect shifts in the
Christian view of sex in the twentieth century which have moved from an
emphasis on purity and `sexual continence' to reveringmarital sexual
fulfillment as part of God's plan 4Mort, 1987). This shift may also reflect a
fear in the post-sexual liberation age of being publicly labeled `anti-sex', for
example beingportrayed as `prudes' or `sexual killjoys' 4Wilson-Thomas and
Williams, 1996: 3, 38), tags that have also dogged some radical feminists. This
concern has led to an emphasis on presentinga `better' alternative. The positive
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portrayal of marital sex repeats the traditional 4and biblical) moral imperative,
whilst promisinga reward for sexual self-control that is more fulfillingthan the
pleasures of sexual experimentation.
However, I think it is significant who is held to be responsible for
perpetuatingthe evil of pornorgaphy. For many of the women, the
`perversion' of pornography is a result of `man's' actions. Though `man'
was frequently used by these women in the generic sense, it seems to become
clear that for most of these women in discussingpornography they do often
mean adult males. In general women and children were seen as the innocents
or exploited in pornography, and men as its primary users and perpetuators.
Nonetheless, the women also emphasised the harm to men, spiritual and
relational, of involvement with pornography. Indeed some perceived that the
worst effects were on men, in terms of their inability to form proper
relationships and actingin ways that are destructive, to others but also to
themselves. In contrast to many anti-pornography feminist perspectives,
`there is an emphasis on men also beingvictims of the pornographic images'
4Senn, 1993: 331).
For the CARE women explicitly, but also for others, the issue seems to
revolve Christian resistance to the temptations that characterise the Fall. Thus
pornography as an industry has been set up to the perceived `benefit' of some
men, but, as others have noted, really it is Satan's gain 4Durham, 1991;
Thompson, 1994). Men, as a whole, lose out. Therefore, there is a need for
individual salvation for those, mainly men,5 who perpetuate its existence. A
focus on men overcoming `addiction' to pornography, primarily through
contact with the Christian message, is seen as an important strategy in
6
combatingpornography 4Wilson-Thomas and Williams, 1996).
For the women I spoke to there was both a separatingout and unity within
the category of men that others have noted 4Rowland, 1984). The majority of
Christian men, and indeed `family-minded men' 4ML5), are seen as opposed to
pornography but still unwillingly and negatively affected by it, due largely to
the perception of men's `natural' sex drive. The classic patriarchal idea of an
essential male sex drive, that is stronger than, and different from, that of
women is key here 4Richardson, 1993). There are also echoes of earlier purity
movements with their view of `masculinity as a never-endingbattle, requiring
constant watchfulness and supervision' 4Mort, 1987: 115). The conviction that
there are innate gender differences in sexuality, and that gender and sexuality
are inextricably connected, is at the heart of these ideas. In CARE's writingon
pornography this gender-differentiated sexuality is highlighted as being at the
heart of men's use of pornography:
pornography is essentially a male habit because a woman is not normally
attracted to its images and suggestions. While men are usually sexually
aroused by sight or thought, women tend to respond to relationships. The
market for pornography for women is small, for men it is vast 4CARE,
BP16).
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In recent discussions however there has been a recognition that there is an
increasing genre of pornography `by women, for women' 4Wilson-Thomas and
Williams, 1996: 29). However, though `this material may be attempting to meet
a need to openly discuss female sexuality' it argued that it will not affect the
amount of pornography consumed by men and therefore do nothing to reduce
the negative impacts on all women 4Wilson-Thomas and Williams, 1996: 29).
The emphasis on the effects on all women of certain women choosing to engage
with pornography has parallels in anti-pornography feminist arguments and
will be important when comparingtheir ideas of the `harm' of pornography.
The framework within which the pro-family women seem to be working
therefore is one that sees pornography as a result primarily of a 4male)
perversion of sexuality, but not from a critique of male power7 or of
`hegemonic' notions of heterosexuality 4VanEvery, 1996), ideas which have
been central to much anti-pornography feminist critique.
However, despite the centrality of marriage and God's design for a
`gendered' sexuality in opposing pornography, there are also examples of
concerns that tie in more clearly with those of secular anti-pornography
feminists. Whether this reflects a merely strategic response, as has been
suggested 4Thompson, 1994), or a more complex overlap based on specific
understandings of feminism is worth exploration. In a 1988 CARE Back-
ground Paper, Anna Grear 41988) made clear, and controversial, links between
pornography and a system that subordinates women in various ways. She
laments the Christian response to pornography as reactive and piecemeal,
addressingthe symptom but not the underlyingbiblically based truths. Though
she emphasises again the `beautiful complementarity' of the sexes, Grear argues
in effect that sexism is as much a symptom of the Fall as pornography:
Pornography is a deformed offspring of the male view of women across the
board, not just a perverse view of sexuality! Men prey upon women in many
ways, pornography being just one. It is this basic injustice and betrayal of
biblical truth that Christians need to challenge. Christians need to speak out
on behalf of the downtrodden and abused. Women come into this category,
and pornography is a particularly offensive example of the whole pervasive
value system. 4Grear, 1988: 13, my italics).
