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Japan and Asian-Pacific
security: regionalization,
entrenched bilateralism
and incipient
multilateralism
Nobuo Okawara & Peter J. Katzenstein
Published online: 26 Nov 2010.
To cite this article: Nobuo Okawara & Peter J. Katzenstein (2001) Japan
and Asian-Pacific security: regionalization, entrenched bilateralism
and incipient multilateralism, The Pacific Review, 14:2, 165-194, DOI:
10.1080/09512740110037118
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The PaciŽc Review, Vol. 14 No. 2 2001: 165–194
Japan and Asian-PaciŽc security:
regionalization, entrenched
bilateralism and incipient
multilateralism
Nobuo Okawara and Peter J. Katzenstein
Abstract This paper traces the formal and informal aspects of Japan’s
robust bilateralism on issues of external and internal security and discusses
a variety of embryonic multilateral arrangements that have sprung up in the
1990s. Asian-PaciŽc multilateralism is not yet a strong and unquestioned
collectively held norm in either Tokyo or any of the major capitals in the
Asia-PaciŽc. What matters instead are political practices shaped by a strong
tradition of bilateralism and, only very recently, by an incipient multilater-
alism.
Keywords National security; internal security; bilateralism; multilateralism.
1. Introduction
Regionalization is becoming an increasingly important aspect of Japan’s
and the Asia-PaciŽc’s security affairs. We support this claim by showing
the existence of a variety of formal and informal, bilateral arrangements
in Japan’s security policy that in turn help generate different forms of
incipient multilateralism in the Asia-PaciŽc. The paper concludes that
Asian-PaciŽc multilateralism is traditional, in contrast to the ‘new’ types
more readily apparent in Europe and subject of critical security studies.
Nobuo Okawara is Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Law, Kyushu University. Peter
J. Katzenstein is the Walter S. Carpenter Jr., Professor of International Studies at Cornell
University.
Addresses: Peter Katzenstein, Department of Government, McGraw Hall, Cornell University,
Ithaca, NY 14853, USA. E-mail: pjk2@cornell.edu. Nobuo Okawara, Kyushu University, 4–2–1
Ropponmatsu, Chuo-ku Fukuoka, Japan 810. E-mail:, okawara@rc.kyushu-u.ac.jp
The PaciŽc Review
ISSN 0951–2748 print/ISSN 1470–1332 online © 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/0951274011003711 8

166 The PaciŽc Review
The precise meanings of the terms region and security are, however,
far from clear. Regions are combinations of physical, psychological
and behavioral traits (MansŽeld and Milner 1997: 3–4; Lake and Morgan
1997: 11–12; Fawcett 1995: 10–11; Morgan 1997: 20; Daase 1993: 77–9;
Thompson 1973; Cantori and Spiegel 1970; Russett 1967). While geograph-
ical proximity is important, regions cannot be reduced to spatial dimen-
sions. Jeffrey Frankel (1997: 37, 118, 124–5), for example, has demonstrated
the powerful effects that political borders have. But he also Žnds that ‘the
effect of sharing a common language, even for far-removed countries, is
very similar in magnitude to the effect of sharing a common border’
(Frankel 1997: 75). Regions are thus not only geographically given but
also politically made.
A world of regions is shaped by economic and social processes of region-
alization and by structures of regionalism (Grugel and Hout 1999; Fishlow
and Haggard 1992; Fawcett and Hurrell 1995). Regionalization describes
geographic manifestations of political, military, economic or social
processes at the international level. As we argue in this paper, regional-
ization can be both societal and governmental. We argue below that it
occurs in the area of social phenomena, such as crime, and in the area of
national security policies that governments adopt.
The concept of ‘comprehensive’ security was initially championed by
Japan in the late 1970s (Alagappa 1998; Inoguchi forthcoming). It was
developed further by ASEAN in the 1980s. When in the 1990s China
made increasing use of the concept, it gained even wider currency
throughout the Asia-PaciŽc. Throughout most of the Asia-PaciŽc region,
the Asian Žnancial crisis of 1997 has reinforced further the belief that
security must be understood in ‘comprehensive’ terms that goes beyond
traditional military connotations.
In the case of Japan the concept of comprehensive security includes
both external (‘international’) and internal dimensions. Both are bringing
Japan’s Defense Agency (JDA), the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) which
is a part of the Ministry of Transportation, and the National Police Agency
(NPA) closer together. By exchanging information and developing new
forms of cooperation the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF), the
Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF), and the police are attempting to
meet what to the government looks like novel threats to Japan’s national
security including incursions into Japan’s coastal waters, acts of terrorism
and guerilla attacks on airports, nuclear power plants and harbors (Japan
Times, June 17, 1999; Interview 10–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000).
This paper traces the formal and informal aspects of Japan’s robust
bilateralism on issues of external (section 2) and internal (section 3)
security, and discusses a variety of embryonic multilateral arrangements
that have sprung up in the 1990s (section 4). The Conclusion argues briey
that Asian-PaciŽc multilateralism differs in kind from the multilateralism
that has become the object of attention of students of globalization.

N. Okawara and P. J. Katzenstein: Japan and Asian-PaciŽc security 167
2. Formal bilateralism and changes in the US–Japan
security arrangements
The political consolidation of the formal US–Japan security arrangements
since the mid-1990s has regionalized their scope in the Asia-PaciŽc’s
evolving security orders. In the early years of the Clinton administration
growing bilateral trade conicts, Japanese uncertainty about US strategy
in the Asia-PaciŽc, and a growing emphasis on the Asia-PaciŽc in Japanese
policy pointed to the possibility of a loosening of bilateral ties. But the
actual parameters of change in Japan’s security policy were outlined in
the August 1994 Higuchi report to the prime minister. Even more impor-
tant, they were shaped by the February 1995 Nye Report.1 Subsequently,
Japan’s Žrst revision of the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO)
since its adoption in 1976 (November 1995) culminated in the Japan–US
Joint Declaration on Security of April 1996 and a review of the 1978
Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation in September 1997. This
review spells out concretely the roles of the US military and the GSDF
in the eventuality of a crisis. Based on the review, a new Acquisition and
Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) was signed by the two governments
in April 1998 (Asahi Shimbun, April 28, 1998, evening 4th edition).2 The
new agreement referred speciŽcally to ‘situations in areas surrounding
Japan that will have an important inuence on Japan’s peace and security’
as the context in which the two governments could provide supplies and
services to each other (Gaiko Forum 1999: 139).3
The negotiation of the guidelines was deadlocked until low-level staff
from the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) interviewed US military personnel
about the practical planning issues that, from the perspective of the US,
needed to be addressed. The list those interviews generated was eventu-
ally passed on to the higher echelons inside the JDA. Negotiations that
eventually resulted in forty speciŽc measures were affected by the 1994
crisis over North Korea’s nuclear program. That crisis convinced the
Japanese government of the need for a legal framework that covers emer-
gency situations not involving direct attacks on Japan (Interview 02–99,
Tokyo, January 11, 1999; Ina 1997: 30; Asahi Shimbun, May 21, 1998, 13th
edition; February 10, 1999, 14th edition; April 27, 1999, 14th edition).4
Political implementation of the revised guidelines in the form of
Japanese legislation proved to be controversial. The original bill was
approved by the cabinet in April 1998, but leaders of the LDP and the
government admitted that, because it was so controversial, the bill would
not be able to pass during that year’s Diet session (Jo 1998a; Asahi
Shimbun, April 26 and May 3, 1998, 14th editions). Eventually, several
changes were made to the bill to assure its passage, among them the drop-
ping of controversial clauses on ship inspections.5 The defense guideline
bills eventually passed the Lower House in April 1999 and the Upper
House one month later.