There were many instances when the women I spoke to did present views that
were very similar to the ideas propounded by anti-pornography feminist
analyses. Notably, the majority of the women believed that pornography was
directly and conclusively linked to sexual violence.8 A typical comment
highlights the view of most of the women I spoke to:
I think it's the link I think with sexual crime is quite a strongone for me,
that non-Christians and Christians alike have been able to show and prove
by statistics that it definitely has a link 4ML2).
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There are similarities with an anti-pornography feminist position in implicating
much pornography as `the downright torture of women' 4ML1), and in viewing
women's exploitation as the lynchpin of the industry:
I feel very strongly about pornography and I feel it's tremendously
demeaningto women. I mean the trouble is that issues like that always so
very, very rapidly turn into economic issues. Pornography is such a vast
billion dollar industry, the exploitation of women. But it's tremendously
demeaningto women and I think it's absolutely monstrous, the way it has
developed, absolutely terrible 4ML7; my emphasis).
Some women also made links to inequalities more generally, in terms of
relationships between men and women and in areas like employment:
How can you be sayinground the boardtable, well actually you're a valid
member of this team to a woman and then going down to a club or whatever
and saying, it's all right for this lady to take her clothes off and for me to be
sittinghere as a gentleman, I mean it just doesn't add up, does it? 4ML1)
Pornography was not seen by the majority of these women as harmless and
private, or as solely an individual spiritual issue, but as negatively and deeply
embedded in the social fabric, with disastrous results particularly for women.
Thus though the sanctity of the private, principally understood as the
desirability of marital sexual and familial privacy, should be upheld this is not
an absolute censor on any intervention. There remains a belief in the need to
intervene and emphasise codes of conduct that will ensure the private conforms
to and upholds a public, moral order. Thus there is a willingness to understand
and support the notion that pornography is not a harmless, private activity
beyond the realm of legitimate intervention. Though for different reasons and
aims, both anti-pornography feminists and moral lobby women challenge the
strict separation of the public=private spheres in relation to pornography.
The moral lobby women's perspectives, on the negative private and social
implications of pornography for women, led the majority to an incredulity at
the idea that any woman could voluntarily be involved with or support the
industry. Missingin these objections, however, is any analysis of the economic
and social reasons that may lead women to `choose' to be involved in
pornography. While anti-pornography feminists have stressed the role of
economic necessity, coercion and abuse that underlie many women's
participation in pornography 4see, for example, Russell, 1993), this perspective
is notably absent from the moral lobby women's discussions. Of course, such
anti-pornography feminist analysis has been criticised for not allowing for
women's voluntary involvement in pornography and for, it is claimed, over-
emphasisingthe role of coercive forces, thus seemingto deny women's sexual
agency 4Ellis, 1990; Rodgerson and Wilson, 1991). In light of this criticism, it
could be argued that the moral lobby and anti-pornography feminists do share
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a reluctance to accept that women's involvement in pornography is anything
other than an aberration. However, for moral lobby women this seems
grounded in an essentialist notion of what women's sexuality is, whereas for
anti-pornography feminists the explicit emphasis is on the context in which
such `decisions' are actually made, not least the contextual nature of the
construction of women's sexual agency.
Several moral lobby women also wondered how anyone who considered
themselves a feminist, or who was concerned about women's `dignity', could
support pornography. One woman criticised feminists for being divided on the
issue, a division she did not understand:
I mean it astonishes me that women, feminists, can't see how degrading
pornography is to their sex. 4ML8)
Further, the moral lobby women were generally dismissive of any idea that
pornography can be reclaimed or, in certain forms, enable women to explore
their sexuality:
I don't see how you can go along with that argument that pornography is
fine and that you should do it to explore your own sexuality, I don't. 4ML7)
For the moral lobby women, then, pornography is degrading, exploitative and
offends against women's 4and men's) dignity. Bryson 41992) has noted how the
language of degradation is now available in opposition to pornography
because of the influence of feminism, whereas earlier objections had to rely on
the `puritan' language of obscenity. The language of feminism is now not only
legitimate, but may also allow women, of all political persuasions, to articulate
their concerns and feelings about pornography more fully. Therefore, the use
of this language may reflect both political savvy and personal insight in often
complex, and indeed contradictory, ways.