168 The PaciŽc Review
The new guidelines pose formidable challenges for a redeŽnition of the
mission and operations of Japan’s military, speciŽcally of the MSDF.
Military and bureaucratic experts now pay great attention to having their
voices heard as the government attempts to clarify the operational impli-
cations of the new guidelines (Interview 10–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000).
In the context of modern warfare the new defense cooperation arrange-
ments have diluted somewhat the traditional post-war policy of prohibiting
any use of force in the absence of a direct attack on Japan. They have
done so in part because of the extension in the scope of the US–Japan
security arrangements. For one simple reason regionalization is likely to
complicate matters in a future crisis. For the GSDF it is easier to draw a
line in the sand than it would be for the MSDF to draw a line in the
water (Interviews 12–99 and 13–99, Tokyo, January 14, 1999).
The Japan–US Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security has always
performed an important regional function owing to (1) ‘an implicit contri-
bution to regional security through Article 5 of the Treaty (the defence
of Japan)’ (Green and Self 1996: 42) and (2) the placing of US bases in
Japan under Article 6 (the maintenance of international peace and stability
in the Far East) (Watanabe and Ina 1998: 20). But the growing impor-
tance of regional considerations has linked the regional scope of the treaty
with authorization of SDF operations in crisis situations that do not involve
any direct attack on Japan. In its effects the security arrangement between
the two countries has been more thoroughly regionalized than before.
SDF operations will no longer focus solely on the defense of the Japanese
home islands (Interview 03–99, Tokyo, January 12, 1999). A key provision
of the revised NDPO underlines this regional dimension:
Should a situation arise in the areas surrounding Japan which will
have an important inuence on national peace and security, [Japan
will] take appropriate response in accordance with the Constitution
and relevant laws and regulations, for example, by properly sup-
porting the United Nations activities when needed, and by ensuring
the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan–US security
arrangements.
(Boeicho, n.d.: 38)
Put differently, the scope of the NDPO and the Defense Cooperation
Guidelines has broadened, in the eyes of the proponents of such devel-
opment, from having the SDF defend Japan against direct attack, and thus
securing Japan’s position in a global anti-Communist alliance, to having
the SDF enhance through various measures stability in the Asia-PaciŽc
region, and thus Japan’s own security. In the 1997 Defense Cooperation
Guidelines a new type of ‘mutual cooperation planning’ complements
traditional ‘bilateral defense planning’ (Igarashi and Watanabe 1997: 35).
The Security Treaty itself has been left untouched. Attention has been

N. Okawara and P. J. Katzenstein: Japan and Asian-PaciŽc security 169
drawn inside Japan to a provision in the new guidelines stating that the
‘rights and obligations’ under the treaty remain unchanged. And according
to the Japanese government, which sees a revising of the treaty as too
controversial to be politically feasible, the implementing of measures
included in the new guidelines is not required by the treaty. Thus, in
the context of Japanese domestic politics, an extension in the scope of the
security arrangements between the two countries is sharply differentiated
from any broadening of the scope of the treaty itself.
The redeŽnition in the scope of future US–Japan defense cooperation
raises concerns in many quarters: among those, mostly in Japan, fearing
the risk that Japan might be dragged into global conicts; among those,
mostly in the US, doubting Japan’s commitment to a more equal partner-
ship in securing, through collective defense measures, regional peace and
stability in the Asia-PaciŽc; and among those, in the Asia-PaciŽc, worrying
about the possible application of the revised guidelines to the Korean
Peninsula and Taiwan.
The fear of a globalization of Japan’s defense cooperation with the US
had existed throughout the Cold War, especially among members of the
Japanese Left. It was therefore no surprise that in the Diet, Social
Democratic and Communist Parties opposed the cabinet bill implementing
the new guidelines. With roughly a third of its Diet members former
Socialists, the largest opposition party, the Democratic Party, also voted
against the bill (Asahi Shimbun, April 21, 28, and May 25, 1999, 14th
editions).6 The fear of getting entangled in international military conicts
remains widespread in Japan.
With such a fear in view, the new guidelines attempt in various ways
to reassure a skeptical audience in Japan. According to the guidelines,
‘[w]hen the two governments reach a common assessment of the state of
each situation, they will effectively coordinate their activities’ (V); and
the two governments’ taking of appropriate measures in response to crises
will be ‘based on their respective decisions’ (V-2). The revised guidelines
also say that ‘Japan will conduct all its actions within the limitations of
its Constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the main-
tenance of its exclusively defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear
principles’ (II-2); and they limit contingencies in which the SDF will
provide rear area support to the US forces, to ‘situations in areas
surrounding Japan that will have an important inuence on Japan’s peace
and security’ (V). Furthermore, the 1999 law implementing the guidelines
offers, as a typical example of such ‘situations’, ‘situation that, if allowed
to stand as it is, is in danger of developing into a direct armed attack on
Japan’. Thus the new guidelines, in face of strong opposition, have been
presented to the public as both securing independent decision-making by
Japan, and sustaining post-war Japan’s low-proŽle security policy.
The fear in the US defense establishment runs in the opposite direction.
In the mid-1990s there was a pervasive sense that the alliance was eroding

170 The PaciŽc Review
from within. Japan’s growing interest in regional multilateral arrangements
and its renewed attention to the United Nations were seen as a hedging
strategy against a possible weakening of the US presence in East Asia
(Cronin and Green 1994: 2). Since 1995/96 such sentiments, though weaker,
persist. Whether it is justiŽed or not, the perception of Japan’s ‘tepid’ and
‘cautious’ response to many US requests for closer defense cooperation
in the past, makes ambiguity in the scope of future defense cooperation
worrisome. When the chips are down, ask members of the US defense
establishment, can US policy really count on the active support of the
Japanese SDF?
The volatile issue of Okinawa is a case in point (Mochizuki 1997: 24–8;
Cossa 1997: 43–7; Shimada 1997; Yamaguchi 1997; Johnson 1997; Institute
of Social Science 1998). In a bloody battle in the waning months of the
PaciŽc War, a quarter (by one estimate), of the citizens of Okinawa were
killed. Ever since, US policy has been one of occupation rather than
reform. Many Okinawans regard themselves as different from and having
been treated in less than an equitable way by the rest of Japan, a sentiment
increasingly recognized by non-Okinawan Japanese. The issue of American
bases has brought these powerful emotions into the open in the 1990s.
The smoldering conict erupted when three US servicemen raped a 12-
year-old Okinawan schoolgirl on September 4, 1995. Okinawa was the
prefecture in Japan which had the lowest per capita income in 1997. It
was saddled with the costs of hosting more than half of the US military
presence in Japan. American bases occupy about 20 per cent of the main
island. In terms of land area about 75 per cent of all US military facilities
in Japan are situated in Okinawa, about a third of which are located on
private property (Asahi Shimbun, February 16, 2000, 14th edition; Johnson
1997: 5). A staging area for the US military in the Asia-PaciŽc, Okinawa
suffers from a variety of social ills and economic opportunities foregone.
Under the leadership of a popular governor, Masahide Ota, about 53 per
cent of the total Okinawan electorate voted in the Žrst-ever prefectural
plebiscite held in Japan on September 8, 1996, for both consolidation and
reduction of the US military presence and a reform of the US–Japan Status
of Forces Agreement. At present the situation is at a stalemate, between
the US and Japan as well as between the central government and the
citizens of Nago who on December 21, 1997, voted by a slight majority,
despite heavy political pressure, against the relocation of the Futenma
Marine Corps Air Station to their community. The Japanese central govern-
ment is trying to buy the assent of the 55,000 citizens of Nago, with approx-
imately 1 billion dollars in subsidies to be invested during the coming
decade. For the time being the operational side of US–Japan security rela-
tions exists on a politically fragile basis of support (Interviews 01–99 and
03–99, Tokyo, January 11–12, 1999; French 2000).
The application of the revised guidelines to potential instabilities on the
Korean Peninsula is also a source of political controversy (Hughes 1996).

N. Okawara and P. J. Katzenstein: Japan and Asian-PaciŽc security 171
In March 1999 Japanese destroyers Žred warning shots at intruding North
Korean vessels. This was the Žrst time since its creation in 1954 that the
Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) engaged in such operations.
Ignoring several warnings by the destroyers as well as gunŽre from the
Japanese coastguard (MSA) patrol boats, the North Korean vessels were
apparently permitted to escape after they went beyond Japan’s air defense
identiŽcation zone (Kristof 1999a; Defense Agency 2000: 210). North
Korea’s nuclear and missile programs as well as its faltering economy have
raised the specter of another Korean War that could enmesh Japan and
affect it directly if weapons of mass destruction were to be deployed or
if large-scale refugee movements were to occur (Interview 13–99, Tokyo,
January 14, 1999). After expressing initially strong reservations, South
Korea has come to appreciate the considerations that have pushed Japan
to acquiesce in US pressure to revise the defense guidelines, especially
since the historic visit of President Kim Dae Jung in Tokyo in October
1998 has improved diplomatic relations between the two states.7
Military toughness is not a recipe for Japan’s approach to China. For his-
torical, political and military reasons China is a central challenge for Japan
and Asian-PaciŽc regional security and in the long run probably more
important than Korea (Green 1999; Christensen 1999). The change in the
US–Japan security relationship was met with mixed emotions by Beijing’s
policy elites. Condemnation of the new security guidelines adopted in
September 1997 was swift. The changes were interpreted as inherently more
aggressive in particular with respect to Japan’s ambiguous stance in case of
an outbreak of hostilities between Taiwan and the PRC (Kynge 1999a). At
the same time many members of China’s political and military leadership
are fully aware of the stabilizing effects of the US–Japan security alliance
(Christensen 1999: 58–9; Wang and Wu 1998; Ross 1999; Garrett and Glaser
1997; Interviews 01–98, 04–98 and 03–00, 04–00, Beijing, June 15 and 16,
1998, and June 13, 2000). Before 1995, Chinese policy elites were alarmed
by the prospect that a fraying of the US–Japan relationship might remove
the ‘bottle cap’ that had contained a possibly unilateral remilitarization of
Japan. After 1995 they were equally concerned by the consolidation of the
US–Japan relationship and the creation of an ‘egg shell’ which eventually
would hatch, under US tutelage, a militarist and expansionary Japan in the
Asia-PaciŽc (Christensen 1999: 59–62).
The issue that has Chinese ofŽcials concerned more than the possibility
of Japan’s nuclearization is the development of weapon systems that are
tailored to Japan’s proven strength in dual-use technologies such as Theater
Missile Defense (TMD) systems (Hildreth and Pagliano 1995; Cambone
1997; Green 1997; Crowell and Usui 1997).8 In the view of Japanese policy-
makers the joint research project with the US government on TMD is use-
ful politically both in the short and medium term. In accommodating
requests that the US government has made since 1993, TMD strengthens
cooperative security arrangements with Japan’s most important partner,

172 The PaciŽc Review
and it responds to the strong sense of worry of the Japanese public over
the 1998 North Korean missile test. But this policy also affects political
developments in the Asia-PaciŽc even without Japan altering its traditional
policy of barring the export of military technologies to all countries except
to the United States (Interviews 03–99 and 04–99, Tokyo, January 12, 1999;
Interview 03–00, Tokyo, January 11, 2000). SpeciŽcally, TMD further com-
plicates Japan’s relations with the PRC, which have already been clouded
by the new guidelines. It will also strain Japan’s defense budgets with R&D
expenditures over Žve years expected to run in the range of 20–30 billion
yen (Mainichi Daily News, August 14, 1999). Considering the system’s
uncertain technical prospects, a decision on deployment will most likely be
delayed for at least a decade (Interviews 01–99 and 02–99, Tokyo, January
11, 1999; Interview 05–00, Tokyo, January 12, 2000; Sims 1999).
For various reasons, Japan’s decision to participate in TMD research
has aroused strong Chinese opposition.9 The fact that TMD is perceived
to be linked to an intense discussion in Washington and a likely US deci-
sion on the building of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system makes
it unpalatable to China, as well as Russia, France and most other European
states. China in particular objects to the TMD on political–military grounds
and also because of possible technological spillover effects from one
program to the other (Interview 12–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000). From
the Chinese perspective the notion that weapons, such as TMD, are inher-
ently defensive rings hollow. TMD would strengthen the hand of the
Taiwanese government in its quest for sovereign statehood, an inherently
aggressive act from the perspective of the PRC. Introduced into a speciŽc
political and historical context, a jointly developed and produced
US–Japanese TMD system, from the perspective of Beijing thus is a factor
seriously destabilizing Asian-PaciŽc security. To be sure TMD had been
on the agenda of the US and Japan since 1993, long before the Nye Report;
Japan has been reluctant to commit itself to the project; and Japanese
policy changed only after a North Korean missile test across Japanese
territory on August 31, 1998. These facts are recognized in Beijing. But
they are judged to be much less consequential than the fact that TMD
might counter missiles as the pre-eminent military asset the PRC possesses
in its relations with Taiwan (Christensen 1999: 64–9; Dickie and Fidler
1999: Walker and Fidler 1999; Kynge 1999b; Wiltse 1997).
The importance of bilateral relations with the US Žt a broader pattern
of Japan’s security policy. Senior JDA ofŽcials have met annually between
1993 and 1997, and again in 1999 with their Chinese counterparts, with
the 1998 hiatus most likely occasioned by the adoption of the New
Guidelines (Interview 13–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000). Besides China,
Japan has initiated also regular bilateral security talks with Australia (since
1996), Singapore (since 1997), Indonesia (since 1997), Thailand (since
1998) and Malaysia (since 1999).10 Japan’s JDA is increasingly engaging
the Asia-PaciŽc in a broad range of bilateral security contacts (Interviews

N. Okawara and P. J. Katzenstein: Japan and Asian-PaciŽc security 173
10–00 and 13–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000).11 In sum in the 1990s region-
alization has increased in Japan’s external security affairs.
3. Informal bilateralism and Japan’s internal security
policies
Compared to formal bilateralism on issues of external security, on ques-
tions affecting Japan’s internal security the government has responded
through informal bilateral arrangements to the actual or perceived growth
of transnational organized crime. In the Asia-PaciŽc, problems such as
illegal immigration, organized crime, money laundering, narcotics and
terrorism remain almost without exception under the exclusive preroga-
tive of national governments. But the Japanese police has begun to culti-
vate systematically its contacts with foreign law enforcement agencies on
a bilateral basis. Japanese policy aims at increasing trust among police
professionals throughout the region, thus creating a general climate in
which Japan’s police can cooperate more easily with foreign police forces
on an ad hoc basis. Put briey, on a case-by-case basis Japanese police
organizations are attempting to share more freely information with other
police forces in the Asia-PaciŽc.12
Japan’s crime syndicates, or yakuza, make the most of their money
inside Japan, traditionally in gambling, prostitution, racketeering and
extortion, especially in the entertainment and construction industries. With
the advent of the bubble economy in the late 1980s the syndicates entered
Japan’s corporate world on a large scale. David Kaplan estimates that
despite Japan’s prolonged recession in the 1990s, the net worth of the
syndicates doubled between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. Easy loans,
especially in real estate and the securities industry, created a new type of
economic gangster in Japan. Some estimates put the direct and indirect
share of uncollectible bank loans to the yakuza at 40 per cent of the esti-
mated total of about 1 trillion dollars of bad loans held by Japanese banks.
In the views of several observers Japan was experiencing in the 1990s an
economic recession prolonged not only by the blunders of party politi-
cians and the mismanagement of Ministry of Finance bureaucrats but also
by the hesitation of bankers, intimidated by the occasional murder, to
push the mob to pay up. This delayed further the banks’ interest in begin-
ning the process of writing off bad loans (Kaplan 1996: 3, 6; Friman 1999:
6; Takayama 1995; Fulford 1995).13
Japan’s crime syndicates have important international connections
throughout the Asia-PaciŽc that net annually large amounts of revenues
(Flynn 1998: 25–6). Links to the Chinese triads, for example, date back to
the PaciŽc War and the Japanese occupation of China. Recruiting among
Japan’s heavily discriminated Korean minority, Japanese crime syndicates
also have close ties to Korea where yakuza-Žnanced laboratories used to
supply most of the world’s market for crystal methamphetamine. In Taiwan,

174 The PaciŽc Review
Thailand and the Philippines Japan’s crime syndicates have organized a
burgeoning sex tourism. And Hawaii’s real estate market became a con-
venient place for laundering illegal funds in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Japan’s NPA seeks to cooperate with the law enforcement agencies of
other countries primarily by cultivating a systematic exchange of infor-
mation.14 The NPA is most satisŽed with the good working relations it
has established with Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan; it is very eager
to build up its contacts with police ofŽcials from Fujian province (Interview
09–99 and 10–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999); and it funds projects that bring
Japanese researchers to provinces in northeast China, relying on existing
Chinese contacts, to build closer ties with provincial police forces while
investigating the local conditions that permit China’s crime syndicates to
operate in Japan (Interview 04–00, Tokyo, January 12, 2000).
Like the Chinese triads and organized crime in other Asia-PaciŽc states
Japan’s crime syndicates are deeply involved in the international drug
trade (Shinn 1998a). Japanese crime groups have strong transnational links
and cooperate with organized crime in Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan and
China (Friman 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996). In the 1990s all of the metham-
phetamine, Japan’s drug of choice, comes from abroad, much of it from
Fujian province, compared to Taiwan in the 1980s and South Korea in the
1970s. International syndicates handle transshipment, illegal immigrants,
often of Iranian origin, street-level distribution. Japan’s yakuza acts as an
intermediary and derives about one-third of its total revenues from drugs
(Interview 06–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999). Since the NPA lacks the power
and resources of an organization such as the US Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA), it also lacks precise estimates of the ow of drugs into
Japan. But it is clear that Japan’s high living standard make it an attrac-
tive market for international drug dealers (Interview 06–99, Tokyo, January
13, 1999; Kristof 1999b).
Most of the practical police work is facilitated by personal relationships
with law enforcement ofŽcials from other countries, especially China,
Thailand, Taiwan, Burma, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.15 In the view of
the NPA, bilateral police relations are good or excellent with the members
of ASEAN, South Korea and the United States. High-level contacts with
Taiwan work well but the problems of Taiwan’s ambiguous diplomatic
status severely constrain practical police cooperation at lower levels. And
relations with China are difŽcult since the vast bureaucracy of China’s
Public Security Department exercises strong, central control over locali-
ties such as Fujian where drugs are produced and shipped to Japan. The
ministry’s insistence on strict observance of all formalities seriously under-
mines practical police cooperation (Interview 06–99, Tokyo, January 13,
1999). In sum, international drug trafŽcking by crime syndicates is
spreading in the Asia-PaciŽc. In response, Japan’s NPA seeks to build
informal cooperative relations with foreign law enforcement ofŽcials
rather than ceding national sovereignty to formal, multilateral institutions.