Despite their differences, pornography was an issue on which the moral
lobby women felt closest to feminists, and, ironically, to radical and
revolutionary feminists, whose other opinions moral lobby women tend to
equate with ideas of feminist extremism or going `too far' 4Luff, 1997):
And we supported the Campaign Against Pornography run by 4a) feminist
group by taking stuff off the shelves, we tried to support them ... Obviously
you can't agree with people about everything, and there've been wild
differences of opinion between them and us in other areas. But in that
particular area obviously we were in accord, and so we worked with
them ... 4ML9)
What this woman means by `workingtogether' is unclear, certainly from the
view of CAP. Women from CAP vehemently denied any working links with
moral lobby organisations but stated that you obviously could not stop people
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publicly supportingyour positions or campaigns. As one woman from CAP
said, `it's not the bedfellows we would choose', but she added, `I mean you just
have to go with it a bit' 4CAP1). In other words, though you have to `be
careful' about who you align yourself with, `you can't stop people from
agreeing with you' 4CAP1). Further, despite claims that strategic alliances with
anti-pornography feminists `can only benefit' groups like CARE 4Thompson,
1994: 232) some of the moral lobby women were also concerned that these
alliances could be problematic. For example, they were concerned about the
possibility of alienatingsupporters by beingseen to work with people who were
`pro-abortion' 4ML10). However moral lobby women generally felt that these
issues could be kept separate. The CAP women on the other hand were clear
that no alignment was desired, given the way in which the arguments of the
moral lobby ultimately uphold patriarchy. As both groups of women recognise
the `wild differences' between them, why moral lobby women are more willing,
or more able, to offer 4public and private) support to feminists warrants further
exploration.
It is crucial, of course, not to loose sight of the possible public relations
aspect of the moral lobby women's comments. FollowingHerman 41994), it
may be that support for forms of feminism is at times more pragmatic or
strategic than real. It is therefore only with extreme caution that support or
utilisation of feminists arguments can be taken at face value. However, it was
certainly the case that all the women I interviewed did focus on women in
relation to pornography and support, to some extent, anti-pornography
feminist arguments. The centrality of women-centred arguments could be
explained in several ways. First, it could be seen as unsurprisingin an interview
situation which also explored attitudes to women and feminism more broadly.
It could be seen as a tactical response to the belief that feminist arguments are
socially ascendant 4Herman, 1994) and that `an overt Christian message in the
age of feminism has as much chance of success as insisting the end of the world
is nigh' 4Thompson, 1994: 41). Alternatively, it could be that any apparent
overlap represents a tactical alliance of `enemies' on both sides, who may
remain well aware of each others `real' agendas. However, I want to argue that
any similarities represent a more complex picture that includes some genuine
sharingof attitudes between the women, combined or not with desires for
strategic alliances. That is, that the moral lobby women share and have been
influenced by some feminist arguments on pornography, but their ability to
endorse these views reflects the state of the power relationship between the
anti-pornography feminists and moral lobby groups which is rooted in the
institutionalisation of hegemonic heterosexuality.
Political pragmatism or moral agreement?
In the US, Cowan et al. 41989) surveyed the attitudes of feminist and Christian
fundamentalist women towards pornography control from the perspective of
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moral reasoning. The research suggested that what differentiates fundamen-
talist and `pro-control' feminists, from those opposed to control is a harm-
based outlook and an `ethics of care'. The concept of an `ethics of care'
originates in the work of Carol Gilligan and has been the focus of much
feminist scholarship and controversy 4for an overview see Gilligan, 1982;
Larabee, 1993; Hekman, 1995). Gilligan suggested that for many women the
need to maintain relationship and a recognition of human interdependence was
central to their moral reasoning. In this, she challenged prevailing wisdom
about moral development which centred on the work of Lawrence Kohlberg.
Kohlberghad purposed a pattern of moral development which moved in stages
from self-centred reasoningin children throuhg to an adult concern with
justice. Using Kohlberg's stages, it appeared that girls less frequently moved
into the `mature' phase of moral personhood than boys. Gilligan's research
suggested that, rather than this representing a `failure' of moral development in
girls, the lived experience of gender led to differences in moral concern for girls
and boys with many girls utilising an `ethic of care' rather than Kohlberg's
`ethic of justice'. Rather than positioningthese differences in a hierarchical
way, in which girls' development is inferior, Gilligan depicted equally valid, if
alternative, mature states of moral reasoning. Her work has caused
considerable debate about the importance of gendered experience to ethical
positions, and the implications for feminists of espousingan `ethic of care'. In
particular, the relationship between an ethic of care and an ethic of justice,
both within an individual's moral reasoningand within ethical theory
4Larabee, 1993), has been the subject of much controversy.
Drawing on these debates, Cowan's work on pornography suggests that the
prime concern for fundamentalist and `pro-control' feminists in her study was
responsibility for the welfare of others, whereas `anti-control' feminists placed
greater importance on individual rights and freedoms 4Cowan, 1989). Cowan
argues, therefore, that the groups hold `divergent principles of moral reasoning'
4Cowan, 1989: 98). The reasoningof the `pro-control' feminists and
fundamentalist women reflects a responsibility or care model of moral
reasoningwhereas the `anti-control' feminists operate with a justice model
4Cowan, 1989).
There are some problems with Cowan's analysis. The positions of `anti-' and
`pro-' control seem to replicate the idea of a clear polarisation between
feminists on pornography and serve, I feel, to obscure the complexities of the
issues around notions like control. For example, though feminists may be
divided on which types of control they would like to see on pornography, how
it should be regulated and by whom, it seems to me that few are in favour of a
completely, libertarian, `anti-control' position. In Britain, Feminists Against
Censorship may reject further state restrictions on the content and distribution
of pornographic images, but might favour increased regulation within the porn
industry to protect sex workers 4Rodgerson and Wilson, 1991). Cowan indeed
points to the difficulties of the definitions when discussingthe conflicts women
expressed about their views. Notably, the fundamentalist women, whose
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opposition to pornography stems principally from their religious morality,
experience less conflict over their positions than do either group of feminists.
The feminists' positions then are often tenuously and problematically held, and
represent a compromise for many.
With these reservations, there seems to me much of value in Cowan's ideas.
Separatingout processes of moral reasoningmay help to further explicate
divisions and alliances around pornography. In developing these ideas it could
be asserted that the fundamentalist and `pro-control' women are operatingon a
similar moral plane, though their political=social motivations diverge. That is,
these women held similar concepts on issues like responsibility for others, even
though their views may have a differential genesis and the solutions they
propose may diverge. I would suggest that there are many parallels between
Cowan's findings and my own. The moral lobby women object to pornography
principally in terms of the perceived `harm' to social mores and the stability of
heterosexual marriage, but this did not preclude concern about the specific
harm done to women. Both moral lobby women and anti-pornography
feminists therefore emphasis the issue of harm to women in relation to
pornography. However what the harm is considered to be has both similarities
and differences. Anti-pornography feminists emphasis both the literal harm to
individual women involved in or abused as a result of pornography, and the
wider role of pornography in harming women as a `group'. As Catherine
MacKinnon has argued `pornography is the essence of a sexist social order, its
quintessential social act' 41989b: 155).
As MacKinnon 41989b) would also argue, the moral lobby's definition of
harm has been somewhat different. She regards the traditional emphasis on
obscenity9 as renderingpornography deviant and harmful if it causes anti-
social acts against the social order, rather than being implicated in that very
order itself. As I have argued above, this seems to be generally the picture,
though the arguments of Grear 41988) should caution us against thinking that
these links are never made. What is clear is that where this is acknowledged it is
seen as a perversion of the `natural' institution of heterosexuality, not rooted in
that very institutionalisation itself. I would suggest that moral lobby women
would not agree with Andrea Dworkin's claim that `male power is the raison
d'etre of pornography' 41981: 25).
This delineation of the differences in `harm' seems important; however there
are also important crossovers and appropriations that merit further attention.
In Britain, while it is arguably the case that feminist anti-pornography activism
has not been as firmly grounded in a critique of heterosexuality as its US
counterpart 4Merck, 1992), activists do share much of the Dworkin-
MacKinnon analysis. The Campaign Against Pornography Action Pack uses
the Dworkin and MacKinnon definition of pornography, and similarly refutes
any idea that pornography can be harmless. For example, debates about
`erotica' are seen as a `smokescreen' and the advice is to turn the debate around
and ask the question `we are against pornography, we are concerned with the
harm it inflicts ± what is your concern?' 4CAP:14). Similarly Catherine Itzin
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41992), of the Campaign Against Pornography and Censorship 4CPC), has
argued, in agreement with MacKinnon, that there is no debate that
pornography is harmful, rather the crucial feminist concern should to make
the harm count as important. The key areas of agreement among differing
groups of British anti-pornography feminists appear to be that pornography is
harmful in direct, experiential ways and also in perpetuatinga system of male
power.
The way in which the issue of harm has been taken up by some moral lobby
organizations makes implicit and explicit reference to the work of these
feminists. In CARE's 1991 discussion of pornography, Williams credits the
`feminist movement' with having`so helpfully identified' the male power and
dominance in much pornography 4p. 22), as well as referring to the work of
Catherine Itzin both in the text and under recommended reading. CAP and
CPC were also listed as `useful addresses'. The more recent discussion, though
incorporatingmany feminist ideas and continuingto reference Itzin, has
dropped overt praise for or recommendation of feminist campaigns 4Wilson-
Thomas and Williams, 1996). This could be interpreted in several ways. It
could be argued that the `alliance' claimed by Thompson and others has
broken down, or that changes in the nature and resources of feminist anti-
pornography groups have lowered their profile as political agendas move on.10
Alternatively, it could be that the arguments and language of feminist anti-
pornography has now become familiar and accepted as part of the pro-family
anti-pornography discourse, so that they no longer `need' their feminist `allies'.