N. Okawara and P. J. Katzenstein: Japan and Asian-PaciŽc security 175
Since 1996 the smuggling of illegal immigrants has become a problem
that Japan’s police ofŽcials are forced to pay growing attention to (Friman
1998, 2000a, 2000b).16 Even though the sharpest increases in the arrests
of Chinese occurred in the early 1990s, the NPA has only since 1998 inten-
siŽed its contacts with Chinese police ofŽcials. One reason was the extreme
caution with which the NPA’s Security Bureau had traditionally viewed
the building of cooperative ties with police ofŽcials from China. But with
the problem of illegal immigration perceived as becoming very serious by
1996, the Security Bureau’s opposition has weakened. Since May 1997 the
NPA has sought semi-annually to develop cooperative ties at the deputy-
chief level.17
Even more signiŽcant is the beginning of joint operation of the Japanese
and Chinese police. The NPA has acted as an intermediary for the coop-
eration between prefectural police departments with the Hong Kong police
since 1997 and with Canton and Shanghai police forces since 1998, leading
to several arrests (Interviews 08–99 and 10–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999;
Hirano 1998: 45–6). NPA ofŽcials met their Shanghai and Cantonese
counterparts after having built up their ties with the Hong Kong police
prior to 1997. They are now very interested in creating closer personal
relations with police forces in Fujian so as to facilitate future joint oper-
ations (Interview 10–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999).
The dramatic decline by the Japan Red Army (JRA), marked by the
arrest of nine JRA members since 1995, has not ended the perceived
threat that terrorism poses to Japan. In the 1990s Japan has had to cope
with some spectacular acts of terrorism both at home (Aum Shinrikyo’s
sarin gas attack in Tokyo’s subway in 1995) and abroad (the attack on the
Japanese embassy in Lima in 1996). The target of the NPA’s concern is
shifting from the JRA to North Korea and to fundamentalist Islamic
groups (Interview 07–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999).18 In line with its policy
on other security issues the NPA has sought vigorously to increase trust
through the strengthening of bilateral contacts with foreign police profes-
sionals and the systematic exchange of information.19
Japanese police ofŽcers also seek to gather systematic intelligence
abroad. More than 100 police ofŽcers stationed at Japanese embassies
practice cooperative security with local police forces in the host countries.
In response to the takeover of the Japanese embassy in Lima, Peru, a
terror response team (TRT) was set up in the spring of 1998. It will be
dispatched in future crises when Japanese nationals are threatened by
international terrorism. The unit trains abroad, and it exchanges infor-
mation with corresponding units in other countries (Interview 07–99,
Tokyo, January 13, 1999).20
Japan’s anti-terrorism policy displays clearly the characteristic features
of its preferred approach to issues of internal security (Leheny 2000).
Multilateral international or regional institutions are relatively unimpor-
tant in Japan’s approach. Interpol, for example, is of secondary importance

176 The PaciŽc Review
in the eyes of NPA ofŽcials, even though the director-general of the NPA’s
International Affairs Department, Toshinori Kanemoto, became the head
of Interpol in 1996. On questions of organized crime Interpol does not pro-
vide the police with sensitive information. On questions of drug trafŽcking
its information, at best, duplicates what police ofŽcers learn through other
channels. On questions of illegal immigration Interpol is largely useless.
And in Japan’s anti-terrorism policy its main function is restricted to the
posting of international arrest warrants (Interviews 06–99 and 10–99,
Tokyo, January 13, 1999).
In sum, informal bilateralism has been the most important response to
the regional spread of transnational crime. The increasing importance of
Asia-PaciŽc regionalism is noticeable in the intensiŽed efforts of the NPA
to create more trust through the improvement of its bilateral ties with
national police forces throughout the Asia-PaciŽc.
4. Incipient multilateralism in Japan’s external and internal
security policies
Formal and informal bilateral arrangements in Japan’s external and
internal security policies shape an incipient form of multilateralism that
covers a broad spectrum of different admixtures of bilateral and multi-
lateral elements in the Asia-PaciŽc’s security affairs. Multilateral security
arrangements cross the gamut of Track One (government-to-government) ,
Track Two (semi-governmental think tanks), and Track Three (private
institutions) (Stone 1997; Wada 1998).21 The institutional afŽliation of
national research organizations participating in Track Two activities
confounds the attempt of drawing a sharp line between governmental
Track One and non-governmental Track Two activities. It varies from being
integral to the ministries of foreign affairs (the two Koreas, China and
Laos), to being totally (Vietnam) or partly (Japan) funded and largely
(Vietnam) or moderately (Japan) staffed by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, to very close proximity to the prime minister (Malaysia), to high
degrees of independence (Thailand and Indonesia) (Interview 04–00,
Tokyo, January 12, 2000). Whatever their precise character, for most
Japanese ofŽcials, dialogues that involve semi-ofŽcial or private contacts
are useful to the extent that they help facilitate government-to-govern-
ment talks; they are not of value in and of themselves (Interview 01–00,
Tokyo, January 11, 2000).22
Japan’s interest in and support of stronger multilateral arrangements
dates back to the 1960s when its neighbors in Southeast Asia rejected
several Japanese proposals to create multilateral economic arrangements
(Katzenstein 1997: 12–20). The Japanese government supported the
creation of ASEAN and saw it as a useful arrangement to help stabilize
Southeast Asia after the end of the Vietnam War. Prime Minister Tanaka’s
1974 visit in the region was the Žrst occasion at which the Japanese govern-

N. Okawara and P. J. Katzenstein: Japan and Asian-PaciŽc security 177
ment referred to ASEAN as a collective political institution rather than
to Southeast Asia as a geographic area (Interview 02–00, Tokyo, January
11, 2000). Before 1989, like the US, but sometimes for different reasons,
Japan had no interest in regional security institutions. Looking for a new
diplomatic initiative in the wake of the Gulf War and convinced that the
cause of Asia-PaciŽc regionalism was ready to be advanced further diplo-
matically, in July 1991 the Japanese government proposed a new multi-
lateral security dialogue as part of ASEAN’s Post-Ministerial Conference
(PMC) (Fukushima 1999a: 143; Interview 02–00, Tokyo, January 11, 2000).
The proposal by Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama, writes Paul Midford
(1998: 2), ‘represented a dramatic departure from Japan’s reactive policy
toward regional security, and marked the Žrst time since the end of World
War II that Japan made a regional security initiative on its own, and
without American support’.
Although the Nakayama initiative proved unacceptable to ASEAN
members, it did have a threefold effect. It prompted ASEAN to push
ahead with its own plans for setting up a multilateral security institution
as part of the ASEAN PMC; it contributed to a rapid shift in the hostile
stance of the US government toward multilateral security arrangements
in the Asia-PaciŽc; and it prepared the grounds for further diplomatic
initiatives by Prime Minister Miyazawa on multilateral regional security
initiatives and the growth of multilateralism in the Asia-PaciŽc in the
1990s. By the end of the decade, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA) and JDA had become interested in pushing from ‘conŽdence-
and security-building measures’ based on a sharing of information by
various participating states about each other’s defense posture to ‘preven-
tive diplomacy’ as one way of solving some of the harder security prob-
lems in the Asia-PaciŽc.23 With varying degrees of enthusiasm the Japanese
government has supported all of the new multilateral initiatives and has
thus followed the recommendations of the Advisory Group on Defense
Issues (Cronin and Green 1994).
This is not to argue that there were no domestic divisions in Japan.
Security multilateralism in the Asia-PaciŽc meant different things to
different groups (Kawasaki 1997). ‘Realists’ viewed all the talk about coop-
erative security and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as one addi-
tional tool for practicing balance-of-power politics with China (Interviews
04–99 and 12–99, Tokyo, January 12 and 14, 1999). ‘Idealists’ welcomed
the ARF as a promising way of moving the Asia-PaciŽc away from tradi-
tional power politics towards the growth of one or several overlapping
security communities that might eventually transcend the system of
competing alliances. Finally, ‘realistic liberals’ in the MOFA who were
crafting the new policy hoped to increase Asia-PaciŽc stability through
institutionalized ways of enhancing transparency and trust (Interview
11–99, Tokyo, January 14, 1999). ‘Their conception of the ARF was an
amalgamation of Idealism and Realism: a sort of international community