In other words, that the moral lobby has successfully appropriated these
arguments and strategies.
There have also been tactical parallels in the emphasis that both the moral
lobby and anti-pornography feminists have placed on personal testimonies to
demonstrate the harm of pornography. Grant has called into question the
valorisation of `experience' as arbiter of truth, a perspective that she feels cuts
across many feminist positions, not just radical feminism with which it has
come to be most identified 4Grant, 1993). Grant's concern about the use of
`authentic' experience is combined with anxieties about the strategies of
MacKinnon and Dworkin in interpretingthese experiences:
MacKinnon is very aware that the experiences of women are unlikely to
conform to her and Dworkin's version of them without `consciousness
raising'. MacKinnon knows that experiences need interpretation. The
problem is that MacKinnon believes she knows in advance what that
interpretation should be. Thus, her claims to rely on experience becomes
dubious. 4Grant, 1993: 78)
Whilst I would take issue with Grant's tendency towards her own general-
isation here ± there are arguably many women who find Dworkin and
MacKinnon's ideas a valid and liberatinganalysis of their experience ± I feel
she touches upon issues of relevance to the discussion here. I would argue that
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both the moral lobby and some anti-pornography feminists have relied on the
validity of personal testimony in such a way that only certain testimonies seem
valid, whilst others are rendered misguided or deliberately oppositional. The
centeringof harm in their discussions leads then to a focus on this area. As a
CAP supporter stated, when discussingwomen who feel pornorgaphy is
harmless:
My philosophy is if women tell me somethingthen I believe them, but, and
so it's difficult in those kinds of situations to say well, actually you're talking
crap or whatever and you're only sayingthat because this that or the other.
And yet I do know that to be the case that it's about conditioning... Of
course the media will always wheel out somebody who'll say well, I'm in the
industry and I love it and I'd be exploited as a secretary anyway, you know.
You just have to kind of just keep arguing your corner, because for all those
that say that there are many more who don't like it, who have been harmed
by it.
Her words reveal both the power and the problems of a politics reliant on
experience. Though she wants to believe all women's experiences, in reality they
are prioritised based on the idea of harm. Women whose experiences of
pornography do not lead them to accept the harm analysis are queried, on the
other hand women's testimonies of harm are always truthful and to be
believed.
I want to stress here, given the bitterness of the controversy, that I am not
11
claimingthat believingwomen's accounts of harm is necessarily dubious.
Rather I am seekingto show that where testimonies are used to provide
evidence for a position that a priori cannot be questioned, this can lead to
disavowal of diversity in `authentic' experience and can come close to the moral
lobby in failingto see how any woman could really support or engage in
pornography. The danger in this harm-based experientialism is also of
providingfuel for those who claim that anti-pornography feminists see women
as 4only) victims and 4always) coerced, before some crucial feminist awakening,
which then bestows the right to interpret experience 4Valverde, 1989; Hunt,
1990; Grant, 1993).
For both feminist and moral lobby anti-pornography women, I would
suggest, certain propositions become self-evident, namely that we know all
pornography to be harmful=sinful. In both cases those who cannot see this
`truth' are criticised. For the moral lobby they are either livingin unredeemed sin
and=or supporters of the destructive permissive society who have yet to see the
damage caused by their ways. Anti-pornography feminists have portrayed their
opponents as `so-called feminists' 4Dworkin, 1990), who deny the sufferingof
other women because they find it `sexy' 4Wingfield and Scanlon, 1992). I am not
arguing that an alternative accusation has not gone on the `other side' of the
feminist debate 4see Rodgerson and Wilson, 1991) or from other critics. Indeed
judgments that serve to undercut the entirety of an opponents position, have
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certainly not been the sole preserve of anti-pornography feminists,12 but rather a
key feature of the pornography `debates', feminist and non-feminist. However
there have also been feminist positions that strive to assert that pornography is
`neither the problem or the solution' 4Rich, 1986). For example, Jolly 41992), has
sought to explore the ways in which analyses of pornography as experienced,
actual harm, and pornography as representation, currently sexist but potentially
liberatory, are both incomplete and to argue, however tentatively, for a move
beyond this polarisation.