178 The PaciŽc Review
in the narrow realm of information sharing, beneath which the cold reality
of power politics and alliance systems persist’ (Kawasaki 1997: 495). On
balance, Japan’s approach to multilateralism has been cautious.
The incipient security multilateralism of the Asia-PaciŽc takes somewhat
different forms. It is, for example, evident in the recent history of several
Track Two dialogues. They provide a convenient venue for senior govern-
ment ofŽcials to meet in relatively informal settings. Since 1993, for exam-
ple, Japan has cooperated with China, Russia, South Korea and the US in
the North East Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD).24 In addition since
1994 a Japanese research organization has co-sponsored, with its American
and Russian counterparts, the Trilateral Forum on North PaciŽc Security
also attended by senior government ofŽcials.25 Furthermore since 1998
Japan has conducted semi-ofŽcial trilateral security talks with China and
the US (Asahi Shimbun, July 16, 1998, 14th edition; Japan Times,
September 28, 1999; Fukushima 1999b: 36; Sasaki 1997).
On questions of Asian-PaciŽc security, however, the most important
Track Two dialogues occur in the Council for Security Cooperation in the
Asia PaciŽc (CSCAP) (Interview 04–00, Tokyo, January 12, 2000; Simon
2001: 20–2 (prepublication manuscript); Stone 1997: 21–5; Wada 1998:
162–5; Job 2000). Its predecessors were the ASEAN-associated Institutes
for Strategic and International Studies. In the early 1990s these institutes
played a crucial role in pushing ASEAN to commence systematic security
dialogues. And with the establishment of the Track One ARF, the Track
Two activities of these institutes have grown in importance. They prepare
studies that may be too sensitive for governments to conduct. And they
organize meetings on topics that for political reasons governments may
be unwilling or unable to host. CSCAP was created in 1993, and held its
Žrst meeting in 1994. It incorporated these institutes into a larger non-
governmental body with a membership that was nearly coterminous with
that of the ARF. It is ‘the most comprehensive, regular, non-governmental
forum on PaciŽc security’ (Simon 2001: 21). With its Žve working groups
CSCAP-sponsored dialogues were modelled after those in the PaciŽc
Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) that bring together, since 1980,
business people, government ofŽcials in their private capacity and acad-
emic economists (Fukushima 1999a: 131, 154–5; 1999b: 33).26
Track Two activities thus can offer governments a variety of informal
venues to exchange information and to take stock of the evolving assess-
ments of a variety of governmental and non-governmental actors. Track
Two activities also help shape the climate of opinion in national settings
in which security affairs are conducted. They can help in articulating new
ideas for national decision-makers. Over time they may socialize elites
either directly or indirectly to different norms and identities. And they
may also build transnational coalitions of elites that retain considerable
inuence in their respective national arenas. In brief, they have become
an important aspect of Asian-PaciŽc security affairs.27

N. Okawara and P. J. Katzenstein: Japan and Asian-PaciŽc security 179
Multilateral Track Two activities advance also a variety of speciŽc political
objectives. All ARF members, for example, are interested in modifying
China’s political aims through a strategy of engagement (Interviews 03–00,
Tokyo, January 11, 1999; 03–98, Beijing, June 15, 1998; and 06–00, Beijing,
June 14, 2000; Johnston and Ross 1999; Johnston 1999: 304–15).28 The
Chinese government puts a high premium on its international standing
which is inuenced in part by its conduct in regional organizations such as
the ARF (Interviews 03–98, 05–98, 06–98 and 08–98 and 03–00, Beijing, June
15, 19 and 21, 1998, and June 13, 2000). Both factors, Alastair Johnston
(1999) argues, have helped advance the evolution of the ARF’s institution-
alization since 1994. China’s decision to become a member was a boost for
the ARF. After initial opposition China also responded to Japan’s sugges-
tion, as part of an ARF initiative, of publishing at least a skeletal National
Defense White Paper. This is an indication of a slight shift in China’s security
policy that reects its sensitivity to at least some international suggestions;
it may augur well for China’s willingness to consider giving further support
to ARF or other multilateral arrangements some time in the future. Even
without a major crisis, such as over Taiwan, China’s approach to multilateral
security arrangements retains a strong unilateral bent (Interviews 02–00,
03–00, 08–00 and 11–00, Tokyo, January 11 and 13, 2000).
Like China, the US also has come to support multilateral security insti-
tutions in the Asia-PaciŽc (Acharya 2000a: 12). This change dates back
to the late 1980s and the end of the Cold War. For a variety of reasons
the United States embraced a regional strategy in North America, the
Western hemisphere and the Asia-PaciŽc. The shift was gradual. US grand
strategy accepted at the global level regionalism as complementary to its
traditional emphasis on universalism. And in the Asia-PaciŽc it supported
multilateral arrangements as complementary but subordinate to estab-
lished bilateral security treaties. The growing US toleration of and interest
in the ARF reects this change in policy.
Since the mid-1980s a multilateralism centering on the US military has
also become important for the armed forces throughout the Asia-PaciŽc
including Japan’s (Interview 10–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000). Since 1986,
the Commander-in-Chief, PaciŽc Command (CINCPAC), for example, has
brought together military and civilian ofŽcials from about Žfteen Asia-
PaciŽc countries in a ‘Seminar for East Asian Security’ that was designed
primarily to socialize the different militaries.29 The intent of the US was
to increase the level of reassurance and knowledge in the area. In 1994,
the US set up an Asia-PaciŽc Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in
Honolulu which is offering a variety of short-term, mid-career courses
largely for professional military personnel. The US-sponsored PaciŽc Air
Force Chief of Staff Conference (PACC) is held every other year.30 In the
fall of 2000 Japan co-hosted in Tokyo with the US the US-sponsored
PaciŽc Army Management Seminar (PAMS) which brought together
ofŽcers from thirty to forty states.31

180 The PaciŽc Review
Multilateral meetings among ofŽcers that are orchestrated by the US
military are complemented by the initiatives of some governments in the
Asia-PaciŽc. Through the renegotiation of military base arrangements,
Singapore, for example, has sought to ensure that the US navy remained
engaged in maritime Asia-PaciŽc – since the late 1980s a double hedge
against both China’s rising political aspirations and Japan’s growing econ-
omic weight.
Japan’s SDF plays a very circumscribed role in such multilateral meet-
ings. At ARF sessions the SDF is represented by JDA ofŽcials. Members
of the SDF participate in intersessional working groups when technical
issues are being discussed (Interview 10–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000).32
But at the civilian level, the sheer scarcity of resources and manpower
constrains the degree of involvement of JDA in multilateral meetings.
Even within these constraints, the scales are tilted heavily in favor of the
political side. MOFA sends very senior ofŽcials to the annual ARF meet-
ings while JDA is represented by less senior personnel.33
East Timor illustrates the circumscribed role of the JDA in UN-spon-
sored multilateral peacekeeping operations. Japanese security policy is
based on the premise that East Timor and Kosovo, though regionally
speciŽc, raise more general issues of international security that require
action by the international community rather than regional segmentation
(Interview 08–00, Tokyo, January 13, 2000). Yet it was only in mid-
November 1999, two and a half months after the East Timorese refer-
endum on August 30, that the cabinet decided on the sending of Japanese
personnel to assist this international effort. In the absence of a declared
ceaseŽre between the opposing sides, under the restrictions of Japan’s 1992
International Peace Cooperation Law the government was prohibited from
sending peacekeeping or humanitarian aid missions to East Timor.34
According to a top unnamed JDA ofŽcial, East Timor had requested that
aid be delivered by ‘an Asian nation that is racially similar . . . instead of
Australian troops’ (Maeda 1999). Compared to the opposition aroused in
many quarters in the Asia-PaciŽc that Australia’s active and high-proŽle
role engendered, despite its direct participation in the UN peacekeeping
operation, Japan’s $100 million support of an intervention force staffed
by ASEAN member states, and its pursuit of quiet diplomacy, shielded it
from international criticism. It probably consolidated further Japan’s polit-
ical position in Southeast Asia, despite its inability to contribute directly
to the UN peacekeeping operation.35
Questions of internal security also show incipient forms of multilater-
alism that reect a mixture of bilateral and multilateral elements.
International meetings are of increasing importance at the professional
police level. The annual number of international meetings attended by
senior NPA ofŽcials has increased from about two or three in the 1970s
to about ten in the 1990s (Interview 07–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999). Since
1989, for example, the NPA has hosted annually a three-day meeting on