The dangers ± and potentials ± of pornography as a moral issue
In assessingthe limits and implications of any similarity in moral reasoning, it
seems, as Carole Vance has suggested of the American situation 41992), that
some sections of the moral lobby have been able to accept anti-pornography
feminist rhetoric, and I would add some of its justificatory strategies, but not
the solutions proposed. Thus moral lobby solutions to the problem of
pornography involve changes in existing obscenity laws based on the idea of
what would offend a `reasonable person'. As MacKinnon argues, feminists
might question how such a phrase is, or would be, interpreted 41989b).
In the view of moral lobby women, pornography offends women's worth
and dignity as human beings, but this worth is generally tied into fixed gender
categories, and always into heterosexuality ± the very issues of inequality and
relations of power and dominance that have been at the heart of anti-
pornography feminist critique. Further, as Carol Smart has argued, the moral
lobby have tied legitimate concern by and for women in relation to
pornography to their position as `women-as-mothers and as-wives'
41989: 130). Central to this position is the idea that women's life experience,
includingmotheringand their `role' as sexual agtekeepers, lends them a
higher moral perspective. The idea that woman are in some ways morally
superior to men of course also has a considerable feminist heritage 4Mort,
1987; Ellis, 1990). Many other feminists have argued that as a political
strategy this is counterproductive at best, and have expressed concern about
what they see as another valorisation of this moral stance articulated from a
anti-pornography feminist perspective 4Wilson and Weir, 1986; Leong, 1991;
Bryson, 1992).
In response, of course, many anti-pornography feminists have insisted that,
in contrast to the moral lobby, they see pornography as a political not a moral
issue. As Leongargues:
Radical feminists themselves take great pains to disclaim their role as moral
guardians of society and have dismissed the moral dimensions of their
discourse on pornography-as-problem. `Moralism' today is associated with
`conservatism' 4eg, the New Right) and radical feminism is self-consciously
at odds with conservatism 41991: 103).
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For anti-pornography feminists, then, the repeated stress on pornography as a
political rather than moral issue may reflect increasingcharacterisations of
radical and revolutionary feminisms, seen as central to anti-pornography
activism, as `moralistic', prescriptive, and as presentingessentialist views of
women's sexuality. There have been strongobjections to the presentation of
radical feminism as unitary and as essentialist 4Hanmer, 1993; Richardson,
1993). Indeed, Diane Richardson has argued that an anti-censorship position
which insists on the existence of `a sexuality that has been repressed or denied',
can itself be essentialist 41993: 86).
In feminist debates on pornography I suggest the introduction of the
concept of morality continues to have negative connotations for feminists of all
perspectives, for important reasons. This feminist rejection of pornography as
a moral issue reflects the way in which morality has been perceived as having
`two genders', with morality for women being experienced as something to do
with the body and sexuality, and yet these areas beingoutside of classic moral
discourse 4Haug, 1992). Haug 41992) has argued that morality has been
`bisexual' in nature and that the ways in which moral virtue have been
gendered have been mutually reinforcing of the status quo. As this status quo
has, of course, been the site of sexual inequality it is little wonder that the
introduction of concepts of morality has quickly been associated with
moralisingabout women's virtue in ways perceived to be antithetical to
women's liberation. Given the ways in which the ideas of moral theorists, like
Kohlberg, have been articulated to suggest or support notions that women's
moral reasoningis inferior whilst claiminguniversal applicability 4Gilligan,
1982, 1992; Benhabib, 1987) this may of course raise anxieties for feminists in
claiminga `moral stance'. Particular concern, for example, has been expressed
about the potential essentialism, or at least essentialist uses, of promotinga
feminist morality based on a notion of a gendered ethics 4Parsons, 1987;
Faludi, 1991). However there has also been a considerable and growing interest
amongst feminists in the position of women within moral theory and in
developingfeminist ethics. In particular the possibilites of reconcilingethics of
justice and ethics of care, which I have argued underlie positions of moral
reasoningaround pornography, have been central to feminist ethical debates
4Gilligan, 1982, 1992; Okin, 1989; Frazer, Hornsby and Lovibond, 1992).
The political dangers for feminists of distancing from any notion of `moral
reasoning' around pornography are, I feel, real and twofold. First, it
continues the cedingof the power to define the moral discourse in relation
to pornography to non-feminist and anti-feminist forces, as writers like
Petchesky 41986) and Shrage 41994) have recognised in relation to abortion. I
would argue that the general unacceptability of the idea of moral discourse in
the area of pornography for feminists has both reflected and contributed to the
further colonisation of `morals' by those, like the pro-family lobby, whose
social aims are a threat to many feminist goals. Secondly, reflection on moral
reasoningmay not reduce the divisions between feminists on pornography but
it may help to further clarify the reactionary and liberatory perspectives of all
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positions. An engagement with moral positions could potentially allow for a
fuller articulation of feminist concepts of both individual rights and
responsibilities towards others in the area of both personal and public sexual
relations.