N. Okawara and P. J. Katzenstein: Japan and Asian-PaciŽc security 181
organized crime. Funded by Japan’s foreign aid program this meeting is
designed to strengthen cooperative police relationships that facilitate the
exchange of information.36 Although more formal multilateral institutional
activities matter much less on questions of internal security, they do occa-
sionally occur.37 Confronting its third wave of stimulant abuse since 1945,
Japan convened an Asian Drug Law Enforcement Conference in Tokyo
in the winter of 1999.38 At that meeting, the director of the UN OfŽce of
Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNDCP) chastised the Japanese
government for its limited commitment to curtailing multilaterally the
regional trafŽcking in methamphetamines (Friman 1999). The NPA
attended as an observer a May 1999 meeting in which the Žve Southeast
Asian countries and China formally approved an international police
strategy (Haraguchi 1999: 36–7). And it organized in January 2000 a
conference, attended by ofŽcials from thirty-seven countries, on how police
cooperation could stem the spread of narcotics (Asahi Evening News,
January 28, 2000).
Because terrorism is a direct threat to the state, it has been a subject
of high-level political meetings of heads of state. In this area, as in the
area of multilateral security, Japan has actively sought to create regional
institutions.39 But this is a recent and tentative move. On questions of
internal security the absence of multilateral regional institutions in the
Asia-PaciŽc remains striking, especially in comparison to Europe. A recent
inventory of a number of transnational crime problems lists several global
institutional fora in which these issues are addressed but in addition to
CSCAP’s working group on transnational crime for the Asia-PaciŽc there
is only one regional one, the ASEAN Ministry on Drugs (ASOD) (Shinn
1998b: 170–1).
On questions of both internal and external security the Asia-PaciŽc’s
incipient multilateralism and entrenched bilateralism do not contradict
one another (Capie et al. 1998: 7–8, 16–17, 60–2, IV/3–4, 7). Amitav
Acharya (1990: 1–12; 2000b: 18) speaks of an interlocking ‘spider-web’
form of bilateralism that compensates in part for the absence of multi-
lateral security cooperation in the Asia-PaciŽc. In the 1960s and 1970s,
anti-Communism provided the political base that allowed joint police
operations and the right for cross-border ‘hot pursuits’ of Communist
guerillas, for example, between Malaysia and Indonesia as well as Malaysia
and Thailand. What was true of internal security in the 1960s and 1970s
is to some extent true of external security in the 1990s. The North Korean
crisis illustrates, as Michael Stankiewicz (1998: 2) observes, ‘the increasing
complementarity between bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts
in Northeast Asia’. Improvement in various bilateral relations in the
Asia-PaciŽc, occasioned by the conict on the Korean Peninsula, is
fostering a gradual strengthening of multilateral security arrangements
such as the NEACD and KEDO. The potential for a ash-point crisis
between North Korea and its neighbors thus is a source for strengthening

182 The PaciŽc Review
nascent multilateral security arrangements in Northeast Asia. In April
1999, for example, Japan, South Korea and the US created the Trilateral
Coordination and Oversight Group to orchestrate policy towards North
Korea.40 Japanese diplomacy thus is beginning to make new connections
between bilateral and multilateral security dialogues (Interviews 02–99
and 05–99, Tokyo, January 11–12, 1999).
Japan’s external and internal security policies bring together politicians
and professionals in region-wide Track One, Track Two and ad hoc meet-
ings. A growth of Asian regionalization in the 1990s is unmistakable in
this incipient multilateralism. It reects a complex mixture of unilateral,
bilateral and multilateral aspects. More often than not Japanese policy
and Asian-PaciŽc multilateralism aim at enhancing trust through trans-
parency rather than at transforming state identities.
5. Conclusion
Multilateralism is often understood to refer to the coordination of national
policies in groups of three or more states (Keohane 1990). Some scholars
such as David Twining (1998: 3) argue that we need to look beyond formal
structures to the content and nature of state interactions in a ‘qualitative’
multilateralism. This comes quite close to John Ruggie’s (1992; Sewell
2000) insistence on the existence of collective norms and social purposes
as a deŽning criterion of multilateralism. Proponents of critical security
studies go further. Brought together for a large research project under
the leadership of Robert Cox, they insist instead that a ‘new multilater-
alism’ links structural change in world order to the emergence of new
multilateral practices shaped in particular by a growing number of non-
governmental organizations (Cox 1997: xvii, xix, xxiv; Schechter 1999: 3–5).
Concurrent developments in global and local politics encourage a move
‘beyond multilateralism [which] must embrace new forms and the widest
possible participation, particularly by nongovernmental organizations’
(Twining 1998: 143).
The data in this paper suggest that such movement is not discernible
in the security affairs of Japan and the Asia-PaciŽc. The virtual absence
of Track Three activities on security issues is an indication that no qual-
itatively new multilateralism has yet taken hold in the Asia-PaciŽc. Instead,
full-blown region-wide intergovernmental dialogues, Track Two processes,
and bi- or trilateral coordination mechanisms all constitute Asian-PaciŽc
multilateralism in its incipient form. For Track One and Track Two are
impossible to distinguish empirically.
Multilateralism often cannot do without bilateralism for reasons of inter-
personal relations and mass psychology (Bredow 1996: 109–10). In the
case of Japan and the Asia-PaciŽc, an even more important reason is that
multilateralism is not yet a strong and unquestioned collectively held norm
either in Tokyo or in any of the other capitals in the Asia-PaciŽc, not to

N. Okawara and P. J. Katzenstein: Japan and Asian-PaciŽc security 183
speak of the fact that non-state actors have acquired no institutionalized
standing on security issues. What matters instead is a layering of bilateral
and multilateral state policies as the foundation for an incipient security
multilateralism.
The distinctiveness of that multilateralism is readily apparent in compar-
ative perspective. Intrusive or transformative multilateralism European-
style is not in evidence on questions of Asian-PaciŽc security. Instead what
matters are political practices shaped by a strong tradition of bilateralism
and only very recently by an incipient multilateralism. Japanese security
policies thus reect and shape the Asia-PaciŽc’s emerging security order.
Acknowledgments
Without saddling them for any of the remaining errors of commission and
omission we would like to thank for their criticisms, comments and sugges-
tions on earlier drafts of this paper: Amitav Acharya, Thomas Berger,
Robert Bullock, Tom Christensen, Susanne Feske, Michael Green, Walter
Hatch, Brian Job, Chalmers Johnson, Alastair I. Johnston, Robert
Keohane, Kozo Kato, Stephen Krasner, Ellis Krauss, David Leheny, T. J.
Pempel, Richard Samuels, Keiichi Tsunekawa, Robert Uriu, and an anony-
mous reviewer as well as members of seminars at UC San Diego, Cornell
University and Aoyama Gakuin University. We are also very much
indebted to a large number of Japanese and Chinese government ofŽcials
and policy advisers who gave generously of their time to talk with us.
Notes
1 The report suggested four components which were designed to support US
interests in a stable and peaceful Asia-PaciŽc: maintenance of the forward
deployment of US forces in the Asia-PaciŽc; strengthening of multilateral
arrangements in the Asia-PaciŽc; an adaptation of US alliances, especially with
Japan, to the new conditions after the Cold War; and, Žnally, encouragement
of China to deŽne its interests in ways that would be compatible with US
interests (Nye 1997; Department of Defense 1995, 1998).
2 The previous agreement signed in 1996 had stipulated that the SDF and the
US military could provide each other with supplies and services in joint exer-
cises, UN peacekeeping operations, and international humanitarian relief oper-
ations. Supplies and services covered by the agreement included, among others,
fuel, food, medical support, transportation, but not ammunition (Gaiko Forum
1997: 77).
3 The SDF’s provision of weapons and ammunition to the US military, and the
US military’s provision of weapon systems and ammunition to the SDF, are
beyond the scope of the agreement (Gaiko Forum 1999: 139).
4 SDF responsibilities in the new guidelines came to include, among others, intel-
ligence gathering and sharing, rear area support, and manning search-and-
rescue operations. The review also committed the Japanese government
politically to permit US forces to utilize civilian airports, harbors and private
sector assets (Okimoto 1998: 27).

184 The PaciŽc Review
5 Another change in the revised legislation required prior approval by the Diet
of the SDF’s rear area support and search-and-rescue operations. In crisis situ-
ations, the government has the right to initiate such operations without Diet
approval; but the Diet can subsequently refuse its approval and terminate an
ongoing operation (Asahi Shimbun, April 26, 1999, 16th edition).
6 These parties had considerable support among the voters on this issue. In a
public opinion poll taken in March 1999, 37 per cent of the respondents
supported and 43 per cent opposed the bill. Even among the supporters of
the LDP, only 50 per cent were for, and 34 per cent against it (Asahi Shimbun,
March 19, 1999, 14th edition).
7 Military-to-military contacts have expanded greatly since 1999. The two navies
have initiated joint military exercises. And the two governments have opened
three hotlines between Japan and South Korea to facilitate rapid communi-
cations in the case of an incursion of their air space or territorial waters
(Interview 12–99, Tokyo, January 14, 1999). These lines have become opera-
tional since May 1999 (Boeicho 1999: 177).
8 In the view of the US media Japan overreacted to the North Korean missile
test of 1998; but in the view of Japanese observers it is the United States that
is overexploiting that test politically in using it as the occasion for embarking
on a National Missile Defense (NMD) program (Interview 04–00, Tokyo,
January 12, 2000). It should be noted that the term TMD is itself contentious.
The Japanese government prefers the term ‘Ballistic Missile Defense’ as the
focus of ‘TMD’ is on the defense of US military forces stationed abroad
(Boeicho 1999: 133).
9 However, that opposition appears not to have been voiced frequently in bilat-
eral contacts at either bureaucratic or political levels in 1999 (Interview 03–00,
Tokyo, January 11, 1999).
10 These meetings bring together from each country 5–6 persons in ‘political–
military talks’ (involving both defense and foreign affairs ofŽcials), and 3–4
professional military personnel in ‘military-to-military talks’ (involving only
defense ofŽcials) (Boeicho 1999: 185; Defense Agency 1998: 171; Interview
02–99, Tokyo, January 11, 1999; Daily Yomiuri, February 4, 1997). Military ofŽ-
cers of the SDF also have been engaging in ‘unit-to-unit exchanges’ with their
counterparts in Russia, South Korea and Southeast Asian countries (Boeicho
1999: 177–8, 180, 184; Defense Agency 1998: 167–9).
11 It is worth noting that as Japanese public opinion became less critical, military
ofŽcers have been more free to travel abroad, not only to far-away places in
Europe as in the 1970s and 1980s but to neighboring countries in the Asia-
PaciŽc. With the tightening of US–Japan security relations after 1994, Japan
has become more self-conscious in developing a broad set of bilateral defense
talks and exchanges that complement Japan’s persistent dependence on the
US and also serve the purpose of cementing the presence of the US in
the region. By 1999, Japan was committed to about ten regular bilateral talks,
too many for the two ofŽcials that the JDA had assigned to this role. India,
for example, was interested in commencing bilateral defense consultation, but
Japan stalled, not for reasons of policy but simply because of resource
constraints (Interview 13–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000).
12 This intensiŽcation of bilateral contacts builds on a small foundation of transna-
tional police links that Japan’s National Police Agency (NPA) had developed
before the 1990s. For example, the NPA has organized short-term training
courses for small numbers of police ofŽcials from other Asian-PaciŽc states
dealing with drug offenses (since 1962), criminal investigations (since 1975),
organized crime (since 1988), police administration (since 1989), and commu-
nity policing (since 1989) (National Police Agency 1998: 62). Furthermore,

N. Okawara and P. J. Katzenstein: Japan and Asian-PaciŽc security 185
Japan also runs regular seminars dealing with criminal justice issues which are
attended by ofŽcials from other countries. Finally, Japanese experts travel to
various countries in the Asia-PaciŽc to train local law enforcement personnel.
These seminars and visits serve the purpose of enhancing the capacity of Asia-
PaciŽc police forces, spreading information and establishing contacts that might
be useful in subsequent, ad hoc coordinations of police work across national
borders (National Police Agency 1997a: 95–9; Donnelly 1986: 628; Katzenstein
1996: 68–71).
13 The NPA’s offensive against the yakuza and afŽliated groups has not altered
the fact that, as long as it respects some rules of the game, organized crime
in Japan is a tolerated part of society. Even high ofŽcials of the NPA do not
expect that their efforts will reduce the important role Japan’s organized crime
syndicates had come to play by the mid-1990s (Interview 09–99, Tokyo, January
13, 1999).
14 Since the beginning of the 1980s, three to four bilateral meetings a year, most
importantly with police ofŽcials from Hong Kong, the United States and China,
have offered a useful, informal venue for focusing on concrete cases, such as
the smuggling of illegal immigrants.
15 In 1998, the NPA organized its 36th seminar for middle-level ofŽcials, with
the two-week time divided equally between formal meetings and informal
socializing and sightseeing. US law enforcement ofŽcials attend these meet-
ings as observers, paying for their own expenses, making presentations and
occasionally joining the informal parts of the program (Interview 06–99, Tokyo,
January 13, 1999).
16 From a Žgure close to zero in 1990, by 1997 the number of arrests of illegal
entrants had increased to 1,360, most of them Chinese. According to police
estimates this is less than a quarter of the total number of illegal entrants
(Ishii 1998). Chinese crime syndicates charge about $35,000 for a successful
transfer, with payment to be made in China. Furthermore, by overstaying in
Japan about 271,000 foreigners are in violation of visa laws (Interview 10–99,
Tokyo, January 13, 1999; Keisatsucho 1999: 17).
17 These meetings were followed by ministerial-level exchanges between the
Chair of the National Public Safety Commission of Japan, Home Affairs
Minister Mitsuhiro Uesugi, and the Chief of the Public Security Department
of China, Jia Chuwang in May 1998, and exchanges between Keizo Obuchi
and Jiang Zemin who discussed transnational crime during their November
1998 summit meeting (Interviews 09–99 and 10–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999;
National Police Agency n.d.). In August 1999, Jia visited Japan and discussed
transnational crime with Obuchi. This was the Žrst time a chief of the Public
Security Department visited Japan (Asahi Shimbun, August 27, 1999, 12th
edition). The following month Uesugi’s successor Takeshi Noda met Jia in
Beijing, and discussed, among other things, drug crimes and people smuggling
(Asahi Evening News, September 15, 1999).
18 Because terrorism is a direct threat to the state, it has been an important item
of the G7/G8 since the mid-1990s, as the agendas of recent summit meetings
in Ottawa (December 1995), Sharm-el-Sheik (March 1996), Paris (July 1996),
Denver (June 1997) and Cologne (1999) indicate.
19 It runs two types of annual meetings in Tokyo. Funded by the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) since 1995 the NPA has hosted an
annual two-week seminar on anti-terrorism attended by one or two high- and
middle-level police ofŽcials from ten to Žfteen states of the Asia-PaciŽc
and other regions. And since 1993 the NPA also organizes more intensive,
smaller seminars attended by two or three ofŽcials from three to Žve countries.
In these seminars the Japanese government provides technical assistance on