Conclusion
I have argued that attention to moral reasoning may help to deepen our
understanding of the unlikely charges of `alliance' between anti-pornography
feminists and moral lobby campaigners. Specifically, attention to harm and
experientially based arguments may offer a perspective on the willingness of
moral lobby women to support the work of the very feminists who, in other
areas, they consider `extreme' 4Luff, 1997). However, I would also insist that
this support can only be understood in its wider political and strategic context.
At the pragmatic, political level, the acceptability to women in the moral lobby
of the idea of `working together' with feminists on pornography reflects
important power imbalances between moral lobby women and feminists,
rooted in the institutionalisation of heterosexuality. Despite feelings of
disempowerment amongst the moral lobby 4Herman, 1994; Luff, 1997), I
would argue that existing relations of power tend to favour the position of the
pro-family women. While institutionalized heterosexuality prevails, there may
be little danger, and there may even be advantages, for moral lobby women in
any alliance with feminists, which would not be the case for anti-pornography
feminists.
Ultimately, moral lobby women's support for anti-pornography feminism
does not seem to move them closer to feminist positions in other areas. Anti-
pornography feminist appeals against portrayals of women as mere sex
objects can easily be supported by a range of pro-family women because of
beliefs in shared humanity and justice. The feminist language of domination
can also be sanitised in moral lobby discourse to one of degradation, which
ties in with notions of all sexual `lust' outside marital relations beingagainst
God's plans for human sexuality and with the presumed greater sexual
modesty of women.
I would suggest that moral lobby women can also support anti-pornography
feminists' focus on the harm done to women because the interests of women are
not seen to compete with those of others for whom they have a responsibility to
care. The `rights' of 4mainly male) pornography users are seen as invalid as
they rest on harm to other human beings and a constraint of the rights of
others. In this respect the moral lobby is consistent in its reasoningbetween not
only abortion and reproductive technologies, as other have suggested 4Berer,
1986), but also pornography. In all areas the apparent `rights' of a person are
rendered invalid if they are seen to involve the exploitation of another more
`vulnerable' human being. In the broad area of reproductive issues, for
example, any sympathy with feminists based on harm-based moral reasoning
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breaks down, both because there are now competitors in the category of the
`harmed', ie, that the interests of women and children are no longer perceived
as synonymous, and because the fundamental differences in support for gay
and lesbian rights become stark and unavoidable 4Luff, 1997).
I would argue, indeed, that the moral lobby can afford to publicly support
anti-pornography feminists because there appears to be no immediate question
of opposition to pornography undermining institutionalised heterosexuality,
for example by extending gay and lesbian rights. Though radical and
revolutionary feminist arguments about pornography clearly and consistently
implicate heterosexuality as eroticised domination, there is often a similar
criticism of gay and lesbian pornography based in this very critique 4see
Jeffreys, 1990). For example CAP argue that `gay and lesbian porn is not free
of the patterns of heterosexual porn about domination=subordination' 4no
date: 14). That is, anti-pornography feminists appear to believe that, within
existing heteropatriarchal relations, positive `erotica' whether gay or straight is
unlikely. Such feminist opposition to all pornography under heteropatriarch-
ical conditions may unintentionally, and ironically, enable the support of pro-
family women for whom the most problematic form of heterosex 4from the
viewpoint of many anti-pornography feminists), ie, `transcendent' sex within
the confines of marriage, is the most, if not only, legitimate sexual expression.
Thus, though I agree with CAP that you can `oppose porn and still defend gay
and lesbian rights' 4CAP, no date: 14), the likelihood is that between now and
the end of heteropatriarchy further restrictions on pornography can be used by
the moral lobby to shore up opposition to a range of gay and lesbian initiatives.
Further, their position leaves little room for the possibility of developing
alternative heterosexualities in the heteropatriarchal present. Thus the dangers
to `hegemonic heterosexuality' 4VanEvery, 1996), which of course the moral
lobby support, are not likely to be substantial despite the anti-pornography
feminist critique of these relations.
As a result of the analysis I have presented, I remain concerned about the
danger of anti-pornography feminists inadvertently replacing the immutable
evil of pornography in the eyes of God with the immutable harm of
pornography to women. Both views, however different their political
motivations, can be in danger of furthering reactionary views of 4particularly
women's) sexuality. However, these views also contribute much to our
understandings of the need to consider our responsibilities to both individual
and collective others, as well as our rights, in the sexual arena as elsewhere.
Anti-censorship feminists therefore also need to consider their moral stance,
rather than implyingthat morality is only an issue on one `side' of the
debate. Further work on how to reconcile the ethics of care and of justice in
the area of pornography, as in the area of reproductive rights, seems vital in
thinkingthrough the reactionary and liberatory potentials of all feminist
perspectives.