186 The PaciŽc Review
counterterrorism to developing countries (Interview 07–99, Tokyo, January 13,
1999; Keisatsucho 1999: 231).
20 It complements the activities of seven metropolitan and prefectural assault
teams, with about 200 members, set up in 1996. Since 1997 their activity is
centrally coordinated by the NPA. These teams are being sent abroad for
training (DailyYomiuri, August 13, 1997; Japan Times, August 30, 1997).
21 Since 1994, Track One and Track Two multilateral meetings are listed regu-
larly (Dialogue Monitor 1995–98; Dialogue and Research Monitor 1999). The
annual number of Track One meetings has varied between a high of 19 in
1999 and a low of 11 in 1998. Corresponding Žgures for Track Two meetings
have fallen between a high of 93 in 1994 and a low of 47 in 1997. In addition
there have been additional meetings (varying between a high of 31 in 1996
and a low of 12 in 1998) that do not Žt the normal requirements of Track One
or Two meetings. These data were kindly provided to us by Professor Brian
Job (July 13, 2000).
How to count the number of different tracks is a matter of some disagree-
ment among participants and observers. The line separating different tracks is
blurred by the fact that government ofŽcials often attend Track Two meetings
in their private capacity thus modifying the ‘private’ character of these meet-
ings. This does not necessarily mean that ofŽcials are totally free to talk.
Discussions are constrained by prior policies and by the information that is
prepared prior to the meetings themselves. But since no verbatim minutes are
kept, none of the individuals who participate in the discussion can be assigned
any direct responsibility. While there is no formal debrieŽng by the JDA, the
knowledge that individual ofŽcials gain is added informally to the information
base that the JDA has at its disposal and that can be analyzed for almost any
purpose (Interview 13–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000).
22 Track Two institutions thus tend to support rather than undermine the state.
There are instances where we should think of them not as non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) but as governmentally organized NGOs (GONGOs).
In many states in the Asia-PaciŽc, the divide between public and private is
easily bridged. Prominent businessmen and scholars, nominally in the private
sector, are often linked informally to politicians and bureaucrats whose atten-
dance at Track Two meetings in their ‘private’ capacity is polite Žction. Hence
the choice between the multilateralism of different tracks can be a matter
of political convenience for states (Stone 1997: 9–19). But both the nature of
private sector participants and the pattern of inuence between such partici-
pants and their governments vary widely.
23 In the absence of the spread of a shared sense of community in all parts of
the Asia-PaciŽc, some ofŽcials (at least in the Japanese government) remain
skeptical of moving beyond CSBMs as do a number of other Asia-PaciŽc coun-
tries, including China (Interviews 11–00 and 13–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000;
Interviews 01–98, 02–98 and 03–98, Beijing, June 15, 1998).
24 It brings together senior government ofŽcials every eight months. The second
meeting in May 1994 and the seventh meeting in December 1997 were both
held in Tokyo (Boeicho 1999: 193; Fukushima 1999b: 34–5, 43; Gaiko Forum
1999: 155). Japan co-chairs NEACD’s Study Project on Defense Information
Sharing (Fukushima 1999b: 35).
25 The Žrst meeting in February 1994 and the sixth meeting in December 1998
were both held in Tokyo. The forum was originally proposed by Japan. From
MOFA the director of the Security Policy Division in the Comprehensive
Foreign Policy Bureau is the senior ofŽcial attending meetings of both the
NEACD and the forum (Boeicho 1999: 192–3; Fukushima 1996: 35–6, 43; Jo
1998b: 4; Gaiko Forum 1999: 155; Interview 7–00, Tokyo, January 13, 2000).

N. Okawara and P. J. Katzenstein: Japan and Asian-PaciŽc security 187
26 National committees and international working groups are common to both.
Besides ASEAN members, Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, United
States, China and others have also joined CSCAP. Rather than as members
of a national delegation, Taiwanese participants attend in their personal
capacity the sessions of the Žve working groups on maritime cooperation,
security issues in the North PaciŽc, conŽdence- and security-building measures,
comprehensive security and transnational crime. With Japan co-chairing
together with Canada this particular committee, in 1995 and 1997, the North
PaciŽc Working Group held two of its initial three meetings in Tokyo (Cossa
1999: 16; Fukushima 1999a: 131, 154–7; 1999b: 33). The eighth meeting of
CSCAP’s steering committee was also held in Tokyo in December 1997 (Gaiko
Forum 1999: 155).
27 The prospect of an increasing number of Track Three meetings would change
the picture further.
28 Although reluctant to let China be tied down in any regional arrangement,
some parts of the research and advisory community surrounding China’s
foreign policy bureaucracy have become increasingly convinced of the advan-
tages that multilateral arrangements hold forth for the pursuit of Chinese inter-
ests (Johnston and Evans 1999; Interviews 01–98, 02–98, 03–98, 04–98, 07–98,
08–98, 09–98, Beijing, June 15–16, 20–22, 1998). China, however, remains
strongly opposed to have multilateral institutions such as the ARF or ASEM
discuss any controversial territorial or political issues such as the Spratly Islands
or Taiwan (Interviews 03–98, Beijing, June 15, 1998; 02–00, Tokyo, January 11,
2000; and 01–00, Beijing, June 13, 2000).
29 The Žrst uniformed Japanese ofŽcial attended the seminar in 1993.
30 Japan’s Air Self-Defense Forces have participated in the conference since its
Žrst meeting in 1989 (Defense Agency 1998: 177).
31 The Ground Self-Defense Forces have been participating in the seminar since
its 17th meeting in 1993 (Defense Agency 1998: 176).
32 The intersessional working group in which the JDA has been most involved,
however, was dealing with disaster relief and thus was staffed by several Asia-
PaciŽc states by ofŽcials from, among others, their construction ministries. This
was such a profound source of irritation for the JDA that it set up the Forum
for Defense Authorities in the Asia-PaciŽc Region. Although not formally
afŽliated with the ARF, the membership of this Track One meeting is nearly
identical with that of the ARF. Since 1996 it has met annually with member
states typically sending representatives at the director-general and deputy
director-general level (Boeicho 1999: 422; Defense Agency 1998: 372; Gaiko
Forum 1999: 156; Interview 11–00, Tokyo, January 14, 2000).
33 In the ministerial and senior ofŽcials meetings the foreign affairs ofŽcials do
all the talking. The same applies to ASEAN countries, whose defense ofŽcials
never talk at meetings at various levels while, as a matter of principle, the
JDA representative will talk at least once during the one-and-a-half-day
meeting of intersessional working groups. In the last set of talks, which Japan
hosted in Tokyo in October 1999, an unofŽcial lunch only for defense ofŽcials
was scheduled, to compensate for the silence defense ofŽcials endured. In
the future, the JDA hopes this will become a permanent innovation at the
intersessional working group-level talks (Interview 13–00, Tokyo, January 14,
2000).
34 On a humanitarian aid mission covered by the 1992 law, and under the auspices
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, the
main contingent of a 150-member Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) team left
Japan in late November 1999 with relief for East Timorese refugees settled in
West Timor camps.

188 The PaciŽc Review
35 In fact Japan funded 95 per cent of the cost of the operation, with Portugal
contributing an additional $5 million and Switzerland $0.5 million; this display
of European tightŽstedness contrasts sharply with Japan’s substantial ($240
million) support for the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo (Interview 03–99,
Tokyo, January 11, 1999).
36 Attempting to build more cooperative international police relations to suppress
the smuggling of narcotics, after consultations with the DEA, the NPA has
begun since 1996 to host annually two meetings in Tokyo. Each meeting
involves about 40–50 high-level police ofŽcials, one with China in attendance,
the other with Taiwan. Each of the meetings lasts four days but the ofŽcial
part of the program consists of only a one-day plenary. The rest of the time
is spent on group tours of Japanese police facilities, sightseeing and socializing
(Interview 06–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999).
37 For developments in ASEAN and the Asia-PaciŽc more generally see Calagan
(2000). Some of Japan’s overseas development assistance, for example, is chan-
neled to foreign law enforcement agencies dealing with international drug traf-
Žcking. And in March 1998 the NPA hosted the fourth meeting of an
international conference on combating drugs attended by ofŽcials from the
ICPO and twenty-six countries (Haraguchi 1999: 36).
38 The meeting was attended by Žve Southeast Asian-PaciŽc countries (Laos,
Vietnam, Thailand, Burma and Cambodia), China, ofŽcials from the UN and
observers from eight countries and the EU (Haraguchi 1999: 30, 36–7; Jo 1999;
Masaki 1998b).
39 In June 1997, for example, the NPA was instrumental in helping create the
‘Japan and ASEAN Anti-Terrorism Network’. It strengthens cooperative ties
among national police agencies, streamlines information gathering, and coor-
dinates investigation when acts of terrorism occur. Following up on an initia-
tive taken by Prime Minister Hashimoto while travelling through Southeast
Asia in January 1997, the NPA and MOFA jointly hosted in October 1997 a
Japan–ASEAN Conference on Counterterrorism for senior police and foreign
affairs ofŽcials from nine ASEAN countries (National Police Agency 1998: 53;
Interview 07–99, Tokyo, January 13, 1999). And in October 1998 the NPA and
MOFA co-hosted a joint Asian PaciŽc–Latin American conference on counter-
terrorism. Based on the Žndings of the Peruvian hostage crisis it sought to
strengthen international cooperation on anti-terrorist measures (Gaimusho
1999: 103–4; Hishinuma 1997; Keisatsucho 1999: 231).
40 The group decided to meet at least once every three months (Asahi Shimbun,
April 26, 1999, evening 4th edition; Tainaka 2000).
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