University of Sheffield
Received 27 January 2000
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Finally accepted 29 September 2000
Notes
1 The women I am concerned with have been involved with a variety of campaign groups which
have emerged since the 1970s. Central to their concerns are the preservation of the traditional
family, moral issues in social life, especially the media, and a general opposition to the so-called
`permissive' society. The groups most commonly identified with this phenomenon have been the
National Viewers and Listeners Association 4NVALA) and Christian Action Research
Education 4CARE, formerly Festival of Light), and Family and Youth Concern 4FYC,
formerly The Responsible Society) though there are a range of smaller organisations 4Durham,
1991). These groups are often seen as the stalwarts of a broader, if loose, `pro-family' movement
which has been dubbed the `moral right'. For a fuller discussion of the uses and problems with
the term `moral right' see Durham 1991; Luff 1997. In this article I use the less contentious
terms `pro-family' and `moral lobby' to refer to the groups I studied. As part of this study I
interviewed women involved in CARE, FYC, National Family Trust and Portsmouth Area
Family Concern. I also spoke to members of Campaign Against Pornography, to explore their
perspectives on the idea of an alliance with the moral lobby. For more details of the women and
groups who took part in my research, see Luff 1997.
2 The recent Campaign to Outlaw Pornography 4COP) being one of many initiatives.
3 Principally in relation to their unsuccessful ordinance in Minneapolis and testimonies to the
right-wing Meese Commission. The Minneapolis ordinance, which would have allowed women
4and men) to bringto court alleagtions that they had been harmed in some way by
pornography. It was initially enacted within the city but subsequently overturned by the
Supreme Court, after vociferous opposition, includingfrom other opposingfeminists. For
detailed analysis of the ordinance, especially the widely used definition of pornography
Dworkin and MacKinnon developed, see amongst other sources MacKinnon, 1989a; Dworkin,
1990; Segal and McIntosh 1992; Jolly, 1992.
4 Such critics cite as evidence of this possibility the impact of the Butler decision in Canada,
supported both by the Right and anti-pornography feminists. There were claims that the first
implementation of this anti-pornography measure was the seizure of a lesbian magazine from a
lesbian and gay bookshop 4Smith, 1993). Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin 41994=5)
however issued a rebuttal of such claims, and Dworkin argued that she had not been involved with
the Butler case at all given her opposition to criminal as opposed to civil laws against pornography.
5 Though women do not entirely escape, for example Mary Whitehouse's address at the 30th
anniversary NVALA Convention: `When men ± and women ± ruthlessly exploit sex until
pornography and violence become commonplace, then all of us, including the children, become
anaesthetised to the horrors around us' 41993: 4). To me the quote also neatly sums up the
primacy of NVALA's concerns about the links of `sexual anarchy' to moral and cultural decay,
embodied in the symbol of destroyed childhood innocence, that Durham 41991) and others have
noted.
6 This strategy has links with the notions of restoring `broken sexuality' 4CARE, 1994) that has
also fueled work on the `healing' of homosexuality.
7 The idea that within a hetero-patriarchcal society sexuality actively constructs gendered
experience has been central to the ideas of some feminists closley associated with anti-
pornography stance 4see MacKinnon, 1982; Jeffreys, 1990). In other words, male power over
women is both constituted by sexuality and reflected in its expressions. The `problem' of
pornography therefore is rooted within the very nature of sexuality in a patriarchal society.
8 A view which, of course, has been widely challenged, by anti-censorship feminists and others
4see eg, Segal and McIntosh, 1992). In particular, the problems of establishing any direct causal
relationship and the degrees of `proof' required have been hotly debated. The emphasis on
pornography being harmful, in direct or multi-causal ways, however has come to be clearly
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associated as a key strand of anti-pornography feminist and moral lobby argument. Frequently
referred to in these arguments are the work of Catherine Itzin, Susan Brownmiller and Diana
Russell.
9 In Britain reflected in the recurrent emphasis by the moral lobby on the need for new obscenity
legislation to curtail pornography 4see Williams, 1991; NVALA, The Urgent Need for New Law,
not dated).
10 This was suggested to me both by discussions of limited resources and a kind of `campaign
fatigue' 4my words) with anti-pornography feminist activists.
11 See for example Thompson's 41994) analysis of testimony to the Meese Commission in the
United States. Here he questions the motives and sincerity of many of the witnesses and argues
that the Commission was set up to prove a point it already believed.
12 Yet again I would refer to Thompson for a prime example of this kind of attack. He concludes
for example by assertingthat `As the separatists 4his name for anti-pornography feminists) will
never face up to anything' they `simply have to be stopped; there is no hope for them'
41994: 283).
